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The revival of regional integration in the European
Community (EC) in the early 1980s has brought about profound
implications for the development of regional integration and
its related theory. Firstly, European industry searching to
promote its competitiveness highlighted the need for a
"European-level" solution to European economic decline and
contributions to the relaunching of European integration.
Secondly, as a result of the renewed momentum for regional
integration, external factors which were neglected by
previous efforts in theory-exploration, have become more
. noticeable in the process of regional integration.
The purpose of this thesis about external factors is to
analyse to what extent the progress of regional integration
is driven by the private sector. The relaunching of European
integration which brought about the successful passage of
the Single European Act has demonstrated the crucial
contribution of the business community to accelerating the
progress of integration.
This thesis further offers an analysis of the
proposition that the impact of external factors on
industrial development is the key to understanding the
process of creating the Chinese Economic Area (CEA). It
explores the argument that instead of being motivated by
political factors, the process of regional integration is
primarily stimulated by industrial development in the
private sector. It concludes by suggesting a new focus for
the study of regional integration - the "external
incentives-industrial development" approach, and comparative
insights into the EC and the CEA.
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INTRODUCTION
1.1. DEFINITION AND CRITIQUES: THEORIES OF REGIONAL
INTEGRATION
1.1.1. Integration Theory: The Emphasis on The Internal
Processes of Integration
Integration, according to Karl Deutsch, is "the
attainment, within a territory, of a 'sense of community' and
of institutions and practices strong enough and widespread
enough to assure, for a 'long' time, dependable expectations
of 'peaceful change' among its population." 1
 This definition
implies that peaceful change or reorientation of attitudes
will be spontaneously reflected when psychological sense and
physical transactions are heading toward a satisfactory point.
Ernst Haas has defined integration as "the tendency toward the
voluntary creation of larger political units, each of which
self-consciously eschews the use of force in the relations
between the participating units and groups." Furthermore, he
believes that integration is a process of political actors'
shifting their loyalties, expectations and political
activities toward a new centre. 3
 Again, he refers the further
cooperation among states to the voluntary motives which would
be based upon peoples' self-consciousness, both elites and
masses, rather than upon external compulsion.
Michael Hodges, "Integration Theory", in Trevor Taylor, (ed.), Approaches and Theory in
International Relations, (London: Longman, 1987), P. 237.
Ibid.
James Dougherty, and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., Contending Theories of International
Relations - A Comparative Survey, 2nd edition, (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1981),
p. 421.
1
Charles Pentland shares Haas's perspective on
integration. However, he focuses more on the abolition,
circumvention, and reduction of the sovereign power of modern
nation-states as the main process of integration. 4
 Moreover,
according to Donald Puchala's creative argument of
integration, integration is also seen as a set of processes
that produces and sustains a "Concordance System". Within this
system, interests are thought to be harmonised, differences
are supposed to be compromised among actors, and mutual
rewards are reaped from their interactions. 5 The process of
integration is leading states concerned towards a new centre
of transnational institutions. Therefore, Johan K. De Vree
points out that integration is conceptualisation of a
political process between two or more states. Integration is
then confirmed by James Caporaso and Alan Pelowski as the
development of new structures and functions at a new system
level which is seen as more comprehensive than previously.5
Among those distinguished definitions of integration, Leon
Lindberg's is a particularly comprehensive and orderly one. He
defines integration as follows:
"1) the process of nations forgoing the desire and
abilities to conduct policies and seeking to make joint
decisions or to delegate the decision-making process to
new central organs;
2) the process of political actors being persuaded to
shift their expectations and political activities to a
new centre; and
4. C. Pentland, International Theory and European Integration, (London: Faber & Faber
Limited, 1973), p. 29.
5. Donald Puchala, "Of Blind Men, Elephants and International Integration", Journal of Common
Market Studies, 10: 3, (1973), p. 277.
6. Dougherty, and Pfaltzgraff, Jr., Contending Theories of International Relations - A
Comparative Survey, p. 422.
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3) the process of the evolution of a collective decision-
making system among nations."7
Like other international theories, integration theory
based on the assumptions above is also controversial, and even
confused by various interpretations. Although many research
works, such as Karl Deutsch's and Ernst Haas's, have made
substantial contributions towards a theory, there is as yet
little agreement on an individual independent variable of
integration. This is the reason why while some tend to
highlight the process of integration, others emphasise the
condition of integration. In spite of this enduring argument,
the idea of regional integration has been more practically
seen as "a means of promoting peaceful cooperation and
reducing conflict between states in various parts of the
world."8 Furthermore, regional integration to some extent can
be seen as a way of facilitating mutual interest among member
states by collectively strengthening and promoting industrial
competitiveness and international bargaining power in their
external relations, e.g. the European Community (EC) on behalf
of its member states in negotiating bilateral trade
arrangements and the global trade talks under the General
Agreement on Tariff and Trade (GATT). In addition, regional
integration provides collective mechanisms for regional
economies to sort out their differences and so to benefit from
their strength, i.e. customs, monetary and, to a less extent,
political unions, as well as regional development funds.
According to the traditional federalist approach to
regional integration, the goal of the integration process is
to form a supranational state which is based upon a
7. Leon Lindberg, The Political Dynamics of European Economic Integration, (Stanford:
Stanford University Press, 1963), P. 6.
8. Hodges, "Integration theory", p. 238.
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13:
14.
constitution, or a national contract, agreed by member states
of a regional union. The most important point here is that
federalists "are concerned to direct the integrative process
toward a definite, well-articulated ideal - a supranational
state with specific characteristics." 9 Since for the
federalists the end-product of the process of integration is a
"political community", they stress political solutions which
therefore should be directed by decision-making powers. Jean
Monnet, one of the founders of the idea of the united
shared the federalists' objective of a united Western
He believed that instead of handing authority over
functional areas	 to	 separate	 international
individual states would have to support a single
executive, which would gradually come to take on
of a federal European government.12
Unlike the federalists, David Mitrany, the pioneer of
functionalism, did not regard regional unification as a means
to prevent war. On the contrary, he advocated the creation of
a whole series of separate international functional agencies,"
which he thought would lead to the formation of less tightly
knit communities (or at least something like a pluralistic
community of states ), 14 each of them having authority over one
9
. Ibid., p. 148. The traditional federalist argument is out of date. John Pinder refurbishes
as a neo-federalism. See Pinder, "European Community and nation-state: a case for a neo-
federalism", International Affairs, 62: 1, (Winter 1985/6), 41-54.
10 . Unless otherwise suggested, "Europe" and "European" are used synonymously with Western
Europe and the people in this area, particularly the European Community and the European
Free Trade Association's member states throughout the thesis. On no account "Europe" does
refer to Eastern Europe.
. The federal institutional arrangement for the United States of Europe See Jean Monnet,
Memoires, (Paris: Librairie Artheme Fayard, 1976), pp. 334 and 468.
Ibid., Chapter 16.
Mitrany in 1948 emphasised that: "the true choice is not between the present competitive
nationalisms and a lame international federation, but between a full-fledged and
comprehensive world government and equally full-fledged but specific and separate
functional agencies." See Mitrany, "The functional approach to world organisation",
International Affairs, 24: 3, (July 1948), p. 360.
Charles Pentland, "Functionalism and theories of international political integration", in
A. J. R. Groom, and Paul Taylor, (eds.), Functionalism: Theory and Practice in
International Relations, (London: University of London Press Ltd., 1975), p. 15.
the
Europe,"
Europe •11
specific
agencies,
regional
character
11
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specific area of human life and exempt from control by a
single government. Since the growing complexity of
international systems had increased the essentially technical,
nonpolitical transactions among states, such activities not
only created a demand for technical specialists at the
national level, but also raised technical problems at the
international level. To solve those problems, Mitrany
suggested one should rely on collaboration among technicians
rather than politicians. 15
 His proposition was to encourage
governments to hand over the affairs of "low" politics,
including economics and welfare, to those transnational
functional agencies for the benefit of the world community. 16
The functionalist design was to avoid entanglement with
sensitive "high" politics in order to reduce potential
obstacles to cooperation. In fact, the core of Mitrany's
theory is a doctrine of "ramification" according to which the
progression of collaboration in one technical field will lead
to collaboration in other fields." As a result, functional
activities could re-orient the nature of international
transactions by diffusing national loyalties and redirecting
the framework of international cooperation. Accordingly, the
main	 features
	 of	 functionalism	 contain	 functional
interdependence, sector approaches, non-governmental
transactional actors. 18 Although the functionalists did not
directly refer to their ultimate goal as transnational
political institutions, the implication of the spillover
effect (which successful cooperation in one dimension
15.David Mitrany, A Working Peace System, (Chicago: Quadrangle, 1966), pp. 72-73.
16. See David Mitrany, "A War-time Submission (1941)", The Functional Theory of Politics,
(London: Martin Robertson, 1975), P. 116.
17.As Mitrany said: it "might in time provide a solid foundation for political union." See
Ibid., p. 121.
18.Puchala, "Of Blind Men, Elephants and International Integration", p. 278.
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encroaches into other sectors) has led them to the internal
process of integration.
Instead of emphasising the possible outcomes of
deduction, the students of neofunctionalism, such as Ernst
Haas, Philippe Schmitter, Leon Lindberg, Joseph Nye and Robert
Keohane, focused upon practical developments within the EC to
explore integration theory. In response to the progress of the
EC, Haas assumes that integration proceeds as a result of the
behaviour and expectations of relevant elites in the
governmental and private sectors. Therefore, integration has
been involved in decision-making processes and power, which
refers to politicised neofunctionalism. Schmitter raises three
hypotheses	 as	 neofunctionalist	 characters:	 spillover;
. externalization which assumes member states "will find
themselves compelled to adopt common policies vis-a-vis
nonmember third parties"; 19 and politicisation. In the general
neofunctionalist's view, integration has a cumulative tendency
which will "involve more national actors in an expanding
variety of policy areas and in an increasing degree of joint
decision making. ”20
Using both communications and system theory, Deutsch is
concerned with the relationship between communication and the
integration of political communities. He believes that "the
building of political units depends upon the flow of
communications within the unit as well as between the unit and
the outside world." 21 According to this perception,
communication flows gradually develop certain inward- and
outward-looking transaction frameworks. As the transaction
goes through those communication channels, interdependence
19.Philips Schmitter, "Three Neo-functional Hypotheses about international integration",
International Organisation, 23: 1, (1969), P. 165.
20. Ibid., p. 166.
21 •
 
Dougherty, and Pfaltzgraff, Jr., Contending Theories of International Relations, p. 424.
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among them is therefore accelerated. Deutsch and his
associates set forth two sub-types of security-community:
amalgamated, in which those independent political units have
become a single unit with a decision making centre, i.e.
federal type; and pluralistic, in which separate governments
retain their legal independence, i.e. confederations and
conventional international organisations at the regional
leve1. 22 Because Deutsch tends to consider the political unit
as a whole in the process of integration, vertical and
horizontal communications of societal elites become an
important factor. Furthermore, in structure, as the
integration process carries on, there seems to be a hierarchy
among political units, central and peripheral areas. Deutsch
concludes that "successful integration is attained when the
subjective criterion of certain elite expectations is met: if
the expectations of key elites in the region converge toward
demands for peaceful change and other benefits thought to be
obtainable only through the union, integration is underway."23
Basically, pluralism starts from increasing communication
flows and builds up the networks of interdependence which
would intertwine those political units together. While the
interaction networks have already been established, their
interests would be deeply connected to each other. A regional
consensus would emerge, which is Deutsch's "integration
threshold". In sum, what these theoretical approaches are
commonly suggesting is that the task of achieving regional
integration rests upon transitional processes within a certain
community, while growing common interests may serve as a
driving force.
22 Ibid., p. 524; also Ernst Haas, "Challenge of Regionalism", in Stanley Hoffmann, (ed.),
Contemporary Theories of International Relations, (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1960),
p. 224.
23
. Haas, ibid.
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1.1.2. The Neglect of the External Dimension by Theories of
Regional Integration
According to theories of integration, the process of
regional integration involves all sorts of complicated
economic and political interactions between the likely member
states, which has drawn their attention to the internal
process of integration. In the theory-building process, much
attention was paid to internal factors of a regional system
because theorists were inclined to examine the basic
assumptions made by two pioneer study groups. First, the
communication theories of Karl Deutsch and others argue that
the connection of peripheries to the core of a region lead to
transaction flows among regional actors. Regional integration
then appears to be a constant transaction under certain
networks. Secondly, Haas's work focuses on intersocietal
political processes among pressure groups, political parties,
elites," which results in a number of research projects
concentrating on European Community institutions and their
concerns.
In practice, it is apparent that unless an integrating
union is completely closed to or isolated from international
society, the process of integration and the interactions
between states involved is bound to be considered not as
"without" but "within" the international political and
economic system. Although the development of the EC has been
driven by different external incentives since it was created,
integration theory has paid little attention to them. In the
24
. For the detail see Karl Kaiser, "The Interaction of Regional Subsystems - Some preliminary
Notes on Recurrent Patterns and the Role of Superpower", World Politics, 21: 1, (Oct.
1968), p. 87.
8
past few decades the theorists of integration have almost
exclusively concentrated on the basis of processes and
internal factors to explain and generalise, as well as predict
regional integration, e.g . the federalists' formation of
super-statism, the functionalists' process of the functional
spill-over, and the neofunctionalists' approaching
politicisation. They cared much more about the development
inside of a regional integration system (the EC) than about
the interaction between the system and outside systems. Their
focus on processes and internal factors has conceivably gained
some prominent successes both in theory-building and the
analysis of regional cooperation.
However, this "internal" orientation has been criticised
by some scholars as intentionally separating regional
integration from political reality. 25 The bias towards
"internal" studies and the absence of external factors may, to
some extent, have to shoulder a responsibility for the failure
to form a more complete theory. Integration theory was unable
to explain the disruptions to the integration process between
high politics and low politics, unable to deal with the
setbacks in national economies to European integration in the
1970s, 25
 and incapable of displaying the reasons for the
relaunching of European integration in the 1980s, as well as
too distant from understanding the emergence of subregional
groupings in the Asia-Pacific region. 27
 Studying Caribbean
25. Such as Kaiser, "The Interaction of Regional Subsystems"; Joseph Nye, "Patterns and
Catalysts in Regional Integration" International Organisation, 19, (Autumn 1965); also
James Caporaso, "The European Community in the world system : Prolegomena to a political
economy of the European Community" Journal of European Integration, 2: 3, (May 1979).
26. About the Gaullist disruption to the integration process and the critique about the
applicability of the theory see Pinder, "European Community and nation-state: a case for a
neo-federalism", pp. 50-54.
27. Economic cooperation in the Asia Pacific region refers mainly to cooperations between
subregions of East Asia and Southeast Asia, which more narrowly include economic groupings
amongst China, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, ASEAN countries and countries Indo-
China.
9
integration, one scholar succinctly pointed out "what the
political theory of integration has failed to do is to account
for the factors outside the region that have influenced the
process of regional co-operation." 28 Especially, as a part of
international study, regional integration should also be
considered in the context of the international environments
concerned. This implies that the interaction between a
regional integration system and the outside world is as
important as the internal process. Examples are the impact of
international trade talks (global system) under the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) on the Asia-Pacific
regional economic groupings, and the United States and the
former Soviet Union (external powers), imposing positive and
negative influences respectively on European integration; and
the British influence (colonial links) in the Caribbean
Community and Common Market (CARICOM) and East African
Community (EAC)."
There has been, then, a neglect of theories of regional
integration in terms of external factors. For example, Puchala
criticises functionalism more straightforwardly. First, few
developments in contemporary international integration have
progressed in the way that the functionalists proposed. Since
national governments remain the key players and pivotal in
integration systems, it seems that in the near future people
see no sign of their releasing control on most of the
functional task areas. Secondly, "there are simply no non-
political issues in relations among states." 38 Thirdly, "the
functionalist model misses the essence of the growth and
28. W. Andrew Axline, "Regional Co-operation and National Security: External Forces in
Caribbean Integration", Journal of Common Market Studies, 27: 1, (September 1988), P. 1.
29. For the British influence see Thomas S. Cox, "Northern Actors in a South-South Setting:
External Aid and East African integration", Journal of Common Market Studies, 21: 3,
(March 1983), pp. 283-312.
30. Puchala, "Of Blind Men, Elephants and International Integration", p. 274.
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expansion of international regimes during international
integration." n Moreover, the functionalists have not explained
very clearly how people may achieve international cooperation
by circumventing politics among states. Finally, they have
failed to demonstrate how international cooperation is in fact
to be achieved during the process of international
integration. Puchala complains that the functionalist does not
deal with the reality. Haas criticises Mitrany for having
taken insufficient account of the power element, and
postulates that power is not separate from welfare. Power,
then, is defined as a means to assure the realisation of
welfare aims. In practice, the evolution of European
integration meant that the EC's institutions generated certain
political authority and jurisdiction over its member states
and citizens to ensure that the policies were in accordance
with the Community's interests and were being effectively
implemented.
Stuart Holland in 1980 criticised the economic focus of
neofunctionalism. First of all, there is a misidentification
of the nature of the economic interests involved. Holland's
critique is based upon a four-fold classification of
capitalist businesses, i.e. large-scale multinational
corporations, large-scale national enterprises, small-scale
multinational	 corporations,	 and	 small-scale	 national
enterprises. n His main argument is that the EC's member sates +
have been entangled with complicated individual economic
interests. Therefore, different governments will face
different combinations of pressures. Secondly, he criticises
the neofunctionalist's economic theory which is based on the
assumption that economic growth would continue unabated in the
31. Ibid.
32. Stuart Holland, Uncommon Market, (London: Macmillan, 1980), pp. 109-110.
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capitalist economies; and finally that all the EC member
states would benefit from that growth in the long run.33
However, this assumption is not totally correct. The two oil
crises in 1974 and 1979 abruptly ended the duration of
economic boom which the capitalist economies had enjoyed since
the 1950s, and the EC has suffered from low growth rates and
high rates of unemployment. Holland prefers to restore the
idea of capitalist economics as a cyclical process. Therefore,
he admits that the focus of regional integration would have to
rest upon the wider international dimension.
After Haas publicly announced in 1976 that the
proposition of regional integration was obsolescent, it seemed
to mark an end to the efforts to explore integration theory.
In practice, by that time neofunctionalists had been suffering
from their miscalculation of the internal political diversity
of the EC in the 1960s which had led to the Gaullist
opposition halting the European integration movement. In
addition, neofunctionalists could hardly come to terms with
the aftermath of the economic turbulence of the stormy 1970s
during which economic cyclical recession and the first oil
crisis together drove the EC's member states to seek national
solutions to their economic problems. It is therefore
important to stress that traditional explorations of
integration theory which have emphasised internal processes of
integration are out of touch with the reality of the
interdependence inherent in the international economy. It also
implies that the motives for European integration have been
built upon a combination of fromç internal and external -I-
incentives in various periods. Accordingly, it is necessary to
33
. The criticism was based on economic theory see Ibid., p. 49-85.
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identify and to highlight the impact of external incentives on
the process of regional integration.
1.2. EXTERNAL INCENTIVES AND REGIONAL INTEGRATION
During the 1950s and 1960s, the progress of West European
integration dramatically marched forward, because of , general
political pledges of national cooperation in the arrangement
of the post-War European political structure and because of
steady European economic growth. Although political motives
and the thought of European security contributed to the then
optimism of encouraging further European integration, European
economies in the context of sustained economic growth were
more inclined to act on the arrangement for political and
economic integration. As a result, the integration patterns of
a customs union and common market were brought about in the
wider framework of the Treaty of Rome in 1957 in the hope that
member states would benefit from the development of scale
economies within the Community. Throughout the history of
European integration, economic development and national
commitment have become twin variables for the progress of
European integration. As a result of prolonged recession and
the two oil crises, economic development and industrial
interests have then emerged topping the national and the
European agenda. These brought about the impetus for political
and economic integration in Western Europe.
Ernst Haas wrote in 1976 that the increasing
interdependence between European countries and the rest of the
world had caused European integration to ebb. He conceded that
integration theory had failed because of its neglect of
13
external factors which influenced the process of integration.34
Many scholars, such as Robert Keohane, Stanley Hoffmann, A.
Moravcsik, and W. Sandholtz and J. Zysman, also confirmed that
in the 1970s and 1980s an international political and economic
structural shift, as an external factor, was a necessary
condition for European integration to begin moving again. 35 The
impact of economic turbulence in the 1970s on the development
of regional integration has therefore changed the theorisation
of integration. Those who had previously emphasised internal
political processes in integration have been challenged by the
rise of international economic interdependence, which has
brought external influences to bear on the internal processes
of regional integration in Western Europe and emphasised the
importance of exogenous economic development in the process of
economic integration.
If the short-term effect of the oil crises in the 1970s
on regional integration in Europe was disintegration, its
long-term impact on regional integration in the 1980s and
after was actually to encourage economic integration. To a
large extent, industrial factors became both a necessary and a
sufficient condition for the renewal of European integration
in the early 1980s. Industrial prosperity and growth were
basic conditions for economic and social integration within
the Community. In the 1950s and 1960s, apart from political
motives, the progress of European integration was encouraged
by buoyant economic growth that resulted from good industrial
performance. When European industry became less capable of
34. See Haas, The Obsolescence of Regional Integration Theory, (Berkeley: Institute of
International Studies, The University of California, 1976).
35. See Keohane and Hoffmann, "Institutional change in Europe in the 1980s, in their co-eds.,
The New European Community: Decision Making and Institutional Change, (Boulder: Westview,
1991), 1-40; Moravcsik, "Negotiating the Single European Act: National Interests and
Conventional Statecraft in the European Community", International Organisations, 45: 1,
(1991), 651-688; Sandholtz and Zysman, "1992: Recasting the European bargain", World
Politics, 42, (October 1989).
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competing in global markets in the mid-1970s as a result of
its ageing industrial structure crippled by recession,
economic slowdown brought European integration to a halt.
Therefore, industrial restructuring processes would ideally
revive not only the European economy as a whole but also
regional economic integration. In that particular
circumstance, along with politicians, European industrialists
took the lead in campaigning for industrial integration
grounded on the advantages of all-out integration that in
effect have triggered the progress of economic as well as
political integration in the EC. If transnational business
groups were to be the most sensitive and vulnerable actors in
facing international structural change, then they would be the
most dynamic propulsive forces in pushing integration
forwards. Therefore, the influence of external factors on
regional integration and the role of economic development in
the process of economic integration have become the features
of present regional integration in the EC and elsewhere. These
emphases could help to reshape the theory of regional
integration and our understanding of the role played by
external factors in recent developments in integration in both
the European Community and the Chinese Economic Area.
1.2.1. External Incentives on the Periphery of the Theory of
Regional Integration
Since the late 1960s, the contribution of external
factors to regional integration has gradually come to be
noticed by students of regional integration as part of a
theoretical reappraisal driven by the setbacks incurred by
previous attempts at theorising regional integration. The
15
emphasis of these discussions on external factors has helped
to demonstrate the reality of regional integration in Europe
and elsewhere. However, external incentives have been noticed
by only a few students and therefore have remained marginal to
main stream integration theory. For instance, Karl Kaiser's
initial attempt in 1968 to examine the external factors in the
evolution of regional systems was largely derived from the
apparent disregard of these factors, e.g. alliance relations
and superpower politics, by the theory. 36 Kaiser further
describes this inadequate theoretical dimension as follows:
"We now know to some extent how in the process of
integration, societies, pressure groups, parties, and
governments interact across national frontiers within the
region, but not how they interact with the outside
world.""
In spite of theorists' general lack of interest in
understanding the contribution of external incentives to
integration, external factors motivating the evolution of
regional integration have never been entirely dismissed from
the literature, particularly with reference to the impact of
the United States and the Soviet threat on the birth of
European integration. Criticising integration theory, Ernst
Haas in 1971, Donald Puchala in 1973, and Stanley Hoffmann in
1966, though taking different perspectives, similarly noticed
the importance of the influence of the international political
and economic environment on the processes of regional
integration. According to Kaiser in 1968, Amitai Etzioni's
Political Unification may be the only example in integration
theory which attempts to handle systematically and to
36. Raiser, "The Interaction of Regional Subsystems", pp. 85-86.
37. 'bid, p. 88.
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generalise properly about external factors by developing a
framework for the preconditions, accompanying conditions,
stages and termination of the unification process. 38 Unlike
others, Kaiser considers the environment in the "pre-
unification state" in the form of "a common enemy". 38 This
external element concerned with security threats is regarded
as an original motive, or more likely a catalyst, to
unification. In this way, Etzioni emphasises the interactions
between the union-forming system and the external security
threat.
In a similar context, Etzioni refers to the role of
"external elites" in the evolution of integration, such as the
United States' role in European integration. According to
Etzioni, there is an internalisation of external elites during
the process of integration. Internalisation implies the
process "in which control of a system is taken over by member-
elites from external elite-units". 40 In practice, in the
context of the establishment of the EC, the Community's elites
had been gradually internalising certain functions with
respect to economic, military, and foreign policy through
taking control of these areas previously performed by the
United States. For example, to manage the aid of the Marshall
Plan and to replace the many bilateral payments to the United
States into a multilateral system of payment, the European
Payments Union (EPU) which was established in 1950 under the
Organisation for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) set up a
38. Ibid.
39. Although in Kaiser's analysis of Etzioni's paradigm the relationship between external
military threat and integration has been questioned, whether the threat helps integration
or not, it undoubtedly facilitated the processes of unification at the beginning of
regional integration. For this detail see Karl Deutsch and others, Political Community in
the North Atlantic Area, (Princeton University Press, 1957); Kaiser, "The US and the EEC
in the Atlantic System - The Problem of Theory", Journal of Common Market Studies, 5,
(June 1967), pp. 396-397.
90. Ibid. p. 398.
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clearing mechanism for payments funded by the United States
among the Union's members and thus generated an expansion of
trade. 41 In terms of economic policy, the establishment of the
EPU represented Europeans' efforts to establish their own
monetary competence. These efforts boosted a hope for economic
integration, as a result.42
But, together with this perception of internalisation of
external elites, on the other hand, a regional integration
system, such as the EC, is seen as permeated in many other
ways by external factors. The overlapping development of the
Western alliances has always accompanied the evolution of the
European Community. To take the example of the EPU once more,
the arrangements for the EPU, to some extent, did imply some
discrimination in trade and payments against the United
States, but the United States not only tolerated this
disctimination but also devoted its intellectual and political
support to the EPU. 43 In the military field, although West
European countries most of the time shared the United States'
strategy against the former Soviet Union, the British and
French decision, as a result of processing internalisation, to
build up their own national nuclear deterrents was not in
accordance with the US' multilateral schemes for nuclear
defence. 44 However, Etzioni's perception of internalisation is
but a part of the external relations of the integration
process. In fact, as Kaiser has argued, the perception cannot
help us explain the restraints on interdependence. It is
41
. For the development of the EPU and its importance see Daniel Gros and Neils Thygesen,
European Monetary Integration: From the European Monetary System to European Monetary
Onion, (London: Longman, 1992), pp. 4-9.
92. Indeed, many officials within the US government were keen to advocate economic integration
and customs unions in Europe as a means to economic efficiency and growth. See Alan S.
Milward, The Reconstruction of Western Europe 1945-51, (London: Metheun, 1984), p. 56.
43. Gros and Thygesen, European Monetary Integration: From the European Monetary System to
European Monetary Union, p. 6.
44. Kaiser, "The US and the EEC in the Atlantic System", p. 398.
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because the countries engaging in the process of integration
have been firmly intertwined into complex communication
networks and have changed the way that nation-states act in
the realist world.45
Stanley Hoffmann criticises the theory of integration for
its absence of "an explicit treatment of the role of
superpowers, defence policy, matters of prestige, and tensions
extending beyond the area of integrating states." 48 Since his
framework covers the relations between Europe and the United
States in the context of international systems, he argues that
"one must examine more than the relation of each unit (in a
community) to the international system" 47 and we should
therefore distinguish two types of inter-state behaviour:
states which are engaged in the process of integration towards
political community, and states that do not participate in
this collective action. The former type was brought into the
interactions within integrating groups evolving the formation
of supranational institutions, negotiations for common
interests, the transformation of national loyalty. On the
other hand, the latter would be treated "in the realm of
traditional strategic-diplomatic inter-state behaviour" by the
former states.48
There were some scholars working on non-European bases of
integration, whose realisation of the role of outside forces
had urged the need for adopting external elements in
integration theory. Joseph Nye reviewing the Haas-Schmitter's
pattern of nine variables to regional integration in less
45
. Ibid., p. 400.
46. See Kaiser, "The Interaction of Regional Subsystems", p. 89; also Hoffmann, "Obstinate or
Obsolete? The fate of the Nation-State and the Case of Western Europe", Daedalus, (Summer
1966), pp. 862-915.
47. See Hoffmann, "Obstinate or Obsolete", p. 905.
48. Kaiser, "The US and the EEC in the Atlantic System", p. 401.
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developed areas, Africa and Latin America, 49 proposes that
there is a need for the concept of a "catalyst" to supplement
the insufficiencies of theories which single out internal
variables to explain integration. According to Nye, "the
concept of a 'catalyst' is consciously a deus ex machina. It
is an attempt to focus attention on the role of relatively
accidental and more historically unique factors in regional
integration." 50 He further suggests that the study of
integration should refer to the external environment of world
politics in which an integration process takes place.51
In contrast to Nye, Roger Hansen argues that the Haas-
Schmitter's model suffers from a serious theoretical
inadequacy in its dealing with less developed areas'
integration because of its neglect of those exogenous factors
in the international environment that affect the integration
process. 52 Those arguments benefit Nye's explanation of
"catalysts" which include the use of military force and
economic aid to accelerate the cooperation among East African
countries.	 The	 success	 of	 operating	 transnational
institutions, especially in the field of economic aid, seems
to depend upon the willingness of one dominant external power.
Nye discovers, moreover, that the third countries, other
international organisations, and nongovernmental actors, such
as international corporations, can be involved in an
49. The Haas-Schmitter's pattern was to quantify the levels of the politicisation of economic
unions through nine variable which were assumed as background conditions: 1. the relative
size of the states, 2. the rate of transactions, 3. the degree of pluralism, 4. the extent
of elite complementarity, 5. the degree of congruence in the minds of the participating
governments, 6. the powers of union; and process conditions: 7. the decision-making style
of economic unions, 8. the rate of transaction, 9. adaptability of governments. See Haas,
and P. Schmitter, "Economics and Differential Patterns of Political Integration:
Projections About Unity in Latin America", International Organisation, 18: 4, (Autumn
1964), pp. 705-737.
50. For Nye's definition of catalyst see his "Patterns and Catalysts in Regional Integration",
p. 882.
51. Ibid., p. 883.
52. Roger Hansen, "Regional Integration - Reflections on a decade of theoretical efforts",
World Politics, 21: 2, (January 1969), pp. 249-250.
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integration process, and should be considered as important
determinants. 53 His view on catalysts to regional integration
tends to be in favour of the positive role that a catalyst can
play in advancing integration. Therefore, in revising the
early Neo-functionalist model, he asserts that "involved
external actors" which are as important as other original
"process mechanisms" should be taken into account into the
integration process. 54 Nye therefore suggests that a catalyst
is more likely to be a supplement to the conditions
established in the Haas-Schmitter's pattern. 55 In this respect,
Nye establishes the study of external factors as a necessary
part of regional integration.
Attempting to analyse the interaction between regional
subsystems, Kaiser argues that in history American
contributions to the success of European integration appear an
absolutely indispensable factor which the theory does not
reflect wel1. 56 The American elites had taken part in the
process of European unification in the field of administration
and the European establishments (Etzioni's argument). In
addition, the United States had also provided military
shelter, and economic aid and cooperation to Europe (Nye's
argument about catalysts). All the efforts and supports of the
United States for Western Europe had indeed created a
favourable context for European integration. Kaiser hence
tried to use a socio-political system of interacting units to
analyse the interdependence between the EC and the rest of the
world. He defined his conceptual framework as two relevant
developing systems : the Atlantic system, and the EC as a
53.Nye, "Comparing Common Markets - A Revised Neo-functionalist Model", in Leon Lindberg and
Stuart Scheingold, (eds.), Regional Integration - Theory and Research. (Cambridge, Mass.,:
Harvard University Press, 1971), p. 207.
54. Ibid., pp. 207-223.
55.Nye, "Patterns and Catalysts in Regional Integration", p. 883.
56.Kaiser, "The Interaction of Regional Subsystems", p. 90.
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subsystem within the larger framework of the Atlantic
alliance .57
Under this overlapping system, Kaiser expects that
integration can progress if it is considered as a special case
of system transformation. Whatever perspective is taken to
define integration, like unification, community building,
sector integration, and functional integration, it is really
concerned with system transformation. Kaiser stresses that:
"Within Europe, integration aimed at a transformation of
traditional relations among states and at the creation of
new supranational units and decision-making centres, a
goal which was actively supported by the United States.
Within the Atlantic system as a whole, European
unification was to change the existing distribution of
influence and formal structure by shifting influence to,
or creating, new centres of communication and decision-
making in Europe."58
He therefore refers those process of transformation in
integration to structure, tasks performed in common, and
transnational forces." While those transformations will
presumably lead to new styles of community, the existing
relevant systems will also be undergoing structural
transformation. For instance, no sooner was integration in the
EC extended to establish new centres and networks of decision-
making than the Atlantic system was forcing the EC to pursue
common policies towards the US, e.g. in the fields of
agriculture and general commerce." This acceleration not only
came from internal process of integration but also from
external influences. As a condition of the Marshall Aid Plan,
for example, the US insisted that European countries had to
87.Kaiser, "The US and the EEC in the Atlantic System", p. 406.
88.Ibid., p. 413.
59 . Ibid., pp. 410-412.
88 . Ibid., p. 419.
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61.
62.
63.
64.
cooperate with each other and tried to organise themselves in
order to make best use of their resources, which served as an
external push to start the process of integration."
Among Haas's contributions on integration during 1958, we
can hardly find any discussion about external factors to
integration. Although Haas himself did not focus on external
factors whilst exploring the theory, he did acknowledge that
they were quite important for theory-building. He once
confessed that something was missing in his exploration of the
integration process in Western Europe. 62 But he did not see, as
Hansen has pointed out, its theoretical inadequacy "as a
product of its disregard for the interaction between exogenous
and endogenous variables." 63 Doing quantitative research for
regional integration in 1969, Haas and his colleague formally
regarded external factors as an independent variable. In fact,
three 'new' variables, dependence on the external world, the
perception of dependence, and objective external pressure,
were accrued to the previous Haas-Schmitter's model (nine
variables) . 64 The research emphasised, however, not the actual
exercise of external pressure but rather the perception of
dependence by the actors including threats from the external
world and reliance on moral and physical aid." Haas' research
indicates that 'the perception of dependence' accounts for
Many Americans discussed the Marshall Plan as "thought it were some thing being done to
Europe rather than with Europe." The then Germany's chief officer for the Marshall Aid,
Karl Albrecht said: "(The Aid) encouraged us to intensify our efforts toward European
cooperation." See Harry B. Price, The Marshall Plan and Its Meaning, (Ithaca, New York:
Cornell University Press, 1955), pp. 292-295.
Hansen especially pointed out that Haas himself realised insufficiency of the theory. See
Hansen, "Regional Integration - Reflections on a decade of theoretical efforts", p. 250.
Based on Haas, "the 'Uniting of Europe' and the Uniting of Latin America", Journal of
Common Market Studies, 5, (June 1967), p. 327.
Ibid.
The three variables were dependence on the background conditions, external pressure on
conditions at time of union and on process conditions. See Mario Harrera and Ernst Haas,
"The Operationalisation of Some Variables Related to Regional Integration: A Research
Note", International Organisation, 23: 2, (1969), pp. 151-152.
65 . Ibid.
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twenty per cent, 'external pressure' on conditions at time of
union for twenty five per cent, and 'external pressure' on
process conditions for ten per cent." As far as the result is
concerned, external factors seem to be more important on
conditions at the time of union than during other integration
periods. Moreover, the research suggests that the more a
regional union relies on its big neighbour, such as the
Central American Common Market (CACM) on the US, and the
European Free Trade Association (EFTA) on the EC, the more the
union suffers from external pressure. Haas explains that "high
perception of dependence is thought to reinforce the desire
for unity in order 'to get out from under'" and "to achieve a
united common front against external force."67
Haas has realised that the relations between regional
system and external world "can be of immense importance in
explaining integration. 1168 He goes further to categorise
various exogenous variables as three groups, namely, 'the
global system', 'a single state', and 'a regional
countersystem'. To begin with, while the subsystem perceives
itself struggling or unequal within the existing global
system, the perception appears to be a driving force for the
members of the subsystem, above all the developing countries,
to integration in order to be 'getting out from under'. Next,
Haas defines 'a single state' as "the extraregional force
which aids or hinders integration."" His concerns here reflect
the previous discussion on Etzioni and others' external elites
helping regional integration. Finally, because cooperation and
conflict (or competition) exist between different integration
66. For detail result of the indication see Ibid., p. 153.
67. Ibid., p. 152.
68. Haas, "The Study of Regional Integration : Reflections on the Joy and Anguish of
Pretheorising", in Leon Lindberg, and Stuart Scheingold, (eds.), Regional Integration -
Theory and Research, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971), P. 16.
69. Ibid.
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unions, the impact of extra-regional counterunions is defined
as "a definite aid to integration."70
However, in the military field, regional union may exist
only as long as the threat from its counter-union (integration
elsewhere) remains, such as the North Atlantic Treaty
Organisation (NATO) in relation to the Warsaw Pact
Organisation and the Association of South-East Asian Nations
(ASEAN: Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore
and Brunei) in relation to the Indo-China Federation (Vietnam,
Cambodia and Laos). 71 In the economic field, Haas realised that
among industrialised countries economic union may survive
because the countries seek a united front in coping with
another union, like the EFTA in relation to the EC and the
ongoing North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA) and the
emerging regionalism in Asia-Pacific in relation to the 1992
programme of the EC. Haas's observation and exploration of
regional integration has depended upon both international and
European environments of that time. Since then, in response to
oil crises, economic recession and industrial competition,
Western Europe has been gearing up its integration momentum as
a result of realising that external political and economic
challenges would have to be taken on collectively. In effect,
this realisation of the necessity of regional economic
integration has become widely known, as the world is entering
a new era of regionalism. 72 Hansen has criticised Haas's
70. Ibid., pp. 16-17.
71. According to a research in 1990, the reason why the NATO has not disappeared after the
collapse of the Warsaw Pact is mainly because three reasons: the military might of the
former Soviet Union, the necessity of the nuclear deterrence in a post-Cold War Europe,
and maintaining American presence in Europe. See Barry Buzan, et al. The European Security
Order Recast: Scenarios for the Post-Cold War Era, (London: Pinter Publishers, 1990), p.
226. Although ASEAN was not originally established for military purpose, since the late
seventies it has been more or less integrated in collective defense understanding against
regional potential threats, as the Vietnamese threat became obvious.
72 • Lawrence Krause, "Trade Policy in the 1990s I: Goodbye Bipolw-ity, Hello Regions", The
World Today, (May 1990).
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Hull
recognition of integration and disintegration as two rival
social processes as still "too isolated from external
variables that may well help to account for the variety of
outcomes observed." 73 Furthermore, he suggests that there are
"certain 'compelling' international environmental pressures
which may trigger and sustain integration efforts." '" He
favours the interaction between subsystems since he believes
that "the minimum degree of interaction between system and
regional subsystem may enhance the prospects for success."75
Among these arguments on external factors to integration,
there appears to be a gradual realisation of the importance of
external factors to regional integration that was neglected in
the earlier exploration of the theory. Most theoretical
explorations appeared before the 1970s in the context of the
traditional character of international relations, in which the
idealist approach contested against the realist one in shaping
international integration theory. In the 1960s and 1970s, most
of the regions concerned with integration were just starting
their integration process or, if not, just trying to negotiate
with each other for the basic consensus of a union. Therefore,
what the theorists have done, or could do, was to trace the
background conditions, and to investigate the integration
process simply by adopting a related case - European
experience. In other words, these research contributions were
actually the repercussions of their specific era, and were not
sufficient to explain all the external variables that
integrating unions would meet. For example, while in the Cold
War era high politics had been the predominant concern of the
national actors, the factors of sovereignty, prestige,
73. Hansen, "Regional Integration - Reflections on a decade of theoretical efforts", p. 252.
74. Ibid.
75. Ibid.
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security, and national interest were undoubtedly a lot more
important than low politics.
Nevertheless, while low politics today has more
international salience, international communications have
already gone beyond national boundaries. As the world since
the 1970s has plunged into global economic, social and
environmental challenges, those important external incentives
to integration are noticeably no longer able to be regulated
by the old structure. How to improve the understanding of
regional integration that has involved interactions between
different integration unions is far beyond the knowledge of
those original studies. In particular, there has been a
relatively increasing	 importance	 of global,	 regional,
environmental, economic, and social issues in the agenda of
international politics, which clearly delivers the message
that regional integration ought to have different implications
for the world of the 1980s and after. In short, the old
assumptions have been challenged, some are discredited and
some are rendered invalid. Hence, in many respects the early
theories are now outdated.
1.2.2. Redefining Regional Integration to Take Account of
External Incentives
As the process of regional integration becomes living in
an interdependent world politically and economically, so the
later studies in regional integration have begun to
acknowledge the significance of external factors. This is due
to the efforts to study integration in developing countries
where external influences are much more observable. In 1983,
Thomas S. Cox, an ex-staff member of the United Nations
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Development Programme, concisely sketched the relations
between regional integration and external environment. He
stated that:
"the overall external environment can affect integration
through the formation of trade, investment and aid links
between a given system and a third party or parties in
the developed world. Integration schemes must also
contend with the establishment of parallel links between
individual members of the scheme and an outside actors or
actors. "76
Cox's argument has not only emphasized the importance of
external factors to regional integration, but also pinpointed
that some non-political external factors, e.g. international
trade, overseas investment, and foreign aid, have also played
an important part in the process of integration. As far as the
theoretical assumption is concerned, the argument referred to
external factors has actually gone beyond the original
frameworks of regional integration derived from Deutsch's
"communities", which were concerned with transaction flows
across national borders within an integration union.77
W. Andrew Axline in criticising neofunctionalism points
out that it was based on a particular conception of the
relationship between economic growth and organisational
change, which "never really went beyond the study of regional
organisation as a unit of analysis." 78 He explains that it
offered a rather limited generalisation of the economic
integration of Western industrialised countries. It is true
76. Cox, "Northern Actors in a South-South Setting: External Aid and East African
integration", Journal of Common Market Studies, 21: 3, (March 1983), pp. 283-284.
77. Deutsch's attention to transactions of countries was between people's communications, as
countries were considered clusters of population. See discussion in James E. Dougherty,
and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr. Contending Theories of International Relations: A
Comprehensive Survey, p. 425.
78 •
 
Axline, "South Pacific Region Cooperation in Comparative perspective: An Analytical
Framework", Political Science, 36: 2, (December 1984), p. 40.
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that in the new international setting, the neofunctionalist
experience in Europe has been unable to predict the further
development of the Single European Market itself and cannot
explain the regional cooperation among the developing
countries. It is because its success in Europe was still
largely limited to economic cooperation which has not yet led
to a political union of common foreign and security policies
in the current system of the nation-state centre. Moreover, it
lacks applicability to regional integration among developing
countries in the conditions of economic underdevelopment, of
fragile pluralistic democratic political systems, and, above
all, of vulnerability to external influence.
In his study, Axline especially emphasises that the
existing theory of economic integration "still does not take
into account some of the most important external forces that
influence regional cooperation, powerful states in the region
and at the global level, which are not formally partners in
regional cooperation, but which exert influence on it." 79 For
most of the relatively weak or small countries, like those in
the Caribbean and South Pacific, in terms of political
influence, military capability, and economic underdevelopment,
regional integration is very likely to be influenced by the
outside world. For example, external factors involved in the
process of regional cooperation, either pushing it ahead or
holding it back, in the South Pacific region are from various
sources, such as global powers, hemispheric powers, regional
powers, and non-state actors." The ANZUS countries (Australia,
New Zealand, and the United States) in the 1970s and 1980s
strongly supported South Pacific regional cooperation as an
effective means of maintaining a favourable strategic posture
79. Ibid, p. 43.
80. See Axline, "South Pacific Region Cooperation in Comparative perspective", pp. 47-49.
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over the increasing presence of the Soviet Union and China in
the region.81
As a matter of fact, the integration process of the EC
has also been influenced by various external factors. Although
one might argue that the attempt to solve internal quarrels
between member states and transitional problems of moving
further integration has been the main part of the EC
integration performance, which was the main concern in
integration theory, this does not rule out external incentives
as important driving forces for European integration. After
all, regional integration takes place in the context of the
international political and economic system. From here, the
theoretical framework has shown itself incapable of keeping up
with the development of European integration. To refurbish the
theory, Axline proposes that widening the range of variables
and allowing external factors to be included is the way to
broaden theoretical perspective and to meet the practical
situations in developing countries. 82 External factors, he
suggests,
"are likely to be an important influence on the pattern
of regional cooperation by directly affecting the costs
and benefits of cooperation for the region as a whole,
and the distribution of the perceived opportunity costs
for each of the participants."83
According to this definition, a number of external
factors to Caribbean integration were brought out in his
research: the run-up negotiations for the first Lome
81. Regional cooperation in South Pacific resulted partly from regional states' attempts to
reshape and control the influence of metropolitan countries, and partly from the ANZUS
countries' efforts to control other external involvements in the region. See Gregory E.
Fry, "Regionalism and international politics of the South Pacific", Pacific Affairs, 54:
3, (Fall 1981), pp. 476-482.
82. Axline, "Regional Co-operation and National Security", p. 1.
83. Axline, "South Pacific Region Cooperation in Comparative perspective", p. 45.
30
Convention (positive factor), United States opposition to
policies that interfered with free market forces in Central
American (negative factor), Canada's support of the Caribbean
Development Bank and a regional trade agreement (positive),
changes in the international economic structure (negative),
and the dramatically soaring world oil prices following
economic recession in the 1970s (negative). 84
 Expanding the
detail, Axline further establishes a structure of external
influence by examining those external factors which influence
"the costs and benefits of specific regional options, and the
costs and benefits of alternative policies for individual
member states. "85
Regional integration practices in many areas, given in
Table 1.1, have shown the importance of external factors in
the development of regional integration. At the global level
the superpowers had an impact on regional cooperation because
of their pursuit of ideological and geo-political interests.
At the regional and hemispheric level, groups of powerful
actors provide a second level context which directly affects
the process of regional cooperation with regard to economic,
political, and strategic interests. Regional integration in
most cases is likely to be seen as a means to increase
members' economic interest and security. However, owing to the
link between external actors and the process of regional
integration, any policies toward regional cooperation
determined by members' perceptions of costs and benefits "are
subject to external forces." 88 In other words, external actors
always work for their own interests, either for or against
regional policies to integration. When a powerful external
84. Axline, "Regional Co-operation and National Security", p. 2.
85. Ibid, p. 8.
86. line, "South Pacific Region Cooperation in Comparative perspective", p. 46.
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TABLE 1.1. NUMERICAL INDICATIONS OF INFLUENCE LEVELS OF
EXTERNAL INCENTIVES ON REGIONAL INTEGRATION IN VARIOUS
REGIONS
EC CARICOM LAFTA EAC SPC APC
Global 3/2 2/n 3/n 1/1 2/n 2/n
System
Super- 3/2 3/3 3/n 2/2 2/n 2/n
Powers
Regional 3/0 2/2 l/n l/n 2/n 3/n
Powers
Counter-
unions
0 2/2 2/n 1/n 2/n 2/n
Non-state 1/1 3/2 3/n 2/1 .1/n 2/n
Actors
(IGO/NGO)
Note : 1. CARICOM = Caribbean Community and Common Market.
LAFTA = Latin American Free Trade Association.
EAC	 = East African Community.
SPC	 = South Pacific Community.
APC	 = Asia-Pacific Community.
ii. The two sets of numbers used here are simply
measured by the categories of the relationship
between external factors and regional groups
on conditions before (for the first set of
numbers), and at the time of (the second set)
integration process, if applicable.
iii. The categories are indicated as follows
1 anxious & concerning	 0 irrelevant
2 influential
	 n not available
3 subordinate
Source: Based mainly on Axline, "South Pacific region
cooperation in comparative perspective", 1984;
Axline, "Regional co-operation and national
security", 1988; Cox, "Nothern Actors in a South
-South Setting", 1984; L. Krause, The Common Market:
Progress and Controversy, 1964; and Sung-Joo Han,
"The Pacific Cooperation Concept: Scope and
Limitation", Korea & World Affairs, 7: 2, (Summer
1983), and the present development in Asia-Pacific.
actor is trying to monopolise its vested interest in a region,
it will try to press ahead its integration initiatives to
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regional countries or to diversify their individual interest
in order to retard the emergence of regional unions against
its interest, as in the case of American Caribbean Basin
Initiative. Conversely, the British role in East African
integration was positive through its former colonial links
with Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda to help them build up a
cooperation structure. Although the UK might have its own
thoughts about encouraging East African integration to
maintain its traditional influence, regional integration here
seemed to meet the mutual interests of all parties at the
outset of negotiation.
It seems that whichever factors there may be, external
actors to regional integration should be considered with
respect to the integration process, which help work out a new
framework. In addition, Cox focused on external aid to
regional integration. In the case of East African integration,
the donor/recipient relationship between external actors and
the integration members was recognised as an important stake
for integration. External aid here "was used to buttress local
integration and cooperation sentiment." 87 Further, he indicated
that "resources provided by the industrialised countries of
the north can help accelerate the pace and depth of
integration by assisting the system to move towards higher
forms of integration, including the integration of
production." 88 Like the contribution of the Marshall Plan to
European integration, external aid in East Africa from various
actors, such as from the USA, the UK, Canada, Scandinavian
countries, China, the United Nations and the World Bank, made
some important contributions to the integration process during
the community's period of consolidation. This provided
87. Cox, "Northern Actors in a South-South Setting", p. 285.
88. Ibid.
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political support to enhance the psychological identity of
members, and economic help to build up the community's
bureaucracy and member states' development. All in all, Cox
concluded that "what does seem to come through loud and clear
is that external aid can play a very useful role both
symbolically and substantively during the initial years of an
LDC integration system."89
Through Axline's efforts to characterise external
incentives, a more realistic thinking about regional
integration anchored in the world of interdependence has been
brought about. Therefore, considerable progress has arisen
from paying greater attention to external factors. Changes in
the international economic structure as a whole, e.g. intense
external competition over markets, a larger scale of
international negotiations, and increasing trade development
with other regions, enable regional integration to be
accelerated by the development of regional industrial
restructuring. According to this review of the recent research
on external factors in integration theory, a common concern
has been with those less tangible factors to regional
integration, in particular external impacts on economic
development and industrial competition, which were neglected
by the earlier exploration to the theory. The arguments above
have clearly focused more on the actual development of
European integration rather than on theoretical frameworks of
integration. In order to increase our understanding of
regional integration, a framework should therefore consider
both actor- (external actors involvement) and system-factors
(the influence of systems and functional mechanisms) together.
Systems' influence means that the change of international
89
. Ibid., p. 307.
34
trends, e.g. economic recession, protectionism and technology
advancement, will directly or indirectly result in changes in
the costs and benefits of regional integration. The influence
of functional mechanisms implies that global or counter-
union's functional rearrangements, such as industrial
restructuring, will result in regional groups reconsidering or
being forced to change their policies, as in Table 1.2.
TABLE 1.2. GENERAL OUTLINES OF EXTERNAL INCENTIVES TO
REGIONAL INTEGRATION
System-Factors:
International
Systems:
Counter-Unions
Competition:
Functional
Mechanisms:
recession, restructuring economic order,
economic linkages
market, trade, protectionism, investment
trade, energy, industrial development,
technology,
Actor-Factors:
Superpowers:
Regional Powers:
Governmental
Organisations:
Non-governmental
Organisations:
Transnational
Corporations:
military cooperation, economic aid
political & economic initiatives,
transnational institutions,
transnational interest groups,
regional business strategy
This thesis will explore regional integration by focusing
upon external incentives, their impacts on industrial
development and how they have affected the progress of
regional integration both in the European Community and in the
developing Asia-Pacific economic grouping, in particular in
the Chinese Economic Area (CEA) mainly based on Southern China
Economic Zone including Taiwan, Hong Kong, and China's
Guangdong and Fujien provinces. The development of this
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conceptual framework, however, does not deny the contribution
and importance of internal political developments to the
ultimate success of integration.
1.3. THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND THE CHINESE ECONOMIC AREA
When Western Europe was suffering from recession, in the
early 1980s, which was attributed to obsolescence in the
European industrial structure and intense external competition
from the US, Japan and the Newly Industrialised Countries
(NICs), 9° the attempt to reinforce European industrial
competitiveness through the completion of the European
Internal Market (or Single European Market) 91 triggered the
relaunching of European integration. Unlike the previous
political momentum for integration, the relaunching of
European integration was derived, to a large extent, from
European industry's response to its lack of international
competitiveness. Completing the Internal Market Programme
embodied in the White Paper and endorsed in the Single
European Act (SEA) was urged by European industrialists,
politicians, and academics. On the relaunch of European
integration, what appeared to be crucial was that the appeal
for the relaunch reflected Europeans', in particular
industrialists', pervasive discontent with the ways the EC and
90. According to OECD in 1979, the NICs included Brazil, Greece, Hong Kong, South Korea,
Mexico, Portugal, Singapore, Spain, Taiwan and Yugoslavia. However, throughout this
thesis, the NICs refer merely to Asian NICs (Hong Kong, South Korea, Singapore and Taiwan)
and Latin American NICs (Brazil and Mexico), unless otherwise suggested. See OECD, The
Impact of the Newly Industrialising Countries on Production and Trade in Manufactures,
reported by the Secretary-General, (Paris: OECD, 1979).
91. According to Lord Cockfield, the "Completion of the Internal Market" is officially
accepted in the EC. In France, it is called "le Marchè Grand", while in Britain the
"Single Market" is commonly used. See Lord Cockfield, "The real significance of 1992", in
Colin Crouch and David Marquand, (eds.), The Politics of 1992: Beyond the Single European
Market, (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1990), p. 1.
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national governments impotently managed their economies in
coping with external challenges. Ever since the late 1970s,
much of the European decision-making agenda in the EC and
national levels has been beset by trade deficit, unemployment,
industrial failing, and declining competitiveness. At that
time, the progress of European integration had been largely
driven by a desire for counterbalancing external economic
challenges.
Thereby, the EC carried out industrial restructuring as
part of its economic development aiming at increasing the
strength of the European economy as a whole, for example with
several European industrial collaboration programmes intended
collectively to enhance technology research and development
for improving European industrial competitiveness. There have
been various factors widely noted as the related benefits of
the relaunch of European integration, such as a general
recognition of the need for the reform of the inefficient EC's
decision-making, the settlement of the British budgetary
rebate, an elite alliance across Europe, and the coalition of
ruling parties in West European countries. The general demand
for the improvement of European competitiveness has
contributed much more to the achievement of European consensus
and endorsement of national governments than has been
recognised by integration theorists. What one cannot deny
about integration dynamics is that political agreement has
been based on the assumption that stronger West European
economies would result in political integration. There may
have been other influences on the passage of the SEA within
the EC's governing structures, e.g. the demand for
institutional reform, and for more efficient and democratic
decision-making, but it was the industrial impetus of seeking
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to respond to external competitive challenges from the US and
East Asia which was a critical factor in the renewed
enthusiasm for integration in Western Europe in the 1980s.
Recently, the emergence of the Asia-Pacific Economic
Cooperation (APEC), the advancing Asia-Pacific subregional
economic grouping, and the agreement of a tripartite North
American Free Trade Area (NAFTA) linking the US, Canada and
Mexico, have been realised as a response to the 1992 programme
of completing the European Single Market. 92 In the context of
regional cooperation around the Asian Pacific area, as the EC
1992 programme is being pushed forward, this vigorous movement
of economic cooperation has been accelerating, especially
around Japan, the Asian NICs (ANICs: Hong Kong, Singapore,
Taiwan and South Korea) and ASEAN Countries as well as China
and Vietnam. Above all, the agreement of the European Economic
Area (EEA) on the 22 October 1991 which combined the EC and
EFTA economies, has established the largest economic system in
the world, which has become an enormous external incentive to
Asia-Pacific economic cooperation. Economists argue that this
is a symbol of the growing regionalisation of the world trade
system."
The changes in the international political and economic
system that have been influencing the context of Asian
regionalism include "the evolution of US-Soviet relations from
conflict to cooperation, the collapse of communism in the
Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, the reversal of the
'locomotive' role of the United States, the ascendancy of
92. See various arguments about which the EC as an external factor has contributed to the
'emergence of regional integration in Asia-Pacific and North America: Susumu Awanohara and
Mayan Chanda, "Uncommon bonds", Far Eastern Economic Review, (18 November, 1993), p. 16;
"Year of the blocs?", Asiaweek, (12 January, 1993), p. 42; Tetsuo Naito, "North American
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and its influence on Asia", Pacific Business and Industries,
2, (1993), p. 7.
93. Financial Times, (23 October 1991), p. 3.
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Japan as the world's banker, and the economic integration of
North America." 94 These issues have, to some extent, become an
external driving force for Asia-Pacific economic cooperation.
Facing increasing restraints on their foreign trade with
developed economies, Asia-Pacific regional export-led
economies have sought to adjust their industrial structures
and, thus, maintain their competitive advantage and persistent
economic growth. Moreover, the rapid economic growth in East
Asian economies has been accompanied by the growth of
subregional economic groupings. Industrial development is,
therefore, important for an understanding of the development
of economic integration in the Asia-Pacific region,
particularly the emergence of subregional groupings, e.g. the
CEA.
Since the 1980s, the developing trend of new regionalism
with special reference to industrial competition has been
shaping the new world order, and could lead to the re-
distribution of world power. In particular, the movement of
European unification has been a very strong external economic
incentive to Asian Pacific cooperation. As far as those
efforts to advocate regional cooperation are concerned, the
positive progress towards European integration appears to be
the force behind a great European "economic fortress". For
those countries which depend very much upon trade such as the
ANICs the emergence of the EC's protectionism against those
traders has served as a "catalyst" to direct them to a common
interest of pursuing regional economic groupings. 95 In short,
94. Richard Drobnick, "Economic integration in the Pacific region", Technical Papers, No. 65,
OECD Development Centre, Under the direction of Charles Oman. Produced as part of the
research programme on Globalisation and Regionalisation, (May 1992), p. 15.
95. As protectionism is increasing in the EC against outside suppliers in general, and the
ANICs in particular, new regionalism has emerged in the North America and Asia-Pacific.
The Asian NICs in facing the increase of protectionism have been advocating regional
economic grouping as a way of sheltering their interest and strengthening their
competitiveness. For the EC's external policy vis-à-vis the Asian NICs see Sun-Taik Han,
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all these developments suggest that economic incentives either
endogenous or exogenous, (which were hardly considered by the
theorists, because they did not exist then), have come to
dominate the recent development of regional economic
integration.
It was the external pressure of international structural
change on national industrial development that triggered the
relaunching of European integration in the 1980s. To meet
Japanese and American competition, European business groups
actively and closely worked with the Commission, and in return
won credit for initiating the proposals to complete the
Internal Market and lobbying for relevant policies. So,
shouldering the recovery of the European economy and well
being, national and transnational business groups, which were
a necessary condition, contributed to the success of
negotiating the SEA with the priority of unifying the market.
The completion of the Internal Market, the crucial part of the
SEA, was strongly advocated by European industrial groups and
their blueprints of changing economic scale in Europe.
The importance of industrialists in pushing forward
integration in Western Europe has provided a useful model to
the understanding of the process of economic integration in
the CEA. Especially, while the relationships between China,
Hong Kong and Taiwan have still been confined for political
reasons, their close economic and industrial ties driven
largely by Taiwanese and Hong Kong's businessmen have brought
about a subregional economic grouping in Fast Asia. Despite
the fact that no political arrangement has yet been made for
cooperation, numerous business contracts within the CEA have
stimulated the progress of economic integration. Although the
European Integration: The Impact on Asian Newly Industrialising Economies, (Paris: OECD,
1992), pp. 28-35.
40
CEA may as yet be an intangible concept for many people, it
has already attracted much of the business flows in East Asia
and is to a large extent involved in most of Chinese overseas
economic activities in the Asia-Pacific region. In addition,
regional decision-makers have increasingly paid their
attention to this kind of economic development." While
economic complementarity may be the essential condition for
the formation of a subregional grouping, the actual engine for
this is nothing more than businessmen seeking to gain a
favourable position in international competition.
Following the Japanese example, the ANICs have emerged as
some of the most energetic regional economic players in the
Asia-Pacific region. In the 1980s, as most of the low cost
economies in Southeast Asia and China have gained a
comparative advantage in the production of labour-intensive
industries over the ANICs, the ANICs have engaged in
industrial restructuring by relocating their sun-set
industries, e.g. textiles, footwear, and toys, in low cost
economies, and by upgrading their technologies at home in
order to move industrial structures upwards into knowledge-,
capital- and technology-intensive industries, e.g. Singapore
and Hong Kong's financial and shipping services, Taiwan's
computer and South Korea's machinery and transport equipment.
This developing trend has triggered the prospects for regional
economic integration through intensifying intra-regional
trade, foreign investment, and an international division of
labour.
The emergence of Asia-Pacific subregional groupings has
been based upon a recognition of the importance of economic
96. The Asian Development Bank Workshop on Growth Triangles held at the Manila headquarters in
May 1993 expressed the high regional interest in this development of subregional grouping.
See "Growth Triangles will spur development", ADB Quarterly Review, (May 1993), p. 24.
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development in stimulating economic integration. In the
context of wishing to strengthen competitiveness and
accelerate economic development and the growth of trade, the
CEA has emerged as one of the major subregional groupings in
East Asia. Economic complementarity amongst regional economies
has been an important incentive for the formation of Asia-
Pacific subregional economic groupings. During the last
decade, Hong Kong, Taiwan and overseas Chinese have poured
enormous amounts of capital into China initially seeking
manufacturing bases, but eventually hoping to exploit the
domestic market. Intensifying economic transactions within the
region have created an industrial division of labour, which is
a necessary condition for economic integration. The course of
industrial restructuring in the ANICs has been interlinked
with China's reform process for economic development, which
has led to the formation of economic groupings along China's
coastal areas. Unlike the driving forces behind regional
economic integration in the EC, the emergence of the CEA has
been driven primarily by the private sector. In short, in
response to external challenges, industrial development has
promoted regional integration in both the EC and CEA.
1.4. OVERVIEW
The purpose of this thesis is therefore twofold. It is,
firstly, to explore the proposition that the process of
industrial restructuring is strengthening regional cohesion
and thereby bringing about progressive economic integration
against the context of world economic interdependence and
industrial competition. Throughout the 1970s, due to economic
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recession followed by the wake of two oil crises and
protectionism, the diversification of national interest by the
enlargement of the EC and the procedural weakness within the
EC's decision-making machinery, the pace of European
integration as well as economic growth were slowing down, a
condition which came to be termed "Eurosclerosis" or
"Europessimism". 97 In the early 1980s, at the peak of
Eurosclerosis, European industry was undertaking industrial
restructuring through collaborations under the auspices of the
European Commission. The pressure for further industrial
restructuring asserted by European industry with the
endorsement of the EC led to the relaunch of European
integration. It was this pressure that contributed largely to
the passage of the SEA and the creation of the Single Market.
It can therefore be seen that industrial restructuring may act
as a stimulus to regional economic and political integration
thereby offering
	 an
	 important	 contribution to	 our
understanding of both the theory and practice of regional
integration.
Secondly, this thesis aims to demonstrate that industrial
restructuring and its impact on regional integration offers
the key to an understanding of the regional economic
development of the CEA. In particular, the interaction of
individuals and corporations in the private sector, which has
led the process of CEA integration, has been sufficiently
powerful to be able to overcome political difficulties.
Although this pattern of industrial restructuring leading to
regional economic integration may be more limited in scope
97. For the factors which caused Eurosclerosis See Dennis Swann, The Single European Market
and Beyond: A Study of the Wider Implications of the Single European Act, (London:
Routledge, 1992), pp. 12-14. In economic terms, Eurosclerosis was the symptom of the
decline of labour productivity, little investment, the decline in profitability and
weakening industrial competitiveness. See M. V. Posner, and J. R. Sargent, "A case of
Euro-sclerosis?", Midland Bank Review, (Winter 1987), pp. 9-17.
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than that in Europe, there may be some important parallels
between the patterns of industrial restructuring and economic
and political integration in the two regions. These attempts
to make a comparison of the industrial driving processes of
political and economic integration in Western Europe and East
Asia provides some useful insights for our understanding of
regional integration. To begin with, the thesis provides a
survey of the literature on integration theory and the
contribution of external factors to regional integration and
attempts to create an analytical structure for economic and
political integration. In Chapter Two a historical analysis of
European integration divides the postwar period into three
categories: 1945-1973, 1973-1980 and 1980-1992. Chapter Three
focuses on the impact of the European integration movement on
European industry, the economic crisis facing European
industry and its special interests in the process of
advocating the programme to complete the Internal Market. It
also emphasises the key role industrialists have played in
obtaining the internal market.
Chapter Four analyses the Asia-Pacific region where
industrial development has had so much effect on the formation
of regional economic groupings. Chapter Five focuses on the
concept of the CEA, and analyses the impact of industrial
development on the formation of the CEA. In this particular
economic grouping, industrial development across the borders
of interdependent economies has raised expectations of further
economic integration, and, to some extent, raised the
possibility of Chinese reunification.
Despite other political constraints within the CEA
itself, Taiwan-China's political stalemate in particular may
have limited its further development. Chapter Six therefore
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provides an important vision of Chinese economic integration
being driven by the private sector. This chapter therefore
focuses on the internal political constraints which the CEA is
currently suffering from, which highlight the particular
development of the CEA under the existing political impasse.
The development of the CEA, therefore, gives evidence for a
reappraisal of regional economic integration. Chapter Seven
focuses on external constraints on the formation of the CEA,
concentrating on Japan's political and economic complementary
interests to China, the wary perspective of the ASEAN
countries, the effect of the European Single Market, and the
impact of the NAFTA on the CEA. Finally, the assessment of
industrial development in the experience of the EC and the CEA
suggests that exogenous industrial development has not only
been a significant contributory factor to European economic
integration, but is also applicable to the formation of
Chinese economic integration.
45
CHA' "1" E It TWCI
EXTERNAL INCENTIVES FOR EUROPEAN ECONOMIC
INTEGRATION: A HISTORICAL ANALYSIS
This chapter analyses the context in which European
political and economic integration has taken place through
exploring international incentives that stimulated the
progress of political and economic integration. Since the end
of the World War II, the process of European integration has
been largely driven in the first place by political motives (a
hope for peace) and more recently by socio-economic factors
(general demands for maintaining economic prosperity, creating
jobs and enhancing industrial performance). In general,
regional economic integration is an adjustment process of
economic relations amongst member states of a regional
grouping, which results from the emergence of common interests
through economic interaction. Federalist, functionalist and
neofunctionalist approaches of regional integration have
focused upon exercising the "internal processes" of a
community. As far as the formation of the European Community
was concerned, the momentum for political integration at the
earliest stage seemed to be a reaction to the destruction of
war. Immediately after the Second World War, pacifists and
federalists in Europe, e.g. Jean Monnet and Altiero Spinelli,
sought to organise some kind of European union to combine
German with French interests in order to eliminate any
possibility of conflict in the future. Thus, the Schuman Plan,
which stemmed from the need to manage steel and coal, because
of their potential for being used to manufacture weapons, was
brought about.
46
So, at the outset of European integration, the basic
motivating force was the desire for West European security and
welfare. However, as soon as the Soviet sphere of influence
was established in East Europe in the late 1940s, Western
Europe was then driven to seek much deeper political and
military cooperation with its Atlantic allies. Meanwhile, the
United States in order to help rebuild Europe on the one hand,
and to impose its superpower politics on Western Europe to
contain the Soviet aggression on the other, supplied Europe
with large scale economic aid in the form of the Marshall Plan
in 1947. In order to distribute aid, European countries were
conditioned by the Plan to organise themselves together. From
this the Organisation for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC)
resulted. With American encouragement the OEEC had introduced
a mechanism for international cooperation between West
European countries. Thereafter, until the collapse of
communism in Eastern Europe in 1989-90, European integration
had always coexisted with superpower politics, illustrating
the influence of external factors on European integration.
Although Karl Deutsch has argued that every forward step
towards European integration was achieved by members' efforts,'
these sometimes could not fully explain either the reasons why
members of the EC should go along with integration or the
incentives that lay behind the political momentum for further
integration. Integration theorists have been unable to explain
or to clarify when and how the pace of integration reached the
threshold that pushed it on towards the next step to
integration. 2 Others have argued that European integration was
1. Deutsch has argued that the volume of transactions, political, economic, or cultural
within an integrating union throw a burden upon institutions and member states for change.
See Deutsch, Political Community at the International Level: Problems of Definition and
Measurement, (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Company Inc., 1954), p. 39
If there is a detailed schedule of integration, it would be Balassa's categories of
integration: a free trade area, a custom union, a common market, an economic union, and
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not only implemented by internal efforts but accelerated by
external incentives which were likely to be the main factors
in driving integration beyond the next threshold. 3 If some
detailed rules for integration could be recognised and drawn
up into a formula for integration, then it would be much
easier for member states to control the progress of regional
integration. It is evident that member states in the process
of political, economic and social integration have always had
to take account of the costs and benefits of integration.
However, once external pressures become so strong that they
will cost members more than the costs of integration, the
external costs emerge as a decisive force pushing member
states to reassess whether they should proceed with
integration or not.
What sorts of external pressures have arisen? How did
these pressures affect European integration? In the post-war
period, because of the power vacuum and economic depression in
Europe, external actors, most notably superpowers, were
continuously able to influence the progress of European
integration through the projection of military forces and
economic aid. During the 1970s and 1980s, global recession
brought Europe a further structural crisis in its industry and
foreign trade, which resulted in mass-unemployment, sharply
increasing raw material costs, less commitment to inward
investment, and fierce competition in domestic and
international markets from Japan, the USA, and the NICs.
complete economic integration. The categories can be seen as five different steps to
integration. The threshold between each different step of integration is decisive.
However, the moment at which the progress of integration becomes mature enough to enable
it to be upgraded remains theoretically unclear. See Bela Balassa, The Theory of Economic
Integration, (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1962).
3. Such as Amitai Etzioni, Stanley Hoffmann, Joseph Nye, Karl Kaiser, Ernst Haas, and Roger
Hansen. For their detailed arguments refer to the previous chapter.
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TABLE 2.1. PENETRATION RATE*: INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTS ON THE
INTERNAL MARKET (percentage change between 1973-1982)
EC USA Japan
High-demand Sectors: +7.9 +5.9 +1.6
Electrical & Electronics
hardware +10.9 +6.7 +1.7
Information technology,
office automation &
precision equipment +14.7 +4.5 +1.3
Chemicals & pharmaceuticals +3.6 +2.9 +1.5
Medium-demand Sectors +1.8 +2.3 +0.2
Low-demand Sectors +3.8 +4.2 +1.4
Note: * penetration rate = imports / domestic demand.
Source: EUROSTAT and Commission departments.
In terms of the penetration rate of industrial products
on the internal market, 4 in high-demand sectors notably the
electrical and electronics industries, information technology
and chemicals, European markets over the period of 1973-1982
had the highest increasing penetration rate compared with the
American and Japanese markets (Table 2.1). Moreover, European
export market share in high-demand sectors declined largely by
-2.5 per cent from 1973 to 1983, while the US and Japan, on
the contrary, increased their market share by 2.7 per cent and
5.6 per cent respectively over the same period (Table 2.2).
TABLE 2.2. EXPORT MARKET SHARE (percentage change between
1973-1983)
High-demand Sectors:
Electrical & Electronics
hardware
Information technology,
office automation &
precision equipment
Chemicals & pharmaceuticals
Medium-demand Sectors
Low-demand Sectors
EC	 USA
-2.5	 +2.7
-1.8
	
-5.0	 +5.0
	
-1.0	 +1.9
	
-1.2	 -0.3
	
+4.1	 +1.0
Japan
+5.6
+8.0
+0.5
+6.1
+1.4
+2.4	 +11.4
Source: EUROSTAT and Commission departments.
4
. Penetration rate, one of the useful indicators to assess the impact of imports on domestic
industrial performances, is total imports over domestic demands.
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Apart from unemployment, Europe's ratio of non-wage
labour costs to total labour costs was 40.1 per cent. This was
also much higher than the US' (27.8 per cent) and Japan's
(21.0 per cent) in 1981. 5
 These unfavourably high costs
resulted in the decline of profitability in the European
manufacturing industry. The net rate of return on the fixed
capital in the EC4 (France, West Germany, Italy and Britain)
was 18.7 per cent in 1960-1973 and 13.4 per cent in 1974-1979,
while Japan was 35.6 per cent and 21.0 per cent, and the US
was 29.1 per cent and 20.6 per cent. 8
 As a result, relative to
its main industrial rivals, the USA and Japan, the EC suffered
from a lack of industrial competitiveness, which in turn
stimulated a desire in both the public and private sectors for
a revival of European integration. 7 European industrialists,
notably of the European Roundtable (ERT) along with the Union
of Industrial and Employers' Confederations of Europe (UNICE),8
began a campaign of lobbying national governments and the EC
bureaucrats for the completion of a single European market, as
a means of improving the performance of European industry and
commerce .8
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
Non-wage labour costs are principally social security contributions of the employer.
Europe's higher ratio of non-wage costs to total labour costs was attributed to high
social security costs, albeit hourly labour costs in manufacturing were lower in European
countries than in the US. Information base on Institut der Deutschen Wirtschaft,
Informationsdienst, No. 18, Min, 1982. See Michael Emerson, (ed.), European Stagflation,
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), pp. 204-205.
Information based on OECD and the EC Commission. Ibid., pp. 201, 203.
Through industrial development, politicians and industrialists met a broad consensus to
take account of European dimension in national policy and business strategy. See
"Improving competitiveness and industrial structures in the Community", Document,
Commission of the European Communities, 1987, pp. 34-36.
The Roundtable founded in 1983 was originally named the Roundtable of European
Industrialists. It had grouped 30 chief executives from Europe's biggest companies in
1988, including AB Volvo, Fiat, Philips, Saint-Gobain, Daimler-Benz, Plessey, Ferruzzi,
Nestld, Telefonica, Norsk Hydro and Nokia. The UNICE created in 1958 has been recognised
as official spokesbody for European business and industry vis-a-vis the European
institutions and in 1989 was made up of a 32 industrial member federation (The
Confederation of British Industry and its equivalents) from 22 European countries with a
permanent Secretariat based in Brussels.
See Jacques Pelkmans, "Completing the internal market for industrial products", Document,
Commission of the European Communities, 1986, p. 34.
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Many researches concluded that the EC would have to unify
further in order to respond effectively to external
competitive pressures and to undertake a stronger political
and diplomatic role on the world stage. 1° Thus, European
integration has been constantly inspired by external factors,
whether positive or negative, or whether continual or
contingent events. On this basis, the process of European
integration can be divided into three phases according to the
character of a particular historical period. Firstly, from the
post War era up to 1973, political motives and external actors
played an important part in the process of European
integration (Appendix F-2.1). Secondly, between 1973 and 1980,
the outbreak of two oil crises in 1973-74 and 1979 worsened
worldwide economic recession, which resulted in the
transformation of the international economic structure and
caused a deterioration of European industrial structure.
European integration prior to 1973 was based on economic
expansion from which industrial growth benefited considerably.
European integration came to a halt as a result of the
European economy being hard hit by recession (Appendix F-2.2).
Finally, from 1980, Vicomte Etienne Davignon, European
Commissioner for industry from 1977 to 1985 and for Research
and Technology from 1981 to 1985, led the Plan for the
European Strategic Program for Research and Development in
Information Technology (ESPRIT) which successfully converged
12 big European firms endeavouring to focus on the Community's
rather than national markets. 11 Since then, the European
10. Such researches were under the sponsorship of the Commission of the EC. For example, a
series of relaunching Europe reports were published on European File, 16/81, 3/82.
The ESPRIT programme agreed by the Executive Community of 12 big firms which included
Siemens, AEG and Nixdorf (Germany); GEC, ICL and Plessey (UK); Olivetti and Stet (Italy);
Philips (the Netherlands); and Thomson, GCE and Bull (France). For the successful
performance that ESPRIT credited to European industrial development see Lynn K. Mytelka,
and Michel Delapierre, "The alliance strategies of European firms in the information
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dimension of industrial collaboration has become not only a
European guideline of industrial strategy but also an
effective approach for the understanding of economic
integration (Appendix F-2.3).
2.1. 1945-1973: THE POST WAR ERA - SUPERPOWER POLITICS AND THE
RECONSTRUCTION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY
2.1.1. The Effort for Political and Economic Integration as a
Means and Ends of Conflict Resolution
The disastrous War in Europe between 1939-1945 was a
turning point for Western Europe in many respects. Firstly,
West Europe was no longer the leader of international politics
and had taken second place in world affairs. The emerging new
global balance of power between the Soviet Union and the
United States made Western Europe a superpower political
arena. Secondly, the war and its aftermath transferred the
balance of power in Europe, which resulted in an equality of
power within the region. 12 Moreover, either scattered (such as
Belgium, the Netherlands, Spain, Portugal and Italy) or
substantially weakened (France and Britain), the warworn
European colonial empires were incapable of continuing to
administer colonies. As their colonies became independent
nations, the loss of controlling colonies changed European
countries' past apathy to European common affairs and pushed
them to rethink the whole structure of their political and
economic relations with the world and each other. As a result,
these changes of European political structure contributed to
technology industry and the role of ESPRIT", in John H. Dunning, and Peter Robson, (eds.),
Multinationals and the European Community, (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1988), pp. 147-149.
12
. After the War, there was not any hegemon dominating Western Europe. See arguments by
Gordan Smith, Politics in Western Europe: A Comparative Analysis, 2nd edition, (London:
Heinemann Educational Books, 1976), P. 240.
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the emerging context of political and economic integration in
Europe. Indeed, "the survival of the (European) Community must
largely be attributed to the fact that it has filled a
political vacuum in Europe.""
American thinking of rebuilding Europe was based on its
global strategy of containing the Soviet aggression and in the
belief that revitalising the European economy would assure its
success in those political and military aims. Therefore, the
decisive US moves to help reconstructing European countries
and their economies brought about the North Atlantic Treaty
Organisation (NATO) in April 1949 for European security and
the OEEC for economic recovery. Together these two
organisations dominated the whole pattern of the early
development of European political integration.
Plan which was to encourage European industrial
attached a condition that every participating
accept a common programme of recovery and
establish a permanent organisation, the OEEC,
The Marshall
reconstruction
country should
cooperate to
to serve that
aim. The establishment of the OEEC to distribute the Marshall
aid marked a decisive step towards peacetime cooperation for a
common stance in Europe and offered a valuable institutional
framework to further regional cooperation."
As early as the 1950s, nearly all of Europe was drawn
into rival superpower blocs by a series of international
events: the Truman Doctrine, Marshall Aid, a currency reform
in West Germany, the Berlin Crisis, the founding of COMECON
(Council for Mutual Economic Assistance), the founding of
NATO, the failure of the EDC (European Defence Community), the
recruitment of West Germany into NATO and the establishment of
13.See Mark Blacksell, Post-War Europe: A Political Geography, (Folkestone: Wm Dawson & Sons
Ltd., 1977), p. 83.
14.For the details of the OEEC operation see Ibid., pp. 35-47.
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the Warsaw Pact. 15 Diebold has recorded how superpower politics
was imposed on Western Europe by economic aid, and how this
influenced European attitudes towards integration:
"To justify massive American aid, Europe would have to
make the greatest possible use of its own resources. That
would require close cooperation and, in particular, a
breaking of the barriers to the exchange of goods inside
Europe. 1116
Concerning European security and prosperity, Jean Monnet
suggested pooling coal and steel between France and Germany
under international control in the belief that integration of
crucial industrial sectors would allow Germany to be
reintegrated into the community of European nations and thus
assure peace in Europe, which brought about the Schuman Plan
on 9 May 1950. 17 The outbreak of the Korean War and the
increase of steel consumption for war industries hastened the
need to bring Germany's industries to live under international
control, which resulted in the establishment of the first
European supranational institution, the European Coal and
Steel Community (ECSC). Moreover, during the Korean war there
were growing fears of a Soviet attack on Western Europe and
general demands for West Germany to contribute to NATO, which
encouraged the six members of the ECSC (Belgium, France, West
Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands) to sign the
15. Barry Buzan, Morten Kelstrup, Pierre Lemaitre, Elzbieta Tromer, and Ole Waever, The
European Security Order Recast: Scenarios for the Post-Cold War Era, (London: Pinter
Publishers, 1990), P. 37.
16. William Diebold, Jr., "The Process of European Integration", in Lawrence Krause (ed.) The
Common Market - Progress and Controversy, (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1964),
pp. 29-30.
17. Jean MonneL, one of the pioneering figures of posL-war WesLern European inLegraLion, was
the first President of the ECSC. He put forward this creative idea to the then French
Foreign Minister Robert Schuman. See "1988 European Jean Monnet Commemorative year",
European File, 9/88.
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EDC." Despite the fundamental purpose of the ECSC to encourage
economic expansion, industrial growth, increase of employment
and a rising living standard for member states through the
establishment of a common market in coal and steel, the
decisive reason for a community was nothing more than a
political concept to reposition Germany in the community of
Europe in a multinational framework."
At the beginning of European Integration, one might
wonder why the momentum for signing the Treaties of Rome
establishing the European Economic Community (EEC, generally
referred to as the Common Market) and the European Atomic
Energy Community (EURATOM) was not overshadowed by the failure
of the EDC. 2° Apart from these constant external factors of the
Soviet threat and American aid to Europe, some other external
contingent events were to play an important part in acting as
a stimulus for the progress of political integration. For
instance, after the ECSC was established in 1951, its original
six member states were hoping to move towards further
political integration. However, the prospects for further
political integration 
	
 not so promising, as the Six were
wondering if the experiment of the ECSC would work. The French
government took the first initiative of further integration -
known as the "Pleven Plan" - for the EDC. 21 Ironically the
18. Britain refused the EDC at the beginning. The EDC was not ratified by France and Italy, as
its initial reason - the Korean War had ended - did not exist. See Blacksell, Post-War
Europe: A Political Geography, pp. 90-91.
19• Buzan, Kelstrup, Lemaitre, Tromer, and Weever, The European Security Order Recast:
Scenarios for the Post-Cold War Era, p. 145.
20. As far as the internal factors were concerned, the federalists regained the momentum for
further integration by focusing economic field in order not to entangle with the issue of
national sovereignty. That brought about the agreement for the Six in March 1957. See John
Pinder, European Community: The Building of a Union, (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1992), pp. 7-8.
21. As steel and coal were put under international management, the French Prime Minister Rene
Pleven, advocated that defence was to follow suit. Although the EDC was rejected, a
general demand for an independent European defence initiative brought about the Western
European Union with the full participation of the UK, Italy and West Germany. Ibid., pp.
91-92.
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French National Assembly led by General Charles de Gaulle
rejected the treaty, which served as a serious blow to the
wider European Political Community and the cause of European
integration.
Although the successful emergence of the EEC was
attributed to the growing spirit of compromise amongst the
Six, mainly between France and West Germany over agricultural
and industrial products, several contingent international
events catalysed that progress. The Soviet troops crushed the
Budapest uprising in 1956. It "sharply underlined the need for
greater Western European cooperation." 22 It was because Soviet
action on this scale brought about fears of its ability to
project its military power in other parts of Europe if need
be. In addition, for the French government, with its reluctant
negotiating position, the 1956 Suez debacle and the setback to
its colonial power in Algeria made it more conciliatory
towards its neighbours. It was these external events that
propelled the Six down the road to integration.
Officially, American support for the Common Market was
based on the belief that a strong ally is a good ally and
economic integration would strengthen the members' capacity to
provide their own security. 23 Because the external security
question was very important in this period, the development of
European integration was intertwined with that of the military
alliance, NATO. In fact, American efforts were intended not
only to reinforce the defence of Western Europe itself, but
also to bolster Western Europe's capacity to take more
responsibility for the maintenance of global order. At the
same time, the growing strength of West European integration
22 •
 Allan Williams, The European Community - The Contradictions of Integration, (Oxford:
Blackwell, 1991), p. 25.
23 •
 L. Krause, "The Common Market : Progress and Controversy", in Krause (ed.) The Common
Market - Progress and Controversy, p. 6.
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reinforced the American frontline against the threat of Soviet
aggression to Europe.
In the private sector, the US penetration of West
European markets rested on capital investments by
multinational corporations. According to the US Department of
Commerce's report about American investment in 1965-1966,
"(investment) rose by seventeen per cent in the US, twenty one
per cent in the rest of the world, and forty per cent in the
Common Market." 24 In 1967, one European commentator expressed
the fear that "this European Market is basically American in
organisation, American industry in Europe." 25 He quoted the
view of Harold Wilson, the former British Prime Minister, that
"the primary objective of Europe must be to prevent the
domination of our economy by the Americans." 26 Many amongst the
political and business elites of Western Europe believed that
greater integration was the only way to stand up to
international competition. As a result, European "third force"
sentiment was emerging in the continent, particularly in
France, in accordance with the progress of integration. 27 This
was a core belief of the Gaullists. The calls of the third
force for European nonalignment helped members to cohere in a
common internal position, and to pursue external policies
which were independent from the superpowers. This may be
considered as a psychological impetus to integration, which
actually led both the public and private sectors to a common
voice in response to external challenges.
24. J-J Servan-Schreiber, The American Challenge, (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1968), p. 6.
25. Ibid., p. 3.
26. Ibid., p. 15.
27. See Krause, "The Common Market : Progress and Controversy", p. 4; also Stanley Hoffmann
described it as the "resisters", in particular the French, "Obstinate or obsolete? the
fate of the nation-state and the case of Western Europe", Daedalus, 95: 3, (Summer 1966),
pp. 862-915.
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2.1.2. Internalisation of External Incentives and European
Integration
The successful establishment of the three European
Communities (ECSC, EEC and Euratom) suggested that there had
been increasing recognition of the need for political and
economic integration amongst the Six member states, in
particular to meet external demands. Throughout most of the
1960s, disputes over the role of the European institutions and
political integration between France and other EC members held
up the momentum of political integration, because French
President Charles de Gaulle's intention to overhaul the
structure of the European Communities kept reversing the
agenda of political integration to the original argument of
how to build the Community. 28 Moreover, the row between France
and the US over international trade and security was also
shaping the progress of European integration. The
establishment of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), the
united EEC against the US in the round of multinational
negotiations from 1963-67, popularly known as the Kennedy
Round, under the auspices of the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade (GATT), and the efforts to establish an economic and
monetary union had shown a great deal of external constraint
variously propelling the EC's integration progress.
Developing the Common Market, the Six were seeking for
the alignment of the common external tariff on imports from
non-member countries, while reducing tariffs amongst their own
members. According to the conditions set out in the GATT
regulation to ensure that the formation of a customs union
28
. Throughout the history of the EC, there have been two tendencies in French European
policies influencing the progress of European integration: the federal route enunciated by
Monnet-Schuman, and the route towards cooperation of states (confederate Europe) promoted
by de Gaulle. See Jonathan Story, and Guy de Carmoy, "France and Europe", in J. Story,
(ed.) The New Europe: Politics, Government and Economy since 1945, pp. 187, 204.
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amongst regional economies does not harm the interests of the
third parties, the EEC was bound to complete the customs union
within a certain period and substantially to cover all members
without discrimination. 29 As a result, the Six accelerated the
progress of the establishment of the European customs union
and subsequently reached the final stage in which duties were
abolished within the EEC, eighteen months ahead of schedule in
July 1968.
As the Common Market and the EFTA were in turn
established in 1958 and 1960, the US government anticipated a
considerable impact from regional trading blocs in Europe on
world trade. The Kennedy administration was very anxious that
the preferential trading blocs in Europe would divert trade
from the US markets to Western Europe and the planning of the
European common agricultural policy would adversely affect
American agricultural exports to Europe. Especially, the
European customs union provided a wider European market as the
common external tariff stimulated overseas investment in
Europe and away from the US. This would further aggravate the
US balance of payments." In 1961, when Britain announced that
it would apply for EEC membership, the message suggested to
the US that the EFTA countries may follow suit. The US
President John Kennedy in 1962 was urged to call for an
Atlantic partnership between the US and a uniting Europe to
negotiate for the liberalisation of international trade under
the auspices of the GATT. His trade proposals were made to
prevent the Western world dividing into regional trading
blocs. At that critical moment, President de Gaulle made use
of American demands to push through French policy to establish
29. R. C. Hine, The Political Economy of European Trade: An Introduction to the Trade Policies
of the EEC, (London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1985), p. 43.
30.Gerald Meier, Problems of Trade Policy, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1973), P. 26.
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• The basic regulations for the CAP were adopted in 1962. The acceptance of the CAP came at
the time of the establishment of the customs union in 1968, after a lengthy negotiation
within the EC. Jonathan Story, "Europe in the global state and market system", in J.
Story, (ed.), The New Europe: Politics, Government and Economy since 1945, (Oxford:
Blackwell, 1993), p. 28.
Gerald Meier, Problems of Trade Policy, p. 212.
Western statesmen institutionalised an international monetary order through the creation
of the IMF at Bretton Woods, New Hampshire in 1944, through which international liberal
trade and monetary systems came into being under American leadership. See David Blake, and
Robert Walters, The Politics of Global Economic Relations, 4th edition, (Englewood Cliffs,
New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1992), pp. 68-70.
31
32.
33.
the Common Agricultural Policy, 31
 because the French government
threatened to withdraw from the Community, if its agricultural
interests would not be recognised by its partners. 32 To secure
the Six's interests in the coming negotiation with the US and
to assure the management of the Common Market in a common
direction, other members of the EEC therefore agreed to adopt
the CAP.
During the 1960s, the issue of monetary cooperation was
global. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) acted under the
auspices of the US dollar as a major actor in this in
promoting credit assistance and examining changes in par
values. However, the US was subjected to continual current
account deficit and capital outflows, which resulted in the
weakness of the dollar and the instability of the Bretton
Woods System. 33 In addition, when the customs union and the CAP
were established in the EEC, the exchange-rate adjustments
appeared to disrupt the Common Market's functioning because of
the application of fixed common prices in some agricultural
products. The major
involving the French franc and the German
of the settlement of the crisis, a
following by a D-mark appreciation exposed
mechanism to manage economic and monetary
D-mark. As a result
franc depreciation
the EEC's lack of a
cooperation between
currency crisis burst out in 1968
its member states. This needed to be addressed. The great
attempt to create an economic and monetary union was made by
60
the Hague summit and was crystallized into the Werner Plan
which was submitted to the Council in October 1970. 34 Although
the impetus for an economic and monetary union was to some
extent derived from the EEC's dissatisfaction with the
fluctuation of their exchange-rate because this would easily
threaten the fledgeling CAP in terms of prices, the ambition
to secure greater monetary independence from the US was a
major driving force.
Throughout the 1960s, the six original countries of the
EC had achieved the customs union with the Common External
Tariff and the first common policy in agriculture by compound
efforts for internal political processes and policy response
to external restraints. In terms of political integration,
however, when General de Gaulle, the nationalist French
President, returned to power in 1958, European integration
came to be overshadowed by his controversial concept of the
confederate or intergovernmental form of Europe integration
that rejected Monnet's idea of federalism. De Gaulle's
ambitious plan was to construct a pan-European grouping on the
Continent based on a Franco-German axis.35
In 1961, the French government promoted the "Fouchet
Plan" for a union of states drafted by President de Gaulle,
which was to provide for confederate structures and to allow
national governments to preserve sovereignty in all important
areas. 35 The Plan which had a clear French perspective on the
European	 political	 future	 set	 up	 four	 permanent
34. Pierre Werner, the Prime Minister of Luxembourg, led a group of national and EEC officials
to prepare a report that scheduled the attainment of an economic and monetary union by
1980.
35. For more Gaullism and the Gaullist vision of Europe see Mally's analysis, The European
Community in Perspective, pp. 84-93.
36. The most obvious establishment was supposed to be the Council at the level of heads of
state or government whose decision was made by unanimous voting. For detail of the Plan
see Gerhard Mally, The European Community in Perspective: The New Europe, the United
States and the World, (London: Lexington Books, 1973), pp. 195-196.
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intergovernmental committees to promote policy integration in
foreign, defence, commercial and cultural affairs, which
incurred strong opposition from its five partners. In
particular for West Germany and Italy, the planning of
cooperation in defence and foreign policies would depart from
the Treaty of Rome and weaken the EEC and NATO to which they
were very much committed. 37
 The Benelux countries which feared
French domination within an intergovernmental European
structure of cooperation argued that the fundamental change of
the structure raised in the Plan should be delayed until the
problems of British accession were resolved. 38 The discussion
of the Fouchet Plan was then abandoned and never resumed.
During the 1960s, European political integration was
inactive due to a series of policy conflicts between France
and its allies. France disagreed with the US dollar privilege
over its exemption from the rules of international exchange
and never fully shared the American containment approach to
East-West relations. Under President de Gaulle, France
challenged the whole structure of the Cold War and the Western
alliance. As a result, France took action in 1963 to propose a
new international reserve currency to replace the dollar." In
protesting against the Atlantic alliance's domination in West
European defence, and against the lack of credibility of
NATO's nuclear strategy, in 1966 France withdrew from military
integration within NATO. Moreover, although Paris agreed the
37. Derek Urwin, The Community of Europe: A History of European Integration Since 1945,
(London: Longman, 1992), p. 106.
38. Ibid.
39. De Gaulle was convinced by his economic adviser Jacques Rueff that the inflow of dollars
was to be blamed for causing French inflation. Facing balance-of-deficit, other countries
had to pay in foreign currencies or gold, while the US could simply print its currency to
cover external debts. The dollar privilege granted it "the capacity to finance any foreign
policy activities it might choose." For detailed argument see Henry R. Nau, The Myth of
America's Decline: Leading the World Economy into the 1990s, (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1990), pp. 140-142; also Blake, and Walters, The Politics of Global Economic
Relations, pp. 74-78.
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EEC interests to be represented by the Commission in the
Kennedy Round, de Gaulle's suspicion of the extensive American
influence in the talks had never eased away. The widening gap
-
between France and the US resulted in France twice vetoing the
British application to join the EEC in 1963 and 1967. As far
as the US was concerned, the British membership of the EEC
would reinforce the Atlantic alliance and support the US
negotiation target of tariff-free trade with the EEC in the
Kennedy Round. 4° Indeed, de Gaulle feared that the British
presence in the EEC would be threatening the leading position
of France and, most importantly, the British membership would
give the Americans "a vote in the EEC". 41 During a meeting in
1966, de Gaulle told the British Prime Minister Wilson, that
France still did not know whether it would be possible for
Britain to follow any policy distinct from that of the United
States 42
In 1965, France boycotted the meetings of the Council of
Ministers due to clashing with its counterparts over the
questions of a common agricultural policy and of establishing
the EC's own resources and budgetary control. What France
really protested about was not the unsatisfactory bargain in a
common agricultural policy but the federal intention that the
other five put through in the negotiation. 43 However, seven
months later, to end the French "empty chair crisis", the Six
40• For the EEC and the GATT see R. C. Hine, The Political Economy of European Trade: An
Introduction to the Trade Policies of the EEC, pp. 78-81; for American perspective see
Gary C. Hufbauer, Europe 1992: An American Perspective, (Washington, D. C.: The Brookings
Institution, 1990), p. 5; also Gerald Meier, Problems of Trade Policy, p. 26.
41• See Buzan, et al., The European Security Order Recast: Scenarios for the Post-Cold War
Era, p. 146; also Urwin, The Community of Europe: A History of European Integration Since
1945, pp. 120-125.
92. See Ben Pimlott, Harold Wilson, (Biography), (London: Harper Collins Publishers, 1992), p.
441.
93. For more details of de Gaulle's opposition to the five see Urwin, The Community of Europe:
A History of European Integration Since 1945, pp. 107-113; the issue of the Parliamentary
control of budget was the main quarrel between France and the five, see Pinder, European
Community: The Building of a Onion, pp. 12-13.
63
managed to regenerate integration momentum by reaching the
Luxembourg Compromise (in which the French side asserted a
right of veto in the Council whenever their important national
interests are at stake, while the other five maintained their
stand for the majority vote. This virtually amended the
principle of majority voting introduced by the Treaty of
Rome). This Compromise implied a step in the direction of
increased national control over the EC, which was partly to be
blamed for blocking further economic and political integration
through approaches from transnational institution in the 1970s
and 1980s. Despite the progress of European integration being
deterred by political crises, in 1965 the Six still pushed
through the Merger Treaty to converge three Communities as the
European Community (implemented in 1967).
Soon after President Georges Pompidou took office after
de Gaulle in 1969, European integration development entered
the post-Gaullist era of optimism with more encouraging
achievements. For example, as the new government of West
Germany headed by Willy Brandt decided to go for the
"Ostpolitik" (Eastern policy), in order to maintain West
Germany's firm commitment to the Community Pompidou was urged
to regenerate the momentum for further integration. In
addition, the turbulence in the international monetary system,
as it became apparent that the dollar and sterling were in
deep trouble, jeopardised Europe's interests and stimulated
the Six to further cooperation. Pompidou called for a meeting
of the heads of government which brought about the Hague
summit in 1969. The summit was an important turning point for
European integration in that it cleared the way to the
enlargement of the EC, met consensus on the development of
common policies, reaffirmed ultimate goals for political
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integration, and approved a systematic development of the EC's
own resources.
Thereafter, up to 1973 the momentum of European
Report of the
and the Werner
1970,45 which
integration was fuelled by the Davignon
Commission for foreign policy cooperation,44
Report for economic and monetary union in
encouraged the successful Treaty of Accession in 1972 between
the EC and Britain, Ireland, Denmark and Norway (After the
hard negotiation with the EC over the sensitive issue of
fisheries, the Norwegians in a referendum rejected membership
of the EC by 54 per cent votes against and 46 per cent for
accession). Moreover, in 1972 the first summit meeting of the
Nine in Paris with the participation of Britain, Ireland, and
Denmark appealed for European union "to recognize clearly the
unity of its interests, ...(and) to make its voice heard in
world affairs", 46 as the EC became pursuing more independent
foreign policy from of the United States. 47 Despite the Paris
summit's further confirmation of the Commission as a partner
of national governments rather than a supranational entity,
the optimism of member states' consensus for European
integration was raised to its peak.
44. As stipulated in the Report "Being concerned to achieve progress towards political
unification, the Governments should decide to cooperate in the field of foreign policy."
Report by the Foreign ministers of the Member States on the Problems of Political
Unification (Davignon Report), adopted in Luxembourg on October 27, 1970, Bulletin of the
European Communities, 11/1970, p. 11.
45. Report to the Council and the Commission on the Realisation by stages of Economic and
Monetary Union in the Community, (Werner Report), Supplement to Bulletin of the European
Communities, 11/1970.
46. The Opening Address by President Pompidou in Communique of the Summit Conference of the
Heads of State of the New Europe in Paris, October 19-20, 1972.
47. In the early 1970s there was an upsurge of popular movements in Europe opposed to US
international policy. In particular they were hostile to the US involvement in the Vietnam
War. See John Palmer, Europe Without America: The Crisis in Atlantic Relations, (Oxford:
Oxford University press, 1987), p. 48.
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2.2. 1973-1980: GLOBAL ECONOMIC RECESSION AND THE PARALYSIS OF
EUROPEAN INTEGRATION
By 1973 the member states of the EC seemed to have
reached a certain consensus on the necessity of pushing for
further political and economic integration. Furthermore, the
new French President Giscard d'Estaing and West Germany's
Chancellor Helmut Schmidt shared in common the idea and
objectives of summit meetings in the development of the EC and
thus reinforced the axis of Franco-German cooperation which
anchored the momentum of European integration. However, since
the first oil crisis struck the world to the brink of
recession in the winter of 1973-1974, the upheavals in
international economic and political systems made the EC's
member states hesitate to commit themselves further and so
aggravated their policy differences from each other. As a
result, international economic challenges to the EC became
much more critical for European integration than the internal
political processes. After the first enlargement of the EC,
any further move forward political integration had actually
been blocked by the dispute over keeping the costly CAP and
the problem of budget contributions.
While the oil crisis brought about an attempt by Third
World countries to create a new international economic order,
the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) began
to challenge the West's economic dominance in the aftermath of
the oil crisis. 48 The collapse of the Bretton Woods System of
which fixed currency values had acted as a stable
international monetary system, led to the onset of global
economic recession. This collapse symbolised the relative
48
. Stephen D. Krasner, Structural Conflict: The Third World Against Global Liberalism,
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), p. 96.
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decline of American hegemony in international economics.
Western Europe now faced an economic challenge not only from
Japan but also from the fast growing Asian NICs. At the end of
the decade, when Western Europe fell into a period of
industrial failure and economic depression, industrialists in
association with politicians sought to complete a single
market in order to revive industrial dynamics and economic
strength - the engine of economic integration. They appealed
for a return from regression against European integration and
a renewed momentum for an improved economy.
2.2.1. The Change of the International Economic System and
Eurosclerosis
The late 1970s and early 1980s have been widely regarded
as the apogee of Europessimism. It was not only because of the
oil crises and the global economic recession, but also because
of the declining competitiveness of European industry and of
business confidence, and a new challenge of competition for
market share from the Far East, Japan and the Asian NICs
(ANICs). 49 West European economic performances were lagging far
behind their principal rivals, the US and Japan, as well as
the NICs to some extent. 5° The economic downturn facing the
Europeans derived partly from their fragmented national
markets with the various regulations set by different national
governments, compared to the unified single domestic markets
49. In terms of European industrial competitiveness, this new wave of competition began in the
late 1970s, which was described as the third wave. In this, European economies were
characterised by faltering economic growth different from the previous two waves of
competition, e.g. differences in industrial productivity in the 19508 and technology gaps
in the mid-1960s, in the context of growing economies. See Commission of the European
Communities, "Completing the internal market for industrial products", Document, by
Jacques Pelkmans, 1986, p. 34.
50. See John Pinder, "Our Industrial Competitors And The management Gap: Europe, Japan, The
NICs And The New Technologies", Policy Studies, V. 5, (July 1984).
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of the United States and Japan. 51
 The Europeans were losing
ground in high technology sectors to the US and Japanese
producers on the one hand, and in some consumer goods' sectors
to the relative low cost producers on the other.
Since the 1970s, the global political and economic system
has been going through a dramatic change. Oil price rises came
on top of the collapse of the Bretton Woods System in August
1971, when the United States unilaterally repudiated its
commitment to exchange gold for dollars. 52 Although American
power was not in decline in absolute terms, the relative
decline of its influence in economic and political arenas was
incontestable. 53
 The international system of bipolarity had
begun running towards one of multipolarity. After the US
loosened its control on the international monetary system, the
shift to flexible exchange rates and the turbulence on the
world energy market left the EC member states suddenly facing
fluctuating exchange rates and an increase in their cost of
production. As a result, the EC in 1979 launched the European
Monetary System (EMS) to stabilize its member states' currency
values. It was emphasised that a hegemony, either a power or a
mechanism, was necessary to the stability of international
regimes. 54
 While the United States was unable to dominate the
world economic system, the world economic order was therefore
characterised by more of a multilateral than a bilateral
51
. Such as "Europe's Technology Gap", The Economist, (24 November, 1984), P. 103.
52. Some studies have gone through the history of the Bretton Woods system in detail. See Joan
Spero, The Politics of International Economic Relations, pp. 48-55;and Robert Gilpin, The
Political Economy of International Relations, (New Jersey: Princeton University Press,
1987), pp. 134-142; as well as Blake, and Walters, The Politics of Global Economic
Relations, pp. 74-79.
53. Though some other studies disagreed with the argument of the decline of American power,
such as Susan Strange's article " The Persistent Myth of Lost Hegemony" International
Organisation, 41: 4, (Autumn 1987), Gilpin suggested that it will be more accurate to
realise the decline in relative terms. See Gilpin, The Political Economy of International
Relations, pp. 344-345.
54. Robert Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy,
(New Jersey: Princeton University press, 1984), chapter 2.
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pattern, and preoccupation with more regional than global
issues. These international factors together contributed to
"Eurosclerosis" and so to the delay of European integration.
While the EC was incapable of tackling external challenges
collectively and effectively, individual member states
resorted to their own national prescriptions.
The Energy Crisis and International Economic Challenges to
Europe
During the 1970s, in terms of its political and economic
power, Americaiks
 was facing a relative decline. West Germany
and Japan had successfully begun to challenge the US'
domination in international markets. However, this challenge
has not brought about a new political framework for the
international economic system. The US might have withdrawn
from shouldering economic management alone, but on the other
hand, the EC and Japan were either unable to take charge or
not inclined to do so. 55 For three decades since the end of the
War, apart from its security dependence on the US, European
prosperity had been deeply dependent upon the world political
economy of "American-centred regimes", which rested on three
set of benefits: a stable international monetary system,
provision of open markets for goods, and access to oil at a
stable price. 55 Under the American-centred regimes, Western
industrialised countries were therefore able to enjoy cheap
resources, fuel and raw materials.
55. Gilpin argues that in the early 1980s Western Europe's poor economic performance made the
likelihood of its being the leader of the international economic system improbable, and
Japanese export-led trade structure, which is deeply dependent upon overseas markets and
unlikely to open its domestic market to other trade partners, has resulted in its lack of
qualification to become the leader. See Gilpin, The Political Economy of International
Relations, p. 376.
56. Keohane,. After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy, p. 139.
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TABLE 2.3. CRUDE PETROLEUM: THE CHANGING STRUCTURE OF
PRODUCTION (in percentage)
Country and Group	 1955 1960 1970 1971 1973 1975
Developed economies 48.0 37.9 24.0 23.7 21.0 22.2
Developing countries 41.3 46.5 57.8 58.8 61.0 56.1
Planned economies	 10.7 15.6 17.3 17.5 18.0 21.8
USA	 44.5 33.9 21.0 19.4 16.4 17.3
OPEC
	 36.2 41.0 51.4 52.6 55.5 49.7
Source: World Economic Survey, UN, 1975, p. 68.
During the first oil crisis in 1973-74, OPEC exerted a
decisive control over the price and supply of oil and broke
through the domination of the "seven sisters", international
oil multinationals. 57 Developed countries shared 48 per cent of
the crude petroleum market in 1955, but saw their share
decline to 20 per cent in 1974, as a result of the rise of
OPEC. (For changes in the share of the United States and OPEC
refer also to Table 2.3). In the aftermath of the energy
TABLE 2.4. PRIMARY COMMODITIES IN SELECTION: CHANGES IN
RELATIVE PRICES, 1970-1975
index of commodity price relative to the
unit value of manufactures (1960-1969 = 100)
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975
petroleum 87.9 97.4 103.5 118.4 328.8 296.6
sugar 94.9 98.4 116.5 132.1 291.1 211.4
zinc 101.7 102.1 113.4 181.4 227.8 147.6
cocoa 107.5 79.9 86.5 138.3 172.5 120.5
tin 106.6 95.6 95.2 101.6 146.5 113.8
maize 99.9 92.7 87.8 122.4 135.5 103.3
Source: Information here was based on the United Nations,
Monthly Bulletin of Statistics, and selected from
World Economic Survey 1975, UN, p. 49.
crisis, in other major commodity markets producers at once
attempted to raise prices by organising cartels, e.g. in the
57
. The "seven sisters" international oil companies were five American (Standard Oil of New
Jersey, known as Exxon today, Standard Oil of California, Mobil, Gulf, and Texaco), one
British (British Petroleum), and one Ango-Dutch (Royal Dutch-Shell). Spero, The Politics
of International Economic Relations, pp. 293-295.
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markets for bauxite, bananas, and copper. 58 Consequently, as
part of the Third World's "trade strategy", not only did oil
prices go up dramatically," but also the prices of non-oil
energy products (refer to Appendix F-2.4) 58 and of other major
commodities soared (Table 2.4). The upsurge in commodity
prices between late 1972 and early 1974 was soon reflected in
manufacturing costs, and further resulted in the high prices
manufactures passed on in the following years (Compare
petroleum per barrel prices in 1973 and in 1974, and wheat per
ton in 1973 and in 1974, with the index number of export unit
value of manufactures in the same period in Table 2.5).
TABLE 2.5. CHANGING PRICE RELATIONSHIPS: ENERGY, FOOD, AND
MANUFACTURES, 1965-1975
YEAR	 petroleum*	 wheat**	 manufactures***
1965	 1.80	 59.47	 103
1970	 1.80	 51.61	 117
1971	 2.19	 61.53	 124
1972	 2.47	 69.78	 134
1973	 3.27	 138.02	 156
1974	 11.58	 164.97	 186
1975	 11.53	 143.07	 213
Note: * dollars per barrel
** dollars per ton
*** index of export unit value (1963=100)
Source: World Economic Survey 1975, UN, p. 48.
In Table 2.6, indices of non-fuel primary commodity
prices display an upward trend from 1973 to 1985, which
resulted in increasing prices of commodity exports of both
58. Ibid., pp. 331-338.
59. "For the industrial country group as a whole, the average price of petroleum products to
end-users rose by 162 per cent from 1973 to the first quarter of 1979". See World Economic
Outlook, IMF, (May 1980), pp. 74-75. In real terms, oil product prices increased by 58 per
cent from 1972 to 1978; and from 1978 to 1980 petroleum products rose by 67 per cent.
World Economic Outlook, 1981, p. 99.
60. For industrial countries as a group, average energy product prices rose in nominal terms
by 147 per cent from January 1973 to the first quarter of 1979. World Economic Outlook,
(May 1980), p. 75. In real terms, energy as a whole in the period of 1972 to 1978
increased 48 per cent; the following two years energy prices raised 35 per cent. World
Economic Outlook, 1981, p. 99.
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in US dollars	 deflated ofby prices
(1980 = 100)	 manufactures
DCs	 ICs	 DCs	 ICs
1970	 36.8	 37.4	 107.9	 109.8
1972	 36.1	 41.1	 92.7	 105.7
1973	 55.4	 69.8	 121.0	 152.4
1974	 71.4	 80.4	 131.3	 148.0
1975	 59.2	 67.8	 95.1	 108.9
1976-79	 82.8	 77.3	 109.9	 103.2
1980	 100.0
	 100.0	 100.0	 100.0
1982	 77.4	 82.1	 83.4	 88.5
1984	 86.0	 87.1	 99.4	 100.8
1985	 75.4	 76.2	 86.8	 87.8
industrial and developing countries. In terms of manufacturing
prices, developing countries had a much better competitive
position than industrial countries in most of the period
recorded except for 1979. In other words, as far as trade is
concerned, the price increases, which in industrial countries
was much higher, in fact, did not result from the shortage of
supply markets. (Rather, it was partly because of the
resurrection of Third World consciousness that they could
prevent their resources from being exploited by the developed
countries, and partly because those developing countries
supplying oil raised their political profile towards the West
and made claims to play a major role in the management of
their resources. )61
TABLE 2.6. INDICES OF NON-FUEL PRIMARY COMMODITY PRICES, 1970-
1985
Note: DCs: commodity exports of developing countries.
ICs: commodity exports of industrial countries.
Source: World Economic Outlook, IMF, (April 1986).
In the end, the high profile that the developing
countries took, led in 1974 to demands for movement towards a
61
. Caroline Thomas, In Search of Security: the Third World in International Relations,
(Brighton: Wheatsheaf Books, 1987), p. 76.
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new international economic order in order to push forward a
new international commodity regime in accordance with
developing countries' interests. 62 Meanwhile, in the EC, the
rising price of raw materials on which industrial growth was
based resulted in the increase of production costs and further
caused rises 'of prices to consumer's.° (The EC's annual
increase rates in consumer prices accounted for 8.4 per cent
TABLE 2.7. THE GROWTH RATE
JAPAN (percentage)
OF REAL GDP IN THE EC, USA AND
1960/70 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1979
EC 4.6 4.0 6.0 1.6 -1.6 5.0 2.3 3.1
USA 3.8 5.8 5.4 -1.3 -1.0 3.5 4.9 1.5
Japan 10.7 8.9 9.8 -1.0 2.4 6.0 5.4 5.7
Source: Eurostat.
TABLE 2.8. THE EC GROSS FIXED CAPITAL FORMATION IN VOLUME
TERMS (average annual growth rate in 1970 prices)
1960-70	 1970-73	 1973-76	 1976-78
5.7	 3.9
Source: Commission of European Communities, "Changes in
industrial structure in the European economies since
the oil crisis", European Economy, special issue,
1979.
TABLE 2.9. THE EC PRIVATE CONSUMPTION IN VOLUME (average
annual growth rate in 1970 prices)
1960-70	 1970-73
	
1973-76	 1976-78
4.6	 4.6	 2.2
	
2.8
Source: as Table 2.8.
in 1973, 13.4 per cent in 1974 and 12.8 per cent in 1975). The
increase in inflation brought the EC .a slowdown in economic
62. The NIE0 was also carrying a hope of developing countries to adjust the North-South
economic relationship. Ibid., p. 78.
63. In 1974 and 1975, wages in the EC countries were increased to keep up with the direct
inflationary effects of the oil price increase. See Commission of European Communities,
"Annual Economic Report 1979-1980", 4, (November 1979), p. 32.
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growth (see Table 2.8, also Appendix T-2.1, T-2.2, T-2.3, and
T-2.4), rising unemployment rate," increased tension in
industrial relations, declining investment (Table 2.8), weak
demand (Table 2.9) and a continual decline of business
confidence following the substantial loss of comparative
advantages inside and outside domestic markets.
The crisis facing European industry can be mainly
attributed to exogenous factors which diminished its
comparative advantage in industrial products over its rivals.
The ageing European industrial structure could not keep pace
with the new wave of challenges, such as the increasing price
of energy and raw materials, higher costs of industrial
production, the need to increase R & D investment in
innovative products for staying competitive, and the need to
increase spending on a higher standard of pollution control.
For example, the Chairman of Rank Xerox (UK), Derek Hornby,
recorded that by the time of the outbreak of the first oil
crisis Rank Xerox was highly profitable and successful. It was
the 1973 oil crisis and the change of regimes in business
competition from new Far Eastern rivals with their low
manufacturing costs which upset its leading market share for
the rest of the 1970s."
In fact, up to the early 1980s, some European countries,
such as West Germany and Britain, had performed remarkably in
industrial restructuring to revive their economies in the face
of external challenges." In private sectors, many firms had
64. The EC9 accounted for 2.7 per cent unemployed people of total civilian labour force in
1973, 4.0 per cent in 1975, 5.0 per cent in 1979 and 9.1 per cent in 1983, for details
refer to Appendix T-2.5. The information for the nine EC countries based on Eurostat do
not include Greece, Spain and Portugal.
65. Rank Xerox's market share at this time was reduced from 90 per cent to about 45 per cent.
See Hornby, "Can we teach ourselves to change?", The Royal Bank of Scotland Review, 151,
(September 1986), p. 15.
66. West Germany successfully adjusted its industrial structure to face up to competition in
the early 1970s. See "Changes in industrial structure in the European economies since the
oil crisis 1973-78", European Economy, Special issue, (1979), p. 79. The Conservative
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survived from the general economic slowdown of the 1970s by
carrying out radical restructuring processes. For example,
Philips, the Dutch multinational enterprise, which
restructured the character of its industry by trimming off its
scattered overseas factories, had successfully improved their
competitiveness in countering strong industrial rivalry.67
After re-organising its management team, shedding excessive
work force and raising capital, Italian Olivetti survived from
recession and became Europe's biggest office automation and
data processing group in the early 1980s."
Changes in The International Monetary System
When President Nixon of the United States unilaterally
announced the end of the convertibility of US dollars to gold
in August 1971, the Bretton Woods System on which the stable
monetary system and most industrial countries were dependent
came to an abrupt end. Following many efforts and tedious
negotiations among the Group of Ten, mainly on whether the
other industrial countries' currencies should be revalued
relative to the dollar or whether the dollar should be
devalued straight away," a compromise brought about a system
government in Britain in the 1980s set a new industrial policy to transfer control of
nationalised industry sectors to private ownership, and at the same time to liberalise the
market through competition, as well as to reduce the powers of public sector unions.
Christine M. E. Whitehead, "Experience With Privatisation in Britain", in Keith Cowling
and Horst Tomann, (eds.), Industrial Policy After 1992-an Anglo-German perspective,
(Anglo-German Foundation for the Study of Industrial Society: London, 1990). For the
details of privatisation in other OECD countries, see Barrie Stevens, "Prospects for
privatisation in OECD countries", National Westminster Bank Quarterly Review, August 1992.
67. In Europe alone Philips closed 40 factories by 1986. Huge and unprecedented lay-off plans
were considered necessary to the industry for competitiveness. See Graham Turner, "Inside
Europe's Giant Companies: Cultural Revolution at Philips", Long Range Planning, 19: 4,
(1986).
68. Since Carlo de Benedetti was recruited as the CEO of Olivetti in 1978, Olivetti had the
entire first-line management removed and 14,000 workforce cut. He has turned the company
into the biggest player in Europe. See Graham Turner, "Inside Europe's Giant Companies:
Olivetti Goes bear-hunting", Long Range Planning, 19: 2, (1986), pp. 13-15.
69. The Group of Ten: Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Sweden, Canada, Japan,
the United Kingdom, and the United States. Joan Spero, The Politics of International
Economic Relations, p. 46.
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of exchange rates by bargaining between different currencies.
The United States faced a balance of payment deficit in the
1970s. As many economists believed that it could be amended by
a devaluation of the dollar or realignment with other
currencies, the American government was trying to push the
idea as a part of its policy, known as the Nixon Doctrine, to
reduce international burdens. Nevertheless, most other
industrial countries with either a large amount of dollar
holdings or with balance of payment surplus were reluctant to
press ahead with a realignment or a domestic adjustment
between their currencies and the dollar, even though the
dollar was actually at risk.
In the 1960s, as far as the EC was concerned, exchange
rate adjustments were the major factor influencing the Customs
Union and the CAP. 7° Following continuing US current account
deficits in the first half of the 1970s, divergence in
economic performances appeared dramatically inside Europe
where inflation increased sharply. In five of the EC
countries, inflation rates were well above 20 per cent. 71 Owing
to the increasing intra-EC trade flows, the members of the EC
with experience of the CAP, based on common prices and relying
on stable exchange rates, found themselves in an awkward
position to cope with the monetary turbulence. In particular,
those industries dependent on exports either to EC neighbours
or to other trade partners suffered from a great uncertainty
in prices. There was an early transitional exchange rate
mechanism, the "snake", derived from the Werner Report of
1970. 72
 The idea of establishing an optimum currency area to
70. For details of the development of European monetary matters and the exchange rate effect
to the CAP see Daniel Gros, and Niels Thygesen, European Monetary Integration: From the
European Monetary System to European Monetary Union, (London: Longman, 1992), pp. 9-15.
71. Ibid., p. 25.
72. The "snake" from 1972-1978 was initially known as the "snake in the (dollar) tunnel". The
margin of bilateral fluctuations against the US dollar were agreed at 4.5 per cent, +
2.25. For the detailed development of the "snake" see Gros, and Thygesen, European
Monetary Integration, pp. 15-24.
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stabilise exchange markets re-emerged as the main topic on the
EC agenda in terms of integration.
Most European industries' experience was of dramatically
waning price competitiveness due to volatile currencies. For
example, the international price competitiveness of the UK
mechanical engineering industry deteriorated simply because
the rapid appreciation of sterling resulted in the average
price of machinery exported from the UK being increased by
about 10 per cent." From 1975 to 1979 British mechanical
engineering industry's productivity (output per employee) rose
by only 4 per cent. Over the same period, productivity (value
added per employee) of the West German mechanical engineering
industry increased by 15 per cent, about 50 per cent higher
than the UK's. That of Japan surged ahead by 52 per cent. 74 In
general, British industry in most of the 1970s was afflicted
by lower productivity and higher costs. While productivity of
British industry's annual growth rate fell from 6.5 per cent
in 1973 to 0.3 per cent in 1974, -0.4 per cent in 1975, 0.4
per cent in 1979 and -4.2 per cent in 1980, its labour cost
per unit of output increased dramatically from 7.0 pr cent in
1973 to 22.2 per cent in 1974, 33.6 per cent in 1975 and 23.3
per cent in 1980. 75
 The appreciation of sterling further
worsened its competitive position in world markets. As a
result, it suffered a loss of market share. The relationship
between exchange rates and industry was critical to industrial
survival. For instance, relative unit export values in
national currencies and in dollars produced a different
competitive position in different countries. In national
currency terms the USA, Germany, Switzerland and Japan
73. M. W. Henry, "The competitiveness of the UK mechanical engineering industry: The effects
of fluctuating exchange rates", Barclays Review, 56: 2, (May 1981), p. 36.
74. Ibid., p. 38.
75. Changes from 1974 to 1981: UK industry's productivity rose only 1.2 per cent, while the
average EC's increased 2.9 per cent; UK industry's labour cost increased 16.9 per cent,
while the average EC's grew 10.5 per cent. Information is based on Eurostat from
Commission of European Communities, European Economy, 10, (March 1982).
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improved their competitive position in 1982-1985 (see Appendix
F-2.5). However,
"the disruptive effects of unstable exchange markets and
especially the problem of the weak dollar led to
political support for a new European initiative to fix
rates within the EEC."Th
For the Europeans, the establishment of a common monetary
system with fixed exchange rates would mean that the Europeans
could avoid the costs of converting one currency to another
within EC markets. Thus, in July 1978 the heads of the EC
countries in the European Council agreed to "a scheme for the
creation of closer monetary cooperation leading to a zone of
monetary stability in Europe." 77 The EMS was a system with:
firstly, fixed exchange rates among the members and a floating
rate with the outside world; secondly, the creation of a
European Currency Unit (ECU) which is a basket of EEC
currencies serving as a basis for fixing exchange rates; and,
thirdly, a network of credit arrangements and plans for a
future European Monetary Fund for financing payment imbalances
and supporting the fixed rates.78
2.2.2. A Return from The Regression of European Economic
Integration
As the previously stable international political and
economic framework that European countries had taken for
granted began to dissolve, European countries realised that
76
. Spero, The Politics of International Economic Relations, p. 68.
77. "Resolution of the European Council of 5 December 1978 on the establishment of the
European Monetary System (EMS) and related matters", Bulletin of the European Communities,
12-1978, p. 10.
78. Spero, The Politics of International Economic Relations, p. 68.
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their original consensus for integration had failed to provide
a political and economic framework in Western Europe capable
of addressing the crisis. Further, the global recession almost
resulted in the collapse of the consensus. Williams has noted
how "global economic conditions were making government more
protective, and the road to integration had become far more
difficult." 79
 European Industrialists therefore appealed for a
higher level of economic integration to be achieved in order
to face up to the external challenges arising from recession.
Although the late 1960s' optimism about integration was unable
to protect member states' common interests from global
recession, it was not the case that the faith was completely
lost in the capacity of West European integration to survive
such problems in the future. The EC seemed to lack flexibility
and accountability to respond to the changing global economic
conditions on behalf of its member states, because the
essential limitation of intergovernmentalism on regional
integration itself easily choked off any common policy towards
external issues, especially those which contended with
national trade policy. Conversely, the limited extent of West
European integration showed that a large scale of regional
solidarity was necessary to meet external challenges. Etienne
has noted that "the maintenance of a common position with
regard to external development became a favourite method of
strengthening internal cohesion. ”80
As national governments began to move towards
protectionism, individual member states appeared determined to
follow their own national policies to address the effect of
the oil crisis at the expense of others' interests. Moreover,
79. Williams, The European Community - The Contradictions of Integration, p. 51.
80. Henri Etienne, "Community Integration: The External Environment", Journal of Common Market
Studies, 18: 4, (June 1980), p. 298.
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to control the EC development, the Giscard-Schmidt approach of
European integration favoured intergovernmental cooperation
rather than transnational institutions. This regularised the
practice of summitry into the European Council in 1974.
(France and West Germany were wary of the Commission getting
too powerful and pushing integration too far). The function of
the powerful Council was to set "new targets and lay down the
guidelines for future progress, modify or abandon existing
programmes, and resolve disputes between the members at the
highest level. " 81 Thereafter, as the Council was influential at
the heart of the EC but remained outside the EC framework, the
EC had actually become an intergovernmental organisation with
decision-making taken by way of continual bargaining in the
Council, which was not based on a sense of European interest
but of individual national interests. (The European Council
received its legal recognition within the EC framework only
when the Single European Act was adopted.)
During this period, EC members may claim some credibility
for harmonising their political and economic stand in
international affairs, such as organising the Conference on
Security and Cooperation in Europe in 1975 and in
international trade negotiations. It did not mean that
individual member states would willingly commit more to the
Community. Rather, economic integration was hampered by the
rise of national protectionism. Despite working hand in hand
for the Common Market, in the face of external challenges
individual member states retained their trade barriers against
the exchange of goods, personnel, and services against each
other. In terms of building-up a transnational community,
there was little to be credited in progressive integration.
81 •
 Urwin, The Community of Europe: A History of European Integration Since 1945, p. 175.
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Summitry intergovernmental cooperation could well stir up
political reasons for national protectionism. From 1975 to the
mid-1980s, the agenda of summit meetings was fully occupied
with the quarrels of reforming the CAP and the prolonged
British complaint of its excessive contribution to the EC
budget. In particular, after Margaret Thatcher became the
British Prime Minister in 1979, she tried to argue the issue
of the CAP and its budgetary complaint together, while her
European partners preferred to see them as separate. As a
result of internal political entanglements within the EC, no
promising progress towards integration was made during this
period except for the establishment of the European Monetary
System.
Facing the new international economic setting, European
political elites and industrialists realised that they were
not likely to keep their superiority, or even to survive from
the competition, unless they could work together. Despite
industrial restructuring they were still not able to compete
with their main trade partners, the United States, Japan and
the NICs to some extent, because their counterparts had factor
advantages of either market scale or lower costs of production
and strong productivity with which the fragmented European
markets could not compete. It seemed that merely restructuring
individual industries was not an absolute guarantee of staying
competitive since the international business setting was
undergoing a great revolution in respect of its structure and
market formation. 82 What more the EC could do was to seek for
industrial cooperation at European level and the completion of
. For example Japanese enterprises' lean techniques were not only reducing the large
proportion of labour by automation but also effectively eliminating the cost of production
by specialising the network of factories and standardising their products. Japanese swift
variable cost of production (wage) to fixed cost (equipment and machinery), specialise the
function of each factory within their management network and create "Flexible
manufacturing systems". See "Can Europe compete?", Fortune, (December 2, 1991), pp. 50-51.
As a result, the industry lowers the cost of production, increases profits, and promotes
industrial efficiency. See "Jobs and technology", The Economist, (March 24, 1984), pp. 67-
68.
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the internal market. While internal political stalemate
thwarted any forward step of European integration, there was
increasing dissatisfaction with the European "uncommon market"
from the grass-roots voice of the business community calling
for European industrial collaboration and market integration.
Many European industrialists and politicians looked
increasingly favourably towards the establishment of a single
European market in order to strengthen European industrial
competitiveness by taking advantage of scale economies.
For example, Wisse Dekker of Philips, Carlo de Benedetti
of Olivetti, the Italian office-machinery maker, Helmut
Maucher of Nest16, the Swiss food giant, and Dieter Spethmann
of Thyssen, the West German steel maker, believe that "
becoming big in a big internal market is the only way to stay
internationally competitive." 83 In the case of Philips, it
experienced a slipping share of world markets, so "Philips's
trading profits dwindled from 9 per cent of annual sales in
1974 to 4 per cent in 1980". 84 Dekker complained that for
Philips the most galling obstacle to becoming more competitive
was Europe's uncommon market which "denies Philips the big,
open domestic market that gives American and Japanese
competitors such a strong launching pad into world markets."85
Similarly, Fabrizio Galimberti, Chief economist of Fiat,
points out baldly that "Potential economies of scale were not
being realised because political realities and the
segmentation of European markets prevented rationalisation of
supply. " 86 Robin Biggam, the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of
BICC Plc, the UK largest road builder, states that:
"the creation of an effective Common Market in Europe
could of itself reverse the trends of this century when
firstly the US and latterly Japan achieved a much higher
. "European Co-operation: Bosses want the common market Brussels never built", The
Economist, (May 26, 1984), p. 75.
84. The Economist, (January 5, 1985), p. 66.
85. Ibid., p. 67.
86. Galimberti, "Getting Fiat back on the road", Long Range Planning, 19: 1, (1986), 25.
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rate of growth than Europe, and this represents the
opportunity of Europe to us as industrialists."87
Urging a common industrial strategy, the Chairman of the
French electronics giant Thomson International, Jean Caillot,
stresses that:
"Europe must be much more than a Common Market. Europe
must be a genuine economic Community capable protecting
the social advantages ... . This status can only be
achieved with a powerful European industry based on a
common industrial strategy that will guarantee Europe's
competitiveness on the whole market. 1,88
Apart from the big corporations demanding integration,
other businessmen were also very eager to see a "genuine"
common market. For instance, according to the Institute of
Directors, a London based professional association for company
directors: "British Business was growing enthusiastic for
using the EC as a vehicle for economic recovery" and agreed
that the targets of the common market should be speeded up by
the end of 1988. 89
 Moreover, when Jacques Delors presided over
the meeting of the European Commission in early 1985, he
pointed out that "it was easier to tackle problems
collectively than individually. There were multiplying effects
over and above what one country could do on its own."98
Earlier, Britain and Italy had agreed "on the need to push the
EC forward into a new phase of industrial integration that
will enable Europe to compete effectively with America and
Japan in new technology". 91 To create a genuine internal
87
. International Business Intelligence, 1992-Planning for the Engineering Industries,
(London: Butterworth & Co Ltd. and Eurofi Plc., 1989), P. 433.
88. Based on a presentation at the Financial Times Conference: World Electronics - Europe's
Role in an International Industry, London 26-27 April, 1989, See Ibid., p. 418.
89. "UK institute calls for 'genuine' common market", Financial Times, (1 April, 1985), P. 2.
90. The Times, (8 January, 1985), p. 6.
91. " EEC 'needs industrial unity' to match competitors", The Guardian, (20 October, 1984), p.
4; also British Business, (26 October, 1984), p. 313.
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market, Helmut Kohl, the Chancellor of West Germany, argues
that "We must also encourage the convergence of our national
economies. We should also make greater use of the
opportunities for industrial cooperation than in the past."92
One European People's Party's study on the recovery of the
European economy stated that:
"Europe's inability to apply technological advance to the
dissemination of innovations in both new and traditional
products and production processes is becoming fully
apparent. This is the most serious aspect because it will
have repercussions for the future. It cannot be allowed
to get worse and can most easily be counteracted only on
a Community scale."93
It seemed that in the face of increasingly intense external
challenges, the campaign for a single market became widely
realised as a way of bringing about economic strength. This
generated the momentum for a renewal of European integration
as a result.
2.3. 1980-1992: INDUSTRIAL COMPETITION AND THE IMPETUS FOR THE
RELAUNCH OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION
The prolonged economic stagnation and relative industrial
decline in the EC during the 1970s and 1980s had gradually
resulted in the loss of European industrial competitiveness in
international markets to the US, Japan, and more strikingly
the NICs. Information in Table 2.10 suggests that while nine
major world economies (including four major EC economies)
decreased their world market share, in terms of GDP, from 72.1
per cent in 1963 to 68.7 per cent in 1983, the NICs steadily
92. The Times, (18 January, 1985), p. 7.
93. Emilio Colombo, "The Economics Recovery of Europe", European Digest, 50, (May 1985), p.
11.
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expanded their share from 3.5 per cent to 6.2 per cent in the
same period. With respect to exports of manufactures, the
NICs' market share grew much more impressive from 1.9 per cent
in 1963 to 8.7 per cent in 1983.
In terms of competition in technology development, the EC
industries felt very vulnerable in competing with Japanese and
American industries both in the EC markets themselves and in
world markets. Furthermore, while all industries had faced
strong cost-cutting competition in the early 1980s, the EC was
unable to meet the challenge of the
TABLE 2.10. SOME INDUSTRIAL COUNTRIES AND THE NICS' SHARE IN
WORLD MARKET ECONOMIES (per cent)
1. Gross Domestic Product (at constant 1975 prices)
1964 1973 1978 1980 1981 1983
G9a 72.1 70.6 69.1 68.2 68.5 68.7
NICs6b 3.5 4.7 5.6 6.1 6.3 6.2
2. Exports of Manufactures (at current prices)
G9	 74.6	 71.8	 71.6	 70.5	 70.8	 69.0
NICs6	 1.9
	
4.3	 5.6
	 6.6
	
7.7	 8.7
Note: a . G9: Australia, Canada, France, W. Germany, Italy,
Japan, Sweden, UK and US.b
. NICs6: Brazil, Mexico, Hong Kong, S. Korea,
Singapore and Taiwan.
Source: Based on the UN information from OECD, The Newly
Industrialising Countries: Challenge and Opportunity
for OECD Industries, Paris, 1988.
NICs in many major industrial sectors, such as electronics,
textiles and clothing, and steel. For the period from 1970 to
1985, the import penetration ratios of four major EC economies
by the NICs increased significantly in all manufacturing
products, and in textiles and electricals, in particular
(Table 2.11). A European trade deficit and industrial failure
were brought about as a result. In addition, trade development
between the EC and the NICs from 1980 to 1987 was not
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balanced. The trade deficit of the EC against the NICs had
deteriorated from ECU 2.9 billion in 1980 to ECU 6.7 billion
in 1987 in manufactured products, which implied that the NICs'
exports had dramatically increased market penetration in most
major European industrial sectors.
TABLE 2.11. IMPORT PENETRATION RATIOS: total NICs, 1970 and
1985
Total Manu. Textiles a Electricalsb Radio & TVc
eco./era 1970 1980 1970 1980 1970 1980 1970 1980
France 0.15 0.79 0.11 2.08 0.01 0.73 0.06 2.39
W Germany 0.38 1.40 1.33 7.96 0.04 1.32 0.38 5.36
Italy 0.27 0.91 0.34 1.18 0.07 0.52 0.40 3.91
UK 0.41 1.42 2.10 7.74 0.14 1.15 0.37 4.11
Note: a Textiles, Clothing, leather and footwearb'
. Electrical machines & appliances
c
. Radio, TV and communication equipment
Source: As Table 2.10.
In terms of trade structure, the EC was more dependent on
imports of strong-demand industrial sectors - such as
electrical equipment and electronics, information technology,
automated office equipment and chemicals and pharmaceuticals -
than were the US and Japan. In 1983, among total industrial
imports the EC's imports of strong-demand sectors accounted
for 29.8 per cent, while the US' and Japan's accounted for
27.0 per cent and 26.2 per cent respectively." In terms of
trade in high-technology products which will determine the
future of industry and the economy, the EC's share of exports
of high-technology products suffered an insufficient increase
from 23 per cent in 1963 to 24 per cent in 1981, while the US
increased from 29 per cent to 33 per cent and Japan jumped
94
. Commission of European Communities, "Competitiveness of European industry: situation to
date", by Pierre Buiges, and Philippe Goybet, European Economy, 25, (September 1985), P.
22.
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from 16 per cent to 38 per cent in the recorded years (Table
2.12).
TABLE 2.12. SHARE OF EXPORTS OF HIGH-TECHNOLOGY PRODUCTS IN
TOTAL MANUFACTURED EXPORTS
1963	 1970	 1981
EC10 23 22 24
USA 29 28 33
Japan 16 25 38
Note: EC10 does not include Spain and Portugal.
Source: Commission of the European Communities, European
Economy, 16, (July 1983), p. 126.
TABLE 2.13. SPECIALISATION INDICES IN TRADE IN HIGH-TECHNOLOGY
PRODUCTS
1963 1970 1978 1981
EC10
USA
Japan
1.01
1.27
0.72
0.94
1.18
1.07
0.88
1.27
1.27
0.87
1.19
1.37
Source: As Table 2.12.
In addition, counting on specialisation indices in trade
in high-technology products the EC declined from 1.01 in 1963
to 0.87 in 1981. Conversely, the US managed to retain roughly
the same levels (from 1.27 to 1.19) and Japan increased from
0.72 to 1.37 (Table 2.13). Above all else, in the field of
electronics and information technology, Europe was incapable
of competing with the US and Japan in high-technology
development. Although "a weakness in electronics technology
has often been seen as the reflection of a more general
weakness in the development and exploitation of new and
unfamiliar technology", some acknowledge that "Eurosclerosis"
probably has little to do with any general lack of
87
technological and entrepreneurial dynamism. 95
 It then seems to
point towards general policy problems within the EC.
In the political arena, from 1974 to 1985, while the
European integration movement was on the intergovernmentalist
track, the European Council emphasised intergovernmental
cooperation through negotiation rather than transnational
institutions. European integration was therefore characterised
by the performances of summit meetings. It was clear to see
that the conflict of national interests became inevitable in
this intergovernmental cooperation. The British complaint
about its excessive budget contribution to the EC and the
costly CAP damaged the effort of the Ten (with Greece gaining
access to the EC in 1981) in seeking further integration.
Following the leaving of Roy Jenkins, an able President of the
Commission in 1981, Giscard and Schmidt also left the
political scene soon after. While the new French President,
Francois Mitterrand, and the West German Chancellor, Helmut
Kohl, did not yet reach the cosy Franco-German partnership
that had characterised the Giscard-Schmidt era, Mrs Thatcher
became the dominant political personality of the EC." The
Genscher-Colombo Plan of 1981 appealing for more EC common
policies and of the Stuttgart summit of 1983 was undermined
partly because of Britain's recalcitrant attitude towards
negotiation of the proposed EC budgetary system. (The
Genscher-Colombo Plan was not welcomed by the European
Council, because the initiative suggested that the role of EC
institutions should be made more explicit including
formalising the Council, and the EC budget would have to
increase.) Many academics and politicians shared a sense of
95
. See Pani Patel, and Keith Pavitt, "Is Western Europe losing the technological race?",
Research Policy, 16, (1987).
96 •
 Urwin, The Community of Europe: A History of European Integration Since 1945, p. 225.
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alarm and urgency about the EC in the early 1980s, as the EC
ran into stagnation and crisis in both politics and economics.
The EC's institutions and its member states gradually
realised an urgent need to steer the EC away from
Eurosclerosis through various down-to-earth programmes of
industrial collaboration. Against this context of political
stalemate and economic weakness, since 1980, there have been
two unprecedented trends developing which have greatly
influenced the progress of European integration. Firstly,
successful experiments of Europe-wide industrial collaboration
have shown a critical step in defusing external challenges and
thus increasing industrial competence. While the European
Council struggled with national interests, the Commission
proposed plans for industrial collaboration in the hope of
promoting European industrial strength in technology
development and market cooperation. It was presumed that
European industrial collaboration would lead to the
establishment of a European technological community and
further generate momentum for the completion of the internal
market. In 1980, the industry Commissioner, Vicomte Davignon,
appealed to European industrialists for inter-Europe
industrial cooperation under the ESPRIT programme in order to
promote their development of technology and thus strengthen
their common international market competitiveness. The ESPRIT
programme appears to serve dual needs: "to reduce the costs,
risks and uncertainties of knowledge production and to secure
a wider market through standardisation into co-operation among
EC firms." 97
 The success of the ESPRIT further inspired the
second EC programme "Research for Advanced Communications in
Europe" (RACE) and led to immediate demand for the ESPRIT II.
97
. See Mytelka, and Delapierre, "The alliance strategies of European firms in the information
technology industry and the role of ESPRIT", p. 147.
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The development of these high-technology programmes has
significantly resulted in the development of "corporate
networks" in Western Europe." The consensus on building up
mutual industrial strength which would depend upon the
advantage of a wider single market became more widespread.
Secondly, to echo this European scale of industrial
collaboration, European industrialists teamed up with the
Roundtable to address their demand to the EC and their
governments for a single European market on which future
industrial development is highly dependent. Unlike the
existing European interest groups, .e.g. the UNICE, the
European Trade Union Confederation and the Committee of
Professional Agricultural Organisations which lobby the EC for
their specific sectors of interest," the industrial alliance
amongst the largest enterprises throughout Western Europe has
focused more on overall economic improvement and on the
implications of European integration for industry. The
emergence of the industrial alliance has boosted the
industrialists' campaign for a single European market. The
impetus for the renewed interest in European integration
partly derived from the efforts to solve the problems and
concerns of European industry. The relaunch of European
economic integration was triggered, to a large extent, by
industrial interests in accordance with overall European
economic interests. Increased integration would construct
European industrial strength in order to face up to intense
industrial competition worldwide.
98. Albert Bressand and Kalypso Nicolaidis, "Regional integration in a networked world
economy", in William Wallace, (ed.), The Dynamics of European Integration, (London: Pinter
Publishers for the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1990), P. 43.
99. The main function of those interest groups was to exchange information between member
states and to collect and pass on information between affiliates and EC institutions. See
Emil Kirchner, and Konrad Schwaiger, The Role of Interest Groups in the European
Community, (Aldershot, Hants.: Gower, 1981), p. 16.
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Since 1984, the impetus for the relaunch of the EC has
become energetic because:
"the European Community entered a particularly dynamic
phase in its development; common concerns were translated
into common goals, and institutional and constitutional
reforms were put in place. The pressures for reform in
the Community showed that intergovernmentalism had its
limits. Institutional reform would have to go beyond the
limits of intergovernmentalism. ”loo
In 1984, President Mitterrand tried to reassert France's
credibility of leading the EC by pushing through the
resolution of Britain's budget complaint, the CAP's reform and
the enlargement in the Fontainebleau summit. In addition, as
persistent external economic challenges and industrial
competition remained an agenda at issue, efforts for the
renewal of European integration have further stepped up the
new prospects for European political integration. Within the
EC, internal political manoeuvres settled the prolonged
disputes owing to the fact that the completion of the single
.n.
market would serve	 Europe's best interests in coping with
external challenges. Thereafter, European integration has
returned to driving for transnationalism, as the institutional
reforms approved in the SEA have encouraged the campaign for
the single market.
The collapse of communism in Eastern Europe in 1989 and
the political disintegration of the former Soviet Union in
1992 have stimulated new momentums for the EC "widening"
integration eastward. To make sure that the post-communist
East European countries do not reverse the past mistakes and
are driving towards the West's market-oriented form, the EC
has committed itself in principle to allow the East Europeans(
100 .Brigid Laf fan, Integration and Co-operation in Europe, (London: Routledge, 1992), p. 55.
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gain access to the EC. 101 For sound economic reasons, the East
Europeans' low-cost industria l production would shield the EC
from low-cost East Asian rivals, which has encouraged more
firms to establish an industrial division of labour across
Europe.
2.4. CONCLUSION: EXTERNAL INCENTIVES AND EUROPEAN INTEGRATION
Throughout the course of European integration, external
incentives, like internal political and economic factors, have
played a critical part. During the 1950s, the bipolar
international political system left the war-torn Western
Europe little option but to tie into the Atlantic Alliance
from which European integration was generated. For political
reasons, European integration was encouraged by the United
States as a means of strengthening its global strategy to
contain the Soviet Union. In the 1960s, international monetary
turmoil caused by the troubled US dollar, American industry's
penetration in Western Europe, and increased trade disputes
between the EC and the US about agricultural exports, brought
about the impetus for further economic and monetary
integration in the EC. As the US in 1962 called for an
Atlantic partnership to sort out trade problems, this
incentive led the EC to move to further economic integration,
e.g. the establishment of the CAP.
Global recession and two oil crises in the 1970s greatly
struck European economies and the progress of European
101
.According to the German proposal, the six East European countries, Czech Republic,
Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, Romania, and Bulgaria have been given the year 2000 as a target
to be in the EC. See The Economist, (10 September, 1994), p. 23. The EU has invited these
six countries to attend regularly its meetings of ministerial councils and summits. See
The Daily Telegraph, (6 October, 1994), p. 18.
92
integration. European industrial failure and poor economic
performances led to the period of Eurosclerosis. The progress
of pursuing the Common Market was halted, as many member
states of the EC turned to protect their own "national
champion" industries. Fierce industrial competition coming
from the US, Japan, and the NICs, challenged the EC in terms
of industrial productivity, technology development, and market
sharing. The completion of the Internal Market Programme for
which industrialists have campaigned, became not only the
means of the EC's economic salvation but also the motor for
European economic and political integration.
To summarise the role of external incentives, in the
1950s international superpower politics stimulated Western
European countries to explore the possibilities for political
integration. In the 1960s, European integration was influenced
not only by changes in the international political system, but
also by attempts to liberalise the world trade regime and by
the weakness of the international monetary regime. After the
first oil crisis, instead of political motives taking the
lead, economic recession and industrial competition became
decisive influences in the progress of European political and
economic integration. Accordingly, the EC was counting on the
process of industrial development to cope with external
challenges. While the EC was beset by political disputes over
the British budgetary contribution from the late 1970s to
1984, intense competition globally in industry and technology
development where the EC lagged behind its rivals, generated
renewed momentum for the establishment of the single European
market. That has since helped to set forward the progress of
European integration.
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CI-1E2XF' TER. THREE
INDUSTRIAL RESTRUCTURING AND BUSINESS SUPPORT FOR THE
RELAUNCH OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION
This chapter seeks to demonstrate the importance of
industrial development for an understanding of economic and
political integration by focusing upon the role played by
industrialists in Western Europe in the drawing up of the
Single European Act (SEA). By supporting this process,
industrialists played an instrumental role in the relaunch of
European integration. The first section analyzes the
relationships between European industry and the progress of
political and economic integration, and the impacts of
external incentives on the process towards industrial unity
since the beginning of European integration in the early
1950s. The second section examines why European industries
facing the economic crisis of the 1970s combined multinational
interest groups to lobby Brussels and how the failure of
European industry in international competition became an issue
in the process of economic integration. The general
realisation that European industries were losing
competitiveness in terms of production, markets and the
development of technology has generated the impetus towards
industrial unity and further economic and political
integration. Therefore, the last section focuses on European
industrialists' involvement in the process of negotiations
which contributed to the drawing up and passage of the SEA.
In terms of the relaunch of European integration, the SEA
and the completion of the Internal Market programme were the
EC's two major events of the mid-1980s)- It is important to
For discussion of the Rome Treaty about the Common Market, and the SEA about the Single
Market that sets a new target of European integration by 1992, see Jacques Pelkmans,
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note that the SEA has resurrected the hope for and brought
forward the momentum for European integration. Students of
regional integration have optimistically claimed that
"neofunctionalism ought not to be considered dead! It seems to
have retained explanatory power." 2 When studying the dynamics
of the 1980s' relaunch of European integration and the 1992
initiatives, many have tended to focus on political factors,
amongst and inside the national governments of the EC,
economic factors, and institutional factors:3
Paul Taylor has noted that the new dynamics of the EC
integration in the 1980s came from the settlement of the
British complaint about their excessive budgetary
contributions, a campaign for strengthening the EC's
institutional decision-making ability that led to the 1984
Draft Treaty on European Union, the agreement on the SEA, a
new programme for achievement of a Europe without frontiers by
1992, and the reform of the Common Agriculture Policy. 4 Roy
Pryce has focused on the outcome of the 1984 Fontainebleau
meeting of the European Council. He has also emphasised the
importance of the agreements reached on these critical issues.
He particularly suggests that a widespread and growing
reaction against the ineffectiveness of the EC contributed the
most to the momentum for a relaunch.5
"Europe 1992: internal and external", in Finn Laursen, (ed.), EFTA and the EC:
Implications of 1992, (Maastricht, The Netherlands: European Institute of Public
Administration, 1990), pp. 5-32.
2. Finn Laursen, "Explaining the EC's new momentum", in ibid, p. 47.
3. David R. Cameron, "The 1992 initiative: causes and consequences", in Alberta M. Sbragia,
(ed.), Euro-Politics: Institutions and Policymaking in the "New" European Community,
(Washington D. C.: The Brookings Institution, 1992), pp. 35-64; Moravcsik focused on
institutionalism see "Negotiating the Single European Act", pp. 42-48.
4. Paul Taylor, "The new dynamics of EC integration in the 1980s", in Juliet Lodge, (ed.),
The European Community and the Challenge of the Future, (London: Pinter Publishers, 1989),
p. 3.
5. See Roy Pryce, "Relaunching the European Community", Government and opposition, 19,
(1984), pp. 486-500.
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Juliet Lodge has pointed to the fact that along with the
European Parliament's initiatives, several "negative factors",
i.e. the continued recession, rising unemployment, the need
for the EC to try to safeguard and improve its position vis-à-
vis the US and Japan, the EC's further enlargement and
institutional deadlock, also contributed to the momentum for
further integration by "encouraging widespread reflection on
the EC's future." She reminds us that although there was a
pervasive belief about the urgent need for reform in the EC,
without the Intergovernmental Conference in 1985 on European
Union and a draft treaty of the European Union initiated by
the European Parliament (EP), "it is doubtful whether any
steps would have been taken by the governments to try to
improve the EC's prospects and its functioning." 7 She implies
that the EP's commitment to expanding EC competences and
promoting common (union or supranational) action contributed
much to the successful signing of the SEA. This institution-
initiated focus lays stress very much on the decision-making
of the EC institutions, and their relations with national
governments.
Andrew Moravcsik divides the explanations for the success
of the SEA into two, "the first stressing the independent
activism of international or transnational actors and the
second emphasizing bargaining between leaders of the most
powerful states of Europe." 8
 In response to the question why
the change appeared then, he, therefore, focuses on an elite
alliance between EC officials and pan-European business
interest groups, ruling party coalitions between France, West
6. Juliet Lodge, "The Single European Act: Towards a new Euro-Dynamism?", Journal of Common
Market Studies, 24: 3, (March 1986), p. 203.
7. Ibid., p. 204.
8. Andrew Moravcsik, "Negotiating the Single European Act", in Keohane, and Hoffmann, (eds.),
The New European Community: Decisionmaking and Institutional Change, (Boulder: Westview
Press, 1991), p. 43.
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Germany and Britain, and Franco-German negotiations for a "two
track" Europe:9 The successful negotiation for the SEA was
mainly derived from the strong demand for completing the
internal market, and institutional reforms that attempted to
make the EC's decision-making more effective and democratic.
From the industrial point of view, however, the momentum for
the successful passage of the SEA rested upon the strong
support of European industry and the prospects for better
European economy and industrial strength. In order to achieve
a single European market, it was necessary for the EC and its
member states to carry out institutional and decision-making
reforms. John Pinder rightly suggests that, in terms of
industrial competitiveness, the reason why Europe was left
behind by the US and Japan was mainly due to the fragmentation
of national markets in Western Europe, which eventually
contributed to a consensus for urging the completion of the
internal market and institutional reforms."
As far as the SEA was concerned, the largest single
section of the SEA was devoted to completing the internal
market. The completion of the internal market implied "much
more in terms of the scope of European integration than is
apparent from the SEA.
industrial competition, driven by a "third industrial
revolution" / 12 and the search for cost-cutting in production,"
has governed the pace of the global economy, weakened the
function of the world trading multilateral system, and boosted
9. Ibid., p. 42.
10. John Pinder, "The Single Market: a step towards European Union", in Juliet Lodge, (ed.),
The European Community and the Challenge of the Future, pp. 94-95.
11. Juliet Lodge, "The Single European Act and the new legislative cooperation procedure: a
critical analysis", Journal of European Integration, 11: 1, (1987), p. 6.
12. Used the term by John Pinder, "The Single Market: a step towards European Union", p. 95.
13. Global industrial competition has demanded a cut in production costs with simultaneous
advances in technology. See Richard Barnet, and John Cavanagh, Global Dreams: Imperial
Corporations and the New World Order, (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994), pp. 283-309.
" 11 Since the early 1980s, a new wave of
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the trend towards regionalism. The need for governments and
industrialists to address Europe's flagging competitiveness
was to be one of the major triggers of the 1980s' relaunching
of European integration. As a result, an unprecedentedly
influential industrialists alliance emerged actively to push
forward the progress of European integration. The agenda for
completing the internal market was enshrined in the SEA
(Article 13, 14 and 19), which recognised the fact that the
removal of all internal frontiers (physical, technological and
fiscal barriers) for strengthening industrial operations and
economy as a whole would encourage an industrial unity and
contribute to the political consensus upon which future
integration would be based.
3.1. INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT AND THE EVOLUTION OF EUROPEAN
INDUSTRIAL UNITY
3.1.1. National Interests and Making European Industrial
Policies
The history of European integration has always been
influenced by external factors, both political and economic,
which indeed triggered the whole process. In the 1950s and
1960s West European integration was in fact strengthened not
only by West European countries' demand for peace and
prosperity (shown for example in the Benelux countries'
cooperation and improved Franco-German relations), but also by
the influence of superpower politics. Europeans' demands for
integration were encouraged, if not directly pushed, by the
United States. The development of European stability and
prosperity was considered by American elites as the best
policy to oppose the communist threat from the East. In short,
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15
16
the early development of regional integration in Western
Europe seemed to be a natural product of the Cold War whose
security and bloc politics, the East-West confrontation, had
predominantly overshadowed national decision-making with
regard to international economic and political cooperation."
For the original Six of the ECSC, "West European
integration did not involve sacrificing national economic
interests on the altar of Europeanism; rather, considerations
of national economic gain provided the motor force which
carried them down the road of West European integration." 15 In
the 1950s, the industrial structures of the Six showed great
similarities, in which industrial sectors accounted for about
one-third of the work force (agricultural sectors about a
little less than one-third and the rest in service sectors).
Each individual state was concentrating upon its own national
economy rather than upon the joint economic problems of
Europe. The main reason for retaining the application of
restrictions at the national border was simply to avoid "a
cycle of mutually destructive retaliation. u16 In spite of
different national interests existing amongst West European
economies, during the 1950s, their economic targets were
similar in seeking to achieve a satisfactory national growth
rate (which was obtained at around 5 or 6 per cent), to
maintain stability in prices, employment and foreign exchange
On the question of the struggle for power and national interest, as the realists of
international politics, Hans Morgenthau, Raymond Aron, etc., emphasised, nations pursue
their best interests by employing naked force against each other. In the Cold War's
bipolarity system, confrontation and conflict were expressed in national policy with the
emphasis on security and militarism. Indeed, European integration in the early period was
in accordance with American global strategy. For the argument of security factors as an
"high politics" agenda see Joan E Spero, The Politics of International Economic Relations,
3rd edition, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1985).
. David Arter, The Politics of European Integration in the Twentieth Century, (Aldershot:
Dartmouth, 1993), p. 119.
. Raymond Vernon, "Enterprise and Government in Western Europe", in Vernon, (ed.), Big
Business and the State: Changing Relations in Western Europe, (London: The Macmillan
Press, 1974), p. 4.
14.
99
17.
18.
19•
20.
earning, and to deal with the social and political problems
within each national economy. 17
 These efforts marked the
European economy as a whole for the period with fast
expansion, full employment, heavy investment, low energy and
raw material prices (refer to Appendix T-2.1 and T-2.2). The
tendency of industrial sectoral development within the Six was
moving towards nationally industrial integration instead of
broad industrial integration between countries, because "no
country freely gave up its industrial sectors to the benefit
of other member states, where such sectors might be more
efficient. n18
For example, in order to make the steel industry
competitive, the ECSC treaty sought to eliminate the barriers
to interstate trade, subject industrial cartels and
concentrations to administrative supervision and establish
common commercial rules for pricing and sales. The
transnational ECSC's vision of harmonisation of the European
steel industry incurred the steel makers' deep suspicion of
competition. This resulted in their defensive action with
increased combination between them." Subsequently, the Six
retreated from the transnational vision of industrial
competition towards national planning, which pressed each
country "to save its steel industry at the expense of the
others. u20 The French government went further to veto a High
Authority (of the ECSC) proposal in July 1966 to replace
national subsidies with Community financing to the industry.
Ibid.
Henk W. De Jong, " Sectoral development and sectoral policies in the EC", in Alexis
Jacquemin, (ed.), European Industry: Public Policy and Corporate Strategy, (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1984), p. 149.
J. E. S. Hayward, "Industry - Steel", in Vernon, (ed.), Big Business and the State:
Changing Relations in Western Europe, p. 279.
Ibid.
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During the 1960s, West European countries enjoyed strong
economic growth (The EC's GDP per capital growth rates from
1960 to 1970 were around 5 per cent: Belgium 4.8 per cent,
West Germany 4.4 per cent, France 5.7 per cent, Italy 5.3 per
cent and the Netherlands 5.5 per cent).
era of economic growth, Europe was experiencing a boom in
productivity, private investment and employment. As far as
economic integration was concerned, although European
industrialists were very concerned with the possible effects
of the progress of integration on the business environment,
they did not pay close attention to integration itself. 22
 It
was because of the early uncertainty surrounding integration
and the nature of the integration arrangements, as well as
interdependent networks with the rest of the world, that
elites within national governments tended to dominate the
issues of integration. The participation of industrialists at
this stage was not a necessary condition for the forward
momentum of integration.
In terms of the private sectors, the establishment of the
Common Market by the Treaty of Rome had not produced
industrial concentration on a European scale as had been
expected but very much on a national basis, although the
Commission of the EEC proposed a policy of European industrial
concentration in a statement to the European Parliament and a
memorandum presented to the Council of Ministers in December
1965. It had become evident that by 1965 industry in the Six
had generally made few adjustments necessary for future
survival. In 1968, the then EC Commissioner for industry,
Guido Colonna Di Paliano, recorded that:
21. World development Report 1985.
22. Ernst Haas, The Uniting Europe: Political, Economic, and Social Forces 1950-1957, (London:
Stevens & Sons, 1958). He noticed the lack of active elite business support for the early
European initiatives.
21 In that unprecedented
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"(the Six) had done little to assure adequate profits for
future development, in a climate of growing competition
at home as well as abroad. To the extent that firms had
remained too small to function in a large, free, and open
market, the solution depended largely on the public
authorities' willingness to remove the barriers that
prevented changes in the structure of industry."23
Indeed, at one time the Common Market provided little
incentive for industrial cooperation in a wide range of
sectors, since these nationally based firms "have been
frequently able to improve their competitive capacity first
through concentrating on a domestic basis and then by
expanding into the markets of other member states through
direct sales and the establishment of wholly owned
subsidiaries." 24
 While national interests were far ahead of
European interests, European states' approaches to the
practice of business and industry by making use of the public
ownership in enterprises served for nothing more than national
targets. In the context of the Cold War and European economic
recovery, West European national governments' commitment to
international economic cooperation was rather passively pushed
by the progress of political integration.
In the mid-1960s, as European economies gradually
overcame the problems of post war reconstruction, it became
important for the European countries to show that their
economies and industries were independent of the United
States. This would imply that they were once again of some
importance in world affairs. Therefore, American economic
23. Guido Colonna Di Paliano, "Why Europe needs continental-scale firms", The Atlantic
Community Quarterly, 6: 4, (Winter 1968-69), p. 567.
24. Steven J. Warnecke, "Industrial policy and the European Community", in Warnecke and Ezra
N. Suleiman, (eds.), Industrial Policies in Western Europe, (New York: Praeger Publishers,
1975), p. 166.
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predominance in Europe through direct investment and
transnational corporations engaged in key sectors was made an
issue of European industrial strength, which encouraged the EC
to take a more interventionist strategy. 25 In order to compete
with their American counterparts, "Europeans would have to
emulate the American industrial structure - particularly in
regard to the size of corporations and in the new-high-
technology fields. 1126 Industrial groups, such as the UNICE and
the Patronat Francais, pointed to an urgent need to change the
disparity in size of European enterprises and European
political and economic network compared with those of the US.22
As a result, a programme of industrial concentration through
cross-frontier mergers and industrial links was brought
forward. In terms of industrial competitiveness, the
challenges from American industrial superiority became a
motive to the development of industrial unity.
In 1970, a Commission report by Guido Colonna Di Paliano
for establishing a Community industrial policy highlighted the
importance of industrial unity in spearheading European
integration:
"If the general well-being is to be improved, industry
must be able to make the most of the Common Market, as an
entity, and as an entity permitting large-scale
operations. ft 28 "A common industrial development policy
encouraging the creation of a European industrial
'fabric' is indispensable if three vital objectives are
to be achieved: the establishment of firm foundations for
the economic - and soon the political - unity of Europe,
the maintenance of economic growth, and a reasonable
25. Dennis Swann, Competition and Industrial Policy in the European Community, (London:
Methuen & Co., 1983), P. 136.
26. Warnecke, "Industrial policy and the European Community", p. 177.
27. Ibid., p. 178; also Swann, Competition and Industrial Policy in the European Community, p.
136.
28. Commission of European Communities, "Principles and general datelines of an industrial
policy for the Community", Supplement to Bulletin of the European Communities, 4/1970, p.
5.
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degree of technological independence of major world
powers. "29
Nevertheless, this approach to industrial concentration
relying upon the private sector was neither advancing to full
scale industrial cooperation nor to a European level
industrial policy. At the centre of the intergovernmental and
transnational tug of war in the decision-making of the EC, the
private sector in response to the Commission in seeking a
European industrial network for political goals was reluctant
to make a case. 30
 During the 1970s' international economic
turbulence, the prospect for European industrial unity was
given a big push by exogenous economic problems: slower
growth, increasing unemployment, declining investment, rising
prices and fluctuating exchange rates.
3.1.2. Industrial Unity as A Catalyst for European Economic
Integration
The conventional understanding of regional integration,
in theories such as federalism and neofunctionalism influenced
by a state-centric approach, has focused more on political
approaches and motivations for regional integration, taking
into account national interests rather than the wider regional
interest. 31 In addition, the conventional approach, emphasising
internal processes of regional integration, has highlighted
political, economic, and cultural transactions between states
within a region from which "consensual values for the
29 . Ibid., p. 4.
39 . Warnecke, "Industrial policy and the European Community", pp. 160, 184.
31. The conventional understanding here is mainly concerned with the exploration of
integration theory. Integration, in the view of the realist, is not the dominant
characteristic of either world society or of inter-state relations. See A. J. R. Groom,
and Alexis Heraclides, "Integration and disintegration", in Margot Light and A. J. R.
Groom, (eds.), International Relations: A Handbook of Current Theory, (London: Pinter
Publishers, 1985), p. 175.
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34
. Peter Robson, The Economics of Internal Integration, 3rd. edition, (London: Unwin Hyman,
1987), p. 158.
• In Mitrany's functionalist theory, a doctrine of "ramification" to integration process
explains the natural and progressive development of collaboration which generates a need
for more functional collaboration in other fields. David Mitrany, A Working Peace System,
(Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1966), p. 97. Although neofunctionalists take a "spillover"
effect to integration for granted, Ernst Haas, the major exponent of neofunctionalism, has
reasserted that the idea of "spillover" is not automatic but probable. See Haas, "The
Study of Regional Integration: Reflections on the joy and anguish of pretheorizing", in
Lindberg, L. and Scheingold, S. (eds.), Regional Integration, (Cambridge, Mass., Harvard
University Press, 1971).
35
achievement of common goals" have resulted. 32
 Both theory and
practice have confirmed that the progress of regional
integration is influenced by political aspirations. The
motivations of regional economic integration were in general
coming much more "from above" (high politics) than "from
under" (low politics). Laf fan has asserted that the Western
European regional system "was moulded by the priority of the
superpowers, the need to reach an accommodation on the German
question, and the imperative of political, social and economic
reconstruction." 33 Therefore, in the establishment of Benelux
Custom Union and the ECSC, for instance, political and
security considerations were amongst the most important
factors behind integration.
Furthermore, Robson has argued that "the initiative for
Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) in Europe that subsequently
developed in the late 1960s was predominantly motivated not so
much by any obviously pressing economic necessity for the
conduct of the Common Market itself but rather by a political
desire to provide a focus and a driving force for European
integration in the next decade." 34 Functional cooperation was a
means rather than an end of integration. As the spillover
effect is to be brought about automatically by frequent
interaction, argued by functionalists and neofunctionalists,35
within the existing cooperation networks amongst European
32. Ibid., p. 174.
33. Brigid Laf fan, Integration and Cooperation in Europe, (London: Routledge, 1992).
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nations, business activities gradually emerge as one of the
main forces for integration by pushing the policy-making of
national governments and the European Community."
After the recession of the mid-1970s when the developed
economies experienced falling rates of economic growth, high
inflation, and mass unemployment, the lesson for national
elites was that economic affairs were of primary importance.
Thereafter, there have been widespread worries about survival
amongst European private industries. State interference, used
by the Left governments in Western Europe as an industrial
strategy, involving large scale nationalisation, price
controls, bureaucratic meddling, and confiscatory tax systems,
was depressing industries. Furthermore, the rise of powerful
trade unions throughout Western Europe gave rise to demands
for work-sharing arrangements and guaranteed job security, and
newly militant environmentalists in France and West Germany
hindered the private sectors from expanding operations that
the industries required. 37 In addition, high inflation rates
dampened the prospects of increasing economic growth whilst
action to reduce inflation caused an increase in unemployment.
Higher inflation led to efforts to cut production costs
by shedding labour leading to higher unemployment in European
companies, such as the Dutch electronics giant Philips, 38 Ford
(Britain),"
	
and	 SGS-Ates,	 the	 Italian	 semi-conductor
. To some extent the economic factors have gradually replaced politics, or more precisely
security, as the most outstanding factors in national decision-making processes,
especially in the post Cold War era. In the theoretical debate, pluralists and
structuralists are particularly associated with this arrangement. See Michael Banks, "The
Inter-Paradigm Debate" in Light, and Groom, (eds.), International Relations - A Handbook
of Current Theory, pp. 7-20.
37. Robert Ball, "The surprising new optimism of Europe's C.E.O.s", Fortune, (August 14,
1978), pp. 112, 114.
38. Philips cut 68,000 jobs in 1970-1985. For Philips' restructuring process in the 1980s see
Graham Turner, "Inside Europe's Giant Companies: Cultural Revolution at Philips", Long
Range Planning, 19: 4, (1986), pp. 13-15.
39. Ford Britian shed 40,000 jobs in 1979-1984. See "More job cuts, Ford chief says", The
Times, (30 October, 1985), p. 4.
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• It cut 1,500 out of its 5,300 workers in Italy by 1984. See The Economist, (December 8,
1984), pp. 73-74.
"More job cuts, Ford chief says", The Times, (30 October, 1985), p. 4.
Based on Eurostat, see Commission of European Communities, "Unit labour costs in
manufacturing industry", European Economy, 10, (March 1982).
The EC here includes six countries, Belgium, Denmark, France, Italy, the Netherlands and
the UK. Information estimated by the Deutsches Institut fOr Wirtschaftsforschung from The
Economic and Social Situation of the Community, Economic and Social Consultative Assembly,
1985.
40
41.
42.
43.
producer.40 Bob Lutz, the head of Ford Europe, in 1985 stated
that "we have no choice but to continue reducing the head
count to become competitive." 41 Labour costs, social charges
(From 1974 to 1981 industrial compensation per employee in
nine EC countries increased 13.8 per cent, while in the US it
grew 9.9 per cent and in Japan 10.7 per cent.) 42 and the costs
of meeting new environmental standards rose as a result. The
fading of industrial profitability (The EC net rate of return
on fixed capital excluding the construction industry accounted
for 10.6 per cent in 1960-73, 5.9 per cent in 1974-80 and 4.0
in 1981.) 43 resulted in the depression of investment and of
business confidence in the EC.
As a result, European political elites, at both the
national and supranational levels, started to work closely
with leading industrialists in an attempt to improve
industrial competitiveness. 44 Industry and politicians turned
to the creation of the Single European market as the core of
their strategy to improve industrial competitiveness as well
as the economy as a whole. 45 It is clear that the
neofunctionalist argument with its emphasis on the
contribution to integration made not so much by social-
economic factors as by the interaction of political and
44. This view has been reflected in many studies as a pervasive need for the alliance between
governments and industry, e.g. Jacques Pelkmans and Alan Winters, Europe's Domestic
Market, (London: RIIA, Routledge, 1988), p. 6; Margaret Sharp, "The Single Market and
European policies for advanced technologies", in Colin Crouch and David Marquand, (eds.),
The Politics of 1992: Beyond the Single European Market, (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1990),
p. 105.
45. Commission of the European Communities, "Completing the internal market for industrial
products", by Jacques Pelkmans, Document, 1986, p. 34.
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economic factors," has not been able to keep up with the
progress of European integration in the mid-1980s. Socio-
economic factors have been in the vanguard of demands for a
single European market.
The practical measures taken towards strengthening the
Commission's partnership with industry were revealed in the
White Paper of 1985 by the European Commission to the European
Council. In chapter six of the Paper, the Commission stated
that "Community budgetary and financial facilities make their
full contribution to the development of greater cooperation
between firms in different Member States" and "the Community
is now, for the first time, setting the stage for a new type
of association to be known as the European Economic Interest
Grouping (EEIG) that will be governed by uniform Community
legislation." 47 According to the Council's Regulations
governing the EEIG, to ensure that the grouping would work for
the Community's interest, there would be a Contact Committee
composed of the representatives of the Member States and the
Community. 48 This legal confirmation of the close ties between
the European Commission and European industrialists has
symbolised their joint efforts to push forward the completion
of the internal market and the wider process of integration.
The impetus for the relaunch of European integration
played an important role in reaching the Draft Treaty on
European Union (EUT) in the EP. 49 Whilst the EP called for
political reforms in the EC's institutions which suggested
that the EP should share more power in pursuit of a People's
46. See Juliet Lodge, "integration theory", in her (ed.) The European Community -
Bibliographical Excursions, (London: Francs Pinter Publishers, 1983), pp. 6-16.
47. Commission of the European Communities, "Completing the Internal Market", White Paper from
the Commission to the European Council, (Milan, 28-29 June, 1985), COM(85) 310 final, (14
June 1985), pp. 34, 35.
48. Council Regulation (EEC) No. 2137/85, of 25 July 1985, on the European Economic Interest
Grouping. This regulation came to effect on 1 July, 1989. Official Journal of the European
Communities, L199, (31 July 1985), pp. 1-9.
49. For the detail about the EP and the development of the EUT see Juliet Lodge, "The Single
European Act: Towards a new Euro-Dynamism?", Journal of Common Market Studies, 24: 3,
(March 1986), p. 203-223.
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Europe, the Commission backed by industrialists placed its
hopes on the completion of the internal market as the primary
engine of integration. To create the internal market, the
Commission realised that a certain degree of political
agreement for the reform of EC decision-making would have to
be reached in order to avoid any proposal about improving
industrial performance becoming bogged down at the
implementation stage. To address economic and monetary policy,
scientific and technical research and energy policy at the
supranational level, on which the restoration of European
industry's international competitiveness would depend, and the
creation of the internal market would be based, the Community
would have to be backed by political commitment from the
member states. In a discussion paper to the Council, the
Commission stated that it:
"would call for a return to the decision-making methods
which, in the early years of the Community's existence,
produced the policies on which it is based.""
In 1984 at the Fontainebleau summit of the European
Council, an ad hoc Committee on institutional reforms (called
the Dooge Committee) was established. 51 In 1985 at the Brussels
summit, there was a call for the completion of the internal
market. In June 1985, a key Commission report, the White
Paper, by Lord Cockfield, the then Commissioner for Internal
Market, emphasised the completion of the internal market and
was endorsed by the 1985 European Council's Milan summit.
Commenting on the Paper for completing the internal market by
the removal of technical, physical and fiscal barriers, the
50. Commission of the European Communities, "discussion paper for the special Council meeting
of 20 to 21 September 1983 on the question of improving the international competitive
position of European firms", COM(83) 547 final, (14 September, 1983), p. 12.
51. Another Committee for the creation of a People's Europe (the Adonnino Committee) was also
established at the same time.
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Economic and Social Committee of the EC, an influential
consulting body on some key policy issues, 52 believed that:
"For this reason the appropriate decisions will have to
be taken with the unswerving political will to succeed,
to overcome reservations and obstacles." Therefore, The
Committee "urges the Council to reform its decision-
making capacity. It calls on the Council to accept
qualified-majority decision-taking. In order to cope with
the large volume of legislation needed to complete the
internal market, this is necessary."53
These efforts prepared the law for the Single European Act of
1986. In the SEA, the task to complete the internal market
represented "not only a firm step towards unity in the EC, but
was an essential prerequisite to future economic growth,
employment and trading prospects in the world."54
In the peak of the "Europessimism" or "Eurosclerosis",
politicians, academics, and industrialists alike lost their
confidence in the future of European integration because of
the indecisive and discordant European Community, and its bad
performance in dealing with the recession. Despite the fact
that the European Council had realised the need for the
internal market at the 1981 Luxembourg meeting, and later that
year in London, nothing had been brought about in reality but
a mere confirmation of the internal market between the Council
and the Commission. Even in December 1982 at the Copenhagen
summit, Gaston Thorn, the then President of the Commission,
"recommended" the European Council for the first time to
remove national non-tariff barriers, simplify frontier
52. The ESC under the treaties of the EC is to be consulted compulsorily on nine subject-
matter specialties. It is made up of representatives of trade unions and professional
bodies. It gives its advisory opinions on the proposals made by the Commission.
53. Economic and Social Committee of the EC, Opinion on the "Completing the internal market -
White Paper from the Commission to the European Council", CES(85) 1019, (27 November
1985), pp. 2-3.
54. Ibid., p. 1; a similar viewpoint has been expressed on many occasions, such as that of the
French Government's initiative about revitalisation of the Community. See "French
Government memorandum on revitalisation of the Community", Bulletin of European
Communities, 11, (1981), p. 92.
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formalities, increase competition in public procurement,
equalize legal rights and tax codes for companies, and open up
trade in financial services.
The widespread feeling of impotence in the management of
the European economy was described as the complications of
national economic diseases. 55
 Individual member states of the
EC facing the recession endeavoured to protect their own
markets and industries through the use of public funds to aid
and maintain "non-viable companies" at the expense of fellow
member states. According to a study published by the
Commission in 1979, the crisis facing Europe's industry at
that time was: firstly, a fourfold increase in oil prices;
secondly, increases in raw material costs; thirdly, the
repercussions of the international monetary crisis; and
fourthly, additional competition from recently industrialised
countries." Since the cost of industrial production was
soaring due to the increase in expenditure on energy and
materials as well as wages, European industry was losing
ground in world markets not only to Americans and Japanese but
also to those of the NICs. Some European industries, such as
those in foodstuffs, textiles, shipbuilding, and steel, which
had led the competition for years, could no longer compete
with the market new comers whose low production costs had
already earned them a rising share of the world market.
Another study identified signs of a European "malaise":
firstly, unemployment in the community stood at a level of
around 10 million; secondly, considerable vulnerability in the
energy sector; thirdly, a badly-directed and poorly-exploited
research and development (R & D) effort; and fourthly, a
relative
	 decline	 in	 European	 competitiveness.57 	 High
55.Such as West Germany's Swedish disease (over-indulgent welfare state), the Dutch disease
(compounding the Swedish with gastro-enteritis of the exchange rate), the Belgian disease
(swollen budget deficit and galloping indexation), the Italian disease (booming
inflation), and the British disease (multiple sclerosis). See Michael Emerson, Europe's
Stagflation, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), p. 195.
56. European Me, No, 3/79: "The Community's Industrial Policy", (February 1979).
51. European File, No, 3/82: "Relaunching Europe: A New Community for Industry and
Employment", (February 1982).
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unemployment in Western Europe was evidence that industries
were suffering from a decrease in output and unsuccessful
national macroeconomic policy, an inefficient R & D effort, in
terms of commercial applications in comparison with principal
competitors in the United States and Japan, leaving a wide gap
between R & D spending and Commercial applications, and
diminishing competitiveness resulting from increasing unit
labour costs and low productivity. These problems revealed the
inability of existing national economic frameworks to cope
effectively with global competition, on the one hand, and a
growing demand for a European rather than national solution,
on the other.
Lord Cockfield pointed out and the Cecchini report
suggested that the beneficiaries of a single market in 1988,58
would be European industries and businessmen. Behind the
political scenes the industrialists were one of the most
active groups pressing for further moves towards integration.
Their efforts were not only originally intended as a response
to the economic crisis, but for establishing a cross-border
industrial unity. For example, the formation of EEIG which
evolved from European Cooperation Grouping in 1974 aims at
encouraging cooperation across frontiers in the Community." A
series of important events contributed to relaunching the pace
of European integration. These were the settlement of the
excessive British budgetary contribution in 1984, the
emergence of the 1984 Draft Treaty on European Union, the
agreement on the SEA and a new programme for a Europe without
frontiers by 1992, and finally the agreement about a package
58. "Making a real Common Market: Lord Cockfield points the way to the future", Europe 85,
(November/December 1985), pp. 17-18; Paolo Cecchini, The European Challenge: 1992 The
Benefits of A Single Market, The Cecchini Report - Official Facts and Figures, (Aldershot:
Wildwood House, 1988).
59.Even the British were ready to consider the benefits of this proposal for industrial
unity, as the proposal of the formation could be helpful to British companies. See 25th
Report, European Communities Committee, the House of Lords, 1883-1984 session, (24th July,
1984).
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of budgetary measures in 1988. 60 Through the delicate
negotiation process amongst European political elites, mainly
the German, French, and British, a consensus developed about
the importance of promoting further integration. Others have
focused on European political circumstance and acknowledged
that the pervasive shift in government coalitions, from
communist Left to market socialist Left in Spain, Italy and
France in the first half of the 1980s, planted the successful
seeds of negotiation.61
More recently, some who have tried to pin-point the
explanation for the 1992 programme argued that there were
generally three reasons why the 1992 programme turned out to
be a driving force for integration:
"One approach would look to the internal dynamics of the
integration process itself, as in integration theory. A
second would concentrate on the domestic politics behind
the regional agreements. The third approach focuses on
elite bargains in response to the challenges and
opportunities posed by international and domestic
changes. "62
These approaches together have advanced beyond the range of
the traditional theories of integration, i.e. federalism,
functionalism, neofunctionalism and pluralism, although
internal processes of integration remain their key interest.
They include the pro-European movement, the development of
transnational institutions, member states' interaction, and
their domestic settings. Some external factors, e.g. the
worldwide economic trend, the change of international
60.For the process of the SEA see Andrew Moravcsik, "Negotiating the Single European Act" in
Keohane & Hoffmann, (eds.), The New European Community: Decision making and Institutional
Change, p. 41; for the diplomacy about the British budgetary rebate in 1984, and the cause
and character of the SEA see Paul Taylor, "The New Dynamics of EC Integration in the 80s",
in Juliet Lodge, (ed.), The European Community and the Challenge of the Future, (London:
Pinter Publishers, 1989), pp. 3-25.
61.For example Stephen George, Politics and Policy in the European Community, (Oxford
University Press, 1985), pp. 180-197.
62.Wayne Sandholtz, and John Zysman, "1992: Recasting The European Bargain", World Politics,
42, (October 1989), p. 97.
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structures, and some sporadic international crises, have also
largely contributed to the relaunch of European integration.
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The progress of European integration has been therefore
an outcome of an interaction between internal and external
factors, as illustrated in Figure 3.1. However, a fourth
approach may be brought forward, which focuses on the role
played by European industrial groups undergoing strong
external competitive challenges in the process of industrial
restructuring and the relaunch of. European integration. Prior
to the SEA, except for the Community's pre-emptive research
programme, the ESPRIT, there was, indeed, little EC-wide
industrial and technological cooperation. In the mid-1980s,
after European industrialists' lobbying campaigns for a
favourable business environment in Europe, transnational and
national elites were mobilised towards further integration.
According to Wisse Dekker, the President of the Dutch
electrical giant Philips, European integration in the 1950s
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was mainly initiated by politicians, while in its current
"industrial" phase it has been initiated by business leaders."
To a large extent, Jacques Delors, President of the European
Commission, and the industrialists' "alliance" concentrated
pro-European support and hence strengthened the bargaining
position with national governments. European industrial unity
was first launched in order to reinforced\ industrial
competitiveness. As a result, economic integration would then
be formally brought in, and later social and political
integration follow suit." The re-emergence of European
integration in the 1980s, has had implications for the process
of integrating differences amongst certain groups.
FIGURE 3.2. I NDUSTRI AL DEVELOPIvENT AND I NTEGRAT1 ON
A European Case
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Figure 3.2 shows how the context of European integration
changed in the 1980s and how industrial unity pressed the
63.Wisse Dekker, "Europe's economic power: potential, and perspectives", speech delivered to
the Swiss Institute for International Studies, Geneva, (25 October, 1988).
64.As far as the relaunching of integration was concerned, the study here refers to the real
reasons behind the successful multinational negotiation and the active Commission to
complete signing the SEA.
115
with externaleconomicmore favourable
exter
framework to cope
1 challenges. As a result, economic integration brought
integration progress ahead. A number of external factors
served as the drive for European integration in terms of
industrial development of the EC, albeit most of them turned
out to have a negative effect on European industry. The
completion of the internal market in the White Paper and the
SEA has been initiated to integrate the interests of
industrialists within the EC, as industrialists seek for a
forward the possibility of further social and political
integration. Yet, there were also some other factors, such as
favourable domestic settings, a pro-Europe belief shared by
most outstanding political elites, and an active Commission
led by Jacques Delors, which were as important as the change
of international structure to integration. 65 Given the very
great complexity of the integration process therefore it
should not be thought that the successful relaunching of
integration could be mobilised by one factor only.
3.2. THE IMPACT OF INDUSTRIAL COMPETITION ON EUROPEAN INDUSTRY
AND THE PROGRESS OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION
3.2.1. The Relative Decline of European Industry
It is critical to emphasise how distressed European
industry was in the 1970s facing the recession and increasing
65. A number of studies have discussed all those factors which were regarded as supplying
possible incentives to integration. Keohane, and Hoffmann's three hypotheses of making the
SEA were: spillover, political economy, and domestic politics. See "Institutional change
in Europe in the 1980s", in their (eds.) The New European Community: Decision Making and
Institutional Change, pp. 18-25; the similar view shared by Sandholtz and Zysman's three
approaches, including integration theory, domestic politics, and elite bargaining, in
"1992: recasting the European bargain", pp. 97-103; Moravcsik's two approaches,
transnational and Intergovernmental institutionalism, bringing the success of the SEA, in
his "Negotiating the Single European Act", pp. 46-48.
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external industrial competition in order to provide an
explanation of the industrial dimension of the change of
European integration. Since the mid-1970s, Europe's production
of goods and services was more dependent on traditional
industries than was the case in Japan and the USA. According
to one European report, "In volume terms, the Community
industrial production in December 1983 was 116.0 (1975
base=100) as against 132.8 for the USA and 152.3 for Japan."66
In the exporting of goods and services in world markets
amongst major industrial countries from 1965 to 1986, while
Japan's share rose to 12.03 per cent in 1986 from 4.53 per
cent in 1965, the United Kingdom declined continuously from
13.25 per cent in 1965 to 8.75 per cent in 1986. On the whole,
TABLE 3.1. THE OECD COUNTRIES' WORLD MARKET SHARES OF GOODS
AND SERVICES (1965-1986)
1965 1970 1975 1980 1981 1983 1985* 1986*
USA 17.69 16.01 16.92 17.30 16.44 13.97 12.69 12.43
Jap. 4.53 6.22 7.79 9.47 10.43 10.88 11.92 12.03
FRG** 15.03 15.19 14.90 14.44 15.02 15.18 14.98 15.12
F 7.37 8.11 9.21 9.52 9.61 9.60 9.18 9.13
UK 13.25 11.72 10.86 9.69 9.13 9.15 8.83 8.75
I 5.33 6.11 6.27 6.47 6.48 6.73 6.38 6.29
Others 36.32 36.64 34.05 33.11 32.89 34.49 36.02 36.25
OECD 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Note: * based on forecast. ** FRG: West Germany
Source: Based on OECD, Statistics of External Trade,
quoted from Hatzichronoglou, "Mutations
Technologiques et Compêtitivite de L'Industrie
Frangaise: Dix Constatations".
West Germany's, France's and Italy's shares decreased in 1983-
86, although they had enjoyed the increase in the 1960s and
66
. The Economic And Social Situation Of The Community, Economic and Social consultative
Assembly, (1985), p. 2.
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1970s 67
 (Table 3.1). The export of manufactures from these
industrial countries reflected a similar trend over the same
period (Table 3.2). The slowdown of European industrial growth
was attributed to its aging industrial structure which
adjusted more slowly than the US and Japanese industries to
technological innovation.
TABLE 3.2. THE OECD ECONOMIES' MARKET SHARES OF EXPORTS OF
MANUFACTURES
1965 1970 1975 1980 1981 1982 1983
USA 19.5 17.8 16.4 15.3 16.9 16.4 15.7
Jap. 7.5 9.7 11.0 11.8 14.3 13.7 14.7
FRG 15.4 16.6 17.2 16.7 15.6 16.5 15.9
8.2 8.1 9.4 9.4 8.8 8.4 8.3
UK 11.2 9.1 8.1 8.9 7.4 7.5 7.0
6.1 6.4 6.7 7.0 7.0 7.2 7.1
Can. 5.1 6.4 4.2 4.1 4.6 4.7 5.3
Source: as Table 3.1.
TABLE 3.3. A PRODUCTIVITY COMPARISON OF THE EC10, JAPAN AND
THE US (1973 = 100)
Economy as a whole Manufacturing Industry
EC10
	
Japan	 USA EC10 Japan	 USA
1974 101.5 99.4 97.5 101.3 99.1 96.2
1976 106.8 103.5 99.5 108.7 114.4 100.8
1978 112.0 114.6 101.1 114.9 133.7 105.3
1979 114.5 119.0 100.7 119.9 146.3 105.3
1980 115.3 122.9 99.9 121.1 160.0 103.5
1981 116.3 126.6 101.4 124.1 168.4 106.4
Source: Based on OECD information, from "The Economic
and social situation of the Community", Economic
and Social Consultative Assembly, 1985.
According to the OECD standardised statistics,
productivity in the economy as a whole and in manufacturing
industry in particular has risen faster in the EC than in the
67
. Thomas Hatzichronoglou, "Mutations Technologiques et Competitivitd de L'Industrie
Frangaise: Dix Constatations", Revue D'Economie Politique, 95 annde, 5, (1985), pp. 580-
582.
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United States, but slower than in Japan. Table 3.3 for
productivity shows that the EC was at 116.3 in 1981 (based on
1973=100), compared with the United States' 101.4 in the same
year, and for manufacturing industry the EC' was at 124.1
against the United States' 106.4 in 1981.
TABLE 3.4. TOTAL LABOUR COSTS, PRODUCTIVITY AND UNIT LABOUR
COSTS IN MANUFACTURING: UK, USA AND GERMANY, 1971-1983
(UK = 100 at all time)
USA GERMANY
19831971 1976	 1981 1983 1971 1976 1981
Total LC 236 209 146 186 151 208 145 160
LP 294 284 302 298 133 147 157 153
Unit LC 80 74 48 62 114 141 92 105
Note: LC: labour costs, LP: labour productivity.
Source: National Institute Economic Review, 110, (November
1984).
However, it has been noticed that this situation has
often been accompanied by massive labour-shedding in declining
European industries rather than by an expansion in the high
productivity sectors." In any event, labour productivity is
higher in the USA than in Europe. Some studies suggested that
the USA had much higher productivity than its European
counterparts throughout the 1970s and most OF the 19800 9 (See
Table 3.4). According to a UN industry and development global
report about manufacturing, Japanese industrial production
grew by 40 per cent from 1975 to 1983, the fastest growth rate
68. "The Economic and Social Situation of The Community", p. 2; also see Edward Salle, "Too
lean for a long life", Financial Time, (27 July, 1992), P. 12. "In the US the extension of
service sector employment to increasing numbers of women may have partly caused aggregate
productivity performance to drop." see Michael Emerson, Europe's Stagflation, (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1984), p. 199.
69. "Industrial Labour Costs, 1971-1983", National Institute Economic Review, 110, (November
1984), p. 64. Only two major European industrial countries were discussed comparing total
labour costs, productivity and unit labour costs with the United States'. See also Vanessa
Rossi, John Walker, Douglas Todd, and Kenneth Lennan, "Exchange Rates, Productivity and
International Competitiveness", Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 2: 3, (1986), p. 58.
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amongst the major industrial countries. None of the major
European countries reached this rate. By contrast, Britain
declined by 8 per cent in the same period (refer to Appendix
T-3.1).
While European economic downturn was prolonged in the
late 1970s, falling business confidence resulted in a fall in
investment. 70 For example, European industry's investment in
the Community's manufactured products decreased steadily from
16.7 per cent in 1970 to 11.9 per cent in 1978 (Table 3.5).
The EC's rate of investment in the first half of the 1980s,
the peak of Europessimism, was lower than the USA's and
TABLE 3.5. EUROPEAN INDUSTRY'S INVESTMENT IN THE EC
1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982
investment ratio
growth rate
manuf. products
22.9
6.2
16.7
22.8
3.6
14.6
22.4
-3.7
14.2
21.1
3.5
12.5
20.7
2.8
11.9
21.2
2.0
...
19.7
-1.3
Note: investment rate (gross fixed capital formation as %
of GDP), growth rate (volume in %).
Source: Eurostat.
TABLE 3.6. THE INVESTMENT RATE OF TOTAL INDUSTRY IN THE EC,
THE USA, AND JAPAN (current price in %)
1975	 1980	 1981 1982	 1983	 1984 1985
EC7	 12.9	 13.2	 12.3 11.4	 11.5	 11.8 12.4
USA	 10.5	 12.2	 11.8 11.7	 12.3	 13.3 13.9
Japan	 20.8	 19.9	 20.2 20.1	 18.6	 17.4 17.3
Source: European Economy, 25, (September 1985), p. 131.
Japan' (Table 3.6). n In March 1982 the European Council
expressed its concern at the level of productive investment in
Western Europe, and then agreed with the need for the
Community and each member state to take all necessary steps to
70. The Economic And Social Situation Of The Community, p. 3.
71.Rate of investment in current prices in total industry, including strong demand, moderate
demand, and weak demand industry.
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EC4
USA
Japan(gross surplus)
1960-73	 1974-79
	
18.7	 13.4
	
29.1
	
20.6
	
34.2	 32.0
reverse this trend:72
 Among those obstacles to investment
raised in a same report to the European Commission, the lack
of profitability of European industry was most apparent
(refers to Appendix T-3.1 which shows that the US and Japan
had the best performance in value added manufacturing well
above other major European economies in the years concerned).
TABLE 3.7. NET OPERATING SURPLUS AS A PERCENTAGE OF FIXED
CAPITAL
Note: EC4: France, Italy, the UK and West Germany.
Source: European Economy, 14, (November 1982), p. 153.
Also, Table 3.7 shows that the net yield on business
capital in manufacturing industry was markedly lower in the
EC4 than in the USA and Japan. It was due to low profitability
of industry and increasing uncertainty over the economic
situation. As investment decreased in the EC, eventually
European industry as a whole was exposing itself as having an
aging and inflexible industrial structure with which it could
not keep up with the more innovative Japanese and American
economies. European industries were concentrating too much on
their short-term interests in existing markets rather than on
the longer term, because they could not afford to invest cash
into expanding production in competitive markets. Moreover,
Japan and the USA have constantly invested in new labour-
saving technology that will make manufacturing much cheaper,
of better quality, and more efficient, whilst Europe has
72 . "Commission Communication to the Council on the problem of investment", European Economy,
14, (November 1982), p. 151.
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average annual change share of extra-EC trade
1960
	
40.6
1970
	
31.0
1980
	
41.2
1970/60	 4.9
1980/70	 18.2
1989/79	 5.8
lagged behind." (See Appendix F-3.1 & F-3.2 about the
investment in plant and machinery, and robot population, which
are considered very important factors for industry in the
future.) In terms of the application of patents and the
registration of industrial design, two indicators for
industrial ability, Europeans were lagging far behind the
gains of Japan and the USA in all items of patents considered.
Even some NICs, Brazil and South Korea, were close to the
European's performance in some industrial sectors (refer to
Appendix T-3.2).
From 1975 to
design was far stronger than any
outstandingly achieved industrial
those of European competitors (see Appendix T-3.3). Strong
design ability gives industries a solid production basis from
which to develop new products. The Japanese try to develop as
short a life cycle of commercial products as possible in order
to diversify against industrial competition simply by
fortifying the design ability, innovation and development, as
well as by marketing. On the contrary, European industries
tend to remain operating in traditional markets with
relatively low productivity and less innovative capability.
TABLE 3.8. EC EXPORTS TO DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (in %)
Source: Eurostat: external trade - Statistical Yearbook
1990, recapitulation 1958-89.
73
. For example, in American car industry one robot can do the work of up to six workers.
While each employee costs US$22-24 an hour, the robot can do all their work for ;6 an
hour. The Economist, (March 24, 1984), p. 67.
1984, Japanese performance in industrial
others' and South Korea had
design levels in line with
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During the 1970s, European industries were gradually
losing overseas market shares, partly because of intensifying
trade and capital transactions within the European market
itself, rather than from expanding trade with developing
countries (Table 3.8)." For example, during 1970 and 1982 the
EC lost trade shares in advanced industrial goods to Japan
(e.g. the share in ASEAN imports, SITC VII - machinery and
transport equipment - in particular, see Table 3.9) in all
major markets, even in its own common market. At the 1985
TABLE 3.9. THE SHARE OF THE EC IN ASEAN IMPORTS. 1970-1983 (in
%)
SITC 0+I II III IV V VI VII VIII Total
1970 12.8 3.3 2.3 9.3 35.5 12.2 31.5 22.3 18.9
1976 8.0 2.4 0.3 5.4 26.8 11.1 26.4 16.5 14.5
1981 9.6 3.5 0.4 3.7 26.0 11.7 18.9 17.6 12.2
1983 12.2
Source 75 : Derived from UN, Commodity Trade Statistics,
Series D, Various issues, IMF 1984 Yearbook.
TABLE 3.10. THE PERCENTAGE CHANGE IN MARKET SHARES OF THE EC,
THE USA, AND JAPAN, 1973-1980
EC	 USA	 JAPAN
Manufactured products:
	 -0.2
	 0.7
	 2.0
/steel	 -1.7
	 -0.1
	 2.3
Equipment goods:	 -0.7
	 -0.1	 2.3
/office & telecom equipment 	 -1.0	 2.2	 1.8
/road vehicles	 -3.7	 -3.2	 10.3
Source: European Economy, 14, (November 1982), p. 151.
ASEAN Ministers conference, it was suggested that the EC was
"losing out to Japan and the USA in the prosperous markets of
74. Rolf Langhammer raised five general factors which were in turn driving the trend of the EC
trade within the EC itself. For details see ibid., p. 143.
75. Information based on Rolf Langhammer, "EEC-ASEAN relations: institutional deepening but
modest economic impact", in Christopher Stevens and Joan Verloren van Themaat, eds.,
Europe and the International Division of Labour, EEC and the Third World: A survey 6,
(London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1987), p. 141.
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South-east Asia". 78 As regional trade blocs have developed, the
trade diversion effect between the EC and the ASEAN has been
going on for some time. While the former has concentrated on
its intra-regional trade, the latter has become deeply
involved in intra-Pacific trade networks. In extra-community
trade in manufactured products, the EC's market share fell
throughout the 1970s (Table 3.10), although its share was
still larger than those of either the USA or Japan.
The Fear of A Widening Technology Gap
At the height of Europessimism, Western Europe recognised
an inability of European industries to compete with their
American and Japanese rivals, particularly in high technology
industries. Nor could they see off the NICs' strong challenge
in lower technology industries. The most obvious examples were
those European "crisis sectors", i.e. steel, textile and
clothing and shipbuilding industries, at the mercy of economic
slowdown, diminishing demand and international competition.77
Gradually, even electronics and electrical, motor, and
information industries have relatively declined. Changes of
European industrial export specialisation indicators from 1972
to 1983 saw electrical equipment and electronics decline by -
0.08, transport equipment by -0.08 and information technology
by -0.19, and changes of import specialisation over the same
period saw their increase by 0.24, 0.20 and 0.23
respectively. 78
76. The Guardian, (18 October, 1985), P. 8.
77. See T. Hitiris, European Community Economics, 2nd edition, (London: Harvest Wheatsheaf,
1991), pp. 304-309.
78. Import and export specialisation indicators are based on the calculation of imports or
exports in a sector in one country over total imports or exports of that country by
Volimex, DG II. Indicators here express the figures for the EC10 (excluding Portugal and
Spain). See Commission of European Communities, "Competitiveness of European industry:
situation to date", European Economy, 25, (September 1985), pp. 23. 27.
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High-technology industry is supposed to be the guarantee
of future prosperity. By the mid-1980s, Western Europe's share
of high-technology products (aerospace, automatic data-
processing equipment, electronic and electrical machinery, and
telecommunications equipment) in the world market has fallen
away sharply from its earlier stronger position. For example,
Japanese export market share in the automatic data-processing
equipment machine, electronic equipment, and
telecommunication equipment, rose remarkably and hence left
its major rivals, EUR 12 and the US, at the mercy of its
powerful output. While in the scientific instruments,
electrical machinery, and non-electrical machinery Japan's
share also increased steadily from a quarter to one third of
the market. The EUR 12 on the contrary lost quite a lot of
market shares. The only exception was that the EUR 12 in
aerospace had about a half of the market share and in
chemicals dominated some three-fiftNof the market in most of
the recorded period (Refer to Appendix T-3.4). The perilous
trend to Europe showed that the markets of automatic equipment
and electronics telecommunications industries were dominated
by Japan and of the aerospace industry by the United States.
Moreover, European markets were severely penetrated by the
Class 2 partners (developing countries) from index number 100
in 1980 to 244.9 in 1986, Asian NICs in particular. 79 That is
in fact bringing gloom to its hope for a bright industrial
future, as Japanese shares in many high-technology industrial
products have surpassed the EC's in the first half of the
1980s.
In terms of lagging European technology, it refers
European
	 industry's
	 weakness
	
to research	 capability,
79
. See Appendix T-3.5 for details about the NICs penetrating the EC market in Eurostat,
Statistical Analysis of Extra-EUR12 Trade in Hi-Tech Products, 1989.
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80
. Roger Williams, "The EC's technology policy as an engine for integration", Government and
Opposition, 24: 2, (1989), P. 159.
• John Marcum argues that European problem was not simply R & D, but inadequate investment
in this field and widespread rigidities in many European institutions whose policy was
aimed at preserving status quo rather than promoting change. Stanley Woods makes it clear
that the problems were not really technological but derived from European political,
social and economic rigidities which obstacle innovation. He points out that the crucial
step to Europe for technological success is to exploit every single technologies
commercially. Williams then concludes that "the technological area in which Europe most
lags are consumer electronics, computers and telecommunications." Ibid., pp. 160-161.
81
availability of venture capital, skills in design and
production management, quality control, reliability and
service facilities, marketing arrangements, and consumer,
corporate and governmental demand." Simply, the industrial
performance and market shares are the indicators to evaluate
technology levels. Whereas, whatever the arguments concerned
with the real content of the European technology gap may be,81
the technology gap could be simply reduced into two related
fields: inadequate investment in R & D, and a weak ability for
commercial application could be the reasons why Europeans have
been unable to meet its rivals' challenge. According to the
EC's figure, the Gross Domestic Expenditure on R & D (GERD) of
EUR 10 as a whole was well over )nuk Japan's in any year
listed, although it was still far behind the American R & D
TABLE 3.11. GROSS DOMESTIC EXPENDITURE ON R & D AS A
PERCENTAGE OF THE GDP: THE EC10, USA, JAPAN
R & D/GDP%	 1975	 1979	 1980	 1981
	 1982	 1983
W. GERMANY	 2.24
	 2.40	 2.42	 2.49	 2.58	 2.59
FRANCE
	
1.80	 1.81	 1.84	 2.01	 2.10	 2.14
UK
	
2.10
	 2.28	 2.31	 2.42	 2.34	 2.27
EC 10	 1.81	 1.87	 1.89	 1.99
	 2.03	 2.05
USA	 2.38	 2.37	 2.46	 2.51	 2.66	 2.70
JAPAN	 2.01	 2.10	 2.22	 2.37	 2.47	 2.62
Source: "Europe and the New Technologies - Research,
Industry, Social EC", Economic and Social
Committee, 1986, p. 10.
spending. However, Japan's share of GERD in the GDP was not
only growing faster but was larger than Europe's share (2.01
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in 1975 to 2.62 in 1983 compared to Europe's 1.81 in 1975 to
2.05 in 1983) (see Table 3.11). In fact, the shares of the
EC's three biggest countries, West Germany, France, and
Britain of GERD in the GDP all exceeded 2 per cent at the
period.
One EC study straightforwardly points out that this is
due to the inadequacy of national science policy within the
Community. 82 The trouble not only results from some sort of
governmental policy discrimination in public procurement but
also from the overlapping investment in the same area. In
other words, over-emphasizing big firms does not improve
technological levels in general firms, which causes market
strong players to stay stronger and weak players to remain
weaker. Also, the rationale of individual countries'
investment in R & D was that it was expected to be a means of
improving
	 its	 own	 competitiveness.
	 Nevertheless,
	 the
assumption to some extent did not bring the EC as a whole an
oct
expecting upgrade of technology, but diminished the general +
competitiveness of the EC because countries were virtually
competing with one another within the EC rather than
cooperating. Therefore, as far as the investment in R & D is
concerned, much of the effort was offset by merely competing
inside the EC markets, rather than international competition.
As an effect of Europe's fragmented markets, there was in
• the duplication of investment in the same R & D fields which
caused "an appalling waste of resources" in Europe." Each
European country carried on R & D itself and developed its own
design and evaluations to match different national standards.
Therefore, their developed-products were rarely sold and
82. Europe and the New Technologies, Research Industry Social, Brussels 1986, R & D Industry
Social Aspects, p. 10.
83. "Europe's Technology Gap", The Economist, (24 November, 1984), p. 109.
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applied to the other countries. In the end, Europe was not
only wasting "human resources" in doing the same things, but
also mutually diminishing market ability itself. Moreover,
while Japan spent US$1.5-2 billion on R & D for the latest
generation digital switches and North America spent some $3
billion, Western Europe used up more than $10 billion on 10
different switching systems. 84 Mr. Malcolm Ross, with the
management of consultant firm Arthur D. Little in Wiesbaden,
estimates that "Western Europe used three times as many
hardware and software engineers as either North America or
Japan in developing its switches."85
Apart from the R & D investment, commercialising ability
is also a critical factor for the industrial future. In other
words, "to achieve the effect science and technology requires
to be translated into innovation".
most important thing is to commercialise research programmes
and hence to back industrial production. In fact, this is what
the industrial competition of developing technology is all
about among industrial countries. Nonetheless, European
countries do not seem to meet this requirement for developing
high-technology products.The amounts of patents' application
among main industrial countries show clearly the industrial
ability for innovation in each country (refer also to Appendix
T-3.2). Japan has emerged as the fastest growing innovative
economy in the world. With its difficulties in many existing
industrial circumstances, Europe's inability to lead
competition became ever more obvious.
Weakening Industrial Competitiveness
Industrial competitiveness is a critical factor in
industrial survival. In other words, it is a key item in
84. Ibid.
85. Ibid.
86 •
 Roger Williams, "The EC's technology policy as an engine for integration", p. 161.
86 Whatever R & D is, the
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87.
88.
89.
profit-gaining and market sharing. Industry should obtain a
more competitive position, at least, by enjoying either
comparative advantages of low costs in production processes
and outputs, or the quality of technology. That is to say that
the demand of consumers for goods is dependent upon "prices,
quality and the novelty of the goods on offer." 87 By all means,
to improve competitiveness, corporations focus on reducing the
cost of production including advancing technology, for an
effective production on the one hand, and improving the
technology to upgrade the quality and to accelerate innovation
of their products on the other.
The EC's loss of its industrial competitiveness to its
rivals became apparent in the early 1980s. Most accusations
about the decline focused on the EC's uncontrollable high
costs of production which derived from the rapid increases of
wages and low productivity, although Western Europe was hit by
high inflation. 88
 The Confederation of British Industry (CBI)
warned in March 1985 that "British wages are rising too fast,
productivity is increasing too slowly". The worrying evidence
of the nation's declining labour cost competitiveness raised
by the CBI in 1985 was that "the increase in earnings in
manufacturing industry last year averaged 8.5 per cent
compared with 6.5 per cent in France, 4 per cent for Japan and
the USA, and 3.5 per cent for West Germany." 89 However, the
British case was merely a molehill compared to the mountain of
European problems with industrial structures, particularly
Pierre Buigues, and Philippe Goybet, "Competitiveness of European Industry: Situation to
Date", European Economy, 25, (September 1985), p. 17.
As a matter of fact, one authority argued that the over-valued exchange rate of European
countries also contributed a lot to the high price economic structure which resulted in
their industry less competitive. Ann Morgan, "Protectionism and European Trade in
Manufactures", National Institute Economic Review, 109, (August 1984), p. 48.
"CBI issues pay and productivity warning on Budget eve", The Times, (18 March, 1985), p.
2.
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wage settlements and productivity." Moreover, Mr. Kaspar
Cassani, the head of International Business Machines (IBM),
launched an attack on the uncompetitiveness of European labour
arguing that high wage rates were paralysing industry with
regard to employing labour and expanding business.
TABLE 3.12. EARNINGS PER HEAD, LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY, AND REAL
UNIT LABOUR COSTS (1972 = 100)
Earning Productivity unit labour costs
EUR7 USA JAP EUR7 USA JAP EUR7	 USA	 JAP
72 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
75 113.7 102.7 119.4 107.3 102.3 109.2 106.0 100.4 109.4
80 129.6 111.4 142.9 129.7 111.5 171.3 99.9 99.9 83.4
81 131.6 111.6 148.7 133.1 115.0 179.5 98.9 97.0 82.8
83 134.3 114.9 161.3 142.0 118.7 196.6 94.6 96.8 82.0
85 138.7 117.5 175.8 155.8 125.1 223.6 89.0 93.9 78.6
Note: EUR7: Belgium, Denmark, France, W. Germany, Italy, the
Netherlands, and the UK.
Source: European Economy, 25, (September 1985), pp. 126,
128, 129.
The unit labour cost which is dependent upon the
relationship of earnings per worker and labour productivity is
a key indicator of competitiveness. 91 Although Japan has got
the fastest growing rate of earnings per worker in companion
with EUR7 and the USA in all relevant categories, in the
period recorded in Table 3.12, it has also had the highest
productivity rate in relation to the others. In addition, the
USA during most of the time recorded had the higher growing
rate of productivity relative to the earnings per worker,
which made the Americans competitive. Therefore, EUR7 as a
. For the detailed discussion of wage settlements and comparative Japanese and British
systems see Neil Dunn, "The Japanese 'Shunto': Are There lessons for the UK", The Royal
Bank of Scotland Review, 151, (September 1986).
Exports prices are determined by the unit labour cost, all other non-labour costs and the
marketing policy of exporters including the profit which exporters wish to make on their
sales abroad. Among them the unit labour cost is purely decided by the production factors.
"Industrial Labour Costs, 1971-1983", National Institute Economic Review, 110, (November
1984), p. 64. For those principal factors affecting industrial competitiveness see C.-Rene
Dominique, and Muhittin Oral, "Exporting to Northern markets: the making of an industrial
competitiveness index", Industry and Development, (Vienna), 18, (1986).
91.
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whole was repeating the British story in terms of waning
competitiveness, as a result of increasing unit labour costs
to industry which resulted from relative high earning rates
and low productivity. In fact, high European prices were
derived not only from the cost of production and inflation,
but also from the overvalued exchange rate. 92 In addition, some
focuses on market share in terms of industrial competitiveness
point out that:
"A country's industrial competitiveness rests on its
ability to retain and expand its shares of world markets
and to maintain a balance on its domestic market between
imports and national output that is compatible with its
exports performance. "93
Concretely, Buigues and Goybet's traditional assumption
(domestic demand = output - exports + imports) highlights
domestic market demand as an indicator to assess the
competitiveness of the EC countries and their main partners in
market share of categorised sectors. According to the formula,
the fluctuation of exports and imports implies a changing
trend of demand market from which competing market shares
could be shown. Therefore, the growth of Japanese penetration
into the EC market in all industrial sectors could be directly
read from the market demand's data. By contrast, the market
share structure of the EC as a whole has no longer focused on
high and moderate demand industries but on weak demand
industries. 94 Another supplementary development with regard to
92. For discussion of the overvalued European exchange rate see Morgan, "Protectionism and
European Trade in Manufactures", p. 48. Within the EC market, as a result of establishing
the common market, the prices of goods have been fixed in the common market high prices
system to protect European producers at the expense of general consumers' interests in
enjoying lower world market prices. See T. Hitiris, European Community Economics, 2nd
edition, (Hemel Hamstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991).
93. Buigues, and Goybet, "Competitiveness of European Industry: Situation to Date", p. 11.
94. Ibid.
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competitiveness could be reflected in the sliding market share
of Europeans in international business. According to Fortune
International, ranking the 500 largest corporations outside
the USA by their nationality, Japan and some NICs,
particularly, in the period of 1975-1985 gained their
increasing trends steadily, and the EC9 as a whole obtained
almost an half of the 500 largest corporations in 1975, but
decreased to just over two-fifths of them in 1985. (Table
3.13)
TABLE 3.13. 500 LARGEST INDUSTRIAL CORPORATIONS OUTSIDE THE
USA (1975-1985)
1975 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1985
Japan 122 117 125 121 134 150 147
EC 9* 242 232 233 229 221 295 204
NICs 4** 9 14 20 25 21 23 23
Note: *: Belgium, Denmark, France, W. Germany, Irland,
Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, UK.
**: Brazil, Mexico, South Korea, Taiwan.
Source: Fortune, (August 1976-August 1986).
To gain more market shares, apart from reducing the cost
of production, corporations and national governments have been
undergoing high-technology development efforts, as a part of
targeting strategy to upgrade the existing technology for more
effective production processes and better quality of products.
Joint ventures, strategic partnerships, and other forms of co-
operation are equally important for industrial prospects to
market share and the cost of developing technology, as well as
to obtain advanced technology. European economies were
inclined to an inward-looking trend which, as many
protectionists believe, could allow them to be shielded from
international competition. From international business and
free economics points of view, international competition could
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bring about a necessary growth of industry's scale and also an
industrial rationalisation. Thus, the more a company presents
in a competitive market, the better industrial structure it
will be. Consequently, the Community's ability in many areas
to compete in future was under threat. In general, the
Community's loss of competitiveness implied a loss of
comparative advantage in many areas and an inadequate scale of
production.95
The EC's inability to meet industrial competition, in
effect, drives its firms to industrial unity and to a large
extent to economic integration. For many, particularly big
firms such as Philips, Siemens, Nixdorf, Bull, ICI, Ericsson
and Olivetti, community-level research is the right, perhaps
the only, direction in which to resurrect the lagging
industries. The message directly coming from those big firms
was that "no single European country alone was independently
able to develop a technology policy to win the support of
multinational industries." 95 Wisse Dekker, went further that
"the only form in which a European industrial policy is
possible is on a Pan-European level." 97 The supporting
arguments can therefore be summarised as follows: 1. The
nature of communication and market scale. Some R & D fields
are heading to a transnational action and a potential larger
market. 2. Sharing financial burdens. It has become necessary
to spread the costs and risks because many research projects
are beyond the financial and human means of an individual
country. 3. Long-term character. Instead of national
governments' short and medium-term projects, the Community
offers an opportunity for dealing with structural problems. 4.
Reasonable use of limited resources. The Community can ensure
95. The most serious areas are consumer goods, of which clothing and textiles are the most
important, and certain engineering products, such as cars, consumer electronics and those
advanced technological components concerned. For full discussion see Morgan,
"Protectionism and European Trade in Manufactures", p. 57.
96. Financial Times, (25 April, 1985), p. 1.
97. Ibid.
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optimal use of rare resources within the EC, and prevent the
duplication of efforts. 5. The development of new common
policies. The Community R & D can be used to underpin the EC's
sectoral policy and to tie national vital interests to
Europe's future. 6. A catalytic effect to integration. The
Community level R & D is not only integrating national
policies by aggregating scientists and research teams and by
improving the dissemination of information and research
results inside the Community, but also facilitating R & D
results to be converted into commercial goods and be applied
in the common market.98
3.2.2. European Industry Countering External Challenges
The changing international industrial structure has had a
destablizing effect on European industry," because:
"many firms have not perceived the implications of these
structural transformations early enough and some
countries have persisted in massively investing in heavy
industries with limited world demand prospects at the
very moment these industries are taking-off in some LDCs.
Simultaneously, investment in new high-technology
industries, like electronics, have not been sufficient to
compensate for other sectors' difficulties. u 100
The fragmented markets within the EC with different national
regulations on tax, and the movement of labour, goods and
capital even worsened industry's competence against industrial
competition. Facing the "Uncommon Market", West European
industry's long-term prospects were not rosy. Therefore, in
98. For more detailed discussion about all arguments above see European File, N. 11/79,
"Science, Research and the European Community", (June 1979).
99. Jacques Lesourne, "The changing context of industrial policy: external and internal
developments", in Alexis Jacquemin, (ed.), European Industry: Public Policy and Corporate
Strategy, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984). The author has very detailed description of the
new economic context facing European industry.
100 . Ibid., p. 21.
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response to international competition, West European industry
began to focus more closely on its home market and to depend
on protectionism. As a result, the recession got much worse.
With the rise of the competitive challenge from East Asia, it
was evident that national strategies were not going to draw
Europe out of recession. It became apparent that European
business would have to become more competitive in
international markets, if it was going to survive. 101 It seemed
that only by expanding industrial scale economies through the
creation of a single European market - to unify the fragmented
national markets, could the European Community build up a
solid economic basis for international competition. The idea
encouraged the EC member states to start to pool their
resources to advance technology, to share capital markets,
services, and labour.
In 1981, the Commissioner for internal market, Vicomte
Davignon, brought together a group of large European
information technology firms to form the Thorn-Davignon
Commission, which was not only to develop proposals for
technology matters but also to consider liberalising the
European market. The projects in this pioneer mission of
forming the ESPRIT were generally co-funded by the EC and
industry on a fifty/fifty basis. More importantly research
resultswere shared between all participants of the
projects. lln Significantly the ESPRIT brought about the effect
of creating "an important constituency amongst business
pressing for the completion of the internal market" and was
101
.Such as Wayne Sandholtz, and John Zysman, "1992: Recasting the European bargain", World
Politics, 42, (October 1989).
102
.Margaret Sharp, "The Single Market and European Policies for Advanced Technologies", p.
108.
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proved to be "a catalyst to a far wider reorganisation of
European industry. H103
In the private sector, the European Roundtable united
business interests to lobby the Commission in Brussels. 104 The
Roundtable's "Memorandum", which stressed the most important
issues facing European industry, served as a basis for
supporting the Commission during the debates in the Stuttgart
Summit of the European Council in June 1983. 105 In its grand
design for upgrading Europe's transborder transport
infrastructure, the Roundtable paid close attention to
Europe's cross-border weakness from which Europe's economic
and social development had suffered. The Roundtable emphasised
that:
"To be competitive, Europe's industry must extract more
productivity from its invested capital. Europe's
international businesses must not be prevented from
achieving economies of scale and optimum marketing and
manufacturing strategies by shortcomings in transport and
unnecessary frontier bureaucracy. Equally, Europe can
only become a thriving, unified market if there is the
freest possible movement of goods, people, capital and
ideas. n106
Wisse Dekker quoted a Japanese view of a future scenario in
which America will be providing the world with food as the
granary, Japan with its Far East partners will become the
world's supplier of industrial products and Europe will be the
cultural museum of the world. European industry was lagging
103
.Ibid., p. 116.
104
.The European Roundtable, previously the Roundtable of European Industrialists, was
established in 1983 and chaired by Perh Gyllenhammar, the CEO of AB Volvo. After Wisse
Dekker, Philips' Chairman, took the chairmanship in 1988, the headquarters has since been
moved to Brussels from Paris, which the change has led the Roundtable to become "pan-
European" in its approaches to European integration. See Axel Krause, "Many groups lobby
on implementation of market plan", Europe, (July/August 1988), p. 25.
105
."Achievements of the European Roundtable", mimeograph, by European Roundtable, (May 1988).
106
."Missing Links: Upgrading Europe's Transborder Ground Transport Infrastructure", A report
for the Roundtable of European Industrialists, (December 1984).
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behind in the technological race especially in information
technology. Furthermore, in 1985, he identified some hard
facts facing the EC, e.g. unemployment, the deterioration of
competitiveness, zero return for the private sectors; and
working times too short.107
While many businesses in Europe were losing profits and
market share, and some were even dying out, Japan and the
Asian NICs were filling the "market vacuum" with their rapidly
advancing technology and low cost production at the expense of
EC industry. To cope with this challenge, Dekker believed that
an internal market of continental scale based on free
movements of goods and services would have a beneficial effect
on Europe's competitive position. He explained how important
it was to assist industry:
"1. In the first place, economies of scale are needed to
cover the gigantic rise in research and development costs
which are characteristic of modern technology and which
exceed the scope of national markets.
2. In the second place, increases in scale are necessary
in order to arrive at competitive cost prices in Europe,
because economies of scale and speed of growth are also
the strategic elements used by our competitors world-wide
to exploit the learning curve effect.
3. In addition, a homogeneous infrastructure based on
uniform European standards will be an important stimulus
to the rapid application of innovative products and
systems and of new technologies in Europe.
."The EC has 12.5 million unemployed, many of them young people. Its relative competitive
position on the world market has deteriorated, because of its productivity lagging behind
wages increases by 10% in the last 10 years. The percentage of social charges in wage and
salary costs is about twice those of its competitors in Japan and the USA. A booming
bureaucratic governmental culture, which absorbs more than half of the GNP to settle two
third of total number of civil servants for producing translations, needs to be
reconsidered. The combined results of the largest 100 companies in Europe (excluding oil)
in 1980 show a profit level of 0 per cent. Working times in the EC are to be shortened to
1400 hours per year, whereas Japanese competitors work 2100 hours, and the Koreans work
2800 hours per year. The epicentre of world trade is shifting from the Atlantic to the
Pacific Ocean.""Europe 1990, speech given by Dr. W. Dekker, at the Centre for Europeani
Policy Studies in Brussels, 13 November 1984, on the occasion of the presentation for the
programme "Europe 1990 - an agenda for action".
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4. Advantages of scale and rapid application in the
market are equally important for the small and medium
sized companies, since it (the single market) fosters the
development of a good subcontracting and suppliers'
climate in which high-level specialisation can thrive.
5. Economies of scale and European uniformity would
remove many of the uncertainty and doubts which exist
among financiers, constructors and those who exploit
high-technology development strategies.
6. The combination of free goods traffic and homogeneous
standards on a European scale would result in a great
reduction in stocks, bring down cost prices and improve
the competitive position.
7. Consensus between economic partners is increasingly
developing into an additional production factor. A really
homogeneous Common Market would constitute the basis for
such a European consensus. n 1()8
Having examined a wide range of measures and proposals
from the Roundtable for improving industrial performances, the
Commission clarified four key areas for action to improve the
international competitiveness of European firms. 1" All these
suggested actions were later incorporated in the White Paper -
"Completing the internal market". Institutional change,
transnational business interest groups, national politics, and
elites' alliances seemed to be the determinants of the
successful negotiation for the SEA.1" But, the question also
arose as to why the Commission was so enthusiastic about the
creation of the single market at that moment, while national
governments were reluctant to discuss further integration in
any direction. The dynamic Commission was, to a large extent,
bolstered by the support of European industry for facilitating
108. Ibid, p. 4.
109
.European Commission, "Community measures to improve the international competitiveness of
European Firms", COM(83)578 final, 29 September, 1983. Four key areas were: improving the
economic and monetary context, dynamic use of the internal market, scientific research and
the development of advanced technologies, and energy policy.
110
.See Sandholtz and Zysman, "1992: Recasting the European bargain"; and Paul Taylor, "The
new dynamics of EC integration in the 1980s", in Juliet Lodge, (ed.) The European
Community and the Challenge of the Future, (London: Pinter Publishers, 1989).
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integration, more precisely by industrial leading groups, the
Roundtable and the UNICE, and it was this friendly alliance
which proved to be vital for the passage of the SEA. Indeed,
before the European Council actually reached a consensus on
the framework for progress to the future integration, European
industrialists had put their proposals through the Commission
and individual national governments.
3.3. EUROPEAN INDUSTRY, THE COMPLETION OF THE
INTERNAL MARKET, AND EUROPEAN INTEGRATION
3.3.1. The Need for the Completion of the Internal Market and
the Formation of an Industrial Coalition
It was that change of international economic structure in
the 1970s and early 1980s, which served as an external factor
striking the European economy and brought about the rallying
of industry, which has contributed to progress to the
completion of the internal market and the SEA, as well as
integration in general. Although it is still in question how
far the importance of industry, or "transnational business
interest", is to the above progress, many have confirmed
industrial implications for the revitalisation of European
integration. fli
 It may be that the argument of industrialists'
influencing the decision-making of the EC, at both the
Community and national levels, has not been noted clearly
enough, because informal communication between industrialists
111
.moravcsik, "Negotiating the Single European Act", pp. 67-68, pointed out that
transnational business interest was "ineffective" to the negotiation. However, there are
many more confirmations taking the opposite view. Such as Sandholtz, and Zysman, "1992:
Recasting the European Bargain"; and Lord Cockfield in an address to the London Europe
Society, Europe 85, (November/December 1985), pp. 17-18.
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and the EC decision-makers has been essentially "the most
influential mode"."
As a result of European response to economic downturn
during the late 1970s and early 1980s, protectionism,
undertaken, to a large extent, at the national and the
Community level, emerged as a means of shielding those
uncompetitive industries and their related interest groups
from external competition. New protectionism noted as using
non-tariff barriers was caused by economic recession,
intensified by two oil shocks; by the emergence of new
economic powers (Japan and the NICs); by technological change;
and by the advent of floating exchange rates. 113 To cope with
this turbulence, European countries were inclined to dismiss
their commitment to the Community of transnational management.
Instead, they continued the "national champions" strate
with direct governmental intervention, which "had increased
the perceived diversity of national situations and competition
among European states." 115 The new protectionism in Europe was
quietly imposed on most external suppliers ranging from quota
restrictions through "voluntary export restraint" (VER) and
orderly marketing arrangements to allow certain industries and
firms to be subsidised. As a result, even European industries
themselves were also hindered by the rising trade barriers of
their neighbouring countries. 116
112. Keith Richardson, Secretary General of the European Roundtable, confirmed this
communication behind the political scene. See his "Europe's industrialists help shape the
Single Market", Europe, (December 1989), p. 19.
113 .Jean Pearce, "Europrotectionism: the challenge and the cost", The World Today, (December
1985), p. 225.
114. "National champions" strategy, which was motivated by the need to resist the American
challenges in France in the 1960s, was to develop firms to be large enough to compete
under the auspices of national governments. For example, big firms such as Fiat in Italy,
Renault and Saint-Gobain in France have the right to claim government subsidies. See Ezra
Suleiman, "Industrial policy formulation in France", in Warnecke, and Suleiman, (eds.),
Industrial Policies in Western Europe, p. 31.
115
.Keohane and Hoffmann, (eds.), The New European Community: Decisionmaking and Institutional
Change, p. 22.
116
.Morgan, "Protectionism and European Trade in Manufactures", p. 45.
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There has been always an argument within the EC about
whether or not to raise protectionism against imports from
other countries. Indeed, the fear of trade retaliation from
the rest of the world, and the relatively smaller share of
imports in the Community than in national expenditure, have
made protectionism less likely at the Community level.'" The
"Poitiers effect", for example, was just one of the cases of
European national protectionism against all imports including
those from other "fellow member states of the EC" into a
domestic market. While aiming at the "Japanese invasion" in
consumer electronics, the French government in October 1982
ordered that all imports of video cassette recorders (VCRs)
would have to pass through the customs of its inland city,
Poitiers, all the VCRs imports were seriously delayed by the
custom's insufficient ability. Not only were the Japanese
products suffering from a non-tariff barrier, but also other
European VCRs producers in Denmark, West Germany, and the
Netherlands were hurt. 118
Apart from its lagging technology development and
weakening productivity, European industry was unable to
compete with the American's and Japan's because of
insufficient market scale and their relatively heterogeneous
markets. The common market of the EC was actually composed of
several fragmented markets which had inevitably cost Europe a
slowing pace of economic development." 9 As national interests
were put in first place, the continued use of barriers at a
117 .Ibid., pp. 56-57; also the White Paper of the Commission pinpoints that the remaining
national protectionism which has worsened the European economy in the recession, will have
to be cleared away. See Commission of the European Communities, "Completing the Internal
Market", White Paper from the Commission to the European Council, p. 5.
118. This well known case was then cited as the "Poitiers effect". For detail see World
Development Report 1987, The World Bank, p. 141.
119
.For the details of the unnecessary cost paid due to market fragmentation in the EC see the
analysis with related policy in Pelkmans, "Completing the internal market for industrial
products", pp. 21-27; also the EC official assessment of the cost see Cecchini, The
European Challenge: 1992 The Benefits of A Single Market, part 1.
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number of national borders caused additional costs in many
areas that can be summarised as follows:
"high administrative costs caused by national
bureaucratic requirements; high transport costs due to
delays at borders; high costs due to different national
standards for goods; the duplication of work on separate
Research and Development programmes; intervention by
national governments, preventing open competition;
national markets keeping costs artificially high and
reducing choice for consumers; and economic expansion
limited by the inability to spread across borders. 9,120
Two economists, Jacques Pelkmans and Alan Winters, in
1988 suggested that "static losses in the markets for goods
for around ECU 10 billion per annum due to border measures and
ECU 15 billion due to public purchasing biases... 	 h121
Moreover, the fragmented markets in the EC had substantially
hindered any possibility of developing higher technology in
cooperative form, because research and development for higher
technology by any single country would again expose the
vulnerability of all separated individual national markets to
their principal rivals, Japan, and the USA. What appeared to
be necessary for the European economy and industrial
competitiveness was to complete a single market, which would
encourage pooling enough capital for R & D and sharing the
risk of technology development as any individual country would
be unable to compete with such technological development based
on a region of the market size of Japan and the USA. In March
1985, a Commission's report on strengthening industrial bases
clearly pointed out this weakness of European industry. 122
120. International Business Intelligence, 1992-Planning for the Engineering Industries,
(Butterworth & Co. Ltd and Eurofi Plc., 1989), p. 4.
121 .Pelkmans, and Winters, Europe's Domestic Market, p. 53; for the details of the national
barriers which existed then and their likely costs, see Chapter two, pp. 16-53.
122 .Commission of the European Communities, "Strengthening the technological base and
competitiveness of Community industry", COM(85) 84 final, (19 March, 1985), pp. 1-2.
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Moreover, national policies on implementing individual
standards, technical regulations, industrial subsidiaries, and
protected markets for public procurement were encouraging "the
national character of industrial structures and the
fragmentation of the common market." 23
 To prevent these
national approaches from further jeopardising European hopes
for facilitating technology, the Commission in 1985 firmly
decided to launch a new programme - "Towards a European
Technology Community", through two main approaches: to
complete the internal market, and therefore to make better use
of the unified market by states in order to enable industry to
be competitive. 124 The needs for a single market to improve
industrial competitiveness were wide spread right across
Europe.
During the first half of the 1980s, the European Council
had repeatedly pledged to complete the internal market as an
essential to advancing European integration. In 1982 at the
Copenhagen summit, the European Council decided that "before
the end of March 1983, on the priority measures proposed by
the Commission to reinforce the internal market." That
decision resulted in the Internal Market Council. Its first
meeting was in January 1983. Lord Cockfield recalled that its
work was "fragmentary and insufficiently focused", because it
lacked a complete programme to satisfy all and a timetable to
press ahead. In agreeing to the Solemn Declaration on
European Union in 1983 in Stuttgart, the heads of state or
government confirmed their commitment to "the completion of
the internal market . . . in particular the removal of the
123.Ibid.
124. Ibid., p. 2; also Commission of the European Communities, "Towards a European Technology
Community", COM(85) 530 final, (30 September, 1985).
125 .Lord Cockfield, "The real significance of 1992", in Colin Crouch and David Marquand,
(eds.), The Politics of 1992: Beyond the Single European Market, (Oxford: Basil Blackwell,
1990), pp. 3-4.
143
remaining obstacles to the free movement of goods, capital and
services" and called for developing common policies at the
Community level in transport, commerce, development and
industry. 126 In June 1984 at Fontainebleau, the European
Council asked the Council and the Member States to study the
measures which could lead to "the abolition of all police and
customs formalities for people crossing intra-Community
frontiers..." In December 1984 in Dublin, the European Council
agreed that the Council should take steps to complete the
Internal Market."
Further, in March 1985 in Brussels, the European Council
emphasised "action to achieve a single market by 1992 thereby
creating a more favourable environment for stimulating
7 Most initiatives inenterprise, competition and trade. w12
front of the European Council significantly highlighted
improving the economic situation and industrial
competitiveness, although they very much tended to more
political approaches, e.g. the Gencher-Colombo initiative and
1983 Solemn Declaration of European Union in Stuttgart. 128 The
heads of state and government endorsed the White Paper in June
1985 at the Milan summit, in which the Paper carried forward
the internal market programme into the SEA. The completion of
the internal market provided the trigger for the SEA to
endorse a whole range of policies which had been agreed in the
Solemn Declaration of Stuttgart. u9
 It is conceivable that the
most critical issues in front of most national governments,
126. "Solemn Declaration on European Union", Bulletin of European Communities, 6, (1983), p.
27.
127 .Refer to various declarations by the European Council to the Commission of the European
Communities, "Completing the Internal Market", White Paper from the Commission to the
European Council.
128.see "Revitalizing European Union", Bulletin of European Communities, 11, (1981), P. 10;
and "construction of Europe must be more clearly oriented towards its general political
objectives..." see "Solemn Declaration on European Union", p. 25.
129.Lord Cockfield, "The real significance of 1992", p. 5.
144
prior to negotiations of the SEA, were to get the "internal
market" programme and the supports for the necessary EC
decision-making reforms through legal confirmations. The
multinational negotiations for a single act were therefore
intend to achieve that target and to bargain for each national
interest in a European agenda.
Wisse Dekker in a speech pointed out that "the economic
recession and the pressure of both Japanese and American
competition have created a better climate for making people
aware of the need for a Community approach in Europe.
Indeed, the mounting general concern with the weakness of
European economy and its industrial performance, devoted much
attention to the economic policy cooperation at both European
and national levels, which had raised the major interest in
European integration. Belief in actual advantages of the
single market and further integration could provide the only
solution for European countries to sort out their economic and
social difficulties. What the political commitment of the
member states to the SEA implied was that the real impetus
towards the completion of the internal market was not directly
derived from the political consensus obtained by the 33rd
European Council in the Luxembourg summit in 1985, but very
much relied on the recognition of economic realities. Giovanni
Agnelli, the Chairman of Fiat, stated that:
"[T]he current unity of Western Europe is not so much the
result of a utopian dream as it is the political
recognition of economic reality: the reality of global
markets, the reality of economic interdependence and the
130. "Europe 1990" speech by Dr. W. Dekker, President of N. V. Philips' Gloeilampenfabrieken,
at the Centre for European Policy Studies in Brussels, 13 November 1984, on the occasion
of the presentation of the programme "Europe 1990 - an agenda for action", pp. 9-10.
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reality of competitive pressures - all of which make
cooperation essential. "131
Until Europeans realised their loss of industrial
competitiveness in world and home markets, they would not
commit themselves to the unity of industrial, and economic
development at Community levels. Indeed, prior to the context
of European politicians' alliance with industrialists in the
1980s, the European business community was often objecting to
the concept of the common market brought about by politicians.
It was the change in international competition and the advance
of high technology that reversed the situation in which
European industrialists "are keeping the pressure on
politicians to transcend considerations of local and national
interest." 132 Carlo de Benedetti, the CEO of Olivetti and one
of the active figures in the Roundtable, states directly that:
"the need for change was recognised much later by
politicians than by the Italian business community, which
had already begun to access other European markets to
achieve a European dimension. Today, industry, banks and
consumers are putting pressure on the politicians to
implement the project of the single European market by
the established deadline."133
The reasons why the Single Market plan, or, to some
extent, European integration has been making such remarkable
progress since the mid-1980s were that "the business community
has shown much more vigorous support for the building of
Europe in the 1980s than ever before.
of the SEA and the integration progress thereafter have shown
131 .Agnelli, "The Europe of 1992", in Jeffry A. Frieden, and David A. Lake, (eds.),
International Political Economy: Perspectives on Global Power and Wealth, (New York: St.
Martin's Press, 1991), p. 424.
132 [bid
133 .8enedetti, "Europe 1992 is a necessity for Italy and Europe", Europe, (April 1989), p. 39.
134 .Richardson, "Europe's industrialists help shape the single market", p. 18.
" 124 Although the signing
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a great step forward towards the European Union, the
fulfilment of the 1992 programme remains appropriate for sound
economic reasons and thus confirms the importance of industry
engaging in the process of initiating the Single Market.
However, the completion of the internal market has
implications for making a favourable business environment in
the EC which the national governments of the twelve have been
encouraging and for which their industry has long lobbied. In
early 1985, the Davos Symposium suggested that "all
governments are becoming aware of the importance and the
necessity of the entrepreneurial spirit" and "their new role
will be to create the conditions which will guarantee maximum
business dynamism." 135 In addition, Delors' inaugural address
to the EP also highlighted that the Commission proposed to
take actions in three directions: "a large market and
industrial cooperation, the strengthening of the European
Monetary System, and the convergence of our economies to lead
to higher growth and more jobs."136
3.3.2. The Involvement of Industry in the Process of European
Integration
Industrialists' eagerness to pursue the single market was
based on the prospects for business interests. Their efforts
for the completion of a single European market have, to a
large extent, contributed to relaunching European integration.
In the period of evolving the single "Act", industrial
development became one of the crucial factors for European
135 .The Davos Symposium, organised by the Economy World Forum, presented jointly by European
leaders and heads of business. For details see "How to overcome 'Euro-sclerosis': a report
on the Davos Symposium", Europe 85, (May 1985), PP.
136. "We shall be saying no to scepticism, no to defeatism, and no to all excuses", Europe 85,
(January/February 1985), p. 6.
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integration, as programmes studied by the Commission about
industrial competitiveness and technology had suggested that
strengthening industrial bases in a single market environment
could raise hopes for the advancing European development on
which European integration is dependent. Lord Cockfield
emphasized that:
"[T]he people whose interests are the most directly
affected are not governments at all, but trade and
industry. They have to generate the wealth (but)
governments merely dissipate it. Their views should be
the decisive factor, not the views of government."37
In 1983, the year of European economy at its ebb, the
European Roundtable emerged as a spearhead for industry. Its
objective, described by Keith Richardson, its Secretary
General, is "to strengthen Europe's economy and to improve its
global competitiveness, which it pursues by identifying the
most important issues, analyzing the critical factors, and
making its views known to the political decision makers."136
The Roundtable's weight with the EC officials derives not only
from the economic power its members have held right across
Europe,m but also from "the organisation's seminal role in
launching the 1992 programme. 11140 The ERT has been carrying out
various studies in critical issues, e.g. its "Memorandum",
"Missing Link" for financing infrastructure development,
"Making Europe Work" for unemployment, and "Clearing the
137 ."Making a real Common Market: Lord Cockfield points the way to the future", p. 18.
138 .Richardson, "Europe's industrialists help shape the single market", p. 19.
138 .Although the European Roundtable had only 40 members (for details see Appendix T-3.6) in
1987, these businesses combined sales worth $400 billion a year, and more than three
million workers on their payrolls. Their influence on economic and industrial policy is
considerable. See Keith Richardson, "Europe's industrialists help shape the Single
Market", pp. 18-20. Refer Appendix T-3.6 to Appendix T-3.4 the change of the EC market
share, the industries which suffered the most became the most active lobbying groups.
140
_James N. Gardner, Effective Lobbying in the European Community, (Deventer, The
Netherlands: Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers, 1991), p. 47.
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Lines" for business communication, which have been the common
vision of European industry and have been incorporated into
the wider Community's development. 1' For example, the
"memorandum" written on request of the then Commissioners,
Davignon and Ortoli, advocates industrialists' support for the
Commission during the debates in the Stuttgart summit in
1983." 2 The "Missing Link" report provoked a joint EEC-ERT
task force which was set up by the Commission in order to
generate more private capital in infrastructure development,
which has resulted in the creation of "Financial Engineering"
in Directorate II of the Commission.143
The more influential ways to speak out on behalf of
industry have been direct communication between the Roundtable
and the EC and national decision-makers. The Roundtable may
send a representative group "to meet the Commission to discuss
a whole range of major policies, or talk to an individual
Commissioner about a single thorny issue. u144 Moreover, every
six months, it discusses priorities with senior ministers or
the Prime Minister of the government's Presidency of the EC.
On 14 June 1985, for example, when the White Paper was
presented to the heads of government and state before the
Milan summit, Jacques Delors and other Commissioners, at the
same time, held talks with a delegation from the Roundtable
led by the then Chairman and CEO of AB Volvo, Perh
Gyllenhammar." 5 Both sides shared the same feeling of an
urgent need to develop technological cooperation in Europe.
141 .These four reports were completed by 1987 and their main concerns have been the focal
points of national governments and the EC, such as the Anglo-French Channel Tunnel and a
European high-speed train network. See the European Roundtable, "Achievements of the
European Roundtable", mimeograph.
142 .See Ibid., p. 2. Francois-Xavier Ortoli at that time the Commissioner for Economic and
Monetary Affairs.
143 .Ibid., pp. 3-4.
144 ,Richardson, "Europe's industrialists help shape the single market", p. 19.
145 .Bulletin of European Communities, 6/1985, p. 38.
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Furthermore, the most important part of the Roundtable's
lobbying has been to express its views through "the individual
members in their personal contacts with national governments
and parliaments, business colleagues and industrial
federations, and in private speaking engagements. M
 The
progress in reaching the SEA and thereafter in implementing
the 1992 programme has shown the business' pragmaticism.
The Roundtable has "contributed significantly to the
creation of a better dialogue and understanding between
industry and politicians and notably the European
Institutions." 147 The EC Commission in 1986, after the SEA was
approved, asked Wisse Dekker, the then vice-chairman of the
Roundtable, to form a supporting internal market committee of
its members to press for "completing the internal market".
Moreover, Dekker's committee went to Brussels to deliver the
Roundtable's recommendations, before the July Eurosummit in
1986. 148
 Another active group, the UNICE, composed of members
of over 30 employers' and industrial associations throughout
Western Europe, sought to create an outcome favourable to
business. Its Secretary-General, Zygmunt Tyszkiewicz, has
stated that "nine-tenths of our work comprises the regular,
invisible interchange of ideas between our experts and the EC
Commission's civil servants," and "UNICE also is used by the
Community institutions to speak out to industry and to lobby
our members. n149
Wisse Dekker, praised as one of the outstanding co-
founders of the Roundtable, deserves "a footnote to history as
148 .Richardson, "Europe's industrialists help shape the single market", p. 19.
147 .See the European Roundtable, "Achievements of the European Roundtable", mimeograph.
148 .For the "investigation" committee for "completing the internal market" see the brief
discussion in Roy Eales, "Europe's business knights regroup", Multinational Business, 3,
(Autumn, 1987), p. 36; for the regular meetings between the Roundtable and the Commission
see Richardson, "Europe's industrialists help shape the single market", pp. 18-19.
149 .Axel Krause, "Many groups lobby on implementaLion of market plan", p. 24.
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the visionary behind the 1992 programme. n150 In his well-known
presentation in Brussels at the beginning of 1985, Dekker
evaluated Article II of the Treaty of Rome upon which the
EEC's aims were set as: the establishment of a common market
and a more convergent economic policy of the member states. As
he described the problems Europe faced, which were largely
attributed to Europeans' failures of finishing the "homework"
given in Rome in 1957, Dekker launched a five-year plan (1985-
1990) in the relevant Philips staff departments, which was
intended "as a pragmatic aid to bringing that common European
market in 1990 closer to realisation." 151 His "Europe 1990"
plan emphasized two pragmatic approaches, concrete steps and a
detailed timetable, to help completing the "homework" on trade
facilitation, fiscal matters, Value-Added Tax (VAT),
standardisation, and government procurement • 1 52
Many have credited Dekker's initiative of "Europe 1990"
with the successful agreement of the 1992 programme in the
SEA. 53 It was this paper that drew the President of the
Commission Jacques Delors' attention to undertake the study
for completing the internal market for European economic
integration, and virtually filled in the conceptual blueprint
of Lord Cockfield's "White Paper". Ten months after his first
paper was delivered, Dekker gave another speech in Bonn trying
to assess the progress by then since the "Europe 1990" was
launched in January, and to draw up the agenda in detail.
After consulting with seven related "target groups"
(governments, the European Parliament, the media, the European
150
.michael Johnson, "Dutch cool profile: Wisse Dekker", International Management, (September
1989), p. 50.
151. "Europe 1990" by W. Dekker, p. 3.
152 .Ibid. , p. 4.
153 .Johnson, "Dutch cool profile: Wisse Dekker", p. 50; Richardson, "Europe's industrialists
help shape the single market", p. 19; and Gardner, Effective Lobbying in the European
Community, p. 47.
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movement, the experts, the EEC Commission, and the Council of
Ministers), he confirmed that the plan "Europe 1990" had been
widely welcomed. n4 The plan was largely supported by national
governments of member states, and by the European Parliament,
particularly the "Kangaroo group" which had developed
initiatives for supporting the "Europe 1990" plan and making
it widely known. n5 In his own words, Dekker realizes that the
White Paper had an important feature in common with "Europe
1990": "it contains a schedule and fixes dates for all the
steps towards a real common market. 1,156
Despite the fact that Dekker's papers may stem from the
practical plan of Philips itself, his vision has been
undoubtedly projecting far beyond current European scale
economies to the future of European integration. One may argue
that the progress of the completion of the internal market had
long been developed incrementally during the first half of the
1980s. However, with respect to the White Paper and the SEA,
throughout the ERT's efforts to initiate the plan it is clear
that industry's role was far more prominent as a trigger
rather than an implementer. As many leading industrialists
found, "there was a positive attitude towards industry playing
an active role in the creation of a united Europe." 57 One
concise analysis suggests that "the ERT is both the spiritual
progenitor of the 1992 process and the single most powerful
business group in Europe. It's not surprising, then, that when
ERT talks, Eurocrats listen."" If there is one combined
factor on which all general economic, political and
1 54 . ogurope 1990 - An Agenda For Action: progress and follow-up", Speech delivered by Dr. W.
Dekker, to the "Deutsche Gesellschaft flir Auswartige Politik E. V." on October 9th, 1985,
in Bonn, pp. 1-3.
155 .1b1d., p. 2.
156 . 1bid., pp. 2-3.
157./bid.
158 Gardner, Effective Lobbying in the European Community, p. 48.
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institutional factors of the 1992 programme and thus of
European economic integration have depended, it has been
industrial development and the pressure exerted by
multinational resources.
3.4. CONCLUSION
During the 1970s' recession, the EC witnessed the
relative decline of its industry and overall economic
performance, because its industrial structure had become
outdated. Eurosclerosis was derived from the disadvantages of
the "uncommon market". To strengthen industrial
competitiveness and thus to cope with external industrial
challenges, member states of the EC in the 1980s focused on
the process of industrial restructuring. That process
propelled the impetus of European industrial collaboration and
relaunched European integration. Since 1980, increasingly
fierce international competition has renewed the momentum for
pressing ahead with the completion of the internal market from
which the relaunch of European integration has resulted.
Industrialists have taken an unprecedentedly high profile in
lobbying for the single European market. At that moment, the
EC's competence to cope with external economic pressures
hinged upon the completion of the internal market and
progressive European economic and political integration.
The process of campaigning for the relaunch of European
integration in the mid-1980s showed how external economic
challenges have periodically forced forward the progress of
integration beyond that contemplated by the immediate
political agenda. From the relaunch of European integration, a
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new analytical framework of regional economic integration has
emerged - the "external incentives-industrial development"
approach. Despite its functionalist roots, this approach bases
the process of regional integration upon the interdependent
world of industrial competitiveness, and emphasises exogenous
industrial development as a positive factor to the process of
regional integration. This analytical framework of regional
economic integration includes some variables: external
economic challenges; exogenous industrial development by
regional and multinational industries, in particular by the
private sector; the need for the development of scale
economies; and industrial cooperation of technology
developing. Since 1980, these variables have been amongst the
most prominent generators of European integration. Political
factors have been diluted by these factors, although this does
not deny their critical importance to the development of
regional integration. The remainder of this thesis makes use
of this framework to analyse the incentives and the
implications of the emergence of the Chinese Economic Area in
the context of growing Asia-Pacific subregional economic
groupings.
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CULA.F° lir E Ft F-C1IJ Ft
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND THE PATTERN OF REGIONAL
ECONOMIC INTEGRATION IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION
Where regional economic integration is concerned, related
economies putting forward cooperation programmes have always
taken into account any economic advantages which might accrue
to them. Although political incentives have been crucial in
advancing the progress towards regional integration, profits
have remained the most fundamental motive for economic
integration for the private sector. This is what the
theoretical approach to economic integration has suggested
about the mutual benefits of the "trade creation" effect. In
particular, an integrated market allows economic factors, i.e.
capital, goods, services, and personnel, to be able tO move
freely across national boundaries thereby making the best use
of resources. Without the presence of mutual economic
advantage, therefore, there is little hope for individual
national economies to boost their prospects for regional
integration and to maintain their commitment to existing
regional groupings.
The purpose of this chapter is to explore economic
development in the context of incremental Asia-Pacific
economic cooperation, in general, and the impact of industrial
restructuring in the Asian Newly Industrialised Countries
(hereafter ANICs) on the development of subregional economic
groupings right along the West Pacific Rim, in particular. It
does not seek to review the ANICs' own developmental process,
nor is it an economic assessment of the ANICs performances
individually. It is, instead, an analysis of their attempts to
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resolve structural problems by developing economic
interdependence with their neighbouring economies, which in
turn has inched forward regional economic integration.
Furthermore, through an examination of the division of labour
in the regional economies, the prospects for economic
integration can be evaluated. The analysis focuses on the
extent to which their efforts have brought about the
regionalisation of industrial development which in turn has
accelerated the progress of economic integration in Asia-
Pacific, while regional economies are pursuing a strategy of
globalisation.
Since the late 1980s, a number of international trends
have been shaping the context of Pacific regionalism.' Firstly,
the collapse of communism in the Soviet Union and Eastern
Europe has, more or less, defused the Cold War in the Pacific
area, and reminded China, one of the lone communist
"fortresses" in East Asia which has been implementing a more
pragmatic policy towards the market economy, to keep up with
the prosperous Asia-Pacific economy. Secondly, the relative
decline of the United States has been reflected in its
suffering a huge trade deficit with the East Asian export-led
economies. An increasingly protectionist orientation has
emerged in North America, as a result. Therefore, East Asian
export-led economies will have to increase the volume of
intra-Asian trade to replace their traditional export market
to the United States, so that their economic growth will not
be slowed. Thirdly, the effect of North America and the
European Community becoming more protectionist has boosted the
importance of Japan for the East Asian export-led economies.
Richard Drobnick, "Economic integration in the Pacific region", Technical Papers, No. 65,
OECD Development Centre, Under the direction of Charles Oman. Produced as part of the
research programme on Globalisation and Regionalisation, (May 1992), p. 15.
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Japan has become an investor, banker, trader, and technology
supplier for all East Asian export-led economies, but has also
provided a large market for their exports. This Asia-Pacific
economic cooperation may be leading to a new phase of economic
integration. Furthermore, China has re-affirmed its reform and
open door policy to the world, which implies that it like
Japan will continue to promote Asia-Pacific economic
cooperation.
In addition, there are two sources of uncertainty which
could decisively affect Pacific regionalism. Firstly, the
global trading regime is very likely to be fragile, "as
regional integration proceeds, as intra-firm trade continues
to grow, and as trade among strategic alliance partners
increases." 2 To avoid an immediate breakdown which would have
caused a global trade war, the Uruguay Round global trade
talks of the GATT finally reached an accord by the deadline of
15 December, 1993, imposed on the Clinton administration by
the US Congress. Although the prolonged Uruguay Round
negotiations have ended with a compromise, it does not mean
that it has brought about immediate assurance for economies
and regional blocs around the world over trade problems. Many
believe that "the end of the Uruguay Round will not be the end
of trade talks - or trade battles". 3 The future for freer trade
could be more troubled.4
Secondly, the trade friction between Japan and the United
States could jeopardise the world trade regime under the GATT,
and also block trans-Pacific regional cooperation. On the one
hand, Japan has continued to benefit from a huge trade surplus
with the United States, but, on the other hand, Japan has kept
2. Ibid.
3. The Americans and Europeans both conceive that more negotiations will continue. Jay
Branegan, "And that's a wrap", Time, (27 December, 1993), p. 30.
4. The Economist, (18 December, 1993), pp. 13-14.
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its domestic markets relatively closed to foreigners. Since
the US Omnibus Trade Act of 1988 was introduced, US
administrations have made use of "super 301" legislation as a
foreign policy instrument pressing Japan and others for
bilateral trade negotiations. 5 Trade surpluses, protected
domestic markets, and the US threat of imposing "super 301",
characterise the current picture of the US-Japan's trade row.
Most recently, on 11 February, 1994, in the White House
meeting between the US President Clinton and the then Japanese
Prime Minister Morihiro Hosokawa, a showdown over US access to
Japanese markets brought about renewed tension. Subsequently,
the US has threatened to cite Japan in a "Super 301" action.5
The US believes that because Japan is different from other
industrialised countries, increased bilateral pressure is the
only way to bring about change.
Japan's ongoing political reforms may yet provide scope
for the government of a new generation to act more decisively
in dealings with the US. For the present, in its state of
political disarray, the Japanese coalition government is
inclined "to take a rigid line against US pressure for
numerically measured decreases in Japan's record trade surplus
and increases in the market share of imported goods."7
Predictably, Japan, as suggested by many politicians and
bureaucrats in Tokyo, is likely to adopt a tougher stand
5. For details see United States Senate, "Super 301: Effectiveness in Opening Foreign
Markets", hearing before the subcommittee on international trade of the Committee of
Finance, 101th Congress, second session, April 27, 1990.
6. "Super 301", the centre of the Omnibus Trade Act of 1988, provides "a mechanism through
which U. S. trade negotiators can threaten the eventual imposition of special surcharges
on a country's imports if that country does not agree to modify its 'unfair' trade
practices (as unilaterally defined by the US), but gives the President great flexibility
in determining whether or how far to apply the sanctions." See Robert Z. Lawrence, and
Charles L. Schultze, "Evaluating the options", in their co-edited, An American Trade
Strategy Options for the 1990s, (Washington D. C.: The Brookings Institution, 1990), p. 5.
7. See Jurek Martin, and William Dawkins, "Sparring partners in a new game", Financial Times,
(11 February, 1994), p. 17.
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against foreign pressure. 8
 Many observers have feared that it
might trigger a trade war. 8
 This uncertainty will undoubtedly
undermine not only any plans for Asia-Pacific regional
economic integration but also the critical American
relationships for the Asian-Pacific exporting economies on
which their economic development is highly dependent. The
desire for bridging Asian export-led economies and North
American economies through a larger political framework that
would provide them a framework for regular talks to reduce
trade friction, has, in part, contributed to the emergence of
the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC).
Economic development in the Asia-Pacific region has been
very successful in promoting regional economic prosperity,
firstly in Japan in the 1970s, later in the ANICs in the
1980s, and then in another group of fast 'catching up'
industrialising economies (the 2nd tier of the ANICs), i.e.
Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, the Philippines, and China, in
the late 1980s and 1990s. Regional economies apart from Japan,
have been sharing very similar patterns of economic
development, i.e. considerable levels of dependence upon
American and Japanese technologies and industrial techniques,
and American markets. Since the mid-1980s, the ANICs have been
commonly suffering from the "NICs disease" - namely rapidly
appreciating currencies, soaring property prices, and
shortages of labour, thereby losing their comparative
advantages in labour-intensive industries. As a consequence,
8. For example, Shintaro Ishihara, a maverick Liberal Democratic Party member, said that "Now
it is time for us to say no sometimes and then make counter-proposals." Ibid.
9. For the most recent trade row between the US and Japan see reports "Tough Talk", Business
Week, (28 February, 1994), pp. 14-16; for Japanese response to the showdown see "The
Japanese are hardly heading for the bunkers", pp. 17-19; and the reasons Japanese took a
tough stand towards the US see "Saying no", The Economist, (19 February, 1994), pp. 74,
77.
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industrialists have been seeking to relocate their industries
in Southeast Asia and China.10
Regional economic development has increased the momentum
of economic integration in the region. The economic framework
of an international division of labour in production,
resulting from the ANICs-based foreign investment flows, their
upgrading of technology, and industrial cooperation in the
region has raised the possibility of further and future
economic integration. However, economic integration will be
meaningful only if regional economies have been actively
participating in an international division of labour. 11 It is
quite clear that the ANICs' industrial restructuring has
contributed to exports of capital, technology, and industrial
experience to other East Asian developing economies. The
result of these exports has been to allow other regional
economies to share the benefits of successful industrial
performance. Furthermore, cross border investment and inter-
industry cooperation have not only created comprehensive
economic ties between regional economies, but have also
generated certain common business interests, e.g. their
commitment to keep the world trade system free and open. The
growing trend of economic tie-ups occurring amongst a group of
neighbouring economies involved in smaller areas right along
the West Pacific Rim, is parallel to the general development
of Asia-Pacific economic cooperation. The clearest example can
be seen in the case of the emergence of "subregional economic
groupings" in the Asia-Pacific area, 12 such as the Growth
Triangle, between Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia; and the
Southern China Economic Area between Taiwan, Hong Kong, and
10. This relocation of such industries has been part of their strategy of restructuring
industries to regain competitiveness. See W. B. Kim, "Industrial restructuring and
regional adjustment in Asian NIEs", Environment and Planning A, 25, (1993).
11. M. Panic, National Management of the international Economy, (London: Macmillan, 1988), p.
5
. There have been various terms used, such as "economic circle", "economic zone", and
"triangle", but "subregional grouping" is used here as a general term to be distinguished
from Asia-Pacific "regional economic cooperation".
160
the Fujien and Guangdong provinces in China. Nevertheless,
East Asian subregional groupings today have made their own way
towards economic integration by relying upon industrial
cooperation in which governments' full endorsement has
followed rather than led, especially in the case of the
emergence of the Chinese Economic Area, the Bohai Sea Economic
Circle, and the Yellow Sea Economic Circle." On account of the
ANICs economic development, the impact of the ANICs' policy
for industrial restructuring has been to change both the pace
of structural adjustment, and the political circumstances in
the rest of the Asia-Pacific area as a whole, resulting in the
rise of economic subregional groupings.
4.1. THE EMERGENCE OF SUBREGIONAL GROUPINGS IN THE CONTEXT OF
ASIA-PACIFIC ECONOMIC COOPERATION
Since the early 1960s, in response to the progress of
European integration programmes Asia-Pacific economic
cooperation has been advanced by several attempts to form
regional economic integration. 14 None of these programmes has
yet developed a consensus amongst all economies in the region
in terms of European patterns' regional integration. Some have
argued that in general the Asia-Pacific area lacks the
favourable conditions for regional integration present in
Europe." "East Asia and the Pacific are a relatively
unpromising environment for regionalism", because the wide
13
. 
In his contribution to China's economic cooperation network in Asian-Pacific region, Jin
identified three basic economic circles based on China's coastal area. Instead of the CEA,
he described the area covering Taiwan, Hong Kong, Fujien, and Guangdong provinces, as the
Taiwan Straits Economic Circle. Huongfan Jin, "China's open door policy and Asian-Pacific
economic cooperation", The Korean Journal of International Studies, 22, (1990), pp. 125-
147
14. The programmes in the Asia-Pacific region were brought about partly by a desire to rival
the EEC. See Per Magnus Wijkman, and Eva Sundkvist LindstrOm, "Pacific Basin integration:
A step towards freer trade", in John Nieuwenhuysen, Towards Freer Trade Between Nations,
(Melbourne: Oxford University Press Australia, 1989), p. 145.
15. Ibid., pp. 148-152.
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differences in levels of industrial development, in
particular, have also made a desire to form "a common and
equitable mandate" less likely. 16 Furthermore, Asia-Pacific
economic cooperation in terms of political implication has
been a relatively recent trend, compared with Europe's longer
period of efforts at political cooperation since the second
World War. While in Europe strong political pressure promoted
the emergence of economic integration, the Asia-Pacific area
appears to have little similar political pressure. There are
many competing interests derived from different cultural,
political and economic preferences amongst the region's
countries.
For decades, general efforts for pan-Pacific economic
cooperation have been carried out in various forms by
academics, businessmen, and government officials, e.g. the
Pacific Trade and Development Conference, the Pacific Basin
Economic Council and the Pacific Economic Cooperation
Conference. Since the mid-1980s, economic development in the
Asia-Pacific area has been going through a transitional phase
following the ANICs' industrial restructuring process.
Although there have been different situations in each of the
ANICs depending on their own political and economic
environment, some general factors have contributed to this
change: the appreciation of the Japanese Yen and the
currencies of the ANICs against the US dollar; the
democratisation, rising wage rates, and stricter environmental
protection regulations in force; the 1989 elimination of the
Generalised System of Preference (GSP) status of the ANICs by
the United States; and China's open market. 17 Due to demands
16.Staffan B. Linder, The Pacific Century: Economic and Political Consequences of Asian-
Pacific Dynamism, (Standford, California: Standford University Press, 1986), p. 114.
17.Drobnick, "Economic Integration in the Pacific Region", 1992, P. 22.
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for self-adjustment of industrial structures in order to
regain competitiveness, the ANICs have allowed some of their
low-level skilled industries to relocate in Southeast Asian
countries and China. At the same time, they have pressed ahead
with the upgrading of their domestic technology. This
restructuring process in the ANICs has not only reinforced the
existing regional trade structure, but also built up much more
comprehensive economic ties, based on this industrial division
of labour, with Japan and developing countries in the region.
A new economic East Asian map has appeared based around
subregional groupings. According to geographic characters,
subregional groupings generally can be divided into three
groups: the Japan Sea Zone, including the Yellow Sea Zone, and
the Tumen Delta; the Southern China Zone; and the ASEAN Free
Trade Area plan, including the Growth Triangle, the Northern
Triangle, and the Baht Economic Zone.18
There are four "mini strategic triangles: the
"manufacturing triangle" of Japan, Thailand, and Indonesia;
the "Chinese triangle" of China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong; the
"growth triangle" of Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia; and
the "trade triangle" of South Korea, North Korea, and China's
Shantong Peninsula. 19 An American official has pointed to a
"growth cluster" phenomenon in East Asia with intra-regional
economic ties forming without regard to national borders. The
phenomenon has occurred in a number of subregions: in Hong
Kong, Taiwan, and Southern China, in Sino-Russian border
trade, in the Korean private sector's ties with China's Jilin,
Liaoning, and Shandong provinces, in the interest in a Tumen
18
. Although recently there have been different arguments about subregional groupings in East
Asia, the category here is based on a Japanese work. T Aoki, and H. Ohashi, "Asia:
integration of the world's most dynamic economies", Tokyo Business Today, (June 1992), pp.
26-29.
. Kanmao Wang, "The Pacific and the Global economy", The Pacific Review, 5: 2, (1992), p.
138.
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River development project, and in a "Growth Triangle"
involving Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia. 20 The rush to
triangulate in the Asia-Pacific area has been largely driven
by "the world economic recession and the perceived threat of
protectionism from emerging trade blocs in Europe and North
America. n21
Although the ANICs have not been the only contributors to
the impetus bringing forward regional economic cooperation in
general, they do offer the possibility of subregional economic
groupings which contribute to a larger framework of pan-
Pacific cooperation. Without fully involving the tedious
formality of governmental scrutiny, the ascendence of
subregional groupings, driven by the private sector, to some
extent, results from the anxiety of regional economies
concerning the prospects for a world trade regime and at the
same time for successful regional economic integration. It may
be more accurate to state that the emergence of subregional
groupings is partly a pragmatic response of regional economies
to regional autarky, and partly a natural result of East Asian
traditional business links through personal contact rather
than bureaucratic practices.22
4.1.1. Economic Development and Asia-Pacific Economic
Cooperation
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation: the General Context of
Economic Integration
Stuart Harris once said that "the interest in regional
economic cooperation in Asia-Pacific region has not always
20. "The Asia-Pacific area needs a stronger sense of community" address by William Clark, Jr.
to the Mid-America Committee, Chicago, 4 December, 1992, ASEAN Economic Bulletin, 10: 3,
(March 1993), P. 382.
21. Sandra Burton, "Growing by leaps-and triangles", Time, (17 January, 1994), p. 24.
22. Ibid.
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been motivated by a logical understanding of the need. It was
often a response to what appeared to be happening elsewhere."23
Indeed, for decades, the dynamics of the economic cooperation
movement in this region have partly resulted from some sort of
"defensive stand"	 against the emergence of regional
integration in Europe and North America. 24 Because of the
different rates of economic development in East Asia, most
initiatives for economic cooperation have lacked a common
interest shared by all regional economies.
The first ever institution-establishing initiative for
economic cooperation, the Pacific Free Trade Area, brought
about by the Japanese Professor Kiyoshi Kojima in the early
1960s, was regarded as a response of the five Pacific
developed economies - Japan, Australia, New Zealand, the
United States, and Canada, to the immediate effect of the
European achievement of regional integration. 25 Kojima, in the
early 1970s, observed that: "The enlarged Eurobloc will
continue and strengthen its inward-looking policies,
intensifying intra-regional development and raising the degree
of its self-sufficiency which are the purposes of the
integration" and "These Pacific basin countries should join
efforts in obtaining a bargaining power equal to the Community
so that they could deal with it from a better position. 1,26
While in the second half of 1980s the relaunching of European
23
. Stuart Harris, "Varieties of Pacific economic cooperation", The Pacific Review, 4: 4,
(1991), P. 308.
24. Many have shared this reactive attitude. Toichi Funabashi, "The Asianization of Asia",
Foreign Affairs, 72: 5, (November/December 1993), p. 79; Frank B. Gibney, "Creating a
Pacific Community: A time to bolster economic institutions", Foreign Affairs, 72: 5,
(November/December 1993), p. 20; and Linda Low, "East Asian Economic Grouping", The
Pacific Review, 4: 4, (1991), p. 375.
25. Drysdale quotes others who have said that the proposal for a Pacific free trade area is
primarily a reaction to the establishment of the EEC. Peter Drysdale, International
Economic Pluralism: Economic Policy in East Asia and the Pacific, (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1988), p. 207.
26. Kiyoshi Kojima, "A Pacific Free Trade Area proposed", Pacific Community, 3: 4, (July
1972), pp. 586, 587.
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integration put forward a target for the completion of the
European Single Market in 1992, and the US-Mexico-Canada North
American Free Trade negotiation started off, the effect of the
promotion of such regional economic integration has stepped up
the APEC concept. 27 It was these external factors that spurred
on regional economic cooperation to a "G7 summit like an
influential intergovernmental mechanism" • 28
Since 1960, a series of initiatives have brought forward
economic cooperation in the Asia-Pacific area and have
continued shaping up the progress of economic integration"
(see Table 4.1). For decades, the Japanese and Australians,
the greatest enthusiasts in pan-Pacific cooperation
programmes, have advocated the development of Asia-Pacific
economic cooperation through the promotion of regional trade
and economic development, which, in turn, contributed to
various proposals either of ideas or of establishing
institutions. However, there has as yet to emerge a grand
blueprint similar to EC-like economic integration in the
region, not only because the existing differences between
regional social, political and economic systems have prevented
them from producing a regional identity, but also because the
East Asian export-led economies per se have not relied so much
on regional markets. In the past few decades, although many
proposals, such as the PAFTA and OPTAD, were sponsored by some
27. The background to the emergence of the APEC was trade tension between East Asian economies
and Western countries. For the details see Andrew Elek, "Asia-Pacific Economic Co-
operation (APEC)", South East Asia Affairs, (1991), pp. 33-48.
28. Helen Hughes, "Does APEC make sense?", ASEAN Economic Bulletin, 8: 2, (November 1991), p.
125.
29. For details of the development of Asia-Pacific economic cooperation in the past few
decades see Peter Drysdale, International Economic Pluralism: Economic Policy in East Asia
and the Pacific, pp. 207-222; Norman D. Palmer, The New Regionalism in Asia and the
Pacific, (Lexington, Massachusetts: Lexington Books, 1991), Chapter 8., pp. 133-155;
Lawrence T. Woods, "Non-governmental organisations and Pacific cooperation: back to the
future?", The Pacific Review, 4: 4, (1991), pp. 312-321; and for a review of Pacific
economic cooperation see Hadi Soesatro, "Institutional aspects of Pacific Economic
Cooperation".
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governments, e.g. the Japanese and Australian, and were
planned for converging the related governments' policy, no
firm commitment from any government has yet appeared for the
matter of regional cooperation." With limited governmental
commitment, the efforts for economic integration in the Asia-
Pacific region have focused principally on the construction of
transnational networks on a non-governmental basis.
TABLE 4.1. INITIATIVES FOR PACIFIC ECONOMIC COOPERATION: A
HISTORIC BRIEF OUTLINE
1960 a Pan-Pacific organization a (M. Kajima)
1963 in a report for the JERC b calling
for annual meetings of five
developed Pacific nations (S. Okita)
1965 Pacific Free Trade Area (K. Kojima)
1967 Pacific Basin Economic Council (Japanese and
Australian Business groups)
1967 Association of Southeast Asian Nations (A. Malik &
T. Khoman)
1968 Asian Pacific Bloc Establishment Plan (T. Miki)
1968 Pacific Trade and Development Conference (K. Kojima
& T. Miki)
1969 A System of Collective Security in Asia & the
Pacific Community (L. Brezhnev)
1977 Fukuda Doctrine (Fukuda)
1977 Organization of Pacific Trade and Development
(P. Drysdale & H. Patrick)
1978 Pacific Basin Cooperation Study Group (M. Ohira)
1980 Pacific Economists Community (K. Kojima)
Pacific Basin Cooperation Concept (PBC Study Group)
Pacific Economic Cooperation Conference
1981 ASEAN-Pacific Forum (K. Kojima)
1989 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (R. Hawke)
1990 East Asian Economic Caucus (D. Mahathir)
1992 ASEAN Free Trade Area
Note: a 	 became "Union of Asian Countries" in 1973.
b . Japan Economic Research Centre
Sources: Based mainly on Hadi Soesastro, "Institutional
aspects of Pacific Economic Cooperation", in Hadi
Soesatro, and Sung-Joo Han, (eds.), Pacific Economic
Cooperation: the New Phase, (Jakarta: Centre for
Strategic and International Studies, 1983), pp. 1-52.
30
. Hiroshi Kitamura, "Asian-Pacific economic cooperation: the role of governments", in Hadi
Soesastro, and Sung-joo Han, (eds.), Pacific Economic Cooperation: the Next Phase, pp.
159-160.
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Although those institutions, characterised by
nongovernmental colour, have yet to claim complete success for
their efforts to lead regional economic integration, they have
generated a prevalent interest in the goal of Pacific
cooperation. From the onset of the Asia-Pacific economic
cooperation movement in the early 1960s, this has largely
stemmed from a tripartite network of academics, businessmen,
and governmental officials, which has meant that economic
cooperation has been based more on bargaining between
different individual interests than on the definition of
common interest. Nevertheless, these efforts for Asia-Pacific
economic cooperation have never been so important as to water
down those official regional organisations which have been
continuously devoted to regional economic integration for
decades. The Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the
Pacific (ESCAP) under a regional commission of the United
Nations and the Asian Development Bank (ADB) are both
comprehensive
	 and	 influential
	 regional	 official
organisations. m
 In spite of being an all-regional
comprehensive organisation bridging regional and international
interests and institutions, the ESCAP has not been counted for
the main stream of Asia-Pacific regional economic
integration. 32
 Although the ADB has a substantial capacity to
develop more extensive projects of regional trade and economic
issues, it has actually only on occasion served beyond its
original function of development financing. 33 Therefore, both
31 •
 
The ESCAP was renamed in 1974. Its original organisation was the Economic Commission for
Asia and the Far East (ECAFE) established in 1947 by the Economic and Social Council of
the United Nations. The ADS was established in 1965 under the auspices of ECAFE.
32 •
 The ESCAP, derived from its predecessor, the Economic Commission for Asia and Far East,
was a contact point in the establishment of the ADB. It was not designed for serving as
the sort of regional association promoting economic and political integration. Drysdale
points out that its weakness lies in its comprehensiveness and remoteness from policy
influence in its diverse membership. See his International Economic Pluralism, p. 210.
33
. See Drysdale, International Economic Pluralism, pp. 210-211.
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the ESCAP and ADB have not been included in discussions about
evolving regional economic cooperation.
In 1965, the Pacific Trade and Development Conference
(PAFTAD), derived from Kojima's proposal for a Pacific Free
Trade Area, came into effect. 34
 The PAFTAD, an academic and
policy oriented institution, has long been recognised as the
intellectual driving force of economic cooperation. Its major
contributions to Asia-Pacific economic cooperation and
diplomacy have taken three forms. Firstly, the PAFTAD provides
a forum to embrace economists from all parts of the region,
including those from Southeast Asia, China, the former Soviet
Union, and Pacific Latin American economies, in policy
research and debate. Secondly, its research programmes have
been widened from the earliest trading arrangements to
technology, and industrial policy. Thirdly, its extensive
network is widely spread over the region through academics
tying up with governmental officials and businessmen.35
The business-oriented Pacific Basin Economic Council
(PBEC) was launched in 1967-68 by business leaders from Japan,
Australia, New Zealand, Canada, and the United States.
According to R. Sean Randolph, the international Director
General of the PBEC, "the underlying philosophy of PBEC
embraces active support for multinational economic cooperation
in the Pacific region and the building of bridges between
different economic communities." 35 The PBEC now operates as a
network of about 1000 firms and senior corporate executives
who seek a favourable public policy climate for business.
34. Kojima believed in 1977 that Pacific economic cooperation should be taking practical steps
based more on functional rather than institutional integration. The idea of favourable
benefits of a free trade area was brought about. See Kojima, Japan and A New World
Economic Order, (Tokyo: Charles E. Tottle Company, 1977), p. 173.
35. The PAFTAD's contributions in this part refer to Lawrence T. Woods, "Non-governmental
organisations and Pacific cooperation: back to the future?", pp. 313-314.
36. On Randolph's letter sent to Professor Palmer, see Norman D. Palmer, The New Regionalism
in Asia and the Pacific, p. 137.
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Due to its early organisational preoccupation and limited
representative qualities, the PBEC's ability to enhance the
political function of representation beyond its original
intention of encouraging communication within the regional
business community, has been limited. 37
 Nevertheless, through
the PBEC annual meeting, delegates, in most cases leading
national industrialists, expect each other to carry forward
their own government policies in discussions. Because of this
informal communication between regional industrialists, and
between them and their governmental officials, the PBEC, to
some extent, serves as "a vehicle for the exchange of
information and a conduit for communication between states."38
It is clear that the business communities everywhere are
concerned with the development of more open markets. There
have been some doubts inside the PBEC about regional economic
cooperation as a whole. As economic development is taking
place against the background of diversification in the Asia-
Pacific area, the PBEC has contributed to an increasing common
business interest in the maintenance of an open and free
global or at least regional economic system. Although the
PBEC's capacity in leading regional economic cooperation is
insufficient, its importance lies in its seeking the optimal
business environment that will keep up with growing economic
development and business-based subregional groupings in the
region.
Amongst all the nongovernmental organisations for Asia-
Pacific economic cooperation, the Pacific Economic Cooperation
In the early period of the PBEC, it was suggested by Japanese and Australian businessmen
that initial membership should be restricted to firms and individuals from the five
developed countries, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, the USA, and Canada. Its inability to
integrate the Chinese and Russian delegates has prevented it from representing the
interests of the region as a whole. See Woods, "Non-governmental organisations and Pacific
cooperation: back to the future?", p. 315.
Ibid.
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Conference (PECC), formally launched by participants attending
a Pacific Community seminar held in Canberra in 1980, could
well be the most significant. As the logical extension of the
PAFTAD and PBEC, the PECC's national delegations have been
organised on the basis of tripartite interests: academics,
business leaders, and state officials. In addition, the PAFTA,
and PBEC are institutional members of the PECC along with the
ADB. Unlike the PAFTAD and PBEC, the PECC's network for
cooperation has been, to a considerable extent, advancing
towards taking political implications into account. This is
facilitating negotiations between national states and between
different societal sectors. This function has won the PECC
credit to enhance official relationships between its members
in the discussion of common problems and policies through
"unofficial" forums." The PECC's successful managing of a
Pacific perspective in the Uruguay Round of multinational
trade negotiations has shown its capacity to a transnational
forum of expressing a common regional interest. 40 More regional
governmental commitment is the prerequisite for any further
regional cooperation. Increasing governmental commitment to
regional cooperation programmes may well have created the
context for the emergence of the APEC as an influential
institution.
The APEC concept initiated by the Prime Minister of
Australia, Mr. R. J. Hawk, in 1989, was originally conceived
as "an informal forum of officials from Asia-Pacific countries
in response to the rise in economic regionalism - notably the
39. In January 1980, the then Australian Prime Minister, Malcolm Fraser, and Japanese Prime
Minister, M. Ohira, agreed to hold a non-governmental seminar to explore Pacific economic
cooperation further, which brought about the "unofficial" PECC in the Canberra seminar
later that year. See Kitamura, "Asian-Pacific economic cooperation: the role of
governments", p. 160; and Nadi Soesatro, "Institutional aspects of Pacific Economic
Cooperation", p. 24.
40. Woods, "Non-governmental organisations and Pacific cooperation: back to the future?", p.
317.
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EC and NAFTA." 41
 The APEC was at first intended to be an
informal consultative forum. In 1991, the member states of the
APEC in the 3rd annual ministerial meeting in Seoul sought to
commit themselves to an "open regionalism" of free trade and
economic collaboration. A "Seoul APEC Declaration" which
recognised the need to establish a secretariat has attempted
to transform a consultative to an institutional operation of
the APEC. 42 Moreover, since the United States took over the
chairmanship from Thailand in September 1992, the Clinton
administration has sought to transform the forum from "a
'talking shop' to an achievement-based group" especially at
the Seattle APEC summit meeting in November 1993. 43 Unlike many
other regional economic cooperation initiatives, the APEC "is
not an organisation, and does not aim to have an
organisational form. 1144 Whether the APEC will gradually evolve
into a mechanism for regional economic integration remains to
be seen. Its main objective has, nevertheless, been to co-
ordinate and congregate regional interests for improving the
global multilateral trading framework. Furthermore, as
described by an American official, the APEC provides an
excellent vehicle for achieving regional trade liberalisation
that will encourage more ambitious Asia-Pacific integration.45
Unlike the economies in the European Community, Asia-
Pacific regional economies have been characterised by a more
outward-looking orientation which has been reflected in their
exporting of manufactured products largely to developed
markets. Although the intra-regional trade has steadily
41.Susumu Awanohara and Nayan Chanda, "Uncommon bonds", Far Eastern Economic Review, (18
November 1993), p. 16.
42.For details of the Declaration see "APEC announces Seoul Declaration", Korea Newsreview,
(23 November, 1991), p. 4.
43.Awanohara, and Chanda, "Uncommon bonds", p. 17.
44.Hughes, "Does APEC make sense?", p. 125.
. See "The Asia-Pacific area needs a stronger sense of community" addressed by William
Clark, Jr. to the Mid-America Committee, p. 383.
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increased recently, the economies remain heavily dependent not
upon the regional market itself, but upon the rest of the
world markets." Generally, their industries see themselves as
global rather than "regional traders". 47 Since their outward-
looking strategy has made them very vulnerable to exogenous
factors, particularly developed countries' trade policies,
protectionism, and exchange rate fluctuations, the economies
in the Asia-Pacific region have sought to defend themselves
against such external challenges by forming their own regional
groupings. Regional economies' hopes for establishing a
regional bloc to reduce exposure to international competition
and protectionism have given APEC a leading role. The APEC's
main role in the region should be to bring the regional
economies together continuously, and, in the global economy,
to act on their behalf as "a regional lobby for open global
trade." 48 Their outward-looking perspective has been a major
reason why Japan and the ANICs have yet to show "much sense of
community, or much interest in regional cooperation" in spite
of their increasing economic interdependence." This may also
explain why Asia-Pacific economic cooperation has been more
successful thus far in non-governmental rather than in inter-
governmental forms.
In general, Asia-Pacific economic cooperation was
initially based on nongovernmental, or informal activities
which led to the creation of three functioning institutions,
the PAFTAD, PBEC, and PECC in the region. Only the APEC has
emerged in 1989 as a pan-Pacific official consultative forum.
Later, in 1990, the idea of the East Asian Economic Caucus
46.In 1980, the exports of the West Pacific accounted for 37.3 per cent of its intra-regional
trade. In 1989, it rose to 46.6 per cent. See C. H. Kwan, "The emerging pattern of trade
and interdependence in the Pacific region", Tokyo Club Papers, 4: 2, (1991), pp. 139-141.
47.Bryce Harland, "Whither East Asia?", The Pacific Review, 6: 1, (1993), p. 16.
48. Hughes, "Does APEC make sense?", p. 125.
49.Harland, "Whither East Asia?", p. 16.
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(EAEC), 5° an exclusive Asian grouping, was developed on an
inter-governmental basis, albeit it has yet to obtain the
commitment of the Japanese, which is crucial for the EAEC's
fate. It has been continuously renounced by the United States.
In 1992, the ASEAN countries put forward their ambitious plan
to form the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA). It has become clear
that through the APEC's mechanism, bridging the East Asian
economies to the NAFTA would provide a milestone not only for
Asia-Pacific economic cooperation but also for the world
economy as a whole (See Figure 4.1). This new trend of
regional economic cooperation
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based more on official level contact may promote the
"movement" of Asia-Pacific economic cooperation towards
regional economic integration. As long as the shape of the new
50 •
 
The EAEC which was originally proposed by Malaysia as the East Asian Economic Group (EAEG)
is expected to include Japan, China, South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and ASEAN. "Trade
Blocs: Who's who", Asiaweek, (13 January, 1993), p. 43.
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world trade order is at stake, and the EC and the NAFTA
continue to become more inward orientated, it is very likely
that the current trend towards a Pacific trade bloc will
continue. Despite sharp criticism from the United States, the
ASEAN has already adopted the concept of the EAEC as "an
independent, subordinate institution to the APEC." 51 To some
extent, the EAEC and the APEC could be the double edges of an
Asia-Pacific economies' sword thrusting into the rest of the
world. On the one hand, by leading Asia-Pacific economic
cooperation, the APEC could well be the regional multilateral
mechanism for integrating individual interests in negotiations
with other economies, so that the tensions between different
regional trade blocs will be reduced. On the other hand, the
EAEC appears to have resulted from a defensive reaction to
protectionism elsewhere.
Economic Development: A Tool for Economic Integration
Against the background of general efforts for Asia-
Pacific economic cooperation, growing economic development has
brought about an economic interdependence which "has begun to
forge a sense of cohesion across the Pacific." 52 If the
original momentum for pan-Pacific economic cooperation arose
from a passive reaction to the threat (exogenous factor) of
regional economic integration elsewhere, the dynamics of
economic integration in the region appear now to be driven by
rapid regional economic development and growing international
competition. To some extent, exogenous factors have served as
a trigger to push forward initiatives for economic cooperation
in the Asia-Pacific region.
51
. See M. G. G. Pillai, "Emerging Trade Alliances in Asia", Economic and Political Weekly,
27: 5, (1 February, 1992), p. 199.
52 •
 
"The Asia-Pacific area needs a stronger sense of community" addressed by William Clark,
Jr. to the Mid-America Committee, p. 386.
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In the 1960s and 1970s, East Asian economies except for
Japan were not yet prominent internationally. Asia-Pacific
economic cooperation, or regional "economic integration", was
a topic only between developed economies in the region, namely
Japan, Australia, New Zealand, the United States, and Canada.
In the early 1970s the ANICs started the catching-up process
of economic development, following Japan's example. Later,
during the 1980s, ASEAN economies followed the ANICs' example.
Such East Asian dependent and interdependent development
between economies can be described in three tiers:
"Japan, the NIEs, and ASEAN constitute three tiers of
countries at different levels of skill, wage rate, and
development. The flow of investments from the upper to
lower tier of countries acts as a transmission belt in
transmitting growth momentum from one tier to the next."53
As far as the progress of economic development is
concerned, the relationships between East Asian economies have
enormously increased especially in the last decade, albeit
such increases were not necessarily based on political
congruence, owing to e.g. ASEAN's suspicion of Japan's
increasing influence over the region through its economic
power, and political distrust between China and Taiwan. More
and more practical indices suggest that the increasing
economic interdependence amongst Asia-Pacific countries has
been brought into being by intra-regional trade, investment,
inter-industry cooperation, and division of labour. According
to APEC's definition, intra-Asian-Pacific trade in terms of
total trade shares has risen from 57 per cent in 1970 to 66
per cent in 1988. 54 The most impressive development amongst
53. Low, "East Asia Economic Grouping", p. 378.
54. This intra-regional trade figure including cross-Pacific trade is more conspicuous than
the figure for the intra-West Pacific trade. Compare the discussion in Low, "East Asia
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East Asian economies in the last decade has been rising intra-
investment not only from already developed countries, such as
Japan, the United States, and European countries, but also
from the AN1Cs, which "is a phenomenon reflecting growing
economic cooperation and integration in this region." 55 While
the AN1Cs have been one of the major recipients of foreign
direct investment in the region, they have also devoted very
substantial resources to intra-regional investment. Such new
patterns of investment reveal that the transformation of East
Asian economic development is under way through "an extensive
industrial restructuring and a sophisticated subregional
division of labour."5 5 The emergence of the division of labour
across all East Asian economies has, to some extent, deflected
them from any possible political rows caused by trade disputes
over competition for export markets.
Asia-Pacific economic integration, if it occurs, will be
based on the virtual economic interdependence derived from the
regional economies' adoption of the same economic development
model, rather than on a preoccupation with benefiting from
scale economy. It will be the progress of economic development
that activates the initiatives for regional economic
integration. Although politically Asia-Pacific economic
integration remains the target, at least in the current
situation, it is economically more likely to be brought to
effect on a subregional scale reflecting day-to-day economic
transactions, rather than on a pan Asia-Pacific basis.
Economic Grouping", p. 379; and C. H. Kwan, "The emerging pattern of trade and
interdependence in the Pacific region", pp. 139-141.
55. The extensive foreign direct investment conducted by Japan and the ANICs respectively has
been studied in Edward K. Y. Chen, "Foreign direct investment in East Asia", Asian
Development Review, 11: 1, (1991), p. 32.
56. Ibid., p. 33.
177
57
4.1.2. The Rise of Subregional Groupings
Since the mid-1980s, the world trade structure has been
going through a dramatic change moving from a multilateral
arena to the formation of regional trade blocs, as a result of
the slow progress in the trade negotiations of the Uruguay
Round. During the Uruguay Round, uncertainty over the future
of world trade was aggravated by the staggering economic
performance of Western industrialised countries and an
increasing tendency of protectionism. In this context of
uncertainty and growing competition pressures, a number of
regional trade groupings have emerged throughout the world.57
Developed economies, notably the EC and NAFTA, have been
especially credited with gaining much of the success in
forming regional trade groupings. By way of contrast, to seek
a strengthened position to cope with possible future trade
battles between regional groupings, individual developing
countries are keen to avoid being left out of any potential
trade grouping. The Asian-Pacific economies have already made
a few efforts by private and public sectors to form trading
blocs in order to safeguard their market competitiveness and
strengthen negotiating leverage in case of the collapse of the
GATT negotiations.
The concept of the Chinese Economic Area and the Growth
Triangle searching for "natural allies" reflects in particular
Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Singapore's aspirations to maintain
their market competitiveness. The emergence of the EAEC and
• The EC, the EFTA, and the Visegrade Pact (Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, and Slovakia)
in Europe. See "Trade Blocs: Who's who", Asiaweek, (13 January, 1993), p. 43; the NAFTA,
Andes Free Trade Zone, the Southern Cone Common Market (SCCM), and the Caribbean Community
in America. See report in Financial Times, 7/8 December 1991; the EAEC, AFTA, the South
Asian Preferential Trade Agreement (SAPTA), the Economic Co-operation Organisation (ECO)
in Asia, see "Trade Blocs: Who's who", Asiaweek, (13 January, 1993), p. 43 and The Times,
24 February 1992, p. 10.
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AFTA, on the other hand, implies more searching for a
consensus in the region in terms of trade. The keen efforts to
date have been the outcome of regional economies' industrial
restructuring process and the development of regionalism in
the EC and NAFTA. 58 Malaysia's Prime Minister, Mahathir
Mohamad, the most known enthusiast in the region for forming
an exclusively Asian regional grouping - the EAEC, has warned
that economic blocs in Europe and North America are forcing
East Asian countries to follow suit. 59 Graham Hayward, the
executive director of the Singapore International Chamber of
Commerce, has stressed that the formation of AFTA or a similar
body, has become "a useful insurance policy" for regional
economies." (See Figure 4.2)
Haw 42 AA-PAOF1C afREGCNAL CFEURNGS
In general, regional trade blocs are intentionally
pursuing common stands to cope with other trade counterparts
58
.
	 Year of the Blocs?", Asiaweek, (13 January, 1993), p. 42.
59
. "The stubborn holdout",	 Time, (22 November, 1993), P. 57.60 •
 "Year of the Blocs?", Asiaweek, (13 January, 1993), p. 42.
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by establishing the common regulations for their internal
markets and a consensus in international negotiations. The
interest of individual countries will supposedly be protected
by projecting a common stand against external challenges. Such
a decisive move is entirely dependent on governmental
commitment and policy cooperation. However, the development of
a subregional economic grouping in Asia-Pacific area does not
comply with Western conventional knowledge of inward-looking
trade blocs, partly because there has yet to exist a
comprehensive economic grouping to generate a common interest,
and partly because increasing economic ties between regional
economies have not been based on political motivations, but
rather on economic development. For example, the Growth
Triangle is made up of Singapore's capital, financial
facilities, and well developed industrial base, and Indonesia
and Malaysia' abundance of land and labour force.61
During the period of the ANICs' industrial restructuring,
a political motivation behind economic cooperation has been to
consolidate security arrangements in the post Cold War era.
Singapore through the development of the Growth Triangle which
ties in Malaysia and Indonesia has gained advantages for its
city state's security. Hong Kong has been especially keen to
develop economic interdependence with China, which could be
the only way for Hong Kong to remain economically active after
1997. In accelerating economic transactions across the Taiwan
Strait, possibly resulting in the creation of the Chinese
Economic Area, the political tension between Taiwan and China
has largely abated. Although China remains a potential
political threat to Taiwan, their all round relationship has
improved at an unprecedented speed. This has clearly suggested
61
. See Lee, Tsao Yuan Growth Triangle: the Johor-Singapore-Riau Experience, (Singapore:
Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1991).
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industrial goods have also rushed to take advantage of
cheap labour costs for their production, big firms
heavy and chemical industries have also been targeting
huge domestic market by setting up sales bases." Part
Korean industrial restructuring strategies has been
that the more their economic interests are combined together,
the less likely China will be to use force.
Whilst in recent years South Korean producers of light
manufacturing sectors away from labour-intensive
which has resulted in South Korean enterprises'
China's
in the
China's
of South
to move
products,
persistent
investment in North East China." A common business interest
has been brought about as a result. In terms of security in
Northeast Asia, while North Korea remains a potential threat,
China's pursuing peace and stability as its most important
goal in the region is rather convincing to South Korea." The
increasing economic ties between South Korea and China may
have blended economic interests with South Korean willingness
to sooth the continual tension in the Korea Peninsula.
Believing in Beijing's influence over the Pyongyang regime, in
his trip to Beijing in March 1994, South Korean President Kim
Young Sam was hoping to persuade his Chinese counterpart to
step in the quarrel of North Korea's development of nuclear
weapons."
62. See "A west-bound gold rush?", Business Korea, 10: 11, (May 1993), p. 18.
63. Shim Jae Boon, "China market roars", Far Eastern Economic Review, (27 May, 1993), p. 44.
64. As China is currently undertaking great reform for its economic development, a peaceful
and stable Korean Peninsula remains in China's best interest. For Chinese and North Korean
relations see Brian Bridges, Korea and the West, (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul for Royal
Institute of International Affairs, 1986), pp. 68-72.
65. "Interview: South Korea's Kim Young Sam - Making a plea for patience", Time, (28 March
1994), P
. 
28. While Li Peng, China's Premier, agreed to work with President Kim, he was
granted a £2 billion investment promise from Samsung Electronics. The Times, (3 November,
1994), p. 11.
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4.2. INDUSTRIAL RESTRUCTURING AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF
SUBREGIONAL ECONOMIC GROUPINGS
In the last few decades fast economic growth and their
export-led strategies have led the ANICs to focus on trade
with other economies to propel their economic development. As
neoclassical theory contends, the occurrence of exchanges is
determined by the producers' expectation of advantages and
disadvantages. The comparative advantage based on low cost
production had led the ANICs to compete successfully with
their trade counterparts in developed economies in certain
sectors, such as textiles, automobiles, steel, shipbuilding,
electronics	 and	 electrical	 equipment.	 For	 decades,
commentators have consistently focused on the general
similarities in ANIC development, such as cheap labour, the
state's intervention in economic development and hard working
workers, because it was these factors that won the ANICs'
producers the comparative advantage over the products of their
developed counterparts in the world markets."
However, the ANICs have, since the 1980s, suffered from a
loss of comparative advantage because of the mounting pressure
to their exports from low cost products from other developing
countries, such as Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, the
Philippines, and above all China." These countries are
equipped with abundant low cost production factors, notably
66. For discussion in detail of the ANICs' successful story see: Frederic C. Deyo, (ed.), The
Political Economy of the New Asian Industrialism, (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University
Press, 1987); arguing that the better performance in ANICs is rather due to the
effectiveness of state intervention, Jenkins suggests this lesson to some Latin American
NICs - Rhys Jenkins, "The political economy of industrialisation: A comparison of Latin
American and East Asian Newly Industrialising Countries", Development and Change, 22,
(1991), pp. 197-231; and confirming the quality of the ANICs' labour force James Riedel,
"Economic development in East Asia: doing what comes naturally", in Helen Hughes, (ed.),
Achieving Industrialisation in East Asia, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988),
pp. 25-27.
67. OECD, The Newly Industrialising Countries: Challenge and Opportunity For OECD Countries,
(Paris, OECD, 1988), p. 8; also discussion in Tun-jen Cheng & Stephan Haggard, Newly
Industrializing Asia in Transition: Policy Reform and American Response, ( Berkeley:
Institute of International Studies, University of California, 1987), pp. 3-9.
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cheap land, labour, and natural resources, and are eroding the
ANICs' share of the world markets, mainly in the labour-
intensive industrial products, e.g. textiles, footwear, toys,
and consumer electrical products. As soon as these low cost
developing countries in the region started the process of
catching-up the ANICs by adopting export-led strategies for
economic development in the early 1980s, the ANICs' trading
position as a group of low cost manufacturing exporters was at
stake.
In addition, the ANICs' position as an attractive low
cost production base has also been weakened, above all in
labour-intensive industries. For example, as Thomson Consumer
Electronics, the French electronics giant, is chasing lowest-
cost labour to keep its products competitive, the company has
been operating in East Asia since 1975 because of cheap labour
costs. In response to the increase of labour cost in the ANICs
(See Table 4.2), Thomson has cut production in Taiwan and Hong
Kong and opened plants in South China and Indonesia, as many
ANICs' indigenous industries are also relocated in their
neighbouring countries."
TABLE 4.2. THOMSON'S SURVEY OF LABOUR COSTS
country	 labour (French Francs cost/hour)
Germany	 120
France
	
100
UK	 60
Taiwan	 25
Hong Kong	 22
Singapore	 20
Thailand	 6
Malaysia	 5
China	 2.5
Source: The Times, (7 October, 1992), p. 28.
68
. For more details see Ross Tieman, "Broading horizons of Asia Pacific extend opportunities
for the West", The Times, (7 October, 1992), p. 28.
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Moreover, at the other end of the economic development
spectrum, developed countries, facing intensifying competition
from their trading counterparts, have quietly imposed
protectionist measures, notably by setting up import
restrictions, including tariff and above all non-tariff
barriers, against exports from other economies (e.g. the EC's
import quotas, export restraints, and unfair trade measures),
though the free trade spirit has always been claimed.
Particularly, during the worldwide economic recession, the
ANICs have steadily expanded their shares in world markets
with the increase of trade surplus against most of their trade
partners, which have incurred new protectionism in the EC and
the US. According to an OECD study, discriminatory trade
restrictions by OECD countries have risen in recent years and
mainly focused on Japan and the ANICs." Focusing on the EC's
trade policy to the ANICs in the 1980s, one study suggests
that the EC import barriers not only increasingly target
developing countries in general and the ANICs in particular,
but also their new export items, e.g. colour TVs, and
computers that arouse fierce competition to EC products. 7° The
other study points out that the ANICs, for example, have often
become the targets of the EC anti-dumping charges, due to
their substantial trade surplus against the EC and the lack of
bargaining power. 71 (see Table 4.3)
To fortify their international competitiveness, the ANICs
have, since the mid-1980s, launched a process of industrial
restructuring, seeking to upgrade their industrial structure
by, on the one hand, increasing investment in improving the
quality of their products and upgrading technology, and on the
69. Ibid., p. 73.
70. Sun-Taik Han, European Integration: The Impact on Asian Newly Industrialising Economies,
produced as part of the research programme on Globalisation and Regionalisation, (Paris:
OECD, 1992), p. 27.
71 •
 
Chien-nan Wang, and Jui-ling Hsu, "The impacts of the European integration on Taiwan and
Taiwan's responses", 1992 Sib-European Conference on Economic Development: Impacts of the
European Integration and Responses of Non-EC Countries, Chung-Hua Institution for Economic
Research, Taipei, Taiwan, 6-7 May 1992.
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other hand, allowing more inefficient sun-set industries to
die or relocate, instead of merely sticking to their previous
strategy of cutting production costs. These processes of
restructuring have derived, to a large extent, from external
competition for markets and advantage. As a result, the ANICs'
efforts at exogenous industrial restructuring have reinforced
the existing regional industrial division of labour that has
been exploited by the Japanese for years.
TABLE 4.3. EC ANTI-DUMPING CASES AGAINST ITS TRADE PARTNERS
Exporting countries 1981-1984 1985-1988
Developed countries 60 31
Developing countries 45 79
ANICs 3 27
Taiwan 3 6
South Korea 1 14
Non-Market countries 98 31
Source: Chien-nan Wang, and Jui-ling Hsu, "The impacts of the
European integration on Taiwan and Taiwan's
responses", in 1992 Sino-European Conference on
Economic Development: Impacts of the European
Integration and Responses of Non-EC Countries, Chung-
Hua Institution for Economic Research, Taipei, Taiwan,
6-7 May 1992.
A large part of the ANICs outflow of investment in and
industrial relocation to Southeast Asian countries and China
happened in the last few years and has dramatically changed
the economic structure of East Asia. This new trend of
investment from the ANICs has been more substantial than
investment from the Transnational Corporations, because the
ANICs' investment in those neighbouring countries has involved
a lot more companies, which is crucial if economic integration
is to take place. For example, according to the Taiwan
official figure in 1993, there were about 2,600 companies
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investing about US$900 million in Mainland China:" South Korea
has also increased its investment in China sharply from
US$42.4 million in 69 projects in 1991 to US$205 million in
270 projects in 1992. 73 Subregional economic groupings have
emerged as a result of the ANICs' pursuing industrial
adjustments together with their efforts to globalise their
enterprises and markets.
Apart from their rapid growth performance, it is
difficult, as one analysis has suggested, 74 to find a common
denominator of characteristics amongst the ANICs. Each ANIC
has its particular background of economic development which
has shaped its own industrial structure, such as the
development of South Korea and Taiwan with their relatively
sound monetary and fiscal policies when compared with
Singapore and Hong Kong's free markets. During the ANICs'
earlier development, their common shortage of resources, and
narrow domestic markets characterised their development. In
terms of industrial structure, Korea and Taiwan are quite
similar since both have concentrated on manufactures. In
comparison, Hong Kong and Singapore, experiencing an entrepot
development, are much more focused on international services
(business, transport, financial, communication, etc.),
although they are also remarkably successful in the export of
manufactures which accounted for over 20 per cent of their GDP
annually in the first half of the eighties. 75 Nevertheless,
whatever the basis of ANIC prosperity, their economic success
72. The official figure was calculated by the registration in the Ministry of Economic
Affairs. Although the actual figure remains unclear, the figure suggested by the Ministry
put it around 4,000 companies and US$3 billion. See K. L. Kao, Kuo Ton Kan Ling Yu Lian An
Kuen Si (National Guidelines for Unification and the Relationships between two Sides of
the Taiwan Strait), Mainland Affairs Council, Executive Yuan, Taipei, 1992.
73. Shim Jae Moon, "China market roars", p. 45.
74. OECD, The Newly Industrialising Countries-Challenge and Opportunity For OECD Countries, p.
8.
75. Ibid.
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has been based on the export of certain labour-intensive
products.
Since the mid-1980s, the United States has investigated
the ANICs' advantages in trade with the US and has tried to
deal with the East Asian economies individually rather than in
"a monolithic whole". 78
 In the late 1980s, while the US has
continuously conferred the GSP to most Southeast Asian
countries and China allowing their products easy access to the
US market, the ANICs' GSP status has been eliminated." These
factors are further weakening the competitive advantage of the
ANICs. For instance, Korean economic success was partly
dependent on the creation in 1970 of export zones based on 90
per cent Japanese investment. However, spiralling wages, trade
union militancy, high land prices and fixed government policy
for export have already damaged the confidence and the
competitiveness of Japanese companies in the zones. As the
original advantageous incentives for investment no longer
exist, the Japanese are increasingly likely to move out of the
Korean zones soon. 78
 Moreover, the increasing pressure on the
appreciation of the ANICs' currencies has sharpened the threat
to the competitive advantage of their exports.
The ANICs' capital- and technology-intensive industries
linked with the developed markets were hit by the worldwide
recession and savage competition in the late 1980s, especially
shipbuilding, auto, and machinery industries, as well as
76.The differentiated US policy towards East Asian economies was identified in a report "U.
S. trade relations with Asia" of a staff study mission to Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, China,
Thailand, Singapore, and Indonesia, to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, US House of
Representatives, (November 30 to December 27, 1986).
77.The GSP is based on duty-free treatment on most manufacturing products from developing
countries with the exception of textiles and some leather products. The continuing GSP
treatment has been linked to the actual trade performance of each developing country, by
products. When exports to the US exceed an absolute threshold related to US GNP (around
$57 million in 1989) or account for more than 50 per cent of all exports from developing
countries of that product, the US will call off the GSP treatment in the following year.
See Richard Cooper, " Trade policy as foreign policy", in Robert H. Stern, (ed.), US Trade
Policies in a Changing World Economy, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1989), p.
303.
78. "Goodbye to all that", Far Eastern Economic Review, (13 December, 1990), p. 64.
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computer industry. For example, for fear of excessive capacity
at a time when shipbuilding suffered from world recession,
some companies, Daewoo Shipbuilding and Heavy Machinery Co.,
Hanjin Heavy Industries Co., and Hyundai Heavy Industries Co.
have agreed with the South Korean government imposition of a
limitation on shipbuilders' capacity. 79
 The fast growing South
Korean and Taiwanese computer makers were among the victims of
world recession and the computer price war in 1991 launched by
the big three, IBM, Apple, and Compaq Computer Co." Taiwan's
Acer Inc., the leading computer maker, suffered a substantial
loss of revenue.81
In South Korea, while Samsung Electronics was expected to
post a loss of US$40 million on exporting personal computers,
Koryo Systems, the country's 1990 Silver Tower Trophy holder
of export performance award and the fifth largest computer
maker, even went out of business in October 1991. 82 In
addition, many ANICs' industries have been based on
investments by the developed economies, notably Japan and the
United States, either through joint venture agreements or by
licensing, from which their indigenous industries will gain
access to higher technology. However, these channels have
seldom offered a total transfer of the technology from the
investors, especially the Japanese. Rather, through these
agreements or investments, the developed economies have
continued to dominate. For instance, although Samsung, the
79. The South Korean government curbed shipbuilding companies from expanding in August 1989
and has now lifted the ban in spite of Daewoo, Hanjin, and Hyundai's opposition. See Korea
Newsreview, (1 January, 1994), p. 26.
80. "Computer crash", Far Eastern Economic Review, (17 October, 1991), p. 105.
81. Although Acer's rapid expansion in the late 1980s was responsible for draining out its
profit margin, worldwide recession faltered its pace. See Carl Goldstein, "Acer in the
hole", Far Eastern Economic Review, (13 December, 1990), p. 62. Returned from stagnation
since early 1993, Acer's ambition to be one of the World's top five PC makers remains
alive. See special interview to Acer's Chairman Shih, I. L. Yany, "Hong Gi Ru Her Fan Bai
Wei Shern" (How did Acer come back), Commonwealth, (1 August, 1993), pp. 104-109.
82. "Computer crash", p. 105.
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TABLE 4.4. THE ASIAN NICS INVESTMENT IN REGIONAL DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES (US$ Mil.)
HK/ a 	 China Indonesia Thailand Malaysia Philippines
1987 1,947 135 125 11 28
1988 3,466 240 451 50 27
1989 3,160 407 561 42 133
Taiwan/b China Indonesia Thailand Malaysia Philippines
1989 552 158 892.2 815 148
1990 1,011 618.3 782.59 2,383 140
1991 1,737 1,056.5 583.46 1,314.21 11.61
1992 6,430 563.3 290 602 9.27
Sing./c China Indonesia Thailand Malaysia Philippines
1986-88 111 116 157 112 1
1989 124 166 411 338 24
S Korea/ c Chinad Indonesia Thailand Malaysia Philippines
1986-88 na 78 171 7 1
1989 na 466 41 70 17
1990 22.1 na na na na
1991 42.4 1,141 (ASEAN 4)e
1992 205 1,424 (ASEAN 4)
Note: ASEAN 4 = Indonesia+Thailand+Malaysia+Philippines.
Sources: a . E. K. Y. Chen, "Foreign Direct investment in
East Asia", Asian Development Review, 11: 1,
(1993).
b . Majestic Trading Co. Ltd., London - 1993
Annual Report.
• W. B. Kim, "Industrial restructuring and
regional adjustment in Asian NIEs",
Environment and Planning A, 25, (1993).
d. Shim Jae Hoon, "China market roars", p. 45.
e. Actual investment figure. Ed Paisley, "Time
for a new start", Far Eastern Economic
Review, (13 August, 1992), p. 38.
then biggest conglomerate in Korea and also maybe the biggest
single electrical producer outside Japan in Asia," has made a
tremendous effort to increase its world market share of
electrical products in the last few years by upgrading its
technology through its R & D spending, it is still suffering
83
. "Samsung: Korea's hope for high tech", Business Week, (27 January, 1992), pp. 22-24.
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from the shortcomings of its core technologies i.e.
sophisticated computer IC and semi-conductors. For these it is
still heavily dependent on Japanese technology.
The structural problems of the ANICs are clearly shaped
by two-way pressures: the low production costs of other
regional developing countries facing their downstream
industries, and the technology constraints on the upgrading of
their higher value-added industries. In fact, for the ANICs
these are not only problems of industrial restructuring
itself, but also a political challenge ahead to re-organise
regional economic cooperation (refer to Appendix F-4.1). In
the process of industrial restructuring the ANICs have
released domestic capital to invest in Southeast Asian
countries and China (see Table 4.4). These investment flows
have also carried a transfer of technology and management
practices, and an increase in local employment, which has made
up a regional framework for division of labour. 84 As a result,
the momentum for further regional economic integration has
been generated.
4.3. THE INTERNATIONAL DIVISION OF LABOUR AND REGIONAL
ECONOMIC INTEGRATION
Although there have not yet been formal discussions
amongst the ANICs about integration and there has been keen
competition for overseas markets, they are actually increasing
their consultation and business cooperation among themselves,
for example over Singapore's client role for Taiwanese
products exporting to South Asia and the former Soviet Union,
and Hong Kong's role of matchmaker for the business marriage
84
. Drobnick, "Economic Integration in the Pacific Region", 1992, p. 25.
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of Taiwanese and Chinese products. A "vertical development"
linking the ANICs and their neighbouring economies in the
context of industrial division of labour has been going on
substantially and spontaneously largely through business links
and other economic pursuits in East Asia. 85 To some extent,
this growing trend of integrating the progress of regional
economic development in East Asia has demonstrated a strong
impetus to endorse the likely subregional economic groupings,
albeit political cooperation within the region has been less
likely to take a lead in the efforts for regional economic
integration. In this favourable economic context with the
ANICs projecting their innovative economic capacity into the
region, subregional economic groupings have been arising.
Regional economies have already benefited from their economic
complementarity to each other through certain industrial
divisions of labour.
4.3.1. The Hong Kong-Guangdong-Shenzhen Triangle
The most outstanding example of a subregional economic
grouping is Hong Kong's efforts to participate in and benefit
from China's economic development. The growing triangular
economic zone of Hong Kong, Guangdong, and Shenzhen special
economic zone is to be the next growing star in prosperous
East Asia. The Province of Guangdong itself has become the
fastest growing area in the world, and will within two decades
become the "fifth tiger" following the current four tigers,
85
. Each of the ANICs is building its own "market sphere of influence" with geographic
proximity linking their neighbouring economies together. In terms of economic development
timing, the term "vertical development" hence implies the economic relationship between
each ANIC and its neighbours.
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namely Hong Kong, Singapore, Taiwan and South Korea." Whilst
Southern China has got huge potential for cheap labour coupled
with the government's special preference for export-
orientation, Hong Kong is pouring huge amounts of capital,
technology, knowledge of marketing, business and financial
services and skills and management into economic cooperation.
Japanese and American investment has been playing the same
role in Taiwanese and Korean economic development as Hong Kong
investment in China. On the one hand, Hong Kong enjoys low
cost of production, but is prepared to share the advancing
market and manufacturing experience, on the other. The
industrial structure of this combined economy has been focused
on manufacturing due to its cheap labour and easier access to
raw materials and markets.
In the long run, China's heavy industrial experience may
well be a critical driving force for the absorption of Hong
Kong's commodity economy. As most of Hong Kong textile and
electrical industries are limited in their access to most of
the OECD's markets by various non-tariff barriers, especially
anti-dumping regulations and Voluntary Export Restraint,
cooperation with China offers the easiest access to these
markets for manufacturers. This is a way of circumventing
trade restrictions protecting developed markets. In turn, Hong
Kong's informed business and development experience has
benefited Chinese development. In addition, notwithstanding
the fact that Hong Kong is about to be handed over to China in
1997, the British colonial linkage gives it a pivotal position
to cement the relations between this triangle and the EC. With
86
. Li Hau, Chinese Communist Party secretary for the city of Shenzhen, proposed in November
1991 that developing the city at current economic growth rate, will mean that in twenty
years Shenzhen will be able to keep pace with Hong Kong and Singapore. See Sing Tao Daily
News, (23 November, 1992); also "The fifth tiger is on China's coast", Business Week, (6
April, 1992), pp. 22-24.
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respect to the exchange of information, marketing experience,
and market resources, this triangular development is critical
to China and to those who are concerned with China's market.
If Hong Kong keeps its free trade orientation after 1997, it
will need to expand its access to markets to further
strengthen its competitiveness. The spontaneous linkage of the
triangle tells that the ANICs with their narrow domestic
market and poor resources are expecting to amplify their own
economic scope by linking up with other economies.
4.3.2. The Singapore-Johor-Riau Growth Triangle
Another triangle economy, which is to be an innovative
example of joint marketing at the international level, is
comprised of Singapore, the Malaysian state of Johor and the
Indonesian Riau Islands (Batam and Bintan). Following a series
of Singapore-Indonesia and Singapore-Malaysia ministerial
meetings from 1988 to 1991, the Growth Triangle has officially
come into being. The initiatives for this subregional economic
grouping were derived partly from Singapore's desire to
strengthen its international competitiveness, and partly from
Singapore's new thinking on ASEAN's fruitless economic
cooperation." This again is another complementary economic
complex. Speaking at an investors' forum in Jakarta in 1990,
Lee Hsien Loong, Singapore's then Trade and Industry Minister,
said:
"Singapore is short of land and labour, but has more
developed infrastructure and a higher concentration of
manufacturing and service industries. Indonesia (as well
87
. Michael Vatikiotis, "Triangular vision", Far Eastern Economic Review, (26 July, 1990), p.
15.
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as Malaysia) has abundant labour and natural resources,
and potential for tremendous growth once these are
organised and developed."88
As the Singapore industrial structure is dependent
heavily upon foreign investors, which consist of many TNCs,
the triangle is intended to develop higher technology by
offering an enormous investment opportunity and environment to
those investors who come from the developed countries with
their high technology. In order to globalise its economy to
cope with future competitive challenges, Singapore which has
learned from the experience of the TNCs, has been trying to
extend its hinterland to its neighbouring economies as a way
of expanding its economy. Allowing neighbouring economies to
share its successful economic performance, Singapore has been
trying to portray itself as an economic powerhouse in the
triangle to be the broker for further updating advanced high
technology from the TNCs and a manager for economic
development. Tun Daim Zainuddin, a former Malaysian Finance
Minister, realises that "Prosperity is our goal, and that
prosperity should be shared". 88 It is this which has brought
the triangle economic complex into effect.
The concept of the triangle has stemmed from the global
competitive strategy of the TNCs which have diversified their
production processes in different countries. The purpose of
the diversification of production has been the search for
competitive advantage. The Japanese electrical giant Sony, for
example, has been producing some electronics components in
Taiwan, assembling in Malaysia, but helping its marketing and
management operations in Japan. Indeed, with Batam and Johor's
ready labour and land at competitive rates, and Singapore's
efficient infrastructure and technical expertise, the triangle
88.Ibid.
89.Sandra Burton, "Growing by leaps-and triangles", p. 24.
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is making itself more attractive to foreign investment and
more competitive in world markets. This is what Singapore's
former Prime Minister, Lee Kuan Yew has envisioned: "From
Singapore, they can serve not only their home market, but also
the regional and world markets. Furthermore, they can tap the
region's bigger and cheaper labour pool. Labour-intensive
parts of a product can be done in neighbouring countries and
exported to Singapore for more capital- or skill-intensive
operations. "90
If a single subregional grouping is thought of as an
element of Asia-Pacific regional economic integration in a
limited area, the drive will certainly be derived from a
common interest in economic development. The Growth Triangle
was initiated by the governments of Singapore, Malaysia, and
Indonesia, but their movement has lagged far behind the
businessmen's pace of development. 91 Although some sceptics in
Malaysia and Indonesia see this project as having specific
Singaporean objectives, already in 1991 there were 28
multinational corporations, including the regional biggest
business group Liem Sioe Liong's Salim Group and companies
controlled by Suharto's family, planning to invest in Batam
Island in response to Singapore's proposal for the development
of the Triangle.92
4.3.3. Taiwan's Economic Sphere Of Influence
Taiwan's economic activities for competitive advantage
stretch both to the developed economies for higher technology
90.Ellen Salem, "Twinned hinterlands", Far Eastern Economic Review, (18 August, 1988), p. 77.
91.The private sector has been playing a much more active role in the process of inching
ahead the grouping than the governments. see T Aoki, and H. Ohashi, "Asia: integration of
the world's most dynamic economies", p. 27.
92.Michael Vatikiotis, "Search for a hinterland", Far Eastern Economic Review, (3 January,
1991), p. 35; It is said that Indonesian tycoon Liam Si pe Liong's close relationship with
the Singapore government has helped advocate the concept of the Triangle. See special
report Central Daily News, (13 March, 1994).
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and the developing economies for low cost production factors.
Many have already noticed that Taiwan as Asia's newest banker
is challenging the Japanese role "as the paymaster of regional
industrial integration." 93
 It is outstandingly cash-rich,
according to a recent report. Its foreign exchange reserves
have reached the highest in the world at over US$90 billion
(in 1992), and it has become an attractive investor in the
region. Taiwan has been going through a process of industrial
restructuring and structural adjustment during the last
decade. Many small and middle enterprises, especially those
inefficient and labour-intensive industries on which the
Taiwan miracle was based, have barely survived international
competition because of rising labour costs and land prices,
currency appreciation, and tighter pollution controls at home.
The adjustment itself through outflow investment and
manufacturing relocation has facilitated a hope for regional
economic integration.
TABLE 4.5. THE TOP FOUR FOREIGN EXCHANGE RESERVES HOLDERS
(US$ bn)
Taiwan	 Japan	 Germany	 USA
1992	 90.1	 71.6	 91.0	 60.3
1993	 84.2	 98.5	 77.9
	 62.4
Source: The Economist, (12 March, 1994), pp. 153-154.
To break through its diplomatic isolation and to maintain
its competitive advantage, the Taiwanese government is
actively promoting overseas investment." Companies seeking
93.See Time, (13 January, 1992), p. 15; and Jonathan Moore, "The upstart Taipans", Far
Eastern Economic Review, (19 April, 1990), pp. 82-87.
94.Overseas investment as an instrument of foreign policy tightly links investors and the
host countries. These international economic linkages are expected to tie countries'
interests closer. These diplomatic concerns are especially meaningful for Taiwan since
direct investment can be an effective approach to both markets and friendship. Perhaps,
its capital is the only trump card that Taiwan has got in hand. See "Taipei's Offshore
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low-cost bases for manufacturing products destined for the US
and the EC markets started the latest investment wave in 1987.
Most are labour-intensive industries making shoes, garments,
toys, handbags and consumer electronics in South East Asia.95
Apart from the low-cost manufacturers of South East Asian
countries, the overseas Chinese communities which have been
easily tied to Taiwanese business and offered powerful local
marketing allies for Taiwanese entrepreneurs, have been
another attractive incentive for investment in Taiwan. The
similarity of social and cultural background is also an
important factor for investors. Since the investment wave
started, Taiwanese investment has rapidly increased in South
East Asian countries. Investment to the region which accounted
for over US$ 500 million in 1987 (by early 1993, this figure
went up to US$ 12 billion)" and for US$ 2.5 billion in 1989
including China, has been recognised as "the key to a second
spring for Taiwan industry." 87 Indeed, this is especially
important for those labour-intensive and low-technological
industries, such as Hua Loong Textile Co., and the national
China Steel Co. in Malaysia, and the Yuen Foong Yu Paper
Manufacturing Co. in Indonesia. Moreover, Taiwanese investment
in this region has become ubiquitous not only among ASEAN
members but also in Vietnam. A new figure shows that Taiwan
and Hong Kong are the biggest foreign investors in Vietnam. Up
to early 1994, together they have proposed more than US$ 2.7
billion (total $6.8 billion) in 269 projects (total 787), and
far outpaced the regional number one investor - Japan.88
Trade between Taiwan and China is booming much more
significantly, as both sides have gradually allowed the
expansion of communication between their complementary
Empire", Far Eastern Economic Review, (18 March 1993), PP- 44-50; also "China, Taiwan and
hurt feelings", The Economist, (19 February, 1994), pp. 73-74.
95. Jonathan Moore, "The upstart Taipans", p. 84.
96. That accounts for almost half Taiwan's outflow investment US$25 billion. See "Taipei's
Offshore Empire", p. 44.
97. Jonathan Moore, "The upstart Taipans", p. 86.
98. See "Asian investors lead the way in Vietnam", Financial Times, (24 February, 1994), p. 7.
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economies. Although for political reasons trade is still
indirect, most of it via Hong Kong, and the rest via Japan and
Singapore, the competitive advantage for investors is
attractive. Recently, Taiwan entrepreneurs have been focusing
their investment to China on the south east coastal province
of Fujien - Xiamen, due to kinship, the same dialect and
geographic proximity." Some criticise Taiwan businessmen in
this area as merely seeking for short-term advantage rather
than long-term development of the area. In fact, Taiwanese
investment is dependent upon market conditions which means
that investment is following Chinese economic indicators.
Because the Beijing regime may change its policy after the
communist old guards leave the scene, the uncertain political
situation has cast some doubt on long-term investment. In
addition, bureaucratic red tape, management problems and a
shortage of raw materials has frustrated not only hundreds of
manufacturers already operating there but also a great number
of investors. 100 In spite of some scepticism about the future,
economic and even political contacts between Taiwan and China
are still increasing steadily. Apart from increasing trade and
investment figures, and the regular basis of the quasi-
official talks between the Strait Exchange Foundation and the
Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits, recently,
the Taiwanese government has proposed a joint venture with
Singapore to explore oil, natural gas, and tourism on China's
Hainan Island. 101
In terms of economic development, Taiwan like other
ANICs, is half way to becoming a developed economy. What it is
really short of is the high technology to upgrade its
industrial high value-added products. With respect to
99
. 
Taiwanese businessmen recognise that kinship and sharing the same dialect with Fujien
people are sometimes even more important than a contract particularly for running
businesses in the Chinese society, in terms of eatablishing "guan si" (personal
relationships) and introducing management knowledge.
loco
.Julian Baum, "Second thoughts", Far Eastern Economic Review, (1 November, 1990), p. 68.
loi Margaret Dawson, "The Taiwan Strait never seemed so narrow", Business Week, (24 January,
1994), p. 24.
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technology, Taiwanese investment to the region has almost
nothing to do with the procurement of technology. Rather,
regional economic integration is much more concerned with
production and market cooperation. In the sense of regional
integration, Taiwanese economic development has been tied
firmly to the regional countries through the export of direct
investment, low- and middle-level technologies and
manufacturing experience, and the import of raw materials and
labour forces. One might expect the "spillover" effect to come
in the scope of industrial cooperation and of policies
concerned. In other words, their mutual interest will be
converged in international trade negotiations for the products
concerned. For example, in early 1992, while the US Congress
was seeking to link the annual renewal of China's Most
Favoured Nation (MFN) trading status to fulfilment of American
demands on human rights, missile proliferation, and trade
practices as a way of disciplining China, Hong Kong and Taiwan
foresaw that they would suffer a great loss. Therefore, both
Taiwan and Hong Kong took an action to urge "the United States
to maintain China's MFN status.
4.3.4. The Northeast China-Korea--Japan Triangle
As an ANIC, South Korea also can not escape from
structural problems. South Korean development has been much
more determined by state intervention than that of other
ANICs. To implement structural adjustment for short-term as
well as for long-term purposes, South Korean government
intervention has been the main driving force in response to
102
.For details see Harry Harding, "The US and Greater China", The China Business Review,
(May-June 1992), p. 22.
1,102
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fierce international competition. Recently, for instance, to
make better use of investment in technology and productivity
to increase competitiveness, the South Korean government has
called for an industrial specialisation policy of reorganising
industry which asks chaebol, the highly diversified industrial
conglomerates, to concentrate on three core businesses.'"
Since its development is focused on large and heavy industry,
this direction has resulted in its industry being
characterised by rapidly changing comparative advantage,
highly concentrated export markets prone to protectionist
pressures, a high degree of industrial concentration, and a
strong technological dependence on Japan. VM
South Korean industries have been through structural
adjustment for a decade or so, and comparative advantage has
shifted from traditional and labour-intensive industries (such
as textile yarn and thread, cotton fabrics, wood manufactures,
printed matter, sound recorders, and office supplies) to
capital-intensive industries (such as ships, electrical
equipment, metal products and iron and steel). Although this
adjustment did enable some industries to survive international
competition, South Korea like other ANICs is encountering a
technological threshold which may not be easy to break through
by national R & D spending. This is the reason why the ANICs
are eager to seek the possibility of joint ventures or any
kind of technical cooperation programme in order to get the
higher technology for upgrading their industries.
Since South Korea's recent main industrial strategy has
been concentrated on its moving up the technology ladder,""
103
.See John Ridding, "S Korea's industry giants pick their core businesses", Financial Times,
(23 April, 1991), p. 4.
104
.D. M. Leipziger, "Industrial Restructuring In Korea", World Development, 16: 1, (1988), p.
126.
105
.0ECD, The Newly Industrialising Countries, 1988, p. 37.
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many resources have been devoted to this end. In spite of its
having the highest spending in R & D among the ANICs and
trying to reduce technology imports from Japan, South Korea is
still heavily dependent upon Japanese technology (see Table
4.6). In addition, as the South Korean industrial
restructuring has changed the focus of its industrial
activities to capital-intensive sectors, traditional overseas
markets have been replaced by the developed markets of the EC
and North America. To compete with these developed economies
and other Asia-Pacific subregional economic groupings, South
Korea's need to develop its technology ladder has increased
its close relationship with Japan. 106
TABLE 4.6. SOUTH KOREA TECHNOLOGY IMPORTS FROM JAPAN (US$
million)
amount No. amount No.	 (in %)a
1962-80 168.3 1017 36.8 58.8
1985 35.4 108 25.2 50.2
1990 341.4 333 31.4 45.1
1991 372.5 277 31.5 46.8
1992 266.3 232 31.3 43.5
Note: a . Japan's share of percentage in total.
Source: Based on Korea Institute for International Economic
Policy, Korea Newsreview, (19 February, 1994), p. 16.
To extend industrial capacity and to survive from
international competition, South Korea has already spread out
its labour-intensive industries to north east China as well as
to the South East Asian countries. Korea, like Japan, has also
entered into China's domestic market, albeit its pace has been
far behind Hong Kong and Taiwan. Since the normalisation of
the Beijing-Seoul relationship in August 1992, the two way
trade has been increasing. VW In the sense of economic
106
."Technology imports from Japan dwindling", Korea Newsreview, (19 February, 1994), pp. 16-
17.
107
.The statistics show that while its imports from China have steadily grown from US$3.4
billion to $3.9 billion, South Korea's exports to China have doubled in the same period
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development, South Korea is playing the middle man role to
Japan and China. The industrial focuses of Japan (advanced
technology), Korea (skilled and marketing experience) and
China (low-cost production and manufacturing base) represent
respectively three different development levels of a
complementary economy which is conducive to their further
economic cooperation.
It is clear that Seoul's rush towards China is not purely
business. 108 Politically, South Korea's desire to strengthen
its position against North Korea has served as a drive to
develop relations with China. Seoul's political intention is
in accordance with Beijing's policy which centres on
maintaining peace and stability in the peninsula in order to
assure a peaceful environment for China's development. A "dual
track" approach, which ties simultaneously to Pyongyang and
Seoul, has become China's Korean policy after the 19805.109
Moreover, China's huge domestic market is attractive to Korean
entrepreneurs. The rapidly growing Chinese economy has
motivated the South Korean economy undertaking the
restructuring of its industry. China is now the most preferred
country for investment of South Korean enterprises. n° With
geographic proximity, ethnic connection, and historic links to
Korea and Japan, Shandong and Liaodong Peninsulas as well as
the area along the Yellow Sea have become the main economic
zone of Korean and Japanese investment. The zone has long been
characterised as a heavy industrial development centre with
easy access to raw materials, such as oil, iron ore, and coal,
and with China's skilled but cheap workers.
from $2.37 billion to $5 billion. See Yu Kun-Ha, "Korea-China economic ties rise to new
peak", Korea Newsreview, (26 February, 1994), P. 26.
108
."South Korea plays the China card", Business Week, (11 April, 1994), p. 19.
109
.Hao Jia, and Qubing Zhuang, "China's policy toward the Korean Peninsula", Asian Survey,
32: 12, p. 1142.
110
.Korea Newsreview, (26 February, 1994), p. 26.
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Therefore, South Korea has been increasing investment in
and cooperation ties with China, as this cooperation will not
only allow Korean industries access to the market and
improvement of their international competitiveness but will
also win Chinese assurance in regional security to tame North
Korean aggression. The Chinese market, an increasing exports'
destination for South Korean industrial goods, rose from 71.4
per cent in 1991 to 164.7 per cent in 1992. Targeting the
China market potential, Hyundai Group has boosted its car sale
from shipment of 714 units in 1992, worth US$9.5 million, up
to 14,700 units worth US$148 million in the first quarter of
1993. 111 Already, as many South Korean heavy industrial
companies have profited from their investment in this area,
such as Daewood's cement factory in Shandong, Samsung
Electronics' VCRs assembly in Tianjin, and Goldstar's
industrial water pipe plant, more small- and medium-sized
firms are following suit."1
 Although Japan's investment in
China is behind that of Hong Kong, Taiwan and the US, due to
its concerns about the high risk of investing in China,
recently, some Japanese big firms, Toshiba, Sanyo, Canon,
Sanyo-Nissho Iwai, Matsushita, have started to pour in capital
and technology to Dalian, a port for Liaodong Peninsula.n3
Through existing economic links, a new subregional
grouping in Northeast Asia has emerged. The concept of
Northeast Asian Economic Cooperation has included two economic
development areas: the Yellow Sea Economic Zone combining
South Korea, Japan, and the Chinese provinces of Liaoning and
shandong, and the Tumen River programme with China, two
111 . Shim Jae Moon, "China market roars", p. 46.
112 Ed Paisley, "The harvest to come", Far Eastern Economic Review, (3 September, 1992), p.
12.
113 . "A golden gate on the Yellow Sea", Business Week, (14 March, 1994), p. 22.
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Koreas, Japan, Russia, and Mongolia. 114 The Yellow Sea Economic
Zone, as yet an academic sketch, has been characterised by
complementary economic links between China-South Korea-Japan.
The Tumen River programme now envisioned under the United
Nations Development Program (UNDP) has become attractive
because it is also a complementary economic complex which will
combine China, Russia, and North Korea's abundant natural
resources and manpowers with South Korea and Japan's capital.
Moreover, its enormous potential as a regional market "could
encompass nearly 300 million population, have a collective GNP
of almost US$3 trillion, and account for nearly one-third of
world trade." Again, like other subregional economic
groupings in Asia-Pacific, these two concepts to make up of
Northeast Asian trade bloc as a whole, are driven mainly by
academics and businessmen, and less by any governmental
commitment. 116 However, most recently, South Korean President
Kim has brought his vision of Yellow Sea Economic Zone to
China's leaders. As a result, both China and South Korea have
agreed to cooperate in four key industries, autos, aerospace,
telecommunications, and electronics.n7
4.4. THE PROSPECTS FOR REGIONAL ECONOMIC INTEGRATION IN THE
ASIA-PACIFIC REGION
In terms of economic development, the ANICs' growing
economies as a whole are threatened by low-cost producers in
114
.For details of Northeast Asian economic cooperation see: Joseph P. Hanguno, "A new
regional trade bloc in Northeast Asia?", The China Business Review, (March-April 1993),
pp. 6-11; Guo Zhen Yuan, "The related factors and prospects for the development of
Northeast Asian Economic Cooperation", The Korean Journal of International Studies, 24: 2,
(Summer 1993), pp. 171-183.
115
.Manguno, "A new regional trade bloc in Northeast Asia?", p. 7.
116 Guo Zhen Yuan, "The related factors and prospects for the development of Northeast Asian
Economic Cooperation", p. 172.
117
."South Korea plays the China card", p. 18.
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other developing countries and developed countries'
protectionism and pressure to open the ANICs domestic
markets. 118 The ANICs export-led economies are very vulnerable
and sensitive to external challenges. In the context of the
development	 of	 regional	 groupings	 for	 reinforcing
competitiveness, the ANICs' efforts towards industrial
restructuring (which could be generalised as " exogenous
industrial structural processes"), have generated a momentum
• to promote the formation of Asia-Pacific subregional
groupings. Instead of being driven by political motivations,
the emergence of Asian-Pacific subregional groupings has been
driven by external economic pressures and the response of
private sector interests. By contrast, the development of the
Pan-Pacific or Asia-Pacific economic cooperation movement, has
been characterised by more talking and theorising than action.
Regional groupings with high political profile have not as yet
been fully accepted by countries in the region. Whilst
President Clinton wished to move APEC towards becoming some
sort of "free trade vehicle" at the Seattle summit in November
1993, some Asian leaders remained suspicious.119
The ANICs' exogenous structural problems, including the
wearing away of the comparative advantage of their products,
and their shortcoming in advanced technology, have served as a
drive to boost the possibility of forming subregional economic
groupings. Projecting their economic strength in the region,
the ANICs have taken practical action by means of increasing
foreign direct investment in and industrial links with the
region itself. While the ANICs since the mid-1980s have
undertaken an industrial restructuring process, not only have
118
.For detailed analysis about the ANICs' restructuring see W. H. Kim, "Industrial
restructuring and regional adjustment in Asian NIEs", Environment and Planning A, 25,
(1993), pp. 27-46.
119
.James Walsh, "Toward the Pacific Age", Time, (22 November, 1993), p. 53.
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regional economic
	 structures	 changed but also more
sophisticated subregional divisions of labour have developed
as a result. This trend is very likely to continue, as long as
regional economies continue to intensify their links with each
other and regionalism elsewhere remains a head-on trade issue.
What the Asia-Pacific subregional grouping does imply for
the ANICs is a need to improve their competitiveness and the
prospect of mutual benefits. The biggest part of the ANICs
structural problems has been the shortage of labour and
falling profit margins resulting from the rising production
costs at home. Subregional groupings have provided an
extensive economic space to allow the ANICs to regain their
competitive advantage by exchanging their economic development
expertise. To a large extent, Asia-Pacifc economic integration
at the subregional level offers an effective means of
overcoming labour shortages and of balancing differences in
regional economic developemnt. These are what the prosperous
cases of Taiwan and Hong Kong tied with Southern China, and
Singapore tied with the Johor state of Malaysia and Riau
Island of Indonesia, have shown.
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C11.2%. F' E 	 F IVIE
THE IMPACT OF THE EMERGENCE OF THE CHINESE ECONOMIC
AREA ON REGIONAL ECONOMIC INTEGRATION
The purpose of this chapter is to analyse the newly
emerging geopolitical concept of the "Chinese Economic Area"
(CEA) on the assumption that there are industrial advantages
to economic integration,' and demonstrating that the process of
economic integration has been driven by the profit motives of
private enterprises rather than the political motives of
governments. Defining the process of industrial integration,
therefore, becomes the main focus here. Although the precise
factors contributing to this part of regional economic
integration are yet to be confirmed, industrial activities
have undoubtedly been one of the major influences. The CEA's
increasing intra-regional trade, and investment flows are, due
to its diverse levels of development, notably based on mutual
industrial complementarities between China, Taiwan, and Hong
Kong. The industrial complementarity was made up of: China's
comprehensive, yet elementary, industrial ability, and
affluence of land and work forces; Taiwan's technology,
financial power, and manufacturing ability; and Hong Kong's
international marketing skills. Whilst businessmen, investors,
and economists are looking closely at all intra-regional
transaction flows and their implications for economies as a
The notion of the "Chinese Economic Area" has been widely identified by academics and in
international institutions, such as the OECD, and the World Bank, although there are some
other terms in use, e.g. "Greater China", "South China Economic Sphere", "Chinese Economic
Community". Basically, whatever the term, they are all referring to China, Taiwan, Hong
Kong and Macao. In reality, the CEA is based on "South China Economic Sphere" which
includes Hong Kong, Taiwan, Fujian, and Guangdong. Through their close industrial links, a
full schedule for integration may be appearing.
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whole, there is an increasing focus on the industrial level of
integration.2
For many people who live in the region, any programme for
integration beyond the economic level is part of a more
distant dream of Chinese national reunification. In the
process of forming the CEA, any moves beyond mere business
considerations may reflect political intentions, since Beijing
is particularly eager, though not openly, to project its own
perspective on unification onto economic activities, to which
Taipei is especially sensitive. On many occasions, scholars,
particularly from Taiwan and Hong Kong, have been very much
concerned that this hidden political intention could hurt
fledgling economic cooperation. One author boldly points out
that Beijing tends to politicise all economic activities as if
trade is an instrument of unification. 3 The increasing flow of
Taiwan's investment to China is likely to be seen as "a
prelude to economic and political unification." 4 The actual
development of the CEA has been inspired for decades largely
by business or market forces rather than by political
intentions, because of political conflict between Mainland
China and Taiwan.
Since the economies of Hong Kong, Taiwan and China
complement each other well, intra-economy links and close
2. Randall S. Jones, Robert E. King, and Michael Klein, "Economic integration between Hong
Kong, Taiwan, and the coastal provinces of China", OECD Economic Studies, 20, (Spring
1993). In the past few years, Charles H. C. Kao has written many articles to provoke the
idea of "Economic China" mainly in his co-founded Global Outlook, (Monthly in Chinese);
Charng Kao, "A Greater China Economic Sphere: Reality and Prospects" Issues and Studies,
28: 11, (Nov. 1992); see also Bruce S. Stewart, "Integrating economic resources across the
Taiwan Strait", Euroview, (European Council of Commerce and Trade in Taipei), (June-July
1993).
3. Kai Ma, "Favourable Factors and Obstacles in Economic Development Between economies of the
Taiwan Strait", paper presented in "Mainland, Taiwan and Hong Kong Economic Cooperation
Trend" Conference in Beijing, (9-10 September 1993). Many others at the conference shared
his view.
Natasha Alperowicz, "In Taiwan the private sector comes to the fore", Chemical Week, 152:
2, (January 20, 1993), p. 28.
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economic relationships are already flourishing. 5 The network
for economic cooperation, therefore, has already arisen and is
quickly intensifying as a result of an "unstoppable tide" of
trade crossing the Taiwan Strait. 6 Although in most of this
research "economic integration" and "economic cooperation" are
sometimes interchangeable in terms of the formation of a trade
bloc, the former is likely to be determined by "the intensity
of relations between participating states and the manner in
which those relations are organized and managed." 7 According to
a recent study on the development of the CEA, Hong Kong,
Taiwan and China have already collectively formed an
interdependent economy by trade, foreign direct investment,
and financial flows. 5
 By and large, there has been regional
industrial division of labour which was traditionally regarded
as tantamount to the first stage of economic integration.9
Since this formation is so far led by private sector profit
seeking, in the years ahead, a trans-party organisation is
likely to appear through business association links rather
than political negotiation. The formation of the CEA could
lead to its economic integration. Nevertheless, this should
merely be treated as building the essence for starting the
economic integration process.
According to Karl Deutsch's definition, a "community"
would require a certain transaction volume to reach a
"threshold" level before a group of countries can be
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
David K. P. Li, "Evolution of the Greater China productivity triangle", World of Banking,
11: 5, (September/October, 1992), p. 11.
See Julian Baum, "The unstoppable tide: rapid rise in Taiwan-China trade pressures
Taipei", Far Eastern Economic Review, (20 May, 1993).
Brigid Laffan, Integration And CO-operation In Europe, (London: Routledge, 1992), p. 3.
Randall S. Jones, Robert E. King, and Michael Klein, "Economic integration between Hong
Kong, Taiwan and the coastal provinces of China", OECD Economic Studies, No. 20, (Spring
1993).
P. Marer, and J. Montias, "The Council for mutual economic assistance", in A. El-Agraa,
(ed.), International Economic Integration, (London: Macmillan, 1988), p. 156.
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considered to be at the inception of integration. 10 Although
his concerns were mainly about heading towards political
community, for which transaction volume will be meaningful
only in accordance with the establishment of transnational
institutions, it does not imply that the application of
economic integration would be removed from the requirement of
a threshold. What he did not clarify was the relationship
between transaction volume and the threshold.
However, the development of the CEA gives evidence of a
different profile. To begin with, a certain threshold level
for confirming integration is clearly everywhere necessary. It
is yet to be proven that political involvement is a necessary
condition for transaction volume to lead to transnational
institutions. There have been a large amount of transactions
carrying on within the CEA, but it seems to be less likely
that transnational institutions with governments' involvement
would be determined by these transaction flows at present.
Whereas, it is not suggested that, without clear schedules for
creating transnational institutions, economic integration in
the CEA would be blocked forever.
With its different characteristics from the EC, in terms
of the shape and process of integration, the CEA is advancing
towards its own particular form of integration. Economic
development is driving similar economies to create an
integrated regional economy. Nevertheless, there are some
questions left to be answered. Why is pursuing economic
integration in the CEA possible and necessary for three of the
economies? How are economic transactions, low-politics'
activities, building up confidence in the CEA in an atmosphere
of continued political hostility and tension? What will
10
. Karl W. Deutsch, Political Community at the International Level: Problems of Definition
and Measurement, (Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1954), p. 39.
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industrial integration imply? Is the CEA heading towards a
process of economic integration in accordance with Bela
Balassa's "conventional progress" framework?11
5.1. THE ORIGINS OF THE "CHINESE ECONOMIC AREA"
Fomented by ever greater international competition in
trade accompanied by the appearance of regional trading blocs,
economic integration in this region is forcing Asian Newly
Industrialised countries (hereafter the ANICs include Hong
Kong, Singapore, Taiwan, and South Korea) to realise that
future business development is not going to be as easy as it
once was, because the ANICs' export-led economies are heavily
dependent upon international markets and free trade. Through
industrial cooperation with their neighbours, on the basis of
developmental complementarity, they are seeking to face up to
the competitive challenge posed by international rivals. The
evolving concept of the Chinese Economic Area, which was
brought about in this context of economic development, was
initiated by academics from Hong Kong, Taiwan and China. What
they have been trying to do is to develop a framework, in
accordance with conventional integration theory to regulate
the rapid increase of business transactions between the
economies.
The listed concepts in Table 5.1 which were, to a large
extent, derived from Hong Kong and Taiwan's wishful thinking
about Chinese industrialisation, were coincidentally presented
in the context of fierce international competition and
11
. According to Balassa's analysis of the levels of economic integration, there are five
stages: free trade area, customs union, common market, economic and monetary union, and
total economic integration. In his The Theory of Economic Integration, (London: Allen and
Unwin, 1962).
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industrial complementarity. As business transactions making up
industrial complementarity have intensified in recent years,
these ambiguous concepts seem to have become more useful and
accessible. The incentives for regional integration have
tended to be external, with international competition,
industrial restructuring, and changes in international
politics jointly providing a catalyst for regional economic
integration.
TABLE 5.1. THE EVOLUTION OF THE CHINESE ECONOMIC AREA
1980 C. L. Huang The Chinese International Community
(HK)	 The Chinese Economic Community
1987 K. Y. Chen Chinese Sphere
(Asian Research Centre, HK U.)
1988 C. Y. Cheng Greater China Common Market
(Asian Studies Committee, Ball U., Indiana, USA)
1988 I. T. Chen China Economic Sphere
(Taiwan Research Institute, China Academy of Social
Science, Beijing)
1988 H. C. Kao Asian Chinese Common Market
(Global Views Magazine, Taiwan)
1989 H. S. Zhin Economic Sphere for the Both Sides of
the Taiwan Strait
(Asia-Pacific Economic Research Institute, Fujien
Academy of Social Science, China)
1989 F. G. Chou Southeast China Free Tree Area
(Southeast Information Centre, HK)
1990 C. S. Wong Southern China Economic Sphere or
S. P. Hsu South China Economic Collaboration Area
(Taiwan Research Institute, Xiamen U., Fujien)
Source: 1.Economic Daily News, (21 June, 1992).
2.Kuo Gi Ging Gih Ching Shih Chou Boa,
(International Economic Trend Weekly), 977, pp.
9-10.
5.1.1. International Competition And The Context For
Integration In East Asia
Economically, unlike the EC, the development of the West
Pacific countries is quite heterogeneous. While Japan has been
a member of the OECD for decades, others, the ANICs, ASEAN
212
countries (Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, and Thailand)u,
China and the Indo-China countries (Vietnam, Laos, and
Cambodia), are still among the list of developing countries.
(refer to GDP per head in Table 5.2) However, their economies
enjoy, to some extent, a mutual complementarity in terms of
their industrial development structures, which make different
sorts of division of labour possible. In fact, Japan, the most
highly developed economy, possesses the most advanced
technologies which its neighbouring countries are especially
thirsty for. What Japan needs, and is desperately short of is
raw materials, overseas markets and basic labour forces of
which these other regional countries possess an abundance.
TABLE 5.2. EAST ASIAN COUNTRIES GDP IN FOUR GROUPS IN 1990 (in
US$)
Japan 17,620 Singapore	 15,880
Hong Kong	 15,600
China 1,990 Taiwan	 12,670
North Korea 2,000 South Korea	 6,730
Cambodia 1,100
Vietnam 1,100 Malaysia	 6,140
Laos 1,100 Thailand	 3,990
Myanma 660 Philippines	 2,300
Indonesia	 2,180
Source:	 Based on UNDP information,	 see	 "Survey: Asia", The
Economist, (30 October, 1993), p. 6.
One has to understand that the practical advantages of
cooperation are the main incentive for regional integration.
At the middle level of economic development, there are the
ANICs, whose industrial structures have already been enriched
by capital- and technology-intensive industries and even some
12 •
 Singapore has been ranked in the ANICs' group, while another small but rich member of the
ASEAN, Brunei, is also considered to be different from the rest of ASEAN countries.
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high-technology industries, during the 1980s." At the bottom,
ASEAN countries and China are catching up industrially through
the same process of moving from resource-based exports to
labour-intensive and low-technology manufacturing industries,
as the ANICs did in the 1960s and 1970s."
An international division of labour has, therefore, been
established throughout East Asia in the past few decades. A
new model of a horizontal division of labour is emerging among
Japan, the ANICs, and ASEAN, as well as China. For example,
Japanese automakers, Toyota and Mitsubishi, and consumer
electronics manufacturers, Matsushita, have set up systems in
which parts are being produced through an international
division of labour right across the ANICs and ASEAN
countries. 15 The traditional vertical division of labour
between Japan's manufacturing products and other regional
economies' raw materials is becoming less prominent. 16 This
model is characterised not only by different levels of
economic development, but also by the variety of industrial
structures amongst the regional economies. Furthermore, there
are different levels of technological development which may
13.In terms of composition of manufactured exports, the obvious increase of exports in office
machines, telecommunications and sound equipment, and transport equipment has shown the
changing pattern of these exports. In Singapore and South Korea, the share of these
sophisticated industries accounted for less than 2 per cent in 1966 and more than 30 per
cent in 1987. Taiwan's exports' structure also shows a similar change. Its share of these
industries rose from 16.4 per cent in 1970 to 28.3 per cent in 1983. For the detailed list
of the ANICs' manufactured exports see Anis Chowdhury, and Iyanatul Islam, The Newly
Industrialising Economies of East Asia, (London: Routledge, 1993), pp. 75-79; for the
background of South Korea and Taiwan's industrial restructuring by the government's policy
see The East Asian Miracle: Economic Growth and Public Policy, A World Bank Policy
Research Report, (Washington D. C.: Oxford University Press, 1993), pp. 127-134.
14.In the case of Thailand, while its heavy industries, high-skill, labour-intensive
industries rose from 41.6 per cent in 1970 to 50.5 per cent in 1986, food and related
industries declined from 39.3 per cent to 26 per cent in the same period. See The East
Asian Miracle: Economic Growth and Public Policy, pp. 134-146.
15.Although Japanese consumer electronics sector has been redirected to local demands, its
basis of international division of labour has not been diminished. Iwao Kubo, "Symbiotic
growth: Japanese firms in Asia", Tokyo Business Today, (June 1992),
16.Unlike the horizontal division of labour, the vertical division of labour refers
industrial cooperation to production process which combines upstream (obtaining raw
materials) with downstream (manufacturing) industrial operation.
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18
. Shi Chun Li, "Japan's role in the international division of labour", in Susumu Awanohara,
(ed.), Japan's Economic Role In The Asian Pacific Region: Policy Implementation and
Responses, (Hong Kong: Centre for Asian Pacific Studies, Lingnan College, 1990), p. 22.
• In various articles, the pattern of "flying geese", which was first postulated by Japanese
Professor, Kaname Akamatsu, in the 1930s, has been widely used to describe the fast
growing East and Southeast Asian economies led by Japan. Refer to Saburo Okita, "Japan's
role in Asia-Pacific cooperation", Annals, APPSS, 513, (January 1991), pp. 25-37; Joseph
Roam, "Japan's flying geese", Forbes, 150: 12, (23 November, 1992); Steve Chan, East Asian
Dynamism: Growth, Order, and Security in the Pacific Region, (Boulder: Westview Press,
1990), p. 41.
19
17
offer a good reason for further industrial cooperation. There
have been three types of horizontal division of labour in East
Asia so far. Firstly, a division of trade between manufactured
products. Unlike the previous vertical division of labour,
even Japan has increased its imports of manufactured goods,
largely electrical machinery, by intra-firm trade between
Japanese Transnational Corporations (TNCs), parent firms and
their affiliates in other regional economies. 17 Secondly, a
division of trade between different products within the same
industry, an inter-industry horizontal division of labour,
e.g. trade between yarn and fabric in the textile industry,
electronic parts in the electronics industry, and spare parts
in the auto industry. Thirdly, the horizontal division of
labour between the same kind of manufactured products with
different factor combinations, e.g. the ANICs and Japan in
producing video equipment, the former with simple designs and
the latter with more advanced ones." Overall economic
development and industrial structures in East Asia have been
widely seen as a pattern of "flying geese" (where industrial
laggards follow in the footsteps of the industrial leaders).19
While Japan leads the international division of labour in East
Asia, the ANICs and the rest of the regional economies are
. For the detailed figures of substantial Japanese increases in imports from nine Asian
countries see Richard Drobnick, "Economic integration in the Pacific Rim", Technical
Papers, No. 65, OECD Development Centre, (May 1992), p. 22; about the increase of this
kind of intra-firm trade, for detail see Shujiro Urata, "The increase of direct investment
abroad and change in Japan", in Eric D. Ramstetter, Direct Foreign Investment in Asia's
Developing Economies and Structural Change in the Asia-Pacific Region, (Boulder: Westview
Press, 1991), pp. 189-196.
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more or less tied into the regional industrial structure.
Consequently, it seems that the emergence of regional economic
integration is the preferable outcome of the rapid developing
industrial division of labour in East Asia.
The Johnsonian approach, one of the traditional
approaches to regional economic integration, believes that the
motive for integration between smaller economies and
developing countries is derived from integrating members'
collective objectives. 20 The most obvious of these is "a
collective desire for industrialisation." 21 Basically, regional
economic integration is a vehicle by which members may
collectively tackle obstacles to economic development among
the economies of the region and thereby increase their
collective well-being. But, why should they work together? The
answer lies with the similarity of developmental experience
and with the international division of labour which ties up
the industrial bases of member states into a more effective
and stronger economy.
In terms of the TNCs, Japanese companies have maintained
the headquarters of their businesses in Japan itself,
manufactured components in Taiwan, and assembled products in
Malaysia or Thailand. As part of their global strategy,
Japanese Hitachi, and Sanyo have established the international
network for their division of labour by improving the
technology level of their operation in Taiwan and moving
assembly operation from Taiwan to Malaysia. 22 In other cases,
20
. Based upon a criticism to the Vinerian approach of weighing the cost and benefits of
regional integration, The Johnsonian approach was developed systematically by Harry G.
Johnson, "An economic theory of protectionism, tariff bargaining, and the formation of
customs unions", Journal of Political Economy, 73,(1965); and C. A. Cooper, and B. F.
Hansel, "A new look at customs union theory", Economic Journal, 75, (1965).
21.Joseph C. Brada, and Jose A. Mendez, "Political and Economic Factors in Regional Economic
Integration", Ryklos, 46, (1993), p. 187.
22. Chikara Higashi, and Peter Lanter, The Internationalisation of the Japanese Economy, 2nd
edition, (Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1990), p. 344.
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Japanese companies have gone to Taiwan for components which
are produced by Taiwanese manufacturers in China or Southeast
Asia. For example, the procurement of Cyclepress, the Japanese
bicycle industry giant, from Taiwan for bicycles and
components to the value of V20 billion (Japanese Yen) in 1993
happens to be in the context of Taiwan's industrial division
of labour, i.e. "Taiwan taking orders, China producing, and
exporting to Japan". 23 Originally equipped with Japanese
capital goods, the Taiwanese, in addition, possess a rich and
experienced OEM-oriented infrastructure (Original Equipment
Manufacturer) 24 that "is remarkably adaptable to changes in
worldwide demands. e'25
For the same reasons, the Japanese through Hong Kong,
either via subsidiaries or agents, have invested in China
improving industrialisation in the region and also
establishing an international division of labour. For example,
an investment bank, co-funded by Japanese, C.Itoh & Co. Ltd.,
and by Morgan Stanley Groups, an American securities firm, in
May 1993 decided to invest V1 billion in Chinese Strategic
Investment Co., an Indonesian overseas Chinese enterprise in
Hong Kong for access to Chinese market. According to C.Itoh &
Co. Ltd., strategy to China through overseas Chinese is to
supply some 180 Chinese national companies with machines and
raw materials in order to tie them into their industrial
23 •
 Especially, the mounting appreciation pressure on the Japanese yen has put Japanese
companies to the verge of losing competitive advantage, which directly results in Japan
increasing procurement for components from neighbouring economies, instead of from costly
domestic producers. The bicycle industry, among others, is most prominent one. Central
Daily News, (26 August, 1993).
24.Om is a way of industrial cooperation between big name companies and producers, which
allows manufacturers to produce goods for their buyers licensed with buyers brand names,
such as in foot wear industry (OEMs: Reebok, Hi-Tech, and Puma); in toy industry, (OEMs:
Hasbro, Mattel, Brandai, and Tomy). See Importing from Taiwan, (Hong Kong: Trade Media
Ltd, publishers of Asian Sources Group of trade magazines, 1989), pp. 52-53, 55-57. Even
in the computer industry, many of the world's leading computer makers turn to Taiwan's
OEMs, such as IBM, Hewlett-Packard, Compaq, and Epson. See Taiwan Industrial Panorama, 11:
21, (November 193), p. 3.
25.See Importing from Taiwan, p. 43.
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division of labour- 28
 The Japanese have in these ways been able
to cut their costs of production and increase their
competitiveness against Western competitors. Through this
Japan-Taiwan-China pattern, "Other parts of Asia are
increasingly being drawn into a hierarchical network of
production and exchange."27
Upgrading technology, expanding market shares and
managing access to raw materials are always the basis of
restructuring industrial structure within a country or an
industry itself. But, a new wave of severe competition in some
technology-intensive industries, for instance electronic,
electrical, and computer industries, has been pushing
economies towards industrial integration.28 Recently,
international big names of Computer and Information companies,
Philips of the Dutch, Microsoft, Hewlett-Packard, and
International Business Machines (IBM) of the United States,
have been trying to integrate related industries in Hong Kong,
Taiwan, and China into their "Greater China" operation." On
the supply side, the competition has aroused the need for
industry either to cut production costs or to upgrade their
existing production technology. On the demand side, the need
for scale economies in marketing networks has forced industry
to undertake various strategic alliances.
Against this background, East Asia is entering a new era
of integrating economies by tying up capital, resources, and
manpower, and to an increasing extent setting up a
macroeconomic policy for looking outwards. In addition to
26. Hou Ii RUai Shuen, (Traders' Express), 1090, (9 August, 1993).
27.Mitchell Bernard, "The Post-Plaza Political Economy of Taiwanese-Japanese Relations", The
Pacific Review, 4: 4, (1991), P. 365.
28.According to the EC experience, firms are pooling their resources together for R 6 D and
market share in order to get better positions against their American and Japanese
competitors, before and after economic integration.
29.For the ongoing development in the CEA see Central Daily News, International Edition, (13
November, 1992).
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Japanese involvement in the region, Singapore, Taiwan, Hong
Kong, and South Korea have contributed since the mid-1980s
decisively to the booming regional economy with their massive
inflows of inward investment, mature technology, and
experienced management. Taiwan, for example, used to be the
manufacturing base for Japanese companies through OEM
exporting to the United States. Now, with most of its
manufacturers of OEM moving to Southeast Asia and China,
Taiwan has become not only one of the biggest investors in the
region but also a capital- and technology- intensive economy,
just as Japan was in the 1970s.
All the ANICs, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Korea, Singapore, are
commonly handicapped by high wages and a shortage of labour
which have resulted in their current economic problems,
notably in labour-intensive industries, while China and the
countries of Indo-China possess a superabundance of labour
derived mostly from liberalising their agricultural sectors.
With the existing complementing labour markets, China has
served as the main labour supplier to support its neighbouring
ANICs' manufacturers in gaining competitiveness in related
labour-intensive industries. This has resulted in the
relocation of the ANICs' manufacturers to China. Even so, over
the past few years, China has exported some of its excess
labour abroad, some even through Korean enterprises.30
According to information collected in April 1992, there were
4,000 migrant workers from Mainland China working in Japan,
another 25,000 working in Hong Kong. 31 In late June 1993, the
number of Chinese working abroad hit 148,000. 32 It is said that
a great number of illegal emigrants from China have been
30 •
 Beijing Review, 36: 37, (September 13-19, 1993), p. 28.
32
. Beijing Review, 36: 33, (August 16-22, 1993), p. 29.
31
. Far Eastern Economic Review, (2 April, 19921, P. 21.
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working in neighbouring countries, i.e. South Korea, 33
 and
Taiwan. As economic transactions are intensified in the CEA,
the trend of exchanging personnel, workers, technicians,
scientists, scholars, between China, Taiwan and Hong Kong, is
set to rise rapidly. Over the last few decades, Taiwan has
accumulated huge capital reserves from export earnings and
from fast expanding trade with all major economies. Taiwan's
!manufacturing base for the Japanese, which led to a Japanese
dominated "Japan-Taiwan-USA" trade relationship during the
1960s and 1970s, has been diluted. Foreign investment and
exports of industrial production to other regional developing
economies have shaped Taiwan's leading role in a new "Taiwan-
China-USA" trade pattern.
TABLE 5.3. THE JAPAN-TAIWAN-USA PATTERN OF TRADE
Japan >	 capital, technology, management, marketing
Taiwan >	 OEM, labour-intensive manufacturing, GSP
USA	 export market
TABLE 5.4. THE TAIWAN-CHINA-USA PATTERN OF TRADE
Taiwan >	 capital, technology, management
China >	 OEM, labour-intensive manufacturing, GSP
USA	 export market
The story of Taiwan's industry moving to China for a
manufacturing base is like Hong Kong's. On the one hand, it is
seeking to cut production costs for increasing competitiveness
against other competitors. On the other hand, it is seeking to
share China's trade preferences - Most Favoured Nation (MFN),
General System Preferences (GSP), and quotas 	 in the
developed markets,
	 in order to circumvent possible
33
. "Vanishing assets", The Etonowiste (20 November, 1993), pp. 86, 89.
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protectionist obstacles. However, evidence has emerged of an
American investigation of its trade deficit with China. Over
the period of 1987 to 1991, the US trade deficit with China
had increased sharply, while its trade deficit with Taiwan and
Hong Kong had decreased (Table 5.5). This clearly implies a
large scale transfer of manufacturing from Hong Kong and
Taiwan to South China. 34 In other words, according to the Hong
Kong government's own estimation, were the United States to
revoke China's MFN status, "the territory would lose up to
$15.7 billion in overall trade, up to $2 billion in income,
and as many as 60,000 jobs."35
TABLE 5.5. THE US TRADE DEFICIT WITH CHINA, TAIWAN, AND HONG
KONG ($ billion)
1987 1988 1989 1990 1991
US with China 3.4 3.5 6.2 10.4 12.7
US with Taiwan 18.9 12.6 13.0 11.1 9.9
US with H K 6.5 4.6 3.5 2.7 1.1
Source: Department of Commerce, USA, 1992.
Above all, China's huge market potential is encouraging
Taiwan's producers to take up Chinese brand names in
international markets. The size of China's market is large
enough to support Taiwan's industrial production in its
attempts to establish its own reputation. For instance, the
owner of Shin-Shing Shoes Co., Y. K. Chen, points out that
with China's market prejudice in favour of shoes made in
34. Harry Harding, "The US and Greater China", The Chinese Business Review, (Hay-June 1992),
P. 22.
35. Pamela Balinger, "The birth of Greater China", The Chinese Business Review, (May-June
1992), p. 14.
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Taiwan he is sufficiently confident to establish his own brand
name away from an OEM position. 38 The Chairman of the Fu-Ta
Umbrella Co., T. F. Chen, also shares this view that "You can
not allow your turnover to be decreased at the time of
bringing a new brand name to the market. So, the only way
forward here is to expand production and market share through
manufacturing in China." 37 These developments suggest that with
as yet untapped economic potential, further moves toward
integration within the CEA seems likely.
5.1.2. Restructuring Industries And Strengthening
Competitiveness Through Market Opportunities
In spite of the political hostility between Beijing and
Taipei, the booming trade flow between China and Taiwan is
prompting more economic cooperation (see Figure 5.1). While
Taiwan and China are carrying out "indirect trade" mostly via
Hong Kong, the British colony, which is to be returned to
China in July 1997, has been tied into the network of Chinese
"economic unification", whether intentionally or not. Hong
Kong, with its geographic proximity to China, has long been an
outlet for capital, know-how and technology for China's closed
economy / 38
 even in the turbulent Cultural Revolution era.
Moreover, Hong Kong, an entrepot with outstanding financial
expertise, a well-developed communications infrastructure and,
in particular, proximity to China, serves foreign investors as
a launch pad to China and Southeast Asia. Accordingly, the
36. Central Daily News, International Edition, (10 September, 1993), p. 8.
37. "Taiwan R & D, Mainland Manufacturing", Commonwealth, (1 March, 1992), P . 40. Fu-Ta
Umbrella Co. is now manufacturing in Taipei for more sophisticated upstream development
and Xiamen for downstream lower price umbrellas.
38 •
 Hong Kong has been generally recognised as a financier, trading partner, middleman,
facilitator, and investment centre for China. See John Burns, "Hong Kong in 1992: struggle
for authority", Asian Survey, 33: 1, (January 1993), p. 29.
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Hong Kong Government Trade Department summarises seven facts
of importance to Hong Kong in relation to China: "Hong Kong
and China are each other's No. 1 trading partner. China as a
market for Hong Kong goods. China as a base for outward
processing activities. Hong Kong is an important market for
Chinese goods, an important entrepot for China, an important
location for Chinese interests and the largest investor in
China."39
FlCU;E51 TAIMNS CR:INNG INDIRECT
1RCE WTH CHM
MAI	 1111MMIIMAIMUMILall
Sarce Intern:Call Tra:b Brea4 KEA
FCQ 199. & ftry Ka-g OxtcmStatistics
The Japanese have been eyeing Hong Kong's economic links
with China. More than a quarter of Japan's exports to China
have been channelled through Hong Kong. 4° Hong Kong's ties to
China's economic power house, Guangdong Province, is even more
impressive, with the investment of US$17 billion in the
province, the control of 30,000 enterprises, and employment of
39.For all details of figures collected by Hong Kong Government Trade Department see "China &
Hong Kong: Some Important Facts", (Hay 1993).
40."Shogun wedding", Far Eastern Economic Review, (28 June, 1990), P. 70.
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three million workers. 41 Many foreign investors are using Hong
Kong's stock market as a way into China, because "it has more
listed companies than any other stock market in the world
involved in China, the region's fastest growing economy. 1,42
Above all, many Hong Kong companies with exposure to Chinese
economy have been targets for investors, such as China Light &
Power, Hong • Kong Telecom, Hong Kong Electric, and HSBC
Holdings. Even its business characteristics express its
willingness and availability to be a bridge between China and
the rest of the world. For instance, the Chairman of Wharf
(Holdings) Ltd., Peter K. C. Woo, said that:
"[W]ith the continued integration of the economies of
China and Hong Kong, Wharf intends to act as a bridge to
develop business between its mainland Chinese partners
and business associates from other parts of the world."43
Since Beijing's 'open door' policy was announced in 1979,
the first wave of Hong Kong investment, mainly led by small
and medium enterprises, has poured into nearby Guangdong, and
Fujien Provinces. Not only have Hong Kong businessmen swarmed
to find manufacturing bases in China, but other investors,
Japanese and American as well as Taiwanese at a later date,
have been flocking there in search of low cost production.
They have brought with them their management expertise and
marketing experiences in lower level technology and labour-
intensive industries which could hardly survive at home (where
they were once called sunset industries). Examples are toys,
textiles, umbrellas, consumer electronic components, dyeing,
and foot wear.
41.See James Walsh, "The ties that bind", Time, (21 March, 1994), P. 35.
42.Simon Holberton and Patrick Harverson, "Foothold on cliff of opportunity", Financial
Times, (9 November, 1993), p. 19.
43.See Chairman's statement at 1992 Report, The Wharf (Holdings) Ltd.
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Hong Kong's Advantages For China
As far as Hong Kong businessmen are concerned, booming
Chinese investment means high profits, the survival of their
sunset industries, and circumvention of American trade
protection. According to analysts on the Hong Kong stock
market, many companies have got more than one manufacturing
base in China and normally could expect payback from
investment in only two to three years. 44
 One successful
businessman, Patrick Wang, the managing director of Johnson
Electric, one of the world's leading manufacturers in micro-
motors, said that his investment in China had been paid back
"many times over" and revealed that Johnson's post-tax return
on investment had been 20 per cent over the last few years.45
Many investors believe that these high profits have been
gained largely from the effects of scale economies derived
from China's huge market. In China, foreign investors are
normally able to expand their businesses to a larger scale
with a smaller amount of capital than in Hong Kong. Low cost
production factors and the larger market tend to encourage
producers to go for a larger volume of production in order to
ensure a stable market share. For Hong Kong, China's prospect
as a highly industrialised environment supports Hong Kong's
continuing prosperity and more importantly future stability.
For China, Hong Kong's business efforts are accelerating its
progress towards industrialization in accordance with the
emergence of a massive and booming economic grouping.
While China's "Open Door" policy accelerated its economic
development, most of Hong Kong's industries were suffering the
"NICs disease", namely soaring wage and rent costs, and, more
44. Hong Kong Economic Daily, (in Chinese), (28 September, 1991).
45.Simon Holberton, "China on a wing and a prayer", Financial Times, (7 July, 1993), p. 3.
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seriously, a severe shortage of labour." In terms of economic
development, China's less developed economy has got plenty of
land, almost limitless and cheap labour, but lacks capital,
management and applied technology expertise for which Hong
Kong is renowned. Both economies, therefore, have begun an
unprecedented process of economic cooperation through an
industrial division of labour and complementary economies to
which:
"(Hong Kong entrepreneurs) brought their capital, their
know-how, and their Western customers. Their motives were
straightforward: the tiny British territory simply ran
out of enough workers to make all the toys, cameras,
clothing, and other labour-intensive products the West
wanted to buy. When a low-cost labour pool became
available across the border, they tapped it, slowly at
first, then with growing enthusiasm."47
Gradually, Hong Kong industrialists have moved production
to China. Some listed companies in Hong Kong, producing
stereos, televisions and accessories, computer hard disks, and
toys, have completely relocated their operations in China. 48
 As
a result, the large amounts of capital that China has been
longing for have flowed in. According to the Chinese Ministry
of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation, foreign investment
in China totaled US$37 billion (utilised value) in the period
of 1979-1992, and about $21.2 billion was contributed by the
biggest investment sources from Hong Kong and Macao. 49 In 1992
alone, Hong Kong's investment in China accounted for 68.3 per
cent of China's total US$11.3 billion utilised foreign direct
46 •
 In their arguments, two writers described the symptoms as the "NICs disease". See T. Aoki,
and H. Ohashi, "Asia: integration of the world's most dynamic economies", Tokyo Business
Today, (June 1992), p. 27.
47.Ford S. Worthy, "Where capitalism thrives in China", Fortune, (9 March, 1992), P. 34.
48. Hong Kong Economic Daily, (28 September, 1991).
49.Simon Holberton, "China on a wing and a prayer", p. 3.
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investment. 50 Up to early 1994, Hong Kong has accounted for 64
per cent of the US$135 billion committed to China ventures
since 1979. 51 Hong Kong investment in industrial manufacturing
in China alone accounted for about a quarter of HK$100 billion
by 1993. 52 It was this investment as an accelerator of
industrialization that made Southern China and Hong Kong
become a borderless economic area. One economic survey stated
that:
"The most striking element of the Dengist reforms is
their extraordinary dependence on foreign trade and
foreign investment as engines of development."53
The part China plays in this economic interdependence is
as a manufacturing base with its plentiful cheap labour and
land, whilst Hong Kong is supplying management, marketing,
technology, and, above all else, capital and finance. In
addition, although China's preferential trading status is
subject to political quarrels with the US over human rights
performance, 54 its enjoyment of the GSP and the MFN persuades
manufacturers from Hong Kong and Taiwan to shelter in China,
e.g. using China's export quotas in the case of textiles and
garments. 55
 Previous sunset industries of Taiwan and Hong Kong,
50.The same year, Taiwan accounted for 9.3 per cent, Japan for 6.6 per cent, the US for 4.6
per cent, and European Union for 2.2 per cent. See also Financial Times, (7 July, 1993),
p. 3; Financial Times, (5 August, 1993), p. 15; The Economist, (16 April, 1994), p. 103.
51.James Walsh, "The ties that bind", p. 35; Hong Kong and Macao account for US$147.27
billion out of $216.91 billion all contracted investment in China. See Financial Times,
(20 May, 1994), p. 7.
52.The information based on Credit Lyonnais Securities. See Simon Davies, "Hong Kong
investors warm to mainland cooling", Financial Times, (2 September, 1993), p. 4.
53."A driving force", The Economist Year Book 1993 edition, p. 155.
54.For recent rounds of Sino-American row and the division within the Clinton administration
over the issue linking annual renewal of the MFN and human rights, see Susumu Awanohara,
"Washington's ire", Far Eastern Economic Review, (20 January, 1994), pp.56-57; Carl
Goldstein, "Moving forward", Far Eastern Economic Review, (3 February, 1994), pp. 51-52;
Susumu Awanohara, "Collision course", Far Eastern Economic Review, (3 February, 1994), pp.
18-20; and "China: can he save face?", Business Week, (18 April, 1994), p. 14-15.
55.Economic and Social Commission for Asia and Pacific, United Nations, Economic and Social
Survey of Asia and the Pacific 1992, (1993), p. 64.
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most notably dyeing, umbrellas, foot wear, electronics, have
been revived in this way and are becoming stronger and more
competitive. Subsequently, bigger firms have followed suit,
which have brought about a further wave of investment. More
recently, with a more promising policy announced for
preferential access to markets and profits, the Chinese
authorities have been favouring foreign direct investment in
infrastructure. This sort of investment symbolises business
confidence betting on China's economic future, e.g. Hopewell's
superhighway project, and Wharf's power station and road," as
well as Hutchison Whampoa's US$1.1 billion container terminal
project for Shanghai.57
Hong Kong accounts for over 80 per cent of the foreign
investment and foreign trade in Pearl River Delta, the most
prosperous part of Guangdong, 58 and is the biggest investor in
China as a whole, though some uncalculated investment flows
have been originally redirected from China itself via Hong
Kong agents back to China." In return, Chinese firms, which
are at the moment the leading investors in Hong Kong, mostly
from Guangdong, have invested in various sectors, mainly in
tertiary industries, real estate and financial services.
Mainland Chinese investment in Hong Kong was up from US$12
billion in 1991, and $15 billion in 1992, to $18 billion in
1993 (figures show only the first six months of 1993).
Moreover, Chinese "hot money" flows deposited in Hong Kong
56.Ian Hargreaves, and Simon Holberton, "Hong Kong's one for the road", Financial Times, (28
September, 1993), p. 19; for a list of investment of infrastructure see Shin Pao (Hong
Kong Economic Journal), (16 December, 1992.) .
57.Carl Goldstein "Stranglehold lessens", Far Eastern Economic Review, (15 October, 1992), p.
60.
Se
. See Ford Worthy, "Where capitalism thrives in China", Fortune, (9 March, 1992), p. 35.
59
. According to the declarations of China's State Council, "Provisions for the Encouragement
of Foreign Investment" 1986, and "Provisions for the Encouragement of Investment By Taiwan
Compatriots" 1988, special privileges have been given to Hong Kong and Taiwan investors.
Some Chinese companies redirect their returns through agents outside China to be seen as
foreign investment in order to take tax free advantage. See Michael S. Serrill, "Money
mad", Time, (12 July, 1993), p. 38.
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banks were also up from US$4 billion in 1990 to near $10
billion in the first quarter of 1993. 60 In the first half of
1992, Chinese firms bought property worth about US$ 6.6
billion. Brokers estimated that they will be able to own 20
per cent of all property in Hong Kong by 1997. 61 For many
people in Hong Kong and Taiwan, it is nothing but a show of
Chinese determination to take over Hong Kong and an early
intention to dominate the capitalist society after it has been
taken over. Indeed, China's pouring more than US$ 10 billion
into Hong Kong in the last few years is regarded as not only a
procedure to take over the British colony smoothly, but also a
political profile to convince the Hong Kong business community
of its persistence in capitalism.62
One of the "spillover" effects with which theoretical
integration is concerned is the rise of industrial
integration. Not only has industrial integration here created
frequent interaction networks, but also it has brought about
exchanges of employment in the labour markets. In other words,
simple economic cooperation has been encroaching into society.
About a decade ago, manufacturers in Hong Kong employed about
900,000 workers in the colony and none in Guangdong. Now,
"their Hong Kong payroll is down to about 700,000. But they
have employed three million workers at some 30,000 factories
in Guangdong." 63
 What one can see through this close
relationship, without casting any doubt on prOgressive
integration, is its economic potential and the deepening and
widening trend in the division of labour. As China and Hong
Kong today have become each other's largest investment
60.Both investment and deposit figures were based on Time graphic. Ibid.
61. Far Eastern Economic Review, (23 July, 1992), p. 49.
62.Louis Kraar, "A new China without borders", Fortune, (5 October, 1992), p. 41.
63.James Walsh, "The ties that bind", p. 35.
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destination, economically each one is already "inextricably
linked" to the other."
Taiwanese Industrial Investment In China Via Hong Kong
In 1987, the Nationalist government in Taiwan liberalised
the policy limiting contact with China, which since then has
resulted in a-full range of economic transactions. Because of
the ongoing political stalemate between Taiwan and China,
businessmen on both sides of the Taiwan Strait have had to
trade with each other via a third party. As the "two way"
trade and investment flows have amplified, Hong Kong has
become the third party for this indirect trade. Since most of
Taiwan's trade with and investment in China are directed
through Hong Kong, recently there have been more Taiwanese
investments flowing into Hong Kong itself." There are two
reasons. Firstly, under the existing political impasse Taipei
only allows its business flows through Hong Kong to ensure
flexibility in policy, to provide bargaining chips with China,
and to prevent its economy from being too dependent on China."
Secondly, as the actual need grows in the Taiwanese business
community for trade with China, Taiwanese small and medium
enterprises, in turn, have set up branches or connections with
local agents in Hong Kong to conduct business in China. Most
recently, even big firms have followed suit. Walsin Lihwa Co.,
one of the leading cable & wire manufacturers in Taiwan, for
example, has acquired a 64.2 per cent interest in the publicly
listed Success Holdings in Hong Kong. The purpose of such
64.Louis Kraar, "A new China without borders", p. 41.
65.According to the information of Majestic Trading Company Ltd., Taiwan's Ministry of
Economic Affairs representative in London, Taiwanese recent investments in HK are
especially in trade, property, hotel, shipping, financial services and Hong Kong stock and
futures markets. Refer to 1993 Annual Report of Majestic Trading Company Ltd., (April
1993).
66."Mainland fever is there to stay", Business week, (3 May, 1993), p. 20.
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acquisition was, due to the booming China market, to use Hong
Kong as a base for further overseas investment in China and
the rest of the Asian region."
Local businessmen believe that without any Taiwanese
banking presence in Hong Kong to support the investment in
China, there has to be an individual financial management
office in Hong Kong in order to manage the capital flow into
and out of China." It is also necessary to set up in Hong Kong
to comply with Taipei's policy of no direct links with China.
Growing trade between China and Taiwan has lured Taiwanese
businessmen to set up about three thousand intermediary
companies in Hong Kong in the past five years." Amongst them,
there are over two thousand companies focusing on trade."
TABLE 5.6. TAIWANESE INVESTMENT IN CHINA
Year Agreed Projects Agreed Capital(US$ Mil.)
1983-87 80 190
1988 435 520
1989 552 437
1990 1,011 892
1991 1,737 1,391
1992 6,430 5,540
Total 10,245 8,970
Source: Annual Report of Majestic Trading Co. Ltd., 1993.
based on Hong Kong newspaper Ta Kun Pao and an
estimation.
Since Taiwan officially bans direct Taiwanese investment
in China, there has been a great deal of "illegal" investment
conducted	 through	 various	 channels	 without	 official
67 •
 Information quoted directly from Walsin Lihwa Corporation 1992 Annual Report.
68.Information taken from interviewing Taiwanese businessman over the period of July and
August, 1993, in Taipei. Y. L. Wang, deputy-manager of Chuanshyh Garment Co., Ltd.,
pointed out that an office in Hong Kong under whatever trade name is crucial for investors
to get money inflow from Taiwan and outflow to China. However, its most important job is
to link to Hong Kong's financial service channels to make sure that their payback on
investment can be safely steered out of China. (10 August, 1993).
69. Commercial Times (Kim Shang Shi Bao), (21 May, 1993).
70.See The Independent Weekly Post (Chi Li Chou Bao), (25 March, 1994).
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permission. In spite of the restrictions of official policy
there has been little sign that investment flows have been
slowing down (Table 5.6). Due to recognition of the important
role of Taiwanese investment in China, three of Taiwan's
state-owned commercial banks, Chang-Hua, the First, and Hua-
Nan, set up representatives in Hong Kong in 1992. Since
September 1993, Hua-Nan Commercial Bank has been operating its
first Hong Kong branch which is starting to assist Taiwan's
investors with financial management services. 71
 Up to May 1994,
altogether seven Taiwanese banks have established their
operations in Hong Kong, mainly providing financial services
for Taiwanese businessmen and investors. 72 Further financial
integration programmes should be brought into being soon. As
many of the bank's customers have already invested in China,
particularly in labour-intensive industries, Taipei-based
private China Trust Commercial Bank, one of Taiwan's top ten
banks, opened its representative office in Hong Kong in
November 1993 to be able to serve its customers well and
establish links with its counterparts on the mainland. Its new
chief representative, Vance Chin, states that "Closer
relations with banks from both sides (China and Taiwan) is
ultimately unavoidable."'"
Since 1987, Taiwan has been rapidly increasing its trade
with China through Hong Kong. This booming trade relationship
is reflected in economic indicators. Among Taiwan's exports to
Hong Kong are almost around 40 per cent of the exports
destined to China in the years recorded (See Table 5.7, also
71
. Central Daily News, International Edition, (24 September, 1993).
72.Hua-Nan and the First Commercial Banks and Bank of Taiwan have branches in Hong Kong.
Chang Ewa Commercial Bank is to follow suit soon. The Medium Business Bank of Taiwan,
China-Trust Commercial Bank and Taipei Business Bank have also set up Hong Kong offices.
See Central Daily News, International Edition, (24 May, 1994).
73.Henry Sender, "China Beachhead", Far Eastern Economic Review, (2 December, 1993), pp. 81-
82.
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refer to Figures 5.2, 5.3). Whilst in the past few years,
Taiwan's trade surplus with the US has been reduced following
pressure to diversify export markets, Taiwan has increased its
TABLE 5.7. TRADE BETWEEN TAIWAN AND HONG KONG, AND TAIWAN'S
SHARE OF HONG KONG RE-EXPORTS TO AND FROM CHINA (unit:
$ million)
YEAR EXPORT TO HK IMPORT FROM HK
amount % re-export to China amount %import from
China
amount % export to
HK
amount % import
from	 HK
1987 4,118 1,226.5 29.8 754 288.94 38.3
1988 5,580 2,242.2 40.2 1,922 478.69 24.9
1989 7,303 2,869.5 41.2 2,205 586.9 26.6
1990 8,556 3,278.3 38.3 1,446 765.36 52.9
1991 12,430 4,667.2 37.5 1,944 1126.0 57.9
1992 15,416 6,287.9 40.8 1,781 1119.0 62.8
Source: International Trade Bureau, Ministry of Economic
Affairs, R. 0. C., based on HK Custom Statistics,
1993.
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trade surplus with Hong Kong and China. In 1990, Taiwan's
trade surplus with China accounted for 20.11 per cent of its
global trade surplus, and with Hong Kong 56.90 per cent. In
1992, the trade surplus with China reached 54.53 per cent, and
with Hong Kong 143.8 per cent of its global surplus.74
TABLE 5.8. HONG KONG RE-EXPORTS TO ITS MAJOR ASIAN TRADING
PARTNERS (share of the total in %)
Destination 1989 1990 1991 1992
China 29.9 26.8 28.7 30.7
Japan 6.4 5.9 5.5 5.4
Taiwan 4.8 5.1 4.6 3.8
Source: Hong Kong 1992 and Hong Kong 1993, HK Government.
Moreover, Hong Kong's re-exports to China and Taiwan
account for over one-third of its total re-exports. Hong
74
. Information is based on International Trade Bureau, Ministry of Economic Affairs, R. 0. C.
See Liang Ann Ging Gih Tong Gih Yueh Bao, (Economic Statistics Monthly for Two Sides of
the Strait), Mainland Affairs Council, The Executive Yuan, (June 1993).
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Kong's 'middleman' position for the "two Chinas" is crucia1.75
From the perspective of trade development, China, Taiwan and
Hong Kong have already become very important partners, a trend
likely to be increased in the future. Although trade
relationships do form transaction networks between partners,
this alone is not a sufficient condition for economic
integration. Above all, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and China, to a
lesser extent, have established outward-looking economies
which have directly resulted in their successful economic
development. Their continuation of trading with the rest of
the world remains as crucial as their intra-regional trade.
When the world was twice hit by the raised high prices of
oil and economic recession in the early 1980s, the rise of
protectionism in developed economies threatened international
trade. It was these changes of the economic situation
worldwide that intensified international competition and,
thus, drove trade partners to seek industrial strength
together through closer cooperation. The formation of the CEA
has been accelerated by increasing intra-regional trade flows,
foreign investment, and, above all, the industrial division of
labour from which mutual complementary economies have
stemmed. 76
 The ratio of the intra-industry trade between China
and Taiwan to Taiwan's total commodity trade in manufacturing
sectors rose from 5.53 per cent in 1985 to 28.78 per cent in
1991, and non-manufacturing sectors rose from 28.18 per cent
to 56.54 per cent in the same period. In 1991, the horizontal
division of labour accounted for 75.42 per cent of total
Taiwanese investment in China and Hong Kong, and for about
18.49 per cent in the vertical division of labour.
75
. Refer to footnote 32. John Burns, "Hong Kong in 1992: struggle for authority", Asian
Survey, 33: 1, (January 1993), P. 29.
76 •
 Penelope Hartland-Thunberg, China, Hong Abng, Taiwan and the World Trading System,
(London: Macmillan, 1990), pp. 97-98.
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According to some empirical surveys, Taiwanese
businessmen investing in China procured 80 per cent of the
materials, components and equipment they needed for operation
from Taiwan; and only about 15 per cent from Chinese local
industries. 77
 Among others, footwear, umbrellas, toy
manufacturers, accounted for 90 per cent of their procurement
from Taiwan; those industries for plastic, electronics, and
vehicles were amongst the highest procuring from China for
their local operations (about 20 per cent). 78 Like Hong Kong,
Taiwan, since the early 1980s, has also suffered the "NICs'
diseases", which in manufacturing sectors have turned out to
be serious. Because the history of Taiwan's economic
development has been based more on the growth of labour-
intensive manufacturing industries, growing wages, soaring
land prices, and a shortage of labour have hit related
industries very hard, resulting in the exodus of its
indigenous industry to South East Asia and China.
For general manufacturers in Taiwan, their export-
orientation is largely shaped by the changing trends of
international markets. Therefore, for the sake of keeping
competitiveness, production factors are always cost sensitive.
Cutting production costs has been the ANICs competitive
strategy for some time. Unfortunately, since the mid-1980s,
due to Taiwan's huge trade surplus against the US, the New
Taiwan Dollar has been under American pressure, dramatically
appreciating against the US Dollar from NT$ 40.32 in 1983 to
NT$ 25.40 in 1992. This brought about a crisis for Taiwanese
exporters, although the appreciation occurred over a relative
77.Economists normally investigate industrial complementarity between China and Taiwan by
studying intra-industry trade, division of labour, components procurement, and semi-
finished products. All figures above have shown rapid increase throughout the period
examined (1985-1991). Economic Yearbook for The Two Sides of the Taiwan Strait, 1992,
(Taipei: Chung-Hua Institution for Economic Research, May 1993), pp. 84-89.
78.Ibid., p. 87.
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79
. In an interview to Mr. Thomas Huang, Chairman of Taiwan Sweater Industry Association, he
complains that it was this particular law which drove off many businesses in the past few
years. The interview has undertaken in Taipei, on 23 July, 1993.
• Wang Yeung-Ching's "Ten thousand words" letter was widely regarded as a strong voice from
industrialists to warn the government policy. See Central Daily News, International
Edition, (22 February, 1993), p. 3.
Chi Schive, "The emerging role of Taiwan in the rising Asian-Pacific Regionalism",
Industry of Free China, (May 1993), p. 33.
Taong-Shian Yu, "A Quick Adjustment of Taiwan to an Enhanced Economic position in the
World", Occasional Paper, No. 9205, Chung-Hua Institution For Economic Research, Taipei,
(August 1992), p. 6.
80
81.
82.
long period. In terms of price, Taiwanese competitiveness was
fading away. Furthermore, Taipei's government in the mid-1980s
introduced a "Labour Standards Law" to legitimise labour's
fundamental rights which frustrated most employers." In a
public letter to the government, Wang Yeung-Ching, Taiwan's
leading industrialist, Chairman of Formosa Plastics Co.,
warned that the law had not only increased business costs, but
also changed the diligent habit of labour on which Taiwan's
economic development had relied." Wage rates rose and the
trades union movement became active as a result.
The cost of labour in Taiwan's manufacturing sectors rose
more than 60 percent in US dollars between 1986 and 1988.81
Employers were desperate, because they were facing diminished
profit margins or even bankruptcy. Moreover, as the
environmental protection movement became active during the
1980s, more restrictive environment protection standards were
introduced. 82 For example, due to serious industrial pollution,
Wus Printed Circuit Co. Ltd., ranked as the 48th biggest
electronic company in the country, 83 was coerced into stopping
production for one month by the Taiwanese Environmental
Protection Administration in 1992, which the company's
chairman L. K. Wu confirmed was the biggest push for the
company to relocate in Kuenshang, near Shanghai.84
83.See special survey for the biggest 1000 manufacturers in Taiwan on Commonwealth, (5 June,
1993).
84.C. Y. Tian, "Nan Dian Zai Kuenshang Zao Huei Tsung Tien", (Wus Printed Circuit Co. Ltd.
finds its Spring in Kuenshang), Business Weekly, (28 June, 1993), p. 36.
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TABLE 5.9. A COMPARISON OF THE AVERAGE FOREIGN EXCHANGE RATES
OF CHINA, TAIWAN, AND HONG KONG (National Currency Per U
S Dollar)
YEAR RMB NTD HKD
1983 1.98 40.32 7.27
1984 2.80 39.52 7.82
1986 3.72 35.55 7.79
1988 3.72 28.17 7.78
1989 3.76 26.17 7.82
1990 4.72 27.10 7.79
1991 5.32 25.74 7.76
1992 5.74 25.40 7.73
Source: 1. The Central Bank of China, R.O.C., April, 1993.
2. Ta Run Pao, (Hong Kong),
As the Taiwanese currency appreciated in value (refer to
Table 5.9), "hot money" flows released from sunset industries
circulating around the country were immediately directed to an
illegal gambling lottery, and later into the stock market and
real estate. 85 Consequently, owing to property speculators,
there were less available land for industrial expansion and
soaring property prices which halted private investors'
programmes. Taiwan's industrial tycoon, Wang Yeung-Ching, for
example, was even bidding for a US$7 billion comprehensive
industrial zone first in Fujien Province's Xiamen special
economic zone for his 6th naphtha cracker, later in Yangtze
River in 1992, which was then banned by the Taipei government
for fear of taking away about one third of Taiwan's industrial
base to China." Part of the reason for Wang's China bid
derived from his failing to find a suitable site to expand his
business in Taiwan.
85
. In detail, see Tzong-Shian Yu, "A Quick Adjustment of Taiwan to an
position in the World", Section II, Financial "High Fever".
86 ,
 
Wang's China projects started in 1989. The very first project in Xiamen
Enhanced Economic
was postponed, due
to Taipei authority's objections. Wang and Beijing ended up with no agreement. See Global
Views, (15 December, 1992), pp.46-47; Julian Baum, "Taking the plunge: Formosa Plastics
confirms huge petrochemicals plan", Far Eastern Economic Review, (22 April, 1992), p. 75;
another ambitious investment plan in China by the Cathay Insurance and Construction Group,
the largest in these businesses in Taiwan, was blocked. see Carl Goldstein, "The bottom
line: Taiwan capital, factories pour into China", Far Eastern Economic Review, (17
September, 1992), p. 23..
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All in all, these changing economic factors have boosted
production costs higher than ever. Mr. G. C. Liao, Chairman of
Chen-Chou Enterprise Ltd., argued that following the fast
speed of urbanization, nowadays fewer and fewer employees wish
to work in a traditional factory." Similarly, Mr. L. L. Liao,
Chairman of Merry Electronic Co. Ltd., told the same story
that the reason why he located in China was not because of the
lower social costs, but because of the serious shortage of
labour. 88
 (Refer to Appendix F-5.1, Employment by industry in
Taiwan.) Even the world's leading bicycle maker, Giant
Machinery Co., has suffered a labour shortage in its most
significant manufacturing site in Taiwan." In Taiwan, too
frequent hiring and firing of workers in manufacturing
industries has resulted in instability in production
procedures and quality. Even foreign buyers have urged their
Taiwanese sub-contractors to move to China in order to
maintain the quantity and quality of their production." For
most profitable labour-intensive industries in Taiwan, their
Achilles heel is the shortage of labour. These disadvantageous
factors for Taiwanese industry over time appear to be
incentives, if not positive advantages, for the formation of
the CEA. To begin with, Taiwan's currency appreciation raised
its buying power overseas, and therefore brought about a
foreign investment stimulus. The climate for domestic
investment has deteriorated, which has led to complaints by
industrialists and demands for remedial action.
87. Commonwealth, (1 March, 1992), p. 32.
88. Mei-Lui specialises in producing inter-phones and microphones. Commonwealth, (1 March,
1992), pp. 22, 40.
89. Its Manufacturing site in Taiwan was at the time the largest in the world. Global Views,
(15 December, 1992), p. 42.
90. The most obvious case here is the footwear industry. For instance, the American firm,
Nike, guarantees some regular orders for Taiwanese partners to manufacture in China. In
return, Taiwanese suppliers to Nike brought their management teams to China. See Far
Eastern Economic Review, (17 September, 1992), p. 24.
239
In 1992, a survey of the one thousand biggest Taiwanese
companies showed industrialists' 	 concerns about future
industrial development. 91 Most industrialists are frustrated by
their operating costs in Taiwan and if they are ever to choose
a foreign destination for their industrial expansion, most of
them will place China at the top of the list. (Refer to
Appendix F-5.2.) In 1993, another survey, on the trends of
foreign direct investment of companies listed on the stock
market conducted by Business Weekly in Taipei, confirmed that
58.8 per cent of all Taiwanese companies thought that China
was likely to be the most favourable destination for
investment. 92 (Refer also to Appendix F-5.3.) While labour-
intensive manufacturers have been driven out of the country,
some of them have immediately found a more favourable climate
for manufacturing in China. Some have even closed all their
businesses in Taiwan, but most of the others maintained their
headquarters in Taiwan from where they manage capital flows,
overseas orders, marketing, R & D, assembly and
transportation.
Only manufacturing operations are conducted from their
Chinese base. Entrepreneurs have suggested that, by early
1992, at least 80 per cent of companies in footwear,
briefcase, toy, and umbrella industries, had been seeking
relocation in mainland China." Taipei's Ministry of Finance's
calculations show that Taiwan's footwear manufacturers have
nearly all relocated in China, and about 80 per cent of the
91.The survey which focused on business confidence in the CEO of the one thousand biggest
manufacturers was conducted by Commonwealth Magazine Co. The result was published in
Commonwealth, (1 March, 1992).
92.'Chu Taiwan Hou Chi Yieh Wan Na Li Ch0?", (Where are enterprises to go, after leaving
Taiwan?), Business Weekly, (24 May, 1993). The survey sampling 242 companies on the stock
market on their FDI trend was trying to analyze the possible influence on Taiwan
industrial structure as a whole.
93. Commonwealth, (1 March, 1992), p. 16.
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textile industry has also re-set up in China. 94 Although the
Taipei government fears that these capital investments in
China could hollow out Taiwan's industrial basis and result in
economic dependence on China," Chao Yao Tung, former minister
of Economic Affairs, pointed out that almost all Taiwanese
companies relocating in China have been importing materials
and machinery from Taiwan and depending upon Taiwan's
headquarters for commercial R & D. 96 In other words, these
developments, from a positive point of view, are creating
industrial division of labour within the CEA. Perhaps, the
relocation of Taiwan's clock & watch industry serves as a
typical example of the division of labour across the CEA:
production in China, design and marketing in Taiwan, and
finance and exportation in Hong Kong.97
The result of an earlier survey suggested that by 1992
most Taiwanese investment in China would derive from labour-
intensive industries delivering lower level technology and
used equipment, and by taking advantage of low cost production
factors in China. Nevertheless, more recent investment flows
tend to be targeting China's domestic market instead of export
markets. This recent survey clearly demonstrates a changing
trend of investment for upgrading the industrial division of
labour in terms of target markets and technology involved,
e.g. recent investment by President Foods and Giant
Manufacturing- 96
 President Foods, already number one in
Taiwan's food industry, whose investment is mainly concerned
94
. L. C. Wang, "A decade's retrospection on Taiwanese businessmen's China investment",
Management Magazine, 218, (August 1992), p. 101.
95.See Luisetta Mudie, "Fleeing investors shake Taiwan", Financial Times, 28 August, 1992),
p. 3. About the government's worry see K. L. Kao, "Trade and investment across the Taiwan
Straits maintaining competitive advantage, pursuing complementarity", Mainland Affairs
Council, The Executive Yuan, R. 0. C., 1993, pp. 11-13.
96.L. C. Wang, "A decade's retrospection on Taiwanese businessmen's China investment", P.
101.
97.See The Independent Weekly Post (Chi Li Chou Bao), (25 March, 1994).
98.Carl Goldstein, "The bottom line: Taiwan capital, factories pour into China", p. 24.
241
with scale economies in China, has been building up a business
network equipped with its advanced food processing technology
to access the market. According to its Chairman, C. Y. Kao,
the huge Chinese domestic market is propping up its long term
strategy of internationalisation. Through its market share
expansion in China, in 25 years President Foods could become
the world number one."
Giant Manufacturing, which has already become the world's
leading manufacturer of bicycles, is also seeking to maintain
its superiority through market segments between Taiwan's
higher value added products and China's middle and lower value
added products. 100 In the short term, China provides a base for
industrial revival for labour intensive industries and an
important market from which Taiwan earns its trade surplus. An
anonymous electrical company owner pointed out that: "We were
lucky enough to have China's market absorbing Taiwanese
manufactures and products, otherwise it is very likely that
many Taiwanese companies could be out of business by now. tool
Officials confessed that even if there was not an open Chinese
market, the Taiwan economy, in the face of the worldwide
recession in the early 1990s, would inevitably depart from its
previous high growth track. 102
5.1.3. Overseas Chinese "Nostalgic Investment" In China
For decades, overseas Chinese have played an important
part in Chinese modernisation by inputting capital, management
99 . Global Views, (15 December, 1992), p. 40.
100 
.Global Views, (15 December, 1992), p. 42.
101
.Commonwealth, (1 March, 1992), p. 32.
102
.Koong-Lian Kao, Trade and Investment Across the Taiwan Straits Maintaining Competitive
advantage, Pursuing Complementarity, Mainland Affairs Council, The Executive Yuan, R. 0.
C., 1993.
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skills, and technology. Many overseas Chinese have been
concerned to invest in places where their ancestors came
from.m The reasons for that were based not only on the
business consideration of profits, but also on the ties of
kinship on which most overseas Chinese entrepreneurs rely for
developing their business across national borders. Overseas
Chinese investment from Southeast Asia was mostly in
accordance with their previous emigrant routes back to
Southern China. These investments therefore carry a message
both of a simple economic incentive and of a nostalgia for
home. One empirical survey suggests that "while nostalgia for
the motherland has played its part, their main motive for home
is profit. ”104
With overseas Chinese heading for home, the worldwide web
of their business has become a catalyst for the formation of
the CEA. Nowadays, not only have many Taiwanese and Hong Kong
businessmen made China the focus of their business growth for
the next decade, but also many overseas Chinese businessmen,
particularly, from Southeast Asia have followed suit. In spite
of the early investment from Taiwan and Hong Kong seeking for
low cost production factors and thus, for quick profits, more
recently businessmen from both economies have engaged
themselves in longer term projects for China's economic
development, because of China's commitment to reforms, and
increasing higher profile of the idea of the CEA.
It was the unprecedentedly large number of overseas
Chinese investing in China from Southeast Asia, joining forces
with Taiwanese and Hong Kong businessmen, that has brought
103
.Chinese belief of "Lo yeh guei ken" (As a leaf is for the root, so a person is for his
homeland.) keeps driving overseas Chinese home.
104
."SE Asian Chinese head for home", Asian Business, 29: 4, (April 1993), p. 25.
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about the preliminary condition of forming the CEA."5
Analysing their investment strategies, which are characterised
by five main factors, one can dig up the recent trend of
developing the CEA as follows:
"1. They are motived less by China's cheap labour costs
and plentiful land and more by the country's latent
consumer demand. 2. They are helping to modernise China's
primary industries and build up its infrastructure. 3.
They are bringing to China the management skills they
have successfully used in ASEAN to apply sophisticated
Western technology in an underdeveloped environment. 4.
They are advancing into places often ignored by other
foreign investors. 5. Cash-rich and debt-free, they are
committing long-term investment to China.
Doing business in China today, businessmen realise that
the first priority has not been seeking a good contract, but a
good "guan si" (personal relationship) in the society. Because
the modern legal systems of Western countries have not yet
taken root in mainland Chinese society, most foreign
businessmen there complain about corruption, bureaucratic
inefficiency, and lack of regulations to follow. This
unhealthy business environment, to some extent, allows
informal, private, and even underground business activities to
play a major part. 1" It does not mean, though, that
shortcomings of the Chinese economic system, in terms of the
western developed market economies, is to be a necessary
condition of overseas Chinese investment. Since an element of
Dengist reforms has been heavily dependent upon foreign trade
and foreign investment, China's persistent market opening and
105
.Many scholars agreed with overseas Chinese entrepreneurs helping to establish the CEA in
Beijing's Conference of "Mainland, Taiwan, and Hong Kong Economic Cooperation Trend" in 9-
10 September, 1993. See special report in Central Daily News, International Edition, (11
September, 1993).
106
."SE Asian Chinese head for home", Asian Business, 29: 4, (April 1993), pp. 24-25.
107
.Many Taiwanese businessmen interviewed in August 1993 commonly recognised that successful
"guan si" means a successful start for business.
n106
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economic potential have served as economic incentives to lure
foreign investment. Maybe coincidentally, for many generations
"Chinese entrepreneurs have been operating in a network of
family and clan" ." 8 Their businesses in China and elsewhere
have been set up by means of family links, either by joint
ventures, or partnerships. For example, overseas Chinese
tycoons have favoured this linkage: Liem Sioe Liong, the
leading Indonesian entrepreneur, who came originally from
Fujien Province, has recently developed his businesses in
Fuzhou (Fujien), and Mel Zhou Island (Fujien) in cooperation
with Fuzhou Municipality, and Taiwan investors respectively. 109
In the case of investing in China, dialect, kinship, a common
origin in a clan, a village or a county, have provided a
certain assurance for overseas Chinese business. 110 For
example, S. Y. Tan, President of Kao-Lo Foods Co. in Taiwan,
who left mainland China in the late 1940s, recalled that his
business in China began by cooperation with Yuo-Li Trading
Co., one of China's special trading bodies established for
linking Taiwanese, through the introduction of a friend from
high school in the mainland."
Unlike Japanese Keiretsu (industrial groups anchored by
major banks), the network of Chinese entrepreneurs is
characterised by its diversity and yet potential open system:
"it represents access to local resources like information,
business connection, raw materials, low labour costs, and
different business practices in a variety of environments.
It can be seen that in access to China's market, in general,
108 John Kao, "The worldwide web of Chinese business", Harvard Business Review, (March-April
1993), P. 24.
109
.See Asian Business, 29: 4, (April 1993), pp. 26-27.
110
.The Economist Yearbook, 1993 Edition, p. 154.
111
.Business Weekly, 182, (19 May, 1991), pp. 33-35.
112
.John Kao, "The world wide web of Chinese business", Harvard Business Review, (March-April
1993), p. 24.
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the Japanese have not been as successful as overseas Chinese
enterprises. For example, in 1991, amongst 13,086 of China's
total proven foreign investment venture projects, Hong Kong
and Macao signed 8,879 projects, and Taiwan signed 1,735
projects. Japan had 607 projects. 113
 While overseas Chinese
have taken advantage of China's economic development by
expanding their businesses widely from coastal areas and
riversides into the hinterland, all Western and Japanese firms
can do is watch enviously, and struggle "to keep up with the
overseas Chinese" • h14
The overseas Chinese today, including people in Taiwan
and Hong Kong, account for 55 million around the world, and
have continuously projected their economic dynamics across
continents. One analyst even describes Chinese business
networks as the "Chinese commonwealth". 115 Whatever names have
been used, the global network of the Chinese business
community happens to be a "loose common market system" based
not on geography but on a common culture. China's quickly
growing economy has shown that, on the one hand, China has
greatly profited from the resources contributed from these
networks; on the other hand, pooling resources to China,
overseas Chinese entrepreneurs have extended industrial
cooperation with other overseas Chinese and mainland Chinese
entrepreneurs. Therefore, China's persistent reforms have
brought about a large scale of cooperation between overseas
Chinese entrepreneurs, from which the CEA has stemmed. The
effect of the Chinese entrepreneurs' jamboree in China has
boosted the reality of bringing the CEA into being.
113 .Economic Yearbook for The Two Sides of the Taiwan Strait, 1992, p. 533 (Appendix table
37).
114 .
 "China's diaspora turns homeward", The Economist, (27 November, 1993), p. 79.
115 .Jo 1n Kap defines that this commonwealth is not based on one country or continent, but a
network of entrepreneurial relationships. See his article "The worldwide web of Chinese
business", Harvard Business Review, (March-April 1993).
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5.2. THE EFFECT OF ECONOMIC INTERACTION BETWEEN CHINA, TAIWAN,
AND HONG KONG: ADVOCATES OF INTEGRATION
Within the existing favourable political and economic
circumstances pursued purposefully by related governmental
policy, economic interactions, trade and investment flows,
across existing borders occur spontaneously through the
activities of businessmen pursuing profits. While massive
trade and investment flows rush into China seeking profits
from the booming Chinese economy, regional governments right
across East Asia have far outstripped business communities'
steps to act on this. The trend is for a remarkable pace
towards interdependence of related economies, although at
first the transaction among them was not focused by an
ambitious integration plan. As the transaction flows inside
the CEA, based more on economic complementarity, turn faster
and more frequently, so emerging networks have brought about a
rethinking of economic integration.
On the contrary, instead of governmental initiatives, the
great volume of transaction has raised strong demands for
certain organisations to resolve the problems which have
occurred in the process of transaction. The importance of the
establishment of such organisations was later realised and
endorsed by the governments. Indeed, there have been some
individual semi-official organisations dealing with common
functional problems across the Taiwan Strait. For example, the
Taiwan-based Strait Exchange Foundation, and the China-based
Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait (ARATS), on
behalf of their own respective government's interests, managed
to hold the first summit meeting for mail and documentary
registration between China and Taiwan in April 1993 in
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Singapore. 116 Since then, the talks between the two bodies have
continued on a regular basis in accordance with the consensus
agreed in the first meeting for dealing with their functional
affairs. Because these talks were frequently interrupted by
Beijing's intention to politicize them (to Taipei's anxiety),
they have always ended without agreement. The fourth meeting
in Beijing continued the talk up to March 1994.'17
However, their emergence from already complex
transactions provides some evidence that there is a strong
demand from the business community for regulation of their
transactions across the Strait. This is, to some extent,
directing governments' policy)-' 8 Unlike transnational
institutions for integration elsewhere, what these groups in
the CEA are attempting to be, for now, is "a mediator", on the
part of the business communities, rather than "a manager", by
governments, of the likely integration. It is very distinctive
that the transaction volume within the CEA today presents an
unbalanced relationship, or maybe more precisely a distorted
partnership. Because of the policy restraints, Taipei does not
want its market to be fully opened to China without further
endorsements of friendliness from Beijing, as enshrined in
Taipei's recent "Guidelines for National Unification".
Although Taipei has continuously defied Beijing's proposal for
direct communication and has reluctantly allowed its
businessmen to trade with China via Hong Kong and elsewhere,
trade and investment between China and Taiwan is still
expanding very fast. There is a likelihood that direct trade
116
.See Summary of World Broadcast, FE/1675, (29 April -3 May, 1993).
117
.Central Daily News, International Edition, (28 March, 1994).
118
.Char1es H. C. Kao points out that Taiwan's mainland policy is not made by the government
or Kuomingtang, but by Taiwanese businessmen who have invested in China. The Vice Chairman
of Strait Exchange Foundation, C. V. Chen, confirms that Taiwanese businessmen are the
promoters of developments in mainland policy and the relations between the two sides of
the Strait. Central Daily News, International Edition, (11 March, 1993).
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between Taiwan and China sooner or later will be set up, as
pressure from industrialists has increased. In addition, Hong
Kong's position to be the "third country" of Taiwan's trading
gateway to China will change in 1997. This has made Taipei
feel the pressure of either changing policy to allow limited
"direct trade" between Taiwan and certain Chinese ports, or to
seek for alternative means for continuing "indirect trade".
Indeed, in terms of planning a regional operational centre and
mainland policy, it becomes clear that there are struggles
within the Taipei government.119
For Taiwanese industrialists, in the first wave of China
investment, China used to be merely a base for labour-
intensive manufacturing for export. More recently, China has
been treated as a manufacturing base for intermediaries,
components and semi-finished products, which have been
redirected back to Taiwanese assembly lines for export.
empirical study has pointed to the immediate advantage of
importing Chinese semi-finished products for Taiwanese
industries' exports, because the market price for products
labelled "made in Taiwan" is about 10-15 per cent higher than
that for the same products but labelled "made in China".m
Namely, with Taiwan's labels on, exporting products will be
more profitable. To proceed towards further integration in the
CEA, governmental commitment from Beijing, Taipei, Hong Kong,
will be decisive, in theory and in practice. Before political
hostility between Taipei and Beijing can be watered down, the
119
.See Central Daily News, International Edition, (21 March, 1994).
120
.For example, members of the Bicycle Manufacturing Committee of the Taiwan Association of
Vehicle Industries, confirmed that the decision to import bicycle components from China
has been agreed to increase competition in related sectors. Central Daily News,
International Edition, (30 August, 1993). Taiwan's clothing industry is hoping for the
government's consent for the import of more semi-finished products from China in order to
build up the international division of labour. Central Daily News, International Edition,
(8 July, 1993).
121
.Charles H. C. Kao, Joseph S. Lee, and Chu-Chia Steve Lin, An Empirical Study of Taiwan
Investment on Mainland China, (Taipei, Commonwealth Publishing Co., Ltd., 1992). p. 135.
120 An
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Chinese and Taiwanese governments will have to act on behalf
of their businessmen's interests in dealing with increasing
members of practical problems caused by their increasing
interactions. In the meantime, indigenous industries within
the CEA and the TNCs endorse the ongoing CEA with more
investment projects and by preparing operation centre plans
targeting the CEA as a whole rather than a single economy.
This could positively improve both economic growth and
prospects for integration.
5.2.1. Governments' Commitment to the Formation of the Chinese
Economic Area
As the transaction flows have tied the industries in
China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong, into various frameworks for the
division of labour, the level of their industrial
interdependence, which is composed of the current trade regime
for commodities, investment, and industrial cooperation on
exchanging semi-finished products, personnel and technologies,
becomes more and more apparent. Facing the increase of
business, economic, and social transactions inside the CEA,
businessmen can never again let go of this opportunity for
profits and market share in the CEA. Nor would governments
risk missing any opportunity of forming a regional bloc.
Singapore's former Prime Minister, Lee Kwan-Yew, stated that:
"Chinese reunification is not so easily accomplished.
But, as soon as transactions between the two sides of the
Strait begin, reunification is to be a dynamic and
everlasting process. ... So, the ongoing (benign)
situation between them will not be reversed anyway. 01.22
122
.Translated from Chinese. Information was based on an interview in Central Daily News,
International Edition, (6 September, 1993).
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The more the Chinese economy integrates into the world
economy, the more it will be directed by global market forces
rather than by the Chinese state. Part of the effect of market
forces has been to intensify the business, political, and
economic transactions across the Strait which make up the
beginning of economic integration, and to a lesser extent, of
Chinese reunification. In spite of political obstacles, the
transactions have continuously thrived and problems which
occurred are being collectively sorted out. Therefore,
official moves to link with each other have concentrated on
bringing about common ground for removing the differences.
Chinese Endorsement of Reform
China's commitment to its reformist open door policy has
become a crucial factor not only for its own economic
development but also for the possibility of the formation of
the CEA. No Chinese official has ever commented openly on the
economic integration of the CEA. Most recently, for the first
time, Chinese Vice-Premier and Foreign Minister Qian Qichen
directly made a reference to the concept of "Greater China
Economic Sphere" as being still far from a reality. ED
Beijing's willingness to keep a low profile over the CEA is
obvious in case there may be a backlash from other countries,
notably Japan and the ASEAN countries.
In spite of the lack of formal confirmation of the CEA
from Beijing, its guarantee of the reformist policy has been a
positive incentive. In comparison with China's economic
123
.Qian Qichen, in his visit to Los Angeles on 22 November right after the annual meeting of
Asian Pacific Economic Cooperation conference in Seattle, openly expressed the Beijing
government's attitude to the concept of "Greater China Economic Sphere TM . It was the first
time that a Chinese official commented on this concept. See Central Daily News,
International Edition, (25 November, 1993).
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reform, its political change has not been prominent. In terms
of progress towards democracy, the focus has been not so much
on the political system, but on arranging the transfer of
power. It is very clear that Deng Xiao-Ping's "theory"
encourages more reforms to promote market-driven economic
growth, but, at the same time, Deng is inclined to keep quiet
about political change. In other words, its legitimacy stems
from "its ability to deliver economic prosperity without
forfeiting political securityn.M Deng said in 1984 that "the
domestic policies emphasize two points - politically, to
develop democracy, and economically, to adopt reform" under
the rules of socialist development. m
 Deng's perception of
linking democracy and reform characterised by Chinese
socialism is very different from Western definitions of a
pluralist society. His concept of democracy may have focused
on democratic centralism in the party's system, 126 which allows
party elites, rather than the public, to be involved in the
decision-making process in order to legitimize the collective
leadership. Such theoretical understanding has set up a
complex political and economic paradox: a "socialist market
economy", with a socialism characteristic of China.
No matter what will happen in the unpredictable power
struggle of Beijing, persistent reform on the economic front
has unquestionably been a necessary part of the Chinese
development. So long as the reform is to continue in China,
economic build-up is likely to push the formation of the CEA
further forward.	 For Beijing,	 insistent reform will
124
.Elizabeth J. Perry, "China in 1992: An experiment in neo-authoritarianism", Asian Survey,
33: 1, (January 1993), p. 14.
125. "Brief introduction to dome of Deng's speeches", Beijing Review, 36: 47, (22-28 November,
1993), P . 33.
126
.This understanding has been announced by Deng's party followers in the third Plenary
Session of the 14th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. See Beijing Review,
36: 47, (22-28 November, 1993), p. 30.
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undoubtedly speed up its economic development which has been
tied in with Hong Kong and Taiwan as well as the other
economies in the region. Since early 1992, the Beijing
government's reformist policy has been confirmed on many
important occasions, i.e. in January 1992, Deng Xiao-Ping's
Southern tour; in October 1992, the 14th Communist Party
Congress' affirming a capitalist economic development; and in
April 1993, the first session of the eighth National People's
Congress endorsing a Chinese style of capitalism. With
Congress approval, "a socialist market economy" has been set
as a goal of China's reform.'" According to China's own
explanation, a "socialist market economy" is "a comprehensive
concept, which seeks to combine the superiority of public
ownership with a rational disposal of resources ensured by a
market economy. ”128 One surmises the implication of this term
as "free markets without free politics; a vibrant private
sector alongside a dominant public sector; a further opening
to the west, but a vigorous fight against pollution by some
western ideas. "129
The Premier Li Peng, the hardliners' protégé, in a press
conference even said that "economic development is the most
important task for this government" and that "the government
will ... open wider to the outside world over the next five
years." 13° Jian Zemin, Chinese President, urged the deepening
of reforms as "crucial in solving new contradictions and
problems in China's economic activities" and called for
"stepped-up efforts to carry out reforms in all fields,
especially in the areas of the financial, investment and
127 ,Beijing Review, 36: 15, (12-18 April, 1993), p. 9.
128 ."Jian on foreign and domestic issues", Beijing Review, 36: 34, (23-29 August, 1993), p.
10
129 . licapita1ism, Chinese style", Financial Times, (14 October, 1992), p. 20.
130. N Jian on foreign and domestic issues", p. 10.
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taxation systems, to speed up the establishment of a socialist
market economy. Furthermore, Zhu Rongji, Chinese Vice-
Premier, said that "China's booming economy has given
investors and businessmen more and more confidence because of
its tremendous potential and wide ranging opportunities" and
asserted that "China will not slow down its reform."32
Although there is always a danger ahead of the return of
the hardliners, both sides of the political groups in Beijing
have agreed that reforms will have to be carried on in dealing
with the actual economic development. As long as China's
reform programme remains in place, its desperate demand for
foreign capital will lead to increased dependence on Hong Kong
and Taiwan. More and more people, especially in the Hong Kong
and Taiwanese business communities, trust that the deepening
and widening effects of economic interactions between China,
Taiwan and Hong Kong will only encourage the formation of the
CEA. As far as economic integration is concerned, the
development of the CEA has reflected, up to now, China's bases
defining the current reform as having pure economic and
unofficial features. It is very likely that Beijing will be
positive to the formation of the CEA, as long as it retains
self-restraint by confining itself to an economic event.
Hong Kong: Tying up with China
Hong Kong has been very keen to develop commercial links
with China, because not only has its highly commercialised,
industrialised economy of export orientated strategies taken
advantage of China's low cost production factors, but also its
"middleman" role with regard to China has increased its
131 ."Jiang calls for deepening reforms", Beijing Review, 36: 37, (13-19 September, 1993), p.
5
132 . mReform guarantees further development", Beijing Review, 36: 38, (20-26 September, 1993),
p. 5.
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importance in managing foreign investment flows to China.
Apart from the economic incentives of advantages, Hong Kong's
investment boosted economic growth in China generally, and the
nearby province Guangdong particularly, and has carried with
it an undetected belief in steering China's economy to greater
integration with the capitalist economic world. This may have
contributed much to the emergence of China's recent market
approach. It seems likely that if the economic development gap
between Hong Kong and China can be narrowed down further in
the next few years, market forces will then take charge of
Hong Kong's fate, even after 1997 under China's government.
Recent examples of Hong Kong entrepreneurs' heavy investing in
China's infrastructure have reflected this hopeful line of
thinking.
Because of the free market economy, Hong Kong's
enterprises have been profit-orientated. In addition, Hong
Kong's industrial development policy has been based on a
laissez-faire approach. What the government has intended has
been to "provide the private sector with an economic
environment and the infrastructure conducive to rapid growth,
including the provision of adequate industrial support
facilities and services". m While China's open door to the
outside world encouraged great opportunities for potential
businesses, the Hong Kong government has been actively
offering specific help for enterprises. For example, the Hong
Kong Trade Development Bureau set up links with Beijing in
1986. Since then, the Bureau has purposively played an
important role in linking Hong Kong enterprises with China.134
It may be that such efforts have arisen from a British hope of
133 .0ECD, The Newly Industrialising Countries: Challenge and Opportunity for OECD Industries,
(Paris: OECD, 1988), p. 47.
134 .Global Views, (15 December, 1993), p. 146.
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securing vested interests with as strong a presence in the CEA
as they used to enjoy in the colony.
It is, therefore, in the Hong Kong government's interest
to involve itself actively in the formation of any economic
grouping with China. In the short term, China's industrial
scale economies could reinforce Hong Kong's economic power
through further industrial cooperation to which they have both
contributed. As Singapore has been for the Malaysian economy,
so Hong Kong may become for the Chinese economy, and to some
extent for the CEA. In the long term, with a leading role in
the CEA, Hong Kong will be much more confident about keeping
its prosperity within the Chinese "socialist market economy".
Facing an uncertain future over the political structure
currently in place, Hong Kong's future may all depend upon
tightening its links with China, or at least with Southern
China economically. Although the current tension between Hong
Kong Governor Chris Patten and Beijing about Hong Kong's
political reform has caused a division of Hong Kong society,
Hong Kong's will to tie its economy to China's economic
development remains solid.
Taiwan: Asian Pacific Regional Operational Centre?
The Taipei government has brought forward a very
ambitious programme of building itself up as a regional
operation centre, for R & D, manufacturing, finance, and
transportation. This programme has inspired widespread
discussion amongst officials, economists and industrialists in
Taiwan, because of its implications for the development of the
CEA. One governmental analysis suggests that:
"[F]rom the viewpoint of resource complementarity and
division of labour, current restrictions on indirect
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investment and trade across the Straits will be relaxed
to an appropriate degree; technological exchange will be
strengthened; and more effective guidance and support
will be given to Taiwan manufacturers that invest in
mainland China. "135
Dozens of economic reasons seem to support the programme
that has been put forward, including diversified export
markets, upgraded industries, balanced bilateral trade, an
improved environment for investment, and internationalisation
of management to cope with fierce global competition. Since
1992, the transactions between Taiwan, Hong Kong and China
have reached a "threshold" which has brought their
relationship into a new era of interdependence. According to a
conservative estimation, there are at least 10,000 Taiwanese
companies now located in China, and total investment has
reached the record level of US$ 10 billion. 136 Unofficial
guesses in Taiwan put the amount of investment at US$ 15
billion-25 billion.137
What this programme is concerned with is the preliminary
conditions that Taiwan must develop to become an operational
centre, and its prospects in the CEA. To become a regional
centre Taiwan will have to remove all political and legal
obstacles in order to accommodate multinational corporations'
business strategies. The Director of the Commerce Department
of the United States in Taipei, Mrs Ying Price, pointed out
that Taipei's non-communication policy with China will
definitely bar many multinationals from Taiwan, simply due to
lack of access to the CEA market." 6
 As far as the regional
135 .Economic Revitalization Program: An Action Plan for the Promotion of Private Investment,
Council for Economic Planning and Development, Republic of China, (July 1993), p. 8.
136
.1. S. Kao, Director of the Industrial Development and Investment Centre, under the
Ministry of Economic Affairs, quoted this information to confirm the government's
intention to act on this change in "The Feasibility of Taiwan to be Asia-Pacific Regional
Operation Centre". See Business Weekly, (24 May, 31 May, and 28 June, 1993).
137 .The Economist, (22 May, 1993), p. 73.
138 .Business Weekly, (28 June, 1993), pp. 61-63.
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operation centre is concerned, the programme has to be
considered in the context of economic integration in the CEA.
If Taiwan is to be an Asia-Pacific regional operation centre,
in addition to other necessary conditions, it will have to
define its position in the CEA first, which means that
Taiwan's direct trade links with China will be essential. More
recently, Taipei has proposed an alternative policy for
negotiating "selective" direct trade links with Beijing."9
While current transactions are considered as in the short term
phase, the preliminary conditions for a regional operation
centre have been regulated in the medium term, according to
the Guidelines for National Unification.
From an economic perspective, the regional operation
centre will be conducive to Taiwan's economic success through
alliances with the TNCs for upgrading technology and
establishing a leading role in the division of labour across
the CEA. Although the Taipei government has never blatantly
advocated the concept of the CEA, it has tacitly recognised
its importance with regard to its programme for the regional
operation centre. 140 In accordance with its Guidelines and
market forces, modifications in policies have been quietly
brought forward:
"[R]elaxation of indirect trade across the Straits and
expansion of imports of semi-finished products from the
mainland. Promotion of cross-Straits exchange of
industrial technology and recruitment of talent from the
mainland. Strengthening of guidance and =port for
Taiwan businessmen investing in the Mainland. " 141
 
Daily News, International Edition, (14 September, 1994).
140
.In an interview on 13 August, 1993, Dr. H. H. Tsai, Vice Chairman of Council for Economic
Planning and Development, R. 0. C., admitted that the government has endorsed the
formation of the CEA in its programme for the regional operation centre.
141
.Economic Revitalisation Program: An Action Plan for the Promotion of Private Investment,
(July 1993), p. 13.
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Many argue that the emergence of the CEA has served as a
pure economic cooperation mechanism in the greater Chinese
community. 142 In spite of less open confirmation of economic
integration from governments, Taipei's commitment to the CEA
has been repeatedly apparent in its partnerships with the
TNCs. (see Appendix T-5.1) In response to the reality
occurring in the CEA, the Industrial Development Bureau under
the Ministry of Economic Affairs in Taipei has drafted a
comprehensive framework for integrating "industrial division
of labour across the Taiwan Strait". m In addition, the
Council for Economic Planning and Development, a ministerial
level institution, under the Executive Yuan, emphasises that
to keep up with the increasing trend of economic exchange
between China and Taiwan, Taiwan will not be hesitant in
developing its future economic blueprint based upon China as a
hinterland. A practical move has been setting up an Asia-
Pacific regional operational centre on Taiwan's west coast as
an expediency as no direct link exists with China. 144
In commenting on Taiwan's regional operation centre
programme, a French businessman, Olivier C. Moore, Chairman of
the Taipei-based European Council of Commerce and Trade, has
stated that for many European enterprises Taiwan is seen as a
business springboard from which many of the TNCs have launched
their business development from Taiwan to China, and to the
Chinese community in Southeast Asia." 5 The American Offshore
142. Professor C. Y. Cheng of Ball University, USA, and Professor W. S. Chen of Fu-Dan
Univerity, China, argued that pooling resources in the CEA through rational distribution
could generate a certain economic unity in the Conference for "Trade Relationship Between
the Two Sides of the Strait" held in Taipei, 27-28 September, 1993. Central Daily News,
International Edition, (28 September, 1993).
143 .Central Daily News, International Edition, (13 December, 1993).
144. Central Daily News, International Edition, (12 December, 1993).
145 .According to his comments, Taiwan has got a solid manufacturing base, plenty of skilled
labour, a superior geographic location in the Asia-Pacific market, and the same cultural
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Institute has offered an insight into the industrial
cooperation occurring in Taiwan. It states that:
"[A]s major industrial corporations from around the world
and especially the high technology sectors open regional
offices in Taiwan, joint ventures between the newcomers
and Taiwanese businesses and agencies aim at strategic
placement for basic needs in key areas such as semi-
conductors, chemicals and telecommunications. China is
the main target of this planning. u146
5.2.2. Global Strategy Vs. Regional Economic Integration: The
Position of Transnational Corporations in the Chinese
Economic Area
Clearly, multinationals base their strategy for
investment on profit through the making of opportunities. In
terms of protectionism and national trade barriers, regional
integration has less clear effect in the TNCs' global market
operation. Whilst people usually notice the TNCs' profit
gaining strategies, they tend to ignore how important the TNCs
are in the process of regional integration. Corporate
integration is the term used by some to define the causes and
effects of integration activities. 147
 Regional government
officials describe how important the TNC was to regional
economic development:
"the very rapid growth of East Asian economies over the
past three decades has been due, in large measure, to the
background as China, foreign companies can therefore use Taiwan as a multi-functional base
in the CEA. See Central Dail News, International Edition, (13 August, 1993).
146. "Taiwan stimulates Pacific Rim", The Diamond File, Offshore Investment, 37, (June 1993),
P . 8.
147 .John Dunning and Peter Robson, "Multinational Corporate integration and regional economic
integration", Journal of Common Market Studies, 26: 2, (December 1987). More discussions
can be found in the same volume.
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technology, capital, and managerial and marketing know-
how contributed by multinational corporations. "
From the perspective of regional economic integration,
through industrial division of labour, in some cases division
of trade, which was established as a result of foreign capital
investment, various national economic interests in the region
could be linking together. The hope is that a common interest
will emerge as a result. For example, whilst many other
industries are seeking to pursue industrial cooperation within
the greater Chinese market individually or collectively, the
information and computer industries have already established
their own links targeting the CEA. Microsoft, Philips, IBM and
Hewlett-Packard have since 1992 set up headquarters in Taiwan
to manage rationalisation of their resources covering Taiwan
itself, China, and Hong Kong. " 9 In the petrochemical industry,
ICI (London) has invested in China and Taiwan gaining a market
share in the CEA as a way of looking ahead to the wider Asia-
Pacific market. Through the TNCs' "greater China" marketing
vision, one can expect that an increased exchange of
resources, personnel, and components will intensify existing
interdependence, which will be meaningful and beneficial to
economic integration.
Apart from the technology and marketing experience that
the TNCs normally introduce, their targeting of the CEA is
concerned today with an exchange of managerial and technical
personnel. Philips' President, J. D. Timmer, for instance, in
148 .Vincent C. Siew, Chairman of Council for Economic Planning and Development, (former
Minister of Economic Affairs), in a speech for the American Chamber of Commerce, "The
Prospects of the ROC as a Regional Operation Centre", Industry of Free China, (March
1993), p. 15.
149
.Central Daily News, International Edition, (13 November, 1993).
150
.Natasha Alperowicz, "ICI's Asia/Pacific operations set for significant growth",
Chemicalweek, (November 25, 1992), p. 35.
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a speech to mark the 25th anniversary of Philips Taiwan,
pointed out that:
... with our active participation in this market (the”
Pacific basin) with its prospects for growth and its
enormous potential, Philips definitely intends to expand
its presence in this region.", and "Philips Taiwan has
always been the essential 'Chinese component' in the
Philips family.
Taiwan Philips' management teams, thus, have been chosen
to run its Asia-Pacific strategy of access to the CEA.152
Within its global strategy, the development of Hewlett-
Packard's greater China plan emphasises establishing networks
and exchanging managerial experience between China, Taiwan and
Hong Kong. Since Hewlett-Packard is already highly focused on
China's domestic market, there has been a group of Taiwanese
managers sent to China in the belief that well-educated and
experienced Taiwanese managers probably are the best to
conduct business in China in order to become "networking
technicians" for their Western and Chinese clients. 153 For
reasons of culture, language, and technology, some Japanese
firms have employed Taiwanese technicians in their mainland
China development. N. Tatara, a standing member of the board
of Mitsushita Taiwan Ltd., reveals that the company has sent
out seven engineers it has trained in Taiwan to help other
Mitsushitas operating in China. 154 Recently, some cases of
strategic alliance between the TNCs and Taiwan's companies
targeting the CEA have brought about the division of labour
151 • Philips Taiwan in Perspective, 25th Anniversary (1966-1991), 1991.
152 .Central Daily News, International Edition, (30 May, 1993).
153 information obtained from an interview with Mr. Jia-Bin Duh, Deputy General Manager, Hua
FU Information Technology Co. Ltd., (Subsidiary of Hewlett-Packard in China), on 6 August,
1993 in Taipei.
154 .Taiwan Industrial Panorama, 20: 11, (November 1992), p. 3.
n151
262
within the CEA. Examples are: Carpenter Technology Co. of the
US and Walsin Lihwa Electric Wire & Cable Co. of Taiwan;
Taiwan's Teco Electric & Machinery Co. and Nippon Electric Co.
(NEC). 155 Moreover, while American Telephone & Telegraph Co.
(AT&T) developed a strategic alliance in 1993 with the Taiwan
telecommunication industry "to manage technology transfers,
win contracts and operate manufacturing projects", AT&T was
discussing the formation of joint ventures with China to make
telephone switching equipment. 156
 Many indigenous industries
have also followed in the TNCs' footsteps to expand their
operation within the CEA. For example, Nan Ya Plastics Co.,
Taiwan's leading manufacturer, announces its plan to set up a
US$30 million plastic factory in Guangzhou to supply upstream
materials to Taiwan's downstream plastic producers.157
Industrial cooperation in targeting the greater vision of
the CEA amongst the TNCs and indigenous industries is
virtually paving out a preliminary approach toward further
economic integration. Those industrial cooperations are all
but knitting transaction networks between regional economies
regardless of political constraints. These networks are
considered a preliminary and necessary development to forming
a community. Logically, an industrial strategy bound up with
cooperation would not necessarily advance to a larger scale of
integration. But it is to be borne in mind that integration
would not be thought of without those efforts for industrial
unity which are naturally or purposively underway. However,
while the depth and width of industrial links go beyond the
155.Tsiwan Industrial Panorama, 21: 4, (April 1993), p. 3.
156 .Taiwan Industrial Panorama, 21: 3, (March 1993), p. 3.
157 .Central Daily News, International Edition, (1 April, 1994).
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definition of business strategies, a larger scale economic
spillover is yet to appear.158
5.2.3. Pre-Transnational Institutions for Economic
Integration: Regional Business Associations on the Move
A great move toward economic integration has been going
on for a decade or so between China, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and
the Asian Chinese Community, though it doesn't seem to be
quite following the European track. The Japanese scholar,
Saburo Okita, the head of the Domestic and International
Policy Studies Institute in Tokyo, made the comparison that:
"one of the big differences between East Asian
integration and European integration is that in Europe
it's based on treaties. In East Asia it's based on market
force. "159
European integration was motivated by political factors from
the beginning, though it has been manifested mainly in
economic forms. The development of the CEA, one of the East
Asian groupings driven by market forces, has been pushed
spontaneously by the efforts of many businessmen in the
private sector. It is only activists, mainly businessmen and
academics, who have recognised these developments in terms of
integration. Although businessmen scarcely consider economic
activities beyond their own self-interest, some have
understood a growing need for setting up industrial
organisations to act in their common interest.
158 .Industrial cooperation could be leading not just to the formation of joint ventures, but
also integrated management, labour markets, marketing networks, to name but a few
developments. Hence, the TNCs' lead may draw many more small and medium size enterprises
towards industrial cooperation.
159 ."Will Japan rule a new trade bloc?", Fortune, (5 October, 1992), p. 47.
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There have been an absence of official links between
Beijing and Taipei. Businessmen have relied on their own "guan
Si" (personal relationship) with China. Many different
functional organisations have emerged as a result, e.g. the
semi-official Strait Exchange Foundation (SEF), and the
Association For Relations Across the Taiwan Strait (ARATS),
the unofficial Association for Commerce across the Taiwan
Strait and many other industrial associations. To begin with,
some organisations developed as trouble-shooters or, to some
extent, to promote dialogue. The Taiwan Computer Association
which, amongst many others, has been successful in setting up
a "street for electronics in Shanghai", has managed to sort
out all legal procedures and marketing in China for over
thirty computer companies from Taiwan. 11 The SEF's earlier
business was mainly dealing with smuggling and expatriating
smugglers on behalf of the government. Whilst these activities
gradually became a routine, demands for larger scale
cooperation became increasingly powerful. The first talk
between the SEF and the ARATS in Singapore in April 1993
marked a new milestone for further cooperation and dialogue
between China and Taiwan. More importantly, a network of
regular consultation has been agreed.
Another influential organisation has been the Commercial
Development Foundation across the Taiwan Strait led by P. S.
Chan, the Chairman of the Taiwanese Association of Commerce.
Sponsored by 48 entrepreneurs who are currently actively
investing in China, the Foundation exists to collect business
information, provide consultant services, arrange commercial
exhibitions, bring together Taiwanese businessmen, and for
160
"A street for electronics", which is invested by Taiwanese electronics and computer
industries, is predicted to be an electronics and computer centre in Eastern China. It has
formally started operating since October 1994. See Central Daily News, International
Edition, (17 October, 1994).
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marketing research. 161 As usual, China has immediately created
a parallel organisation, Economic and Trade Association across
the Strait, to liaise with it. China's intention to take the
lead in private sector transactions is clear. Some leading
industrialists in Taiwan and Hong Kong have appealed for
greater cooperation between the three economies. The "Hong
Kong-Taiwan Committee For Economic and Trade Cooperation" was
established in this context in 1992 to strengthen economic and
trade cooperation between Hong Kong and Taiwan. Thereafter the
Committee promised to meet on a regular basis in rotation of
two sides once a year. At the second meeting, held in Taipei
in May 1993, over twenty entrepreneurs from Hong Kong, led by
M. S. Chan, the Chairman of the General Chamber of Commerce of
Hong Kong (GCCHK), and about a hundred local industrialists
led by S. F. Hsiu, the former Chairman of the Chinese National
Federation of Industries (CNFI), called for improved
administrative regulations to speed up the trade between them.
Taipei's decision-makers in economic and mainland affairs were
also present because of its importance.
Most recently, Chairman Hsiu of the CNFI has launched
omnidirectional moves to integrate economic resources inside
the CEA in company with the GCCHK and the China Promotion
Council for International Trade (CPCIT). He believes that in
terms of capital, resources, and technologies, current
transaction networks do not measure up to the objective of
economic effectiveness. 162 He has firmly devoted himself to the
concept of forming a Southern China Economic Sphere upon which
the CEA economic integration is based. In the present stage of
economic transactions, trade, foreign investment, and making-
161 •5•
 
R. Huang, "Su Shih Ba Wei Chi Yei Chia Kun Chuang Liang An Shih Yei", (Forty-eight
entrepreneurs collectively create business across the Strait), Business Weekly, (5 April,
1993).
162
.Central Daily Paws, International Edition, (11 September, 1993).
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up industrial division of labour, have taken place to a
considerable extent in the area of Hong Kong, Taiwan and
Southern China, i.e. Guangdong and Fujien provinces. According
to Taiwan's official statistics on locations of Taiwanese
investment in China, permitted investment which has mainly
gone to Shenzhen, Guangdong, Xiamen, Guangzhou, and Fuzhou,
accounted for 55.95 per cent of Taiwan's total permitted
investment in China in 1991; and 44.37 per cent in 1992. 1053
 In
addition,	 information
	 about	 Taiwanese	 manufacturers'
geographic locations also shows
been the most favoured. 164
In Chairman Hsiu's report
that the coastal areas have
on an investigative trip to
Hong Kong and China in late October 1993, in terms of
industrial cooperation, he suggested that Taiwanese mainland
investment will have to be brought to a macroeconomic-level in
the CEA as a whole, and develop more details for the
industrial division of labour with China through individual
industrial associations. 165
 Furthermore, K. C. Lin, President
of Sino-Japan Feed Industry Co., proposes that to be more
effective in managing trade, commerce, and investment between
China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong, it is better to establish a
collective sharing company combined with capital and
entrepreneurs from the above economies through tasks
undertaken jointly for the CNFI (Taiwan), the GCCHK and the
CPCIT (China). 166 The essence of this proposal is combining:
163
.Information was based on Investment Commission, Ministry of Economic Affairs, R. O. C.
164
.1n April 1991, among 1503 companies registered with the Taipei government, there were 1854
companies relocated in Southern coastal China: companies in Xiamen (275/11%), Pujien
Province (323/12.9%), Dongguan (187/7.5%), Guangdong Province (561/22%), Shenzhen
(379/15.1), Zhuhai, and Shantou (129/5.2). Ibid.
165
.Central Daily News, International Edition, (31 October, 1993).
166
.This proposal was announced on 1 November, in Hong Kong at the conference for "Lien An
Shan Bien Gin Mao " (Economic and trade relationship amongst three parties between two
sides of the Taiwan Strait), which was the first meeting ever joined by leading industrial
associations between China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong. See various reports in Central Daily
News, International Edition, (1-4 November, 1993).
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Taiwan's capacity in design, commercial R & D, marketing, and
management; Hong Kong's financial and trading prominence; and
China's promising production and manufacturing advantage.
Although this plan is so far merely for industrial
cooperation, keen willingness to form "a company", which
would, to some extent, be a managing body for further
cooperation, has been shared by many businessmen in the CEA.
To avoid any uncertainty, Lin's proposal has been regarded as
a practical move to integrate capital, technology, marketing,
and manufacturing in the CEA in order to guarantee the current
optimal economic transactions between the three economies.167
If this can be worked out, industrial cooperation between
China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong will be able to bring about the
hope for economic integration.
5.3. CONCLUSION
Although the CEA has so often been the marketing concept
of the business community in the region, its increasing
economic importance has become the focus for industrial
development, economic growth and regional economic
integration. Since the mid-1980s Hong Kong and Taiwan have
been undertaking industrial restructuring in order to survive
external competition in trade and industrial development.
China, on the other hand, has been on the reformist track
since 1979, during which period its industrial structure and
economy as a whole have been rapidly modernising. It is this
fundamental economic complementarity between China (market and
labour), Taiwan (capital, 	 manufacturing experience and
167
.Central Daily News, International Edition, (3 November, 1993).
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technology) and Hong Kong (financial service and transport
centre), which has provided the favourable incentives for
their economic cooperation.
The post-Cold War international political and economic
context which favours economic interaction, because of
increasingly intense industrial competition, and overseas
Chinese intensifying their investment in the Asia-Pacific
region, has accelerated the process of the formation of the
CEA. More importantly, intense global industrial competition
and the emergence of regional trading groupings with
protectionist measures have marginalised Taiwan and Hong
Kong's trading position in world markets as the suppliers of
cheap manufacturing products. As part of a strategy of
industrial restructuring, Taiwan and Hong Kong have relocated
their manufacturing sites in and have increased their direct
investment in low-cost neighbouring economies, i.e. China and
Southeast Asian countries. As China is experiencing rapid
economic development, the potential market in China provides
Taiwan and Hong Kong their best opportunity for restructuring
industry. Moreover, industrialists recently from China, Hong
Kong, and Taiwan have started to campaign for closer economic
cooperation in the hope of building-up industrial partnership
within the CEA. While economic benefits, instead of political
motives, have been the constant driving force behind the
formation of the CEA, the private sector has from the
beginning been leading the process of the CEA's economic
integration. The peculiar political atmosphere between China
and Taiwan and between China and Hong Kong, has reinforced
this trend.
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C HAP 1r E 7E1 S I X
POLITICAL CONSTRAINTS IN THE CHINESE ECONOMIC AREA
AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR ECONOMIC INTEGRATION
The emergence of the Chinese Economic Area has profited
from the general favourable trend of the "three Chinas"
rallying towards economic integration in response to the need
of Hong Kong and Taiwan for industrial restructuring and of
China for further economic development. Although there are as
yet no official links between Taiwan and China, and Taiwan and
Hong Kong to endorse their economic ties, the governments of
the three have been inclined to support quietly the concept of
economic grouping. Nevertheless, their thriving economic ties
are subject to political constraints, particularly, the
prolonged antagonism between China and Taiwan, and the new row
between China and Britain over the future of Hong Kong. These
political constraints nevertheless have not blocked economic
links, because the Chinese Economic Area has been based very
much on its complicated business links and less on political
commitment. It is to be seen in the future of the CEA whether
or not advancing economic integration clearly relies on the
settlement of political constraints. In terms of economic
interaction, however, the spillover effect becomes noticeable
driving both economic and political development into a
benevolent circle. So far, economic integration generated by
the forces of economic development has gone beyond political
stalemate. Even in contending with each other politically,
China and Taiwan have not been able to sacrifice their
immediate complementary economic interests.
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This chapter analyses political constraints within the
CEA and political developments of "the three" which have
contributed to the emergence of the CEA. It examines to what
extent political constraints will shape the future of the CEA.
The shortage of official collaboration between the economies
of the CEA has thrown doubt upon their further moves towards
economic integration. The purpose of this chapter is primarily
to show that despite political difficulties, economic
development and industrial cooperation, the key factors in the
progressive development of the CEA, could well be an example
in explaining the process of regional economic integration.
6.1. THE POLITICAL IMPETUS TOWARDS THE CREATION OF THE CHINESE
ECONOMIC AREA
The emergence of regional economic integration relies on
a favourable international political and economic setting, as
well as on domestic political and economic situations in the
relevant countries. While the formation of the CEA, so far,
has owed little to political factors, the governments in
China, Taiwan and Hong Kong remain the critical factor on
whether the CEA is coming into being or not. Although these
governments were officially apathetic to the development of
the CEA, there have been some policies pursued by each
government favourable to the CEA. In the context of political
compliance with economic transactions which has intensified in
response to external competition, the CEA has thus been able
to come about to a considerable extent, in fact. How has
political development cultivated favourable circumstances for
the formation of the CEA? In particular, due to political
hostility, China and Taiwan have not yet developed a
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consistent official communications network. It is, therefore,
very important to have a detailed understanding of recent
political developments in the relevant economies.
6.1.1. Beijing's Reformists in the Ascendency
Beijing's reforms have not only led to China's increasing
openness as a market and thus allowed further economic links
with Hong Kong and Taiwan, but have also encouraged the
developments towards economic integration. Although it remains
to be seen how substantial China's reforms are in stimulating
the formation of the CEA, the authority of Beijing's policy on
economic reforms has undoubtedly encouraged the business
community's hope for the CEA. At the end of 1978, Deng Xiao-
Ping emerged as the leader in the Third Plenum of the 11th
Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Since
then, with his management group in charge, Deng's economic
reforms have created a remarkably fast economic growth
performance. Many believe that Deng's "strong faith in
technocrats, technology and people's preoccupation with
material betterment" has been the crucial trigger for
successful reforms.' In addition, although he has not been
officially in charge of all policy-making, Deng has intervened
in economic policy-making on some important occasions, which,
in effect, underlined Deng's confirmation of persistent
' reforms and rebutted possible criticisms from the communist
conservatives. For example, Deng's Southern tour to Shenzhen
Economic Special Zone in early 1992 contributed not only
towards clearing away the uncertainty about economic reforms
1 . Lucian W. Pye, "An introductory profile: Deng Xiaoping and China's political culture",
China Quarterly, 135, (September 1993), p. 441.
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in the wake of the post-Tiananmen hard-lines, but also towards
backing the reform policy politically. Again, while Beijing
started to brake its economic growth in Summer 1993, Deng's
call to speed up economic development occupied the agenda of a
plenary session of the Chinese Communist Party's Central
Committee held in the following November.2
The reform era resulted from Deng's distancing himself
from the previous faulty economic policy initiated in late
1978 by Chen Yun and Li Xiannian with whom he closely allied
at the time. 3 That economic belief was still characterised as
"ensuring the leading role of the planned economy and making
the market economy an adjunct." 4 In 1984, Deng's decision on
urban reform and speeding up progress towards reform was
endorsed in the Third Plenum of the 12th CCP Central
Committee. The planned economy became a "planned commodity
economy" which broke away from the conventional ideology that
the commodity economy conflicted with socialism. 5 During 1987-
88, Deng repeatedly pressed ahead economic reforms and openly
praised the reformist policy in order to keep pumping energy
into the reform process.
After the 1989 Tiananmen incident, to tame the
conservatives, Deng allowed the Premier, Zhao Ziyang, to be
displaced and expediently slowed down economic reform in the
attempt to diminish the damage from the aftermath of the pro-
democracy "counter-revolution turmoil". At the beginning of
1992, Deng's intention to gear up the reform was shown in his
Southern tour to Guangdong. Deng suggested that "a planned
economy is not socialism. And a market economy is not
2 •
 
See "Politics in Command", Far Eastern Economic Review, (25 November, 1993), pp. 14-15.
3
. Barry Noughton, "Deng Xiaoping: The economist", China Quarterly, 135, (September 1993), p.
500.
4. "Dialogue on socialist market economy", Beijing Review, (26 October-1 November, 1993), p.
34.
5. Ibid.
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capitalism - there are markets under socialism as well." While
economic development and fast paced reform were becoming
pervasive, Beijing's decision-makers realised that market
forces were clearly advancing into the heart of the reform. So
they explained that "the more developed and highly socialised
commodity economy is actually a market economy." 7 During Deng's
domination of the 14th Congress of the CCP in October 1992,
the term of the "socialist market economy" was formally
introduced.8
From the long process of Deng's working up to the
"socialist market economy", one can figure out that the
reformists have been seeking for legitimacy for their reforms
and open policy. It is therefore clear that the reforms have
been characterised by Deng's personality. As many China
observers have noticed, China's economic development has been
guided through Deng's wielding influence over key circles of
power in China. 9 Maybe this one man show is the major reason
why many businessmen, in particular the Japanese, still keep a
cautious eye on China in respect of their long-term
investment. However, in the past 15 years or so, Deng himself
has realised that if the reform is to carry on in China, the
political power will have to be assumed by a group of elites
rather than	 a	 single person,	 through	 institutional
transformation processes rather than a power struggle. 113 Deng
has been continually projecting his "theory" of economic
reform to assure the continuation of the reform on his
s. Ibid. p.35
7. Ibid.
8. Ibid. p. 35, also "Dengism enshrined", Far Eastern Economic Review, (22 October, 1992),
pp. 10-11. For the detailed definition of the term "socialist market economy" see section
below.
9. This view was pointed in Barry Naughton, "Deng Xiaoping: The economist".
10.In various speeches made in the late 1980s, Deng, the "second generation" leader, has
emphasised that the reformist "third generation" team led by President Jiang has been made
ready for the transfer of power. See Deng Xiaoping Wenxuan, vol. 3, (Beijing: People's
Publishers, 1993), pp. 296-301 & 309-314.
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approved track. Deng's "theory" calls for political relaxation
in order to allow more social resources to be used in economic
development, and "let more people get rich first". 11 Part of
Deng's achievement was his shift of political attention from
the Chinese Communist Party itself and governmental
organisations to economic construction. Deng's advocacy of a
rapid growth economy and openness to the outside world was
based largely on increasing private sectors and restructuring
state sectors, which all happened in an environment of
political relaxation. Under Deng's theory the central
government will have to delegate authority to the lower level
(local) governments for economic decision-making, as part of
his idea of decentralisation of authority. 12 According to this
idea, there appear to be: five special economic zones (SEZ);
the fifteen coastal open cities; and the three estuary areas
supporting the above SEZ and some coastal cities." In this
context of economic incentives largely released from political
constraints, the coastal area quickly follows the pace of the
market economy to tie firmly in with world markets. The
coastal provinces, have, to some extent, become autonomous in
terms of economic decision-making regardless of central
government's economic retrenchment since 1988. They have soon
taken outward-looking economic approaches in place of the
previous national policy of import substitution. Deng's credit
The main points of speeches made in Wuchan, Shenzhen, Zhuhai, Shanghai, in the visits from
18 January to 21 February 1992, Deng Xiaoping Wenxuan, vol. 3, p. 374.
Refer to Barry Noughton, "Deng Xiaoping: The economist", p. 504.
The five SEZs: Hainan, Shenzhen, Zhuhai, Shantou, and Xiamen; the fifteen coastal cities:
Dalian, Qinghungdao, Tianjing, Yantai, Jinan, Qingdao, Lianyungang, Nantong, Shanghai,
Ningbo, Wengzhou, Fuzhou, Guangzhou, Zhangjiang, and Beihai city; the three estuary areas:
Zhangjiang Delta, Zhejiang Delta, and Minnan Triangle District. For details see Huongfan
Jin, "China's open door policy and Asian-Pacific economic cooperation", The Korean Journal
of International Studies, 22, (1990), pp. 128-129.
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for economic reform was once again seen in allowing provincial
economic plans and the private economy to go forward.14
The Tiananmen incident, which was seen by China's old
guard, e.g. Chen Yun (member of Politburo Standing Committee,
the CCP Central Committee 1978-1985), Peng Zhen, (Chairman of
Standing Committee, National People's Congress in 1983) and Bo
Yibo (Deputy-chairman of Central Commission for Guiding Party
Rectification, the CCP 1983-1987), as a threat to their power,
had resulted in the hardliners on the rise retrenching against
further reform. In addition, as they witnessed the collapse of
communism later the year in Eastern Europe and Mongolia, the
hardliners were trying to move the clock back by taking up
conservative policies. As one commentator succinctly noted:
"the latter half of 1989 and first half of 1990 represented a
return to the ruling techniques of old." 15 The Premier Zhao
Ziyang, the major practicer of Deng's theory, who was made a
scapegoat of the democratic upheaval for Deng, stepped down as
a result of being blamed for causing the chaos.
Nevertheless, the conservatives themselves found shortly
that their policies did not accord with the developing reality
of China's growing economy and the rising expectations of
civil society in which political relaxation was becoming more
general. Widespread passive resistance appeared, as a result,
in the shape of:
"enterprises and localities that failed to remit taxes to
central authorities; provinces that balked at reasserted
central control; work stoppages and increased worker
absenteeism; intellectuals and urban residents who
feigned compliance with post-Tiananmen investigations;
14. Deng's speeches in 12 June 1987 and 25 May 1988 encouraged provincial governments to speed
up the reform. See Deng Alaoping Wenxuan, vol. 3, pp.236-243 & 264-265.
15. David Shambaugh, "China in 1990: the year of damage control", Asian Survey, 31: 1,
(January 1991), P. 48.
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cadres who failed to implement ideological campaigns; and
ordinary consumers who voted with their pocketbooks by
hoarding savings. "16
Apart from the general passive resistance in China, the
demands of the international market and international
political sanctions against the Chinese government for the
Tiananmen incident reminded the hardliners that China can not
be isolated from world society. 1990 was described as a year
"in which China demonstrated the decisive power of a decade of
reformist change" and "facing considerable domestic and
international pressure, the leadership had no choice but to
bow to the reality that China had qualitatively changed during
the 1980s." 17 Those factors maybe helped to force China's
policies to swing back to reformist approaches. Deng himself
delights to see and advocate speeding up the reform process.
Consequently, as part of re-generating his reforms, Deng in
April 1991 promoted some provincial elites with strongly
reformist outlooks into the power centre of Beijing, e.g. the
Vice-Premier Zhu Rongji (former Shanghai Mayor), and the Vice-
Chairman of Chinese People's Political Consultative
Conference, Ye Xuanping (former Guangdong Governor). This is
evidence that, in the post-Tiananmen political situation, the
conservative approach in leadership has been reversed in
favour of the reformist. 18 Furthermore, the so-called "cross
century leading team" was decided in the 14th Congress of the
CCP in October 1992 and later ratified by the 8th National
People's Congress in favour of the reformists: Jiang Zemin,
the President; Li peng, the Premier; Qiao Shi, the Chairman of
National People's Congress, and Li Ruihuan, the Chairman of
16 •
 Ibid., pp. 48-49.
17. Ibid., p. 49.
18. Tai Ming Cheung, "The wind changes: reformists favoured in appointments to state council",
Far Eastern Economic Review, (18 April, 1991), p. 12.
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Political Coordination. The signs for persistent reform have
been greatly reinforced by the retreat of the old guards and
their associates from this team.
In the past 15 years of China's reform, there have been
clear indications that within the Chinese leadership there has
existed a main division, or factionalism. 19 The division is
between Deng's reformists, "who believe that economic reform
is essential to maintain the communist party in power and keep
China socialist," and "those who believe that market
orientated reforms endanger both these aims."" Some have tried
to categorise the division of Chinese leaders, according to
their political stands. 21 Although most scholars tend to agree
that economic liberalisation has a close linkage with
political democratization, many still doubt that China's
economic reforms approaching towards the market economy will
create pressures for political freedom. 22 This contradiction of
the theory and the reality in China may well reflect the
diverse beliefs of Beijing's leaders, and perhaps tell the
reason why economic reforms have implied exploitation and
experiment rather than a planned goal.
While the Tiananmen incident, from the hardliners' point
of view, was evidence of economic liberalisation leading to
political demands, the reformists assume that persistent
economic reform is the only way forward for the party and
socialism in China. Deng's reformist approach is more close to
19.Richard Baum, "Political stability in Post-Deng China: problems and prospects", Asian
Survey, 32: 6, (June 1992), pp. 491-505.
20. Ian Jeffries, Socialist Economies and the Transition to the Market, (London: Routledge,
1993), p. 172.
21.Such as: Baum's three main policy clusters: a neo-Maoist anti-reform group, a
bureaucratic-conservative group, and a more progressive market-reform group. R. Baum,
"Political stability", (June 1992), p. 494; Shambaugh's political alignment in the CCP:
Ultra-conservatives, "soft" conservatives, moderates, and reformists. See Shambaugh,
"China in 1991: living cautiously", Asian Survey, 32: 1, (January 1992), pp. 19-31.
Argument about social change with this linkage has been widely recognised. See Elizabeth
J. Perry, "China in 1992", Asian Survey, 33: 1, (January 1993).
22.
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the reality of China's economic development today. The
immediate political effect for Deng has been the safeguarding
of the communist party's position in China. It is,
nevertheless, true that the current economic reforms in China
have not been given official credit for carrying out political
reforms. In reality, through economic reform and open door
policy, Chinese society has been turning to a "shadow
pluralism" which could gradually transform the social and even
the political system.23
One of the main concerns inside Beijing has been the
relationship between the central and provincial governments.
Since the early 1980s, fiscal and administrative
decentralisation has brought about autonoMous provincial and
local qovernments in China with increasingly independent
ability in economic policy-making, which has resulted in their
disregarding many of Beijing's regulations, mainly about
economic growth speed and profit-sharing schemes. Although the
central government has proposed some austerity programmes
proposed since 1988 to tighten up its grip on economic policy
in coping with inflation, unequal income distribution, and
inappropriate budget sharing caused by the overheated economy,
it is yet to be seen how far the provincial initiatives of
"bold development" will be restrained. Especially in the
Southern Chinese provinces, the pioneering and successful
examples of China's economic reforms, led by Guangdong and
followed by Fujien, have continued to go their own ways, in
spite of Beijing's attempts to reassert central contro1.24
While the Southern Chinese provinces' "bold development" in
economics has stemmed largely from Deng's "theory" stimulating
23.Gordon White, Riding The Tiger: The Politics of Economic Reform In Post-Mao China,
(London: Macmillan, 1993), p. 236.
24.For a series of special reports on Chinese provincial autonomy challenging the centre, see
Far Eastern Economic Review, (4 April, 1991), pp. 21-30.
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rapid economic growth, Beijing's wish to control the pace of
economic reform has never been far in doubt. As provincial and
local governments in China have obtained the initiative on
economic policy in favour of deepening and widening reforms,
this policy orientation has provided a favourable political
background for Southern China's economy to be able to link
firmly with Hong Kong and Taiwan, in terms of trade,
industries, and technologies.
The political change in China, though not an official
initiative, has been the interaction of two forces: briefly,
market and state. 25 While China's leaders have realised that
market forces constitute the drive for economic development,
the legacy of the planned economy provided by the Communist
Party remains the core of reforms. Accordingly, in October
1992, in the 14th Congress of the CCP and, in November 1993,
in the 3rd Plenum of the 14th CCP's Central Committee, state-
owned enterprises, with which the hardliners are concerned,
were still emphasised as the core of the economic reform, with
a complement of private enterprises. But, the central
government has not been able to keep pace with provincial
governments on economic development, although the former has
time and again issued directives to slow down the overheated
economy. There is an uncertainty about how far Deng's
toleration of the provinces' going it alone will prove to be a
temporary expediency, and when the central government would
want to regain economic authority over provinces. Should that
be the case, the present reform and open approach would be in
danger. In the 3rd Plenum of the 14th Central Committee of the
CCP, the attempt to strengthen the leadership and reinstate
the supremacy of the party have been endorsed as a necessity
25
. Gordon White, Riding The Tiger: The Politics of Economic Reform In Post-Mao China, p. 238.
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on China's way to further economic development towards a
market economy. 26
The earlier reformist strategy was that the reform was a
means to introduce an "open policy" in order to generate
enough foreign resources for China's economic development, and
at the same time allowed foreign investors to take advantage
of China's growing economy. As far as the reform is concerned,
China's economy increasingly intertwines with the market
forces of the world economy. In the early 1990s, the results
of the open policy have been pushing forward the reform
process. Politically, the reformist approach which relies on
market economies has, on the one hand, implications for the
fate of the reformists in the context of Beijing's power
struggle against the hardliners; and it has, on the other
hand, provided a kickstarter for China's fast growing economy
and, thus, favourable circumstances for the birth of the CEA.
Especially, as economic and social transactions have been
intensified across China, Taiwan and Hong Kong, there appear
to be common interests over commercial links. While the Bush
administration of the United States, for example, approved
unconditional renewal of the most-favoured-nations' (MFN)
trade status for China's exports to the US in 1991 and 1992,
increasing pressure from Congress to reduce the trade deficit
with China has made it clear that the White House should
reconsider trade policy with China. The present US President
Clinton is said to link the renewal of the MFN for China with
China's human rights performance. 27 This worries all Chinese
enterprises targeting the American market, including many from
Hong Kong and Taiwan. Without the MFN, goods from China will
26.See "Decision of the CPC Central Committee on some issues concerning the establishment of
a socialist market economic structure", Beijing Review, 36: 47, (22-28 November, 1993).
27.Nayan Chanda, "Misguided complacency", Far Eastern Economic Review, (18 November, 1993),
p. 22.
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face new tariffs increased from 9-50 per cent. 28 The negative
impact of withdrawing China's entitlement for the MFN on Hong
Kong would cost 43,000 jobs and US$1.2 billion income in the
first year of its enforcement.29
Unquestionably, so far, Deng's efforts for economic
reforms have created a favourable political impetus to the
formation of the CEA. When Deng Xiao-Ping dies, it is
uncertain which way China will go. The major "weakness" which
communism has suffered is that there are no rules for the
power succession within the Party itself apart from power
struggles which may have planted a landmine in the future of
China's reforms. There is an unpredictable political scenario
ahead. Nevertheless, it is sure that Deng will leave the scene
with a strong collective leadership of the reformist mind in
place guarded by his reformist "theory" for China's
development, and perhaps for the CEA.
6.1.2. Hong Kong: A Hope for Living away from Crisis
Hong Kong's development of its China linkages is not
based on political incentives, but rather on historical and
practical demands, economic incentives. Unlike Taiwan with
regard to China, Hong Kong under British colonial rule, though
it has never had democracy, has not been politically
restrained, and perhaps actually it is not necessary to
concern itself with political issues in developing its
relationships with China. Even in Chairman Mao Zedong's self-
28. John P. Burns, "Hong Kong in 1992: Struggle for authority", Asian Survey; 33: 1, (January
1993), p. 31.
29. For full discussion of the negative effects to China, and Hong Kong, as well as the US
itself see House of Representatives, "Renewal of MFN trading status for the People's
Republic of China", Hearing and Markup before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, 102nd
Congress, 1st Session, Washington, 26 June, 1991, pp.15-17.
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reliant period, Hong Kong was an important trading partner for
China. Economically, Hong Kong's position as a middleman for
Taiwanese, overseas Chinese, and many other foreign
entrepreneurs to link with China, gives it prominence in the
formation of the CEA. On the whole, in the formation of the
CEA, Hong Kong has been politically in a passive position to
be swirled into the focal point of the "Greater China" in
contrast to its economic dynamics. Whatever its political
reservations, Hong Kong will soon be a Special Administrative
Region of China as stipulated in the 1984 Sino-British Joint
Declaration, the basis of China's drafting a Basic Law for
Hong Kong. According to the Basic Law, China is entitled to
appoint the future Hong Kong chief executive and other senior
officials. Since the Basic Law ratified by China's National
People's Congress in April 1990, people in Hong Kong have been
very suspicious of China's bona fides, because Beijing's
willingness to pilot Hong Kong's future by its own track has
been obvious at the expense of Hong Kong's democratic demands.
During most of China's reforms of the 1980s, Hong Kong
increasingly deepened and speeded up its all round ties with
China. After passing through a short period of shattered
confidence about its future soon after the Sino-British Joint
Declaration, Hong Kong regained initiative in its economic
dynamics a couple of years later. Since the Joint Declaration
left the details of the transition to be negotiated between
China and Britain, negotiations beginning in 1988 have so far
brought serious disagreement over Hong Kong's system of
government after 1997. The present Hong Kong governor, Chris
Patten, proposed a constitutional reform in Hong Kong in
October 1992, which has provoked a new round of reprimands
from Beijing. In his reform proposals, he has tried to alter
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the composition of the Executive and Legislative Councils and
their relationships to each other." As far as China is
concerned, the most threatening feature of these reform
proposals, which are attempting to put forward a more
democratic power base through people's direct election to the
Legislative Councils, is not so much in the proposal itself,
but in the way of introducing it. Chinese officials respond
strongly to the proposals "not because they advance democracy
in Hong Kong but because they provide a concrete basis for a
struggle over the exercise of authority over Hong Kong during
the transition." 31 The British government alleges that the
proposals have been made to comply with the demands by the
growing middle class for a more democratic system. For
example, the change of the current Hong Kong political system
has been regarded by the United Democrats, the first real
political party, as a necessary warranty for Hong Kong's
autonomy and prosperity under the Chinese reign.
However, China remains very suspicious of the British
attempt to speed up Hong Kong's change to democracy just
before its return to China, while this had been intentionally
ignored by Britain in the past. The distrust has been based on
general Chinese Communist Party's perceptions of Britain.
Chinese leaders' belief that the main British interest in Hong
Kong is to extract large sums of money has beset every round
of their negotiations. 32 By the end of 1993, the 17 rounds of
negotiations have not yet brought the two to compromise over
their differences. 33 China continuously criticises Britain for
3°. For details see John Burns, "Hong Kong in 1992", pp. 26-29.
31. Ibid., p. 27.
32.About Chinese perceptions of Britain, Michael Yahuda's survey has sketched out a general
picture of what the British believe. See Yahuda, "Hong Kong's future: Sino-British
negotiations, perceptions, organisation and political culture", International Affairs, 69:
2, (1993), pp. 252-256.
33.For the historic review of the Sino-British negotiations see Yahuda's analysis, Ibid., pp.
245-252.
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doing little to reach agreement and threatens economic chaos
for Hong Kong if need be. 34 Governor Patten insisted on
pressing ahead with electoral reform regardless of Chinese
opposition, and on 23 February 1994, the vote in Hong Kong's
Legislative Council showed the margin of support for his
reform. As a result, enraged Beijing has stepped up its
repudiation of the British action and has pledged to abolish
any political arrangements made without its consent. In doing
so, China has showed its design for its favoured future
political structure for Hong Kong by emphasising the
importance of the Preliminary Working Committee (PWC), a group
of 57 Chinese officials and Hong Kong plutocrats. 35 This
confrontation between the two parties has cast a long shadow
over Hong Kong's future. In spite of the political disputes
obscuring the bright future, Hong Kong's economic links with
China have steadily intensified, as many Hong Kong businessmen
agree that "economic alliance (with China) will be the best
guarantee of future liberties."35
Since Hong Kong has been one of the most private-
orientated economies in the world with literally no
governmental intervention in a laissez-faire system, the Hong
Kong government's, in fact the British government's, policy
does not direct the colonial business community in any way. In
this respect, Hong Kong has remained largely a community of
capitalism and open markets. "People generally were satisfied
with the administration. Although they lacked self-government
Britain provided a rule of law that respected human rights,
offered plentiful economic freedoms and maintained social and
34. The economic connection between China and Hong Kong has made this threatening suggestion
unlikely to come about. See The Economist, (18 December, 1993), pp. 16 and 68-70.
35. Financial Times, (25 February, 1994), p. 6
36. This view has been shared by the Liberal Party, supported by Conservative big business
forces, and the Business and Professional Federation. James Walsh, "The ties that bind",
Time, (21 March, 1994), p. 35.
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political stability." 37 This means that political developments
in Hong Kong itself, particularly the pre-1997 democratic
movement, do not happen to be a necessary condition for the
Hong Kong business community to develop close relationships
with China and Taiwan.
In fact, due to Hong Kong's profit-orientated society,
the uncertainty about the pending negotiation between China
and Britain has, to some extent, brought about a sense of
crisis in doing business with Hong Kong. Therefore, a backfire
effect emerges within the business community which is
demanding a predictable and stable economic future. Whatever
political commitment to Hong Kong's future will come about, it
is clear for Hong Kong itself that its last trump to play with
China has been establishing an economic grouping. Namely,
deepening economic cooperation with China, Guangdong in
particular, and Taiwan through trade, investment, and
industrial unity, Hong Kong could, thus, bring itself the only
hope of maintaining the present prosperity for as long a
period as possible. While intensive economic cooperation may
be heading towards economic integration between China, Taiwan
and Hong Kong, the "three Chinas" could thus find themselves
well positioned in a complementary economic structure, i.e.:
Hong Kong: finance and service centre; Taiwan: R & D and
management centre; and China: manufacturing centre and market.
Pragmatically, Hong Kong can therefore maintain its
leading role as a gateway, as it is now, for China's economic
development, if Hong Kong is able to pursue successfully the
formation of the CEA. It seems very likely that any political
compromise brought about by Britain and China could assure
Hong Kong's future less than could the firm establishment of
37
. Penelope Hartland -Thunberg, China, Hong Kong, Taiwan and the World Trading System,
(London: Macmillan, 1991), P. 104.
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an economic grouping. Two arguments which concern Hong Kong's
role in the CEA have been brought to focus on Hong Kong for
some time. Firstly, whether full democracy and universal
suffrage in Hong Kong after 1997 are really able to guarantee
its autonomy away from Beijing, the United Democrats believe
that this political issue is a crucial factor if Hong Kong is
to retain prosperity and autonomy. Further, they "have
attempted to strengthen the accountability of the Hong Kong
government through its Legislative Council." 38 On the other
hand, a pragmatic approach has emerged from the business
community which is increasingly shared by people in general in
Hong Kong, which has thrown doubt upon any attempt to
challenge Beijing's weight over Hong Kong. Instead, the Hong
Kong business community, which is more concerned with
practical economic performances and their relationships with
China, argues that the only common interest between Britain,
China, and Hong Kong on shaping Hong Kong's future has been,
so far, to encourage Hong Kong's current economic performance
to persist.
For example, Linus Cheung, deputy managing director of
Cathay Pacific Airways, one of the Hong Kong businessmen
optimistic about Chinese rule, has said "[M]y understanding of
China's policy toward Hong Kong is that they will be receptive
to anything that will further its stability and prosperity.
There is no reason to destroy a success story." 38 Moreover, the
business community suggests that "there is no need to upset
China and give Hong Kong democracy, when the colony has
thrived without democracy for the past 95 years. " 40 Businessmen
in Hong Kong, therefore, would rather acquire a solid ground
38. John Burns, "Hong Kong in 1992", Asian Survey, 33: 1, (January 1993), p. 24.
39. Mark Clifford, "Mainland Bounty", Far Eastern Economic Review, (27 January, 1994), p. 40.
40. Lulu Yu, "Business and democracy compete to shape future of Hong Kong", The Times, (31
December, 1992), p. 25.
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in economic affairs from China than keep pressing ahead with
demands to China for more political concessions. Even the
chairman of the British-run Swire Pacific, Peter Sutch, has
expressed the same message to that of the Hong Kong business
community. He said: "We as businessmen in Hong Kong see our
role as continuing to invest here and in China. That is as
good a guarantee of future prosperity and stability as
anything else." 41 Simply, there is a possibility that whenever
China takes Hong Kong under its rule, any political commitment
prior to this change could be dismantled. This has been warned
time and again by Beijing. 42 In protesting against the
unilateral British proposals for Hong Kong's future political
structure, China has not only seriously threatened to abolish
any political arrangements made without their consent, 43 but
has also quickened the pace of preparing for the handover by
pushing the PWC to draft an outline of Hong Kong's post-
colonial political structure.44
As many Chinese government units, enterprises, individual
officials, and personal families have profited by means of the
links with Hong Kong during the 1980s, they have in growing
numbers shared the Hong Kong business community's pragmatic
thinking about persistent prosperity. It has been pointed out
that "these personal family interests provide some assurance
that the Chinese government will not purposely kill the goose
that lays the golden eggs that so many influential families
have in their personal nests." 45 To maintain this through
existing economic networks of interdependence, Hong Kong, as
41. Mark Clifford, "Back to China", Far Eastern Economic Review, (27 January, 1994), P. 40.
42. Lulu Yu, "Business and democracy compete to shape future of Hong Kong", p. 25.
43• The Economist, (18 December, 1993), p. 16. and Central Daily News, International Edition,
(18 December, 1993).
44. See Simon Holberton, "Riding to the future on a Hong Kong Harley", Financial Times, (14
February, 1994), p. 5.
45.
Kenneth Lieberthal, "The future of Hong Kong", Asian Survey, 32: 7, (July 1992), pp. 670-
671.
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China's matchmaker, is able to marry China to Taiwan and the
rest of the world. Hong Kong's capitalist society will, hence,
be preserved, whilst China's interests become increasingly
intertwined with transactions with Hong Kong. Likewise,
China's "socialist market economy" will be evolving peacefully
into .a more capitalist market economy.
How important is the democratic system for Hong Kong's
free economy? In the past, Hong Kong's economic performances
were not based on a democratic system, but rather on an
efficient administration. Therefore, there are plenty of
grounds for questioning why people in Hong Kong ought now to
seek for a democratic system which may unwisely risk a
retaliation from Beijing. Will Hong Kong still be as
prosperous as it is now after China's "one country, two
systems" rule is in place? Nobody seems to be sure about
whether a democratic reform in Hong Kong will do anything to
help in securing Hong Kong's prosperity. At least, a
democratic system based on representing people in Hong Kong
could serve as a bargaining chip in balancing Beijing's power,
especially, as Beijing has bowed to provincial and local
governments in economic policy, as a result of economic
reforms in China.
Hong Kong has long been within the British "one country,
two systems" context of colonial rule. Politically, Hong Kong
has had no parliament and its people could not vote.
Economically, "while the British economy was subject to much
government ownership, control, and interference, Hong Kong
operated a free enterprise, free-trade system that was
arguably the most private-sector oriented economy in the
world." 46 Many entrepreneurs, mainly the Business and
46
. Penelope Hartland-Thunberg, China, Bong Kong, Taiwan and the World Trading System, 1990,
p. 99.
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Professional Federation, and the public have begun to worry
that the row between Britain and China may bring a backlash
against their future, and they have turned against the
governor's new reform proposals. 47 One entrepreneur states
directly that "Hong Kong has never been democratic during 150
years of British rule, and this is not the time to start."48
6.1.3. Democratisation and Taipei's Mainland China Policy
Political Reform and the Progressive Mainland Policy
In July 1987, in response to social and economic changes
in Taiwan, its late president Chiang Ching-Kuo decided to lift
the 38-year-old Emergency Decree, which placed the society in
a status of war against communist China. In November 1987, the
Taipei government released the policy restraint on Taiwan
residents from visiting their relatives in mainland China for
considerations of humanity. This has marked a new page in the
relationships between China and Taiwan since 1949, the year
when "China" became legally divided into "two Chinas". At the
same time, the process of democratisation in Taiwan was
further strengthened by lifting the ban on newspapers, and the
establishment of opposition parties. 49 Six years on, with
Taiwan's political development underpining the relationships
across the Taiwan Strait, the intensifying transactions, which
have occurred in economic, social, cultural sectors, and, to a
lesser extent, in the political domain (by quasi-official
approval) between China and Taiwan, have not only greatly
improved their mutual understanding and benefits, but also
47,John Burns, "Hong Kong in 1992", 1993, p. 28.
48, "Going it alone", Time, (13 December, 1993), p. 33.
49 . Republic of China Yearbook, 1990-1991, p. 198.
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strongly enhanced their willingness to cooperate with each
other in an unprecedented progress.
Although the new relationship with mainland China has
boosted a prolonged hope for peaceful unification in both
Taiwan and China, it has also stirred up political controversy
in Taiwan over acceptance of "one China" or "one China, one
Taiwan" between the ruling party, the Kuomingtang (KMT) and
the opposition party, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP)."
The China ties have long appeared to have a love-hate
ambivalence in Taipei's political agenda. While the KMT
remains insistent in its claim of sovereignty over China and
the hope for national unification, the DPP, once in power,
prepares to cut away this Chinese umbilical cord from Taiwan.
This would, the DPP assumes, allow Taiwan to get rid of the
effect of "one China" thinking on the fundamental problems of
Taiwan's constitutional structure and foreign relations.
Since early 1988, the president Lee Teng-Hui, also the
KMT's chairman, has included the reform of political life
among his approaches to constitutional reform in general and
to his reappraisal of the mainland policy in particular. In
terms of the mainland policy, the reform's immediate effect
has been in accelerating Taipei's policy towards a more
practical one. The increasing transactions between China and
Taiwan have derived from this. When President Lee took power
in early 1988, the major task of the constitutional reform was
to allow the re-election of the members of the so-called
"eternal congresses" whose original members had not been re-
elected in order to maintain the Taipei government's
50. "One China", as it is interpreted by the KMT, means the Republic of China which contains
Mainland China, Taiwan, and even Mongolia. That is where Taipei's goal for national
unification stems from and coincides with China's "one China". The DPP prefers "one China,
one Taiwan", which implies that Taiwan will be independent from the "myth" of "one China"
to establish a complete new country with the name of the Republic of Taiwan or the like.
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legitimacy in China since the first election in 1947 which had
been held in the mainland. 51 The conservatives inside the KMT
used to claim that those members of the "eternal congresses"
represented their constituencies in mainland China which had
been occupied "illegitimately" by an "insurgent group", the
Chinese Communist Party. The claim, presumably, assisted the
KMT not only to stress Taipei's legitimacy over the whole of
China but also endorsed the ROC as the only "one China" in
international society. From this point of view, any attempt to
reform this "distorted" constitutional structure would be
blameworthy for breaking China up.
Before the presidential election in May 1990, people
demanded the dissolution of the National Assembly, the
abolition of the "Temporary Provisions Act", a timetable on
Taiwan's political restructuring, and convening a National
Affairs Conference to schedule constitutional reform. As the
reform continued to be pressed ahead, at the end of 1991, an
election based on constituencies in Taiwan was held for new
members of the National Assembly. The decision to hold the
election has marked an end of an essential element of the
outdated political myth on which the Taipei government's
constant claims for its de jure sovereignty over China has
been based. Further, the following year, another general
election for the members of the Legislative Yuan was held.
51. According to the constitution of the Republic of China issued on 25 December, 1945, in the
then Capital Nanking, the government structure is composed of five Yuans, Executive,
Legislative, Judicial, Examination, and Control Yuans, under the lead of the president
indirectly elected by the National Assembly. The "eternal congresses" which included the
members of the Legislative Yuan, the Control Yuan, and the National Assembly were seen as
a symbol of political legitimacy. In 1969 the first partial election for the new members
of the National Assembly was held. The Control Yuan elected two new members in the same
year. In addition, in 1975 the first by-election of the Legislative Yuan allowed 52 new
members to be elected directly from constituencies in Taiwan. For a brief discussion of
the processes of re-electing the "eternal congresses" see Republic of China Yearbook,
1990-1991, pp. 110-114, 118-120, 128-130.
292
While President Lee's reform has brought credit to the
government over the issue of constitutional legitimacy,
increasing criticism has poured over Lee's intention to pursue
a programme of "two Chinas". President Lee, described by the
conservatives as pursuing the policy for "Du Tai" which
implies withdrawing the claim of sovereignty over the whole of
China and at the same time recognising the Beijing regime, has
resulted in a split of ideology within the KMT: the Taiwan
wing and the "one China" wing, or the main stream and the non-
main stream. 52 However, that does not imply that the "one
China" policy has been officially changed in Taipei. Lee's
reformist approaches have brought about a pragmatic attitude
that has bolstered an effort to establish "one China, two
governments" or "one China, two areas", which places the
Beijing and Taipei government on equal footings, without risk
of changing the existing "one China" policy. 53 An official
document clearly states that "the ROC government's 'one China'
policy is a policy that acknowledges division, promotes
exchanges, and seeks unification."54
Indeed, Lee's pragmatism in the exercise of these foreign
and mainland policies appears to have two profound
implications for Taipei's politics. Firstly, his recognition
of de facto "two Chinas", based on a nominal "one China",
could keep his constitutional reform proposals safe from sharp
52. The "Du Tai" criticism claims that the Taipei government will recognise its current
effective sovereignty over Taiwan and Kinmen, Matsu Islands only, and be keeping the
national name as the RepubliC of China. In contrast, the OOP's "Tai Du" has tended to
establish a new Taiwan Republic. In the "one China" understanding, the Taiwan wing tends
to see "one China" means the ROC and recognises the "two Chinas" reality of China's
division since 1949. The "one China" wing worries that the passive policy towards
unification may lead to a permanent division. For full discussion about "one China" and
"two Chinas" policy see Julian Baum, "Parting of the ways", Far Eastern Economic Review,
(12 November, 1992), pp. 16-18; also "Split in the ranks", Far Eastern Economic Review,
(24-31 December 1992), p. 25.
53.See discussion in Jurgen Domes, "Taiwan in 1991: searching for political consensus", Asian
Survey, 32: 1, (January 1992), pp. 45-46.
54.See "The Republic of China's 'One China' policy", Reference: ROC on Taiwan, RR-92-07, (10
November, 1992).
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criticism in his reorganisation of a central governmental
structure based on Taiwan itself rather than on its proclaimed
constituencies in mainland China. President Lee has been
skillful in manoeuvring the reform process while confirming
the "one China" policy at the same time. In February 1991, the
Guidelines for National Unification were made the guiding
principles of the government's mainland policy, which was
composed of four parts, i.e.: one unified China; two
equivalent political entities on the two sides of the Taiwan
Strait; three phases: the short term - exchange and
reciprocity, the medium term - mutual trust and cooperation,
the long term - consultation and unification; and four
principles of reason, peace, parity, and reciprocity. 55 After
the overall re-election of both the National Assembly and the
Legislative Yuan in 1991 and 1992 respectively, the
president's reform programme with confirming "one China" has
not only been able to reduce political intensity in Taipei and
between Taiwan and China, but has also indirectly shown up the
awkward situation Taipei has had in its policy stand. In this
way, the president may have already sown a seed for reform
towards further restructuring.
Secondly, the Taipei government has adopted a practical
approach which is helping to making up its own say on its
international status. In contrast to conventional diplomacy,
this has considerably facilitated the country's pursuit of
"substantive diplomacy" through economic gears. Since Taipei's
diplomacy has long been overshadowed by China's power in
international politics, Taipei is not yet able to make its own
55
. "The Key Points and Content of the Guidelines for National Unification", Mainland Affairs
Council, The Executive Yuan, R. 0. C., 1991.
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way without being intimidated by Beijing. % Although China and
Taiwan have brought their stands together on "one China",
China places the two of them in a centre-periphery hierarchy,
while Taiwan insists on an equal status. In real terms,
Taipei's foreign policy is based upon its moving forward of
mainland policy. This makes Taipei's decision-making on
foreign policy very vulnerable to Beijing's threats. In the
case of application for membership of the United Nations, for
instance, whatever Taipei's efforts there recently, it seems
to be hopeless so far for Taipei to enter through the formal
procedure of application, because Beijing's boycott will
certainly kill any attempt of Taipei to get access to the UN.
(China is one of the five permanent members in the Security
Council.) The lesson taught in the case of the United Nations
reminds Taipei that it would be very wise, instead, to
negotiate directly with Beijing in order to bring the quarrels
between the "two Chinas" to a peaceful solution, before any
further progress can be achieved. It seems to Taipei that
there will be no breakthrough by means of conventional
diplomacy before the "two Chinas" issue is first settled.
Indeed, for years, Beijing has been trying to redirect
Taipei's diplomatic efforts towards direct negotiation between
the two ruling parties, the KMT and CCP. Increasing economic
transactions between the two in the past few years have made
official contacts more likely to come about.
Knowing the difficulty, Taipei's pragmatic approach in
adopting the "one China, two governments" formula or a similar
one has suggested ways in which to diversify its foreign
policy from mainland policy. Although there is still
56
. For Beijing's blunt and acrimonious charges in this issue see the document, "The Taiwan
Question and Reunification of China", by Taiwan Affairs Office & Information Office, State
Council, in August 1993, Beijing Review, 36: 36, (6-12 September, 1993), documents part.
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indifference about "dual recognition" in international
politics today due to Beijing's strong objections, Taipei has
been the more practical in relinquishing its "one China"
insistence in practical diplomacy to accommodate the reality
of "two Chinas". This has given Taipei credit in developing
new ties with other countries. 57
 For example, on his way to
visit Singapore in March 1989 President Lee commented on the
Singaporean media calling him "the President from Taiwan",
instead of "the President of the Republic of China". He said
that although he disagreed with what he had been called, he
could still accept it." Instigated by the president's "summit
diplomacy", Taipei has launched a "Southward policy" targeting
economic and trade relationships with the Association of South
East Asian Nations countries.59
Unification? Taiwanese Independence? the Chinese Economic
Area?
Apart from economic transactions, there are many
indicators such as the rapid increases of numbers of letters
exchanged, phone calls made, and tourist visits between China
and Taiwan, that have together suggested a general trend of
transactions which is very likely to intensify in the present
situation. According to the statistics, letters sent from
Taiwan to China amounted to 1.98 million in 1988, and hit 6.04
million in 1991. In contrast, letters sent from China to
Taiwan amounted to 2.03 million in 1988, and 8.8 million in
1991. While phone calls made from Mainland to Taiwan amounted
57.Taiwan's recent major diplomatic breakthrough see "Ancient fears", Far Eastern Economic
Review, (3 December, 1992), p. 8; "China, Taiwan and hurt feelings", The Economist, (19
February, 1994), pp. 73-74.
58.See the special report for Lee Teng-Hui's performances in three years presidentship in
Central Daily, International Edition, (20 May, 1993), and more comments on the president's
policy in the press conference see Central Daily, International Edition, (22 May, 1993).
59. "China, Taiwan and hurt feelings", p.73-74; various reports about President Lee's "holiday
diplomacy" in Central Daily News, International Edition, (8 February - 18 February, 1994).
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to 0.77 million time in 1989, and increased to 8.02 million in
1991, Taiwanese calls made to Mainland amounted to 0.73
million in 1989 and jumped up to 14 million in 1992 (not
including December). Taiwanese tourists to China via Hong Kong
amounted to 0.43 million in 1988, and 2.8 million in 1991. 60 In
response to mounting pressures from the public in general, and
the business community in particular, for regulating the
increasing transaction flows between China, Hong Kong, and
Taiwan, Taipei has worked hard to ease tension across the
Taiwan Strait. This has been recognised as a positive impetus
towards improving the relationship between Beijing and
Taipei. 61 Particularly, instead of being passive towards China
as in the past, Taipei's political stance to Beijing, backed
by a series of political reforms at home, has been rather
active in initiating programmes. For example, in policy,
Taipei's fresh "no winner, no loser" stand in meeting
Beijing's "zero-sum" strategy; in practice, institutionalising
the contacts between China and Taiwan by setting up the quasi-
official Strait Exchange Foundation (SEF).
The substantial increase of contacts has brought about a
serious contest between arguments for unification and for
independence in Taiwan. Against the political reform context
in Taiwan, there is a big question mark over what Taiwan's
interest will be in pursuing unification, particularly for
those who favour developing links with China. As the KMT
carries on the "nativisation" of the leadership with more
native Taiwanese emerging on the scene, scepticism about the
60.This information is based on the Directorate General of Posts, and the Directorate General
of Telecommunication, the Ministry of Communications, R. 0. C. for mails and phone calls.
About the tourists, the information was estimated by Hong Kong China Travel Agent. See
"Lian An Gin Gi Fen Shi Bao Gou" (Economic Analysis Report on Two Sides of the Taiwan
Strait), Mainland Affairs Council, Executive Yuan, R. 0. C. January 1993.
61.Peter Wickenden, "Taiwan's bridge to the mainland", Financial Times, (30 April, 1991), p.
21 and also "Taiwan clears path for improved links with China", Financial Times, (21 May,
1991), p. 6.
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Chinese unification is rising not only in the opposition
party, but also in the KMT itself. The pragmatic approach in
Taipei has taken this potential uncertainty into account by
leaving unification to evolve over generations, although the
government is still making unification in principle an
eventual national goal.
In terms of political belief in Taiwan's destiny, the KMT
has been placed in the unification-independence tug of war
between Beijing and the DPP. In this respect, Beijing appears
to be sharing the KMT's intentions about unification against
those of the DPP. Ever since its emergence, the DPP has been
continuously advocating self-determination, and pressing the
government for a referendum to decide Taiwan's future over
independence. Since 1988, there have been some resolutions
passed by the DPP advocating independence and acknowledging
the separation from China. By the end of 1991 for the critical
election of the National Assembly, the DPP's assertion of
independence was brought to a new pitch by raising the slogan
of "Republic of Taiwan", producing the "Draft Constitution of
Taiwan" and staging a public demonstration demanding that
government should apply for the United Nations' membership
immediately. More controversially in October 1991, the DPP
formally adopted the resolution to include the Taiwan
independence clause into its party manifesto for the election
campaign. That political move was blamed for a sharp plunge of
the stock market and of foreign investment in Taiwan.
The gradually bipolarising arguments about unification
and independence in Taiwan has worried Beijing a great deal
especially as regards unification. 62 Beijing has on many
occasions threatened that it would not hesitate to use an
62 •
 Qingguo Jia, "Changing relations across the Taiwan Strait: Beijing's perceptions", Asian
Survey, 32: 3, (March 1992), p. 283.
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"adequate means" other than a peaceful one to "unify" Taiwan
if Taiwan would ever dare to declare its independence. In
reality, the claim for Taiwan's independence risks immediate
retaliation from China and is prejudicing Taiwan's national
Interest prematurely. This could further jeopardise Taiwan
which is already in danger in respect of its international
status. At present, economic, political and social
circumstances between Taiwan and China are at a far too
premature stage to solder together unification. The pursuit of
either immediate unification or independence will clearly
bring nothing but disaster to Taiwan's well-being. For
Taipei's decision-makers, the status quo policy which allows
the incremental approach to take place gradually remains the
most favourable.
In 1991, the KMT won 71.17 per cent of the vote and 254
out of 325 seats in the National Assembly election. The
message sent by the public was clear and warns that the
extreme activists for Taiwan independence can find little
place in Taiwan. The radical argument over unification and
independence calmed down as a result. In terms of insistence
on unification, the DPP has been criticising the government
for playing the "Beijing card" at the expense of the people's
interest in Taiwan. Indeed, there has been a very tricky scene
between Beijing, the KMT and the DPP over the issue of
unification and independence. While the KMT accuses the DPP of
risking the country's fate, Beijing always joins in with
condemnation of the DPP for committing a "national crime" in
attempting to separate Taiwan from China. As far as the KMT is
concerned, whatever the arguments between Beijing and the DPP,
each of them serves just as a policy "balancer" to the other
in Taipei's politics.
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For the Taipei government, national unification is far
from practical because of the current political stalemate
between Taipei and Beijing. Taipei's reformists in favour of
the status quo policy are seeking to expand economic links
with China. A practical approach to this is leading
strategically to a context of more secure cooperation between
the "two Chinas" which circumvents possible political clashes,
before acceptable working arrangements for harmony of some
sort could be reached. President Lee proposed in 1990 the
complete opening up of academic, cultural, economic, trade,
scientific, and technological exchanges as a foundation for
mutual respect, peace and prosperity." These proposals have
improved the circumstances for the concept of the CEA which
the KMT has continued to develop according to opportunity.
6.2. THE CHINA-TAIWAN POLITICAL STALEMATE
The concept of the CEA appears to be the most important
grand design for proceeding to economic integration and then
to Chinese unification. Thus, the CEA could be regarded as an
early step towards economic integration which has been brought
about by the transactions between the "three Chinas", Hong
Kong, Taiwan and Mainland China. Although in general the CEA
itself has been widely considered to be a process of economic
integration, without doubt its formation has always been
accompanied by political considerations about the possibility
of unification from which brakes to economic integration have
derived. Because of the different definitions of the meaning
of Chinese unification, both Taiwan and China in progressing
63 •
 Peter Wickenden, "Taiwan clears path for improved links with China", Financial Times, (21
May, 1990), P. 6.
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towards the CEA have inevitably been distracted by persistent
arguments about "Chinese sovereignty" that have shaped their
relationships for decades. The political dead-end between the
two has derived from their both claiming the "one China"
policy. In both Taipei and Beijing's view, Taiwan is an
inalienable part of China according to history. However, China
(People's Republic) asserts that its "inarguable" sovereignty
should include
	 Taiwan,	 as Beijing has become	 the
representative of "China" in international society, since it
took over power from the KMT's Nationalist government in 1949.
In spite of the irrationality of its claim of sovereignty over
Taiwan which in fact has never been in many way ruled by
Beijing's regime, Beijing's assertion that "the PRC is the
true and only one China" has resulted in Taiwan's
international status being at issue for some considerable
time." According to Beijing, the relationship between Beijing
and Taipei has therefore been defined as a "domestic affair".65
Against this, Taipei's realistic approach of "one China,
two political entities" which is placing Beijing and Taipei on
the relationship of a "quasi inter-governmental" one, has not
yet caught international attention. While China perceives that
Chinese unification is based on the process of "peaceful
unification" and the framework of "one country, two systems"
according to which Taiwan would be "incorporated" into China
as a special administrative region, Taiwan asserts that in the
process of national unification Taiwan ought to be respected
as an independent political entity so that the two could start
64.The question of China's representative was in favour of Taipei (Republic of China), until
China got into the UN in 1971. For China's stand on unification see the most recent
Beijing declaration on "The Taiwan Question and Reunification of China", by Taiwan Affairs
Office & Information Office, State Council, in August 1993.
65.Ibid.
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the process of unification at an equal level." As usual,
although China's policy towards national unification is a
peaceful one, it has never been too gentle to remind others
that:
"[H]owever, any sovereign state is entitled to use any
means it deems necessary, including military ones, to
uphold its sovereignty and territorial integrity.""
Notwithstanding political barriers, transactions between
the three towards economic integration have been continually
intensifying. It is important to note that while the economic
integration that has happened in the rest of the world has
been led by political motives, business-led economic
cooperation in the CEA is gradually forming itself and then
passing on practical problems to political authorities for
resolution. It is also clear that the respective governments
in the CEA have been surprisingly inactive in the progress of
grouping, in comparison with governmental commitment to
integration elsewhere. Clearly, the historic enmity
overshadowing relations between Beijing (communism) and Taipei
(capitalism) could be the main factor imposing an unbalanced
relationship in which China impels all the countries of the
world to comply with its "one China" policy of downgrading the
political status of Taipei. However, the CEA's contributions
to regional economic integration have been enormous especially
against the context of political confrontation. It may further
66. For Taipei's response to Beijing's declaration see the Mainland Affairs Council's
declaration of "There is only 'China question' and no 'Taiwan Question'" on 16 September,
1993. Also an article by Lien Chan, the Prime Minister of the Republic of China on Taiwan,
"The Republic of China on Taiwan Belongs in the United Nations", Orbis, 37: 4, (Fall
1993), pp. 633-641.
67. See the Beijing's declaration on "The Taiwan Question and Reunification of China".
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suggest that industrial development has been one of the major
factors behind the advance towards economic integration.
6.2.1. Political Stalemate Contributes to Distorted
Transactions
In practice, efforts for economic integration through the
CEA are not based upon political intentions, but upon the
result of economic transactions. Whether national unification
will come about as a result of economic integration, is as yet
uncertain. It is more realist to assume that the creation of
the CEA is being driven plainly by economic integration in
current political circumstances. There is reason to be very
cautious about the contradiction between the actual
development of the CEA and the existing obstacles to
cooperation, because those obstacles, linked to political
hostility between Taiwan and China in most cases, will bar all
prospects of deeper engagement to integration. In fact, this
remains the main reason why the present and future development
of the CEA has been in doubt especially in comparison to
projects for regional economic integration elsewhere. The
conditions for approaching the process of economic integration
have been inequitable and distorted by being intertwined with
the political intractability of the "one China" myth in
relation to which Beijing's and Taipei's policies have
evolved. Until now, direct business links between Taiwan and
China have not yet been officially and legally permitted by
Taipei. The "indirect trade", which was announced in July 1985
with the "three no's" principle 68 and only allowed trade with
68
. The "three no's" of indirect trade were set for "no direct trade with China, no contact
with Mainland Chinese officials, no governmental intervention on businessmen contacting
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China directed through any third party, (Singapore, Japan,
and, to a larger extent, Hong Kong), is characterised by the
political expediency of the Taipei government. Because of the
fear of Chinese aggression, in taking account of its national
security, Taipei has little choice but to limit the free
exchange of production factors, including capital, goods,
services and personnel."
Although there is a strong demand for free exchange of
the production factors with which the economic integration of
the CEA is concerned, the importance given to economic factors
in Taipei's China policy has lagged far behind political
considerations. The distorted transaction patterns of trade
and investment between the economies has lasted for some time,
as Taipei's renunciation of the "three nos" policy has been
subject to Beijing's good will. Under the existing policy
framework, Taiwan's trade with China has unnecessarily
increased the cost of business because of the need to pass
through the "third place" with more customs and shipping
delays. Nevertheless, with mounting pressure from the business
community to maintain competitive advantage, the Taipei
government has been keeping one eye open to the possibility of
more liberalised trade with and investment in China.70
Since 1991, a number of developments have stimulated a
second wave of investment in China. Firstly, in March 1991,
government policy allowed business investment projects in
China to be legalised through registration and legal
for indirect trade". See Economic Yearbook for the Two Sides of the Taiwan Strait 1992,
(Taipei: Chung Hua Institution for Economic Research, 1993), p. 343.
69.K. L. Kao, "Lian An Gin Hou Shien Kuan Yu Zhan Huang", (Recent economic and trading
situation and prospects between the two sides of the Strait), Mainland Affairs Council,
Executive Yuan, R. 0. C., (March 1993).
70.S. C. Su, and S. M. Chen, "Yiu Gi Chan Chieh Su, Chien Kuei Chan Kai Shih", (As the
guerrilla battle is over, the war begins - The second wave of China fever for Taiwan's
businessmen), Business Weekly, 182, (19 May, 1991), p. 19.
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application procedures from the Ministry of Economic Affairs.71
Secondly, the Beijing visit of the then Secretary-general of
the newly founded SEF, Charng-Ven Chen, facilitated a
consultation framework to settle problems caused by increasing
contact between China and Taiwan, and broke through their cold
relationship to establish a working context with its Chinese
counterpart, Association for Relations Across the Taiwan
Straits (ARATS). Finally, the National Assembly in Taipei
revised the national constitution to end the state of war with
China.72
Although more industrial sectors have been allowed to set
up in China with the government's help in registering in Hong
Kong or Singapore to fulfil the legal requirement of
"indirectness", the policy has not yet been changed for the
purpose of promoting more complete economic integration. In
terms of economic integration, trade development between all
parties has been based on reciprocity in order to allow the
formation of certain exchange mechanisms to undertake
cooperation over investments and industries. Once again,
political obstacles are to the fore. For Taipei, the relations
with China always have to take account of the island's
security. In comparison, Beijing's ever closer movement
towards Taiwan is intended to pave the way for eventual
unification. According to the Taiwanese government, more
Chinese economic incentives to welcome Taiwan's enterprises
will bring about two effects. Firstly, through relocating
various industries in China, Taiwan's economic basis will be
hollowed out completely and so become dependent upon the
Chinese market. Secondly, once Taiwanese entrepreneurs have
71. See Economic Yearbook for the Two Sides of the Taiwan Strait 1992, p. 346.
72. Peter Wickenden, "Taiwan moves to end - state of war'", Financial Times, (2 April, 1991),
p. 4; also his "Taiwan's bridge to the mainland", Financial Times, (30 April, 1991), p.
21.
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relocated in China, they are very likely to become the pawns
of Beijing to press Taipei's decision-makers for more
favourable policies through their interest groups in Taipei.73
In addition, many in Taiwan cannot easily forget their
impressions of communist aggression and worry that "the more
money they invest in China, the more vulnerable they will be
to manipulation by the Chinese government." 74 But, however loud
the arguments for and against its China policy, Taiwan is
steadily advancing towards China, economically, socially, and
perhaps soon politically, at least for the purposes of
economic cooperation, if not for unification.
However, this represents merely a one-sided story. Many
of Taiwan's entrepreneurs have, to some extent, been acting as
middlemen between Beijing and Taipei. Entrepreneurs have also
been influencing economic and industrial policy in Taiwan and
more recently in China. For example, C. Y. Kao, the chairman
of President Food, to facilitate investment in China, has
convinced the Beijing authorities to allow foreign investors
to acquire raw materials in China itself, this has meant that
his company has been permitted to set up a ketchup factory in
Xingjiang Province with access to local tomato farms. His
large scale investment in China came only after Taiwan's
policy altered in his favour, for which he had lobbied the
government for some time. 75
 Kao is more eager to make sure that
policies on both sides of the Taiwan Strait are always
These perceptions were mainly gathered from a series of interviews with Taipei's officials
whose works have been linked with Taiwan's China policy, taken in Taiwan in July and
August 1993. However, they are not in agreement with those of businessmen and related
officials in the Ministry of Economic Affairs who have been much more in favour of
developing economic links with China. Although these views could apparently be regarded as
conservative, in various surveys the public support the argument for further removal of
restrictions in relations with China, as suggested by the United Daily's survey in October
1988 stating that direct trade with China was favoured by 38% and opposed by 27% in a
sample of 911. See K. L. Kao, "Lian An Gin Mou Shien Kuan Yu Zhan Wuang", (Recent economic
and trading situation and prospects between the two sides of the Strait), p. 64.
74. "Twixt handshake and armlock", The Economist, (22 May, 1993), p. 73.
75.See Business Weekly, (19 May, 1991), 182, pp. 30-31. 306
73.
favourable to his business, in order that he may achieve his
ambitions to create the number one food enterprise in the
world, and has made a good start in offering products to over
a billion consumers in China. Furthermore, there is an
increasing optimism that once the direct links between all
three economies, namely China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong, are
further developed, the rate of economic and industrial growth
will increase which will strengthen the prospects for economic
integration. Therefore, for the sake of economic integration,
political barriers will have to be torn down as soon as
possible.
A number of scholars have pointed to the obstacles which
will hinder the progress of economic integration in the CEA.
For example, Huang-hsun Chin stresses that the different
economic systems between China's planned economy, and Hong
Kong and Taiwan's export-led economies have made the CEA as a
comprehensive economic integration an unrealistic hope. P'ei
Lu argues that the industrial division of labour between
Taiwan, Hong Kong, and China has only been a vertical one
rather than a mixture of different types of industries. Ts'un-
I Yin states that in terms of trade and technology among the
three, they rely more on foreign markets than on each other's
market for imports and exports. Moreover, Charng Kao believes
that the differences in economic structure between China, Hong
Kong and Taiwan serve as an impediment to the formation of any
regional economic community. 76
 In reflecting the reality of
economic links that occur in the CEA all the differences have
been significantly narrowed down in the past few years.
76
. All above scholars' arguments about the obstacles to the CEA were derived from a survey of
the literature by Charng Kao, "A 'Greater China Economic Sphere': reality and prospects",
pp. 57-58.
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Nevertheless, political factors remain the biggest obstacle to
the future of the CEA.
To avoid political stalemate, many scholars in Taiwan
tend to be pragmatic about the CEA and to suggest that
attention be concentrated on the development of business links
which, over time, will eliminate the obstacles to economic
integration. 77 One scholar points out that because of the
European experience of integration, national economic
development, and social and political relations will have to
be cooperative in order to make progress towards regional
economic integration. 78 The efforts to create the CEA do not
have to focus on establishing organisations at the current
stage. More practical work should be attempted to accelerate
economic development, and thereby dilute political hostility.
6.2.2. The Origin of the Unequal Relationship: the Common
Insistence on "One China"
Political confirmation of regional integration by
governmental agreements and the establishment of transnational
institutions has been assumed to be a prerequisite of
integration elsewhere. Nevertheless, the CEA seems to be
pursuing a different track of integration which does not
involve the signing of agreements, the establishment of
transnational institutions, and, above all, the obtaining of
governmental endorsement. Whilst China and Taiwan are still
officially antagonistic towards each other, integration
between them has been increasing in step with their fast
77. Ibid
78. Tai-Yin Liu, the then Chairman of Taiwan Economic Research Institute, Taipei, has appealed
for more constructive relations between the three economies. See L. C. Wang, "Tai Shang Da
Lu Tao Chi Shih Nien Hue Koo", (A retrospection for a decade of Taiwanese Mainland China
investment", Management Magazine, 218, (August 1992), p. 100.
308
growing economies. Notwithstanding this optimistic
development, the CEA's future clearly depends on political
cordiality between both sides.
In 1949, the de facto "two Chinas", the People's Republic
of China (PRC-Beijing) and the Republic of China (ROC-Taipei),
were established on both sides of the Taiwan Strait as a
result of the civil war between the Communist and Nationalist
Governments. A duel between both governments has been pursued
ever since. In the 1950s, China's "blood-bathing Taiwan"
policy, had led it to a few failed assaults on Kinmen and the
Matsu Isles, reflecting the intense confrontations which
accompanied the Cold War international system. Endless
confrontation between China and Taiwan has been repeatedly
manifested not only in the pursuit of diplomatic recognition
from foreign countries but also over membership of
international organisations. 79
 The problems of the "China
representative" were conspicuous both in the history of the
United Nations and international politics." In these, an
inferior international position has always been awarded to the
loser in the context to gain recognition - earlier to the PRC
but later to the ROC. Joined with the Cold War crusade against
communism, in the 1950s and 1960s, the ROC was able to
mobilize its allies to support its "one China" policy and to
claim its overall sovereignty over China to block the PRC.81
Indeed, this achievement was subject to the American
"containment" policy towards communism. The objective at that
79.For details refer to Fu-Kuo Liu, "The Problems of Participating in International
Organisations Facing the Republic of China, Since 1971", a MA Dissertation of Graduate
School of Diplomacy and International Law, National Chengchi University, Taipei, January
1987.
80.About the UN's voting on the "China representation" question and its implications for
international politics see Kuo-Chang Wang, United Nations Voting on Chinese
Representation, (Taipei: Institute of American Culture, Academia Sinica, 1984).
81.Joseph Frankel described this situation in China as a sort of confusion between legal
status and actual independence. See Frankel, International Relations In a Changing World,
4th edition, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), pp. 20-21.
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time pursued by the United States as champion of the ROC was
to exclude the PRC from participating in the UN, and to enable
the ROC to claim its legitimate right to represent all Chinese
people. As part of its campaign to contain communism globally,
the United States had mobilized all its policy instruments
with the nonrecognition policy in order to block the PRC's
access to world organisations. 82 However, as the United States
in the early 1970s was pursuing a new policy of US-China
rapprochement with a view to ending the Vietnam War and
reducing US-Soviet confrontation, the effort led to
restructuring the global balance of power system, from a
bipolar to multipolar system. 83 In 1971, Henry Kissinger's
secret trip to Beijing not only accelerated the change of US
foreign policy towards China, but also brought about a new era
of the triangular global power structure between USA, the
Soviet Union, and China.
As a result of the United States' change of policy, the
ROC, in 1971, lost support in the voting at the meeting of the
UN General Assembly that year. The PRC, claiming to be the
only and legitimate government of China, took over all
privileges that the ROC had had in the UN, notably a permanent
seat on the Security Council, and a seat in the General
Assembly, as a result. This change was a threshold of the PRC-
ROC confrontation in the PRC's favour. As a result, Taipei's
diplomacy since then has fallen into a "blind-spot" of
international society with diplomatic recognition from usually
82. For an exhaustive study of the US global containment policy against communism and its
campaign to bar the PRC from international recognition see Lung-Chu Chen, and Harold D.
Lasswell, Formosa, China, and the United Nations: Formosa in the World Community, (New
York: St Martin's Press, 1967), pp. 20-33.
83. Kissinger's secret trip sparked the momentum of the new American China policy towards
Beijing. See Akira Iriye, China and Japan in the Global Setting, (Cambridge,
Massachussets: Harvard University Press, 1992), pp. 122-123.
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less than thirty foreign countries. 84 Because both Beijing and
Taipei insist that there is only one China, a diplomatic
relation with either China involves a choice as to which is
the legitimate government of China. Because of international
realpolitik, most countries have selected the PRC as the true
"China". In 1979, the United States shifted its "China
recognition" to Beijing, Beijing claimed this as its biggest
win over Taipei in the diplomatic bids to represent the true
China. China's policy of "forced liberalisation" has since
then been toned down a little to "peaceful liberalisation".85
In fact, since 1949, as Beijing and Taipei, have been
pursuing the "zero-sum" policy towards each other, the two
Chinas have been the victims of their insistence on the policy
of "one China" in terms of their diplomatic gains or losses,
according to which diplomatic recognition to one of them has
always been accompanied by repudiating the other. Most
recently, Saudi Arabia in 1991, South Korea in 1992, and
Liberia and Lesotho in 1993 shifted their "China recognition"
from Taipei to Beijing; Niger in 1992 and Burkina Faso in 1994
shifted to Taipei, as a result of "one China" policy. In this
respect, the implication of "one China" policy has been
attempts to downgrade the other's state status."
84.At the end of 1993, the number of diplomatic recognitions from third countries adds up to
28. In February 1994, the ROC signed a new friend, Burkina Faso, which has brought the
number to 29. Central Daily News, International Edition, (4 February, 1994).
85.The "force liberalisation", which proposes to use force for the national reunification
with Taiwan, has long been the core of China's policy towards Taiwan, although recently
Beijing's tone has moderated. The "peaceful liberalisation", announced by Yeh Chien-Yin,
the then President of National People's Congress, was composed of the "nine points of
peaceful suggestions" with the principles of "Shan Ton, Shi Liou" (three communications
and four transactions).
86.Before 1991, Taipei regarded the Beijing regime as "banditry". Part of Taipei's foreign
policy was preventing the PRC from obtaining diplomatic recognition in international
society. Nowadays, after the modification of its national constitution, Taipei has
recognised the PRC as a political entity. However, Beijing has never yet softened its high
profile policy to downgrade Taipei's international status to be recognised as its
province.
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The real problem between Beijing and Taipei is the
quarrel about "governing" and "reigning" from which Beijing's
current policy towards unification, the so-called "one
country, two systems", has stemmed. According to Taipei, since
the May 1991 ending of its war state with the PRC, the ROC has
recognised the PRC as another political entity in China.
Therefore, there are two governments sharing the sovereignty
of "one China". However, only one sovereign government in
China is allowed under the current international legal system.
In response to the two Chinas reality, Taipei has appealed to
have equal recognition of the two in international society and
to continue to govern its existing territories before national
unification occurs. 87 But, being influential in world politics,
Beijing is inclined stubbornly to deny the reality of "two
Chinas", so Taipei's suggestion has been denounced as the
partition of China.
The problem of "one country, two systems" was addressed
by Deng Xiao-Ping in 1984, when he suggested resolving the
Hong Kong and Taiwan problems within a framework of
unification, following the communique between China and
Britain about Hong Kong's future. The concept, which became
the top policy guideline of China's unification strategy, was
linked to the earlier 1979 "peaceful liberalisation". 88 The
concept is to be a tentative framework for unification, and is
part of China's commitment to allow Hong Kong to remain a
capitalist economy within a wider communist framework - in
Beijing's term: a socialist economy with a Chinese character.
China's ultimate target is unification with Taiwan. In sum,
87. A report, "ROC's Foreign Relations and Diplomatic Administration", published by Ministry
of Foreign Affairs in December 1992, has recorded ROC's foreign policy in detail. The
report was summarised in Central Daily News, International Edition, (28 January, 1993).
88. See "Deng Xiao-Ping Taen Lian An Kuen Si", (Deng Xiao-Ping talked about the relationship
between the two sides of the Strait), Central Daily News, International Edition, (5
November, 1993).
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90
91
92.
according to Deng, "one country, two systems" within the PRC
will allow mainland China to continue its communist system and
Hong Kong and Taiwan to preserve their capitalist systems.89
Taipei so far officially continues to claim its
sovereignty over the whole of China (even including
Mongolia), 90 although many pragmatists in Taiwan criticise the
government's insistence on maintaining its existing policy on
China as ridiculous. 91 In practice, in foreign relations,
Taipei has been more willing to represent where it currently
rules rather than where it might have ruled, which could be in
effect leading to "two Chinas" as a result. Whether to realise
"two Chinas" as a fact, with the abandonment of the goal of
national unification or Taiwanese independence without
bothering over the China connection, has become a question
over national identity, above all between the KMT and the DPP,
in domestic politics. 92 By way of contrast, Beijing asserts
that there is only one China, the PRC, and Taiwan is a
province of China. If Taiwan decided to challenge this strong
stand by moving away from China towards an independent Taiwan,
Beijing warned on many occasions that it would not hesitate to
use force to check this. Therefore, Beijing has sought to
89
. Ibid.
• The Nationalist government announced the invalidity of the 1946 Sib-Soviet Friendly and
Mutual Assistance Treaty through which China formally recognised Mongolia as an
independent country, as a result of the Soviet Union's violation of the friendly spirit of
the earlier treaty. A few conservatives inside the KMT still believe that in order to
reserve a right to reclaim it in the possible future either through the International
Court of Justice or whatever means, it should be considered to be a pre-emptive allegation
of which the independence of Mongolia has not yet been completely agreed in terms of
legality.
. There are plenty of people in Taiwan who disagree with the government's "one China"
policy. The younger generations and the supporters of the opposition, Democratic
Progressive Party, based on a "Taiwan independent" policy, with no inherited nostalgia for
the mainland, have asked for the abandonment of the one China illusion and to admit the
reality of "two Chinas". For the opposition party, abandoning "one China" implies that
Taiwan is to be an independent country without bothering about the China problem any more.
See "The survey - Taiwan: on the move", The Economist, (10 October, 1992), p. 2. The
argument of "one China" has even split the KMT. See Julian Baum, "Parting of the ways",
Far Eastern Economic Review, (12 November, 1992), pp. 16-18; Baum, "Split in the ranks",
Far Eastern Economic Review, (24-31 December, 1992), p. 25.
Ibid., p. 7.
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convince others that it reigns over Taiwan, although it has
never governed it. One can, thus, identify two different
perspectives. China is always trying to downgrade Taipei's
international status as a fully independent country. The
downgrading of Taipei is a part of its strategy of "one
country, two systems". One scholar of Taipei points out that
the term "one country, two systems" might be agreeable if
there was not a conflict over who should be the central and
who should be the local government.93
Throughout most of the 1980s, diplomatic battles spilled
over to international organisations, both inter-governmental
and non-governmental. Because Taiwan's economic miracle has
'reinforced the government's confidence in diplomacy,
"substantive diplomacy" has emerged as a pattern for
developing its diplomatic relationships through informal,
unofficial and economic means with those who retain diplomatic
relationship with Beijing, in order to break through China's
"besiegement". 94 It is possibly on account of Taiwan's strong
economic performance that many countries cannot ignore Taiwan,
finding ways to exchange "quasi-official" offices with
Taiwan. 95 As a result of other countries succumbing to China's
strategy of downgrading Taiwan, Taipei's representatives at
93. Fuldien Li, "The legal structure of the "one country, two system" policy and its impact on
reunification of China", paper presented in "The Relationship Between Two Sides of The
Taiwan Strait For the Twenty First Century", Yale Association For The Relationship Between
China and Taiwan, Yale University, (2-3 April, 1993).
94. As Taipei decided to adjust its policy stand over diplomatic recognition, "substantive
diplomacy", or "flexible diplomacy", a "self-conceded" policy, has operated, where
unofficial relationships become more prominent than conventional official relations
through mainly economic means, including foreign aid, and investment, accompanied with
other economic development cooperation. In traditional international law, one country has
only one government to which diplomatic recognition and international obligation are
accorded. Taipei's authority has been undermined for its lack of international
recognition.
95• Taiwan's exchange of representatives with foreign countries has been kept low profile in
order not to provoke China. The quasi-official offices appear in various expedient
nomenclatures, e.g. Taipei Representative in UK (London) vs. Anglo-Taiwan Trade Committee
(Taipei) for ROC-UK; Coordination Council for North American Affairs Office vs. American
Institute in Taiwan. See Republic of China Yearbook 1991-92, (Taipei: Kwang Hwa Publishing
Company, 1992), pp. 233-236; also "The survey - Taiwan: on the move", p. 7.
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international organisations have been forced to be known not
as those of the ROC, but under other nomenclatures, such as
"Taipei, China", in the Asian Development Bank (as a model to
be used in inter-governmental organisations) and "Chinese
Taipei" in the International Olympic Committee (as in non-
governmental organisations)."
China's assault on Taiwan's international presence has
not eased off at all regardless of their intensifying economic
relations in recent years. For example, Beijing has obtained
recognition from Riyadh (Saudi Arabia) and Seoul (South
Korea). 97 This recognition angered Taipei greatly. Although
Beijing has been suggesting on many occasions that it is more
amiable towards Taiwan in order to promote economic exchanges
and its economic development, 99 yet nothing has been solved in
respect of its insistence on its high political profile. Due
to China's reluctance to alleviate its political pressures on
Taiwan, the transaction between them has been officially an
unequal one, which has slowed down economic integration in
general, and the talks about unification in particular. Whilst
China regards talks between Beijing and Taipei as "domestic
affairs" to be based on negotiation between both ruling
parties, the Chinese Communist Party and the KMT, Taiwan views
them as a series of international negotiations between the
governments of Beijing and Taipei or at least between two
equals. In the former scenario, China is dealing with Taiwan
96
. In 1985, when China participated in the ADB for the first time, the ADS authority accepted
the representative from Beijing as "China", the ROC, previously China's representative in
the organisation was forced to be renamed as a result of the preliminary negotiations
between Beijing and the ADB, albeit Taipei protested strongly. For the details of China
membership in the ADB see Fu-Kuo Liu, "The Problems of Participating in International
Organisations Facing the Republic of China, Since 1971".
97
.For details see the special report by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ROC. According to
the report, China is still trying to exclude the ROC from being present at international
organisations, at the moment of its improving economic relationship with Taiwan. A summary
can be found in Central Daily News, International Edition, (22 March, 1993).
98
.Dennis Van Vranken Hickey,"China's threat to Taiwan", The Pacific Affairs, 5: 3, (1992), p.
255.
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province, as a talk between central government and local
government, which Taiwan rejects. In the latter scenario, the
attempt of Taiwan to treat China (the PRC) as another equal
"government" has been sharply criticised by Beijing as Taiwan
"intriguing" with the "two Chinas" concept in international
society to transform the China question into an international
affair. China's nightmare has been that a concession to the
"two Chinas" concept could lead from the de facto division of
China, the PRC and ROC, to the division de jure, which will
certainly shatter Beijing's hopes for national unification.
This persistent obstruction from Beijing almost kills off any
effort of Taipei to be a full member of the international
community, as exemplified by membership of the UN.
In short, politically there seems to be a lack of contact
between China and Taiwan, at least at the moment. Most
recently, the SEF and the ARATS, on behalf of their own
governments, have been developing their contacts in dealing
with "functional and technical" matters across the Taiwan
Strait. More regular meetings have been called over various
problems, such as smuggling, the arrangement for repatriating
smugglers, and hijacking. The first Koo-Wang meeting in
Singapore in April 1993 focused on three major topics: setting
up systematic channels of communication, increasing economic
cooperation, and promoting exchanges in culture, education,
science, and technology. 99 In the meeting, the Chinese
representative also announced its basic stand on economic
cooperation across the Taiwan Strait as follows:
99
.Tang Shubei, vice chairman of the ARATS, told the press conference before the meeting about
the major focuses. "Wang-Koo meeting to be held in Singapore", Beijing Review, (26 April-2
May, 1993), p. 7.
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"[T]he mainland and Taiwan should work together towards
the same goals and for mutual benefit, achieve common
prosperity and rejuvenate the Chinese nation. In the
current stage, relations between both sides of the Taiwan
Strait should focus on economic exchanges and
cooperation. Political differences should not impede
economic cooperation.
This is how Beijing and Taipei are supposed to be
treating their different basic political and economic stands.
Indeed, the diversity of policy seems to be coming up only in
the contacts of these two "civilian organisations", as the
increasing economic, social, cultural transactions have drawn
both sides' attention to more practical matters. 10 At
governmental level, before Beijing tones down political
pressure and military threat to Taiwan, there will not be a
full scale free exchange between China and Taiwan. With
respect to the economic advance and its national security,
Taiwan, after all, has got few cards to play, apart from its
economic strength.
Although China is concerned with improving the economic
strength of the Chinese nation, it did not state any cordial
possible political plan, but tried instead merely to press its
intention of developing direct exchange of mail, trade, and
air and shipping services to Taiwan. 102 That suggestion of
establishing direct links at the Singapore meeting was
immediately criticised by Huang Kun-Huei, Chairman of the
Mainland Affairs Council, a ministerial level institution of
100 
.Summary of World Broadcast, FE/1675, (29 April, 1993), p. A1/1.
101
.The SEF and the ARATS basically are two organisations authorised by their own governments,
so that both governments can pass their messages to each counterpart through these two
agents. This special arrangement is also in compliance with current policy in their
political stalemate. The term "civilian organisations" is in use in Taipei official
circles.
102 In the first discussion of the meeting to be limited to the field of functional issues.
Wang Daohan, chairman of the ARATS, raised the intention of direct links across the Taiwan
Strait which was considered by Taipei as a sensitive political matter, and was rebutted by
his counterpart, Koo Chen-Fu. Central Daily News, International Edition, (28 April, 1993).
n100
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mainland policy-makers in Taiwan. He rebutted China's
suggestions as intentionally bringing up political issues to
fish in troubled water. 103 To encourage direct links across the
Strait, Taipei has become more anxious about a positive
response from Beijing with regard to its renunciation of the
use of force for unification, treating Taiwan as an equal, and
allowing Taiwan to enter international organisations. 104
Economic integration of the CEA will depend upon Beijing's
softening its high profile political stance.
Against the backdrop of this political constraint
businessmen from Taiwan have been bravely penetrating into
China's economic activities, though they have been largely
seeking nothing but business advantages. These entrepreneurs
have been not only spreading economic initiatives for growth,
but also establishing frameworks for economic integration.
Economic reform in China has brought about economic
development and, to some extent, changed its backwardness as
an agricultural economy, especially in the coastal provinces.
As the basis of industrial development between China, Taiwan
and Hong Kong has been expanding much deeper and wider in
terms of various industrial sectors, so the forward progress
of the CEA is advancing at an appropriate pace regardless of
the warning signals of politicians.
6.3. CONCLUSION: THE IMPACT OF POLITICAL DIVISION ON THE
CHINESE ECONOMIC AREA
In the theory of integration, political involvement is
critical for a group of states basing themselves on a common
103
.Summary of World Broadcast, FE11675, (29 April, 1993), p. A1/6.
104.
"The
 survey - Taiwan: on the move", p. 17.
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hope for prosperity through government agreements, co-
operating together to apply agreed regulations and to reserve
advantages for themselves."5 According to economic integration
theory, when there appear to be increasing economic links
between a group of economies resulting from the trade creation
effect, grouping is more likely to come about. From the
theoretical arguments, the only question lies on how far these
economic groupings can go without political motives. The
effect of trade creation contributes to the original impetus
towards economic grouping. It is industrial development based
on division of labour that brings regional economic grouping
alive, even without political endorsement.
In the CEA, concern about weakening competitiveness has
led businessmen and industrialists from both Taiwan and Hong
Kong to rush into China to invest regardless of the risk of
political instability and hostility. A trade creation effect,
which enhances Chinese economic development and revitalises
many labour-intensive industries in Hong Kong and Taiwan, has
been clearly based on economic complementarity between China,
Taiwan and Hong Kong. Without being initiated by the related
governments, business flows, trade, investment and finance, as
well as some active industries have increased and contributed
towards the formation of the CEA. An economic grouping in the
CEA through the efforts of the private sectors has shown that
the demand for economic development and its processes can be
an important incentive to economic integration in the region.
Indeed, many studies have discovered that economic integration
in less developed countries (LDCs) is seen as a likely way or
instrument to bring about the economic development of whole
regions. For example, Jaber summarises arguments of limited
105
.A. El-Agraa, (ed.), International Economic Integration, (London: Macmillan, 1988), p.
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traditional theory relating to regional integration in LDCs as
follows:
"Economic integration in case of LDCs should be treated
as an approach to economic development rather than as a
tariff issue. Accordingly, it combines various aspects
which could improve the international trade position as
well as raise the level of economic development of
LDCs "106
Penaherrera argues that one of the "principal
motivations" for economic integration in developing countries
was industrial development and technological progress. 1" To
date, various definitions of what international economic
integration is and how economic integration comes about have
revealed differences at different levels of development.
Jovanovic argues that:
"[I]n the developed market economies, integration means a
way to introduce the most profitable technologies and
allocate them in the most efficient way; in the centrally
planned economies it means the planning of the
development of certain activities; and in the developing
countries it has the meaning of a tool for economic
development. "108
Nevertheless, these arguments were all based on the
development of integration promoted by governments and the
experiences of integration among homogeneous economies. Except
for the case of the CEA, never has any economic integration
been launched without meeting these "general rules" of
integration between	 related	 economies.	 Since	 China's
106
.Tayseer A. Jaber, "The relevance of traditional integration theory to less developed
countries", Journal of Common Market Studies, 9: 3, (1971), p. 256.
107
.Germanico Salgado Penaherrera, "Viable integration and the economic co-operation problems
of the developing world: part two ", Journal of Common Market Studies, 19: 2, (December
1980), p. 175.
108. Miroslav N. Jovanovic, International Economic Integration, (London: Routledge, 1992), p.
7.
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"socialist market economy" has never yet been linked with a
real capitalist economy, sceptics in or outside the region
have always challenged any possibility of a mixed economy of
the type that is emerging with the CEA."9
Nevertheless, in spite of so many doubts and political
barriers, the emergence of the CEA has been a promising
development by facilitating economic transactions for economic
advantage. Apart from economic incentives for forming the CEA,
non-economic factors, such as Chinese expectations of
unification, and t4e starting negotiations for unification,
have also been projected as helping to shape the CEA, a still
vague concept of the economic "Greater China". No wonder why
the first Koo-Wang meeting, which was supposed to be merely
making a positive contribution to the formation of the CEA,
has been widely regarded as a political probe concerning
further governmental involvement. Although officially all
sides in the CEA up to now have only worked for the purpose of
individual economic prosperity, the development of the CEA has
come about in relation to efforts for Chinese national
unification, which will certainly accelerate further moves
towards the CEA. There have been more critical economic
reasons than political ones to support their combining
together. Maybe, at this stage, from an enthusiast's point of
view, a successful CEA will become a milestone for prospects
for a new vision of a "Chinese Community".
109
.In a survey of Chinese enterprises conducted by Lancaster University Management School,
the result suggests that China's state enterprises have still dominated its economy. They
accounted for half of industrial output and 70 per cent of urban workforces. See Alexander
Nicoll, "Long march to market", Financial Times, (27 September, 1993), p. 14.
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CELA.P au El S ENTEN
EXTERNAL CONSTRAINTS ON THE FORMATION OF
THE CHINESE ECONOMIC AREA
The development of economic cooperation in the Asia-
Pacific region has been characterised by Japanese leadership
in economic development, mushrooming subregional economic
groupings, and overseas Chinese trading and financial
networking.' Although there has yet to be a clear political
commitment from governments in the region, the formation of
regional groupings has been an increasing trend, to combine
neighbouring economies in order to increase their economic
strength. For Asian NICs, it is a great benefit to have their
interests represented in any possible economic grouping rather
than to be excluded.
External constraints which challenge the CEA as well as
the rest of the Asian-Pacific economies, have resulted from
the change of international trade practices, particularly the
protectionist regional trade policy, and intensifying
competitive pressures from the establishment of the single
market in the EC and of the North American Free Trade Area
(NAFTA). 2 For other regions, the EC's 1992 programme for the
single market as an external constraint has worried East Asian
traders about the loss of market share in the Europan markets
as a result of the trade diversion effect. The EC could serve,
on the other hand, as an impetus to reinforce the de facto
industrial alliance in the Asian-Pacific economies. In spite
of official inertia, the formation of the Chinese Economic
1. Philippe Regnier, Yuanming Niu, and Ruijun Zhang, "Toward a regional 'block' in East Asia:
Implications for Europe", Issues and Studies, 29: 3, (March 1993), P. 22.2.
For an explanation of the NAFTA and its protectionist inclination see Financial Times, (17
Noveber, 1993), p. 6.
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Area, like other recent self-forming subregional groupings in
the Asia-Pacific region, may well be a part of ANICs' economic
strategy, above all for Hong Kong and Taiwan. Economic
integration within the CEA is not yet mature in terms of the
European experience of integration, although the de facto
economic integration is cumulatively occurring through
regional "integration" of commerce, division of labour and
technology diffusion, and finance. 3 Should economic integration
happen to advance, industrial development will be the essence
of the CEA. Whether it is limited to economic integration or
it will experience a spillover effect to political
integration, the development of the CEA for now is
pragmatically concentrated on intensifying business links
between the three economies. Japanese influences over regional
integration will clearly be shown in future business-driven
development of the CEA.
While many advantageous economic factors, i.e.
complementarity and competitive advantage, within the CEA have
appeared to encourage further moves towards economic
integration, the formation of the CEA has also been propelled
by the emergence of regionalism elsewhere, which has virtually
shifted the weight of multilateral trade structures to
regional concentrations. In addition, the United Staes has
begun to pursue unilateralism which has inevitably caused
trade friction between the US and the Asian-Pacific economies,
Japan in particular. 4 Because Hong Kong, Taiwan and China have
been highly dependent upon foreign trade, the development of
the CEA has, therefore, been subject to external constraints
largely from major trading partners, the United States and
3. Ibid.
9. Soogil Young, "East Asia as a regional force for globalism", in Kym Anderson, and Richard
Blackhurst, (eds.), Regional Integration and the Global Trading System, (London:
Harvester, Wheatsheaf, 1993), p. 135.
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West European countries. As a result, the pressures of
competition sharpening export profit margins have boosted the
ANICs' desire for the formation of a subregional grouping. The
CEA, as a subregional economic grouping parallel to the Growth
Triangle and the Japanese Sea Economic Zone in Asia-Pacific,
will have to be considered in the general context of Asia-
Pacific economic cooperation. In addition, Japan and ASEAN
countries' general response to the CEA has special
implications for its future.
The purpose of this chapter is to examine the impact of
external constraints on the formation of the CEA and to what
extent Chinese economic integration has been stimulated by the
efforts to strengthen competitiveness in reaction to trading
constraints generated by the EC and NAFTA. The analysis also
focuses on the Japanese political and economic influences on
the formation of the CEA. In addition, the formation of the
CEA has been partly motivated by the ethnic Chinese overseas.
Luring more overseas Chinese investments in the region, the
CEA as a "suction pump" has worried its ASEAN neighbours. This
may provide a partial explanation of why the CEA has been kept
to low profile by the related governments.
7.1. CHANGES IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC POLITICAL ECONOMY AND THEIR
IMPACT ON CHINESE ECONOMIC INTEGRATION
International politics today is undergoing a dramatic
change in the post Cold War era. The conventional wisdom of
strategic and ideological confrontation seems to have been
left behind in most parts of the world, as the former Soviet
Union disintegrates. So far as international politics is
concerned, regional trading blocs appear to be the emerging
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6.
7.
8.
Theregions",
the EC and the EFTA. Ibid.
in theand interdependence
83.
includes
of trade Pacific region",
focus for rivalry between nations. Recently, the world's three
main trading regions in Western Europe, North America and
Asia-Pacific, have clearly assumed the shape of a "love-
triangle". 5 The three regions' increasing focus more on intra-
regional trade, above all on the part of the EC, than on their
trade with the rest of the world, has suggested that the
development of a regional inward-looking focus will shape the
new international economic regime. 5
 In 1990, while intra-
regional exports in Western Europe, North America and Asia,
accounted for US$1,164 billion, $178 billion, and $358 billion
respectively, exports of the three regions to the rest of the
world totaled $421 billion, $340 billion, and $421 billion.'
Recently, the Asia-Pacific community has been undergoing
a	 transformation	 of	 industrialization
	 economically,
democraticization politically, and trading "blocization"
regionally. Although these changes may have been stimulated by
various factors, the progress of the transformation has
generally been driven by the demands of industrialization. As
far as economic development is concerned, since the Asian-
Pacific economies have long depended heavily upon US' export
markets, they have now attempted to change the structure of
their foreign trade by increasingly emphasising intra-regional
trade. 5
 This is partly because of the US putting pressure on
its Asian trading partners for a solution of its trade
imbalance and partly because of the growing demands within
Asian markets themselves. In consequence, sub-regional
groupings based on economic complementarity have emerged right
along the West Pacific Rim in the hope that regional economies
See Far Eastern Economic Review, (8 October, 1992), P. 70.
Lawrence Krause, "Trade policy in the 1990s I: good-bye bipolarity, hello
World Today, 46: 25, (May 1990), p.
The trade figure for Western Europe
C. H. Kwan, "The emerging pattern
Tokyo Club Papers, no. 4, part 2, (1991).
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would strengthen their international competitiveness through
market expansion and industrial cooperation. It is still too
early to judge whether increasing economic interdependence
will bring about regional economic integration, although many
alternatives have been set forth by academics and individual
governments .9
An increasing number of economic development programmes
in the region has been driven and, in some cases, led by the
private sector rather than by governments. 19 Driven by economic
incentives, the business communities in the region are by far
the most devoted to programmes developing subregional
groupings, most notably in the case of the Chinese Economic
Area. Perhaps because of regional countries' diverse political
interests, little has yet been achieved politically between
their governments towards the promotion of economic
cooperation, except for the formation of ASEAN. To a large
extent, political motivations have been serving as yet as a
complementary rather than a dominant factor to economic
cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region.
The end of the Cold War may have speeded up transactions
among the "three Chinese communities", namely China, Taiwan,
and Hong Kong. Trade, investment and economic cooperation
clearly have run ahead of any other national priority for
transactions between the rival "two Chinas" - the Republic of
China (Taipei) and the People's Republic of China (Beijing).
It has been suggested that China's main threat today may not
come from a particular country's military invasion, but from
9. Such as the Malaysian government's proposal for an East Asia Economic Caucus and
Singapore's Growth Triangle. Various scholars have proposed a "Greater China".
10. In terms of overseas direct investment, regional industrial development is driven or led
by the private sector. An example is the Kwan-Da Groups, composed of six leading Taiwanese
food companies, in the case of the Philippines' Subic Bay development. In a meeting with
the Group's representatives, President Ramos of the Philippines has promised a more
favourable policy and infrastructure. See Central Daily News, International Edition, (14
May, 1993).
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multi-level economic and scientific challenges from the
Western industrial countries, the ANICs, some ASEAN countries,
and some Eastern European countries." Above all, the impact of
China's economic reforms on its domestic democratic demands
may have posed more immediate challenges to the Beijing regime
than anything else. Post-Cold War China has taken an active
role in regional political and economic affairs. Included in
this are pressures towards the transformation of the
international political system from a bipolar to a multipolar
system, approaches to reform and to an open door policy.
China's thriving recent economic dynamics have great
importance in bringing about continuing East Asian economic
prosperity, while the rest of the world stagnates in economic
recession.
In the context of the changing international system,
Taiwan has been relatively released from the distortions and
strangulation of China's "one China" policy in international
politics. While economic topics have shaped post-Cold War
international transactions, many Western countries have
allowed more official links with economically flourishing
Taiwan regardless of Beijing's diplomatic pressures,
particularly in the case of arms sales. 12 In addition, lasting
worldwide economic recession provides an opportunity for
Taiwan to exercise its economic influence and improve its
relations with the rest of world because . of this. Notably,
while Taiwan has launched its massive "six-year national
'Dime() Chen, "New approaches in China's foreign policy: the post-Cold War era", Asian
Survey, 33: 3, (March 1993), pp. 240-241.
12. The US President George Bush, in August 1992, agreed to sell 150 F16 air fighters to
Taiwan. Three months later, the French government allowed Taiwan to buy 60 Mirage 2000-5E
fighter jets. see "Ancient fears", Far Eastern Economic Review, (3 December, 1992), p. 10.
In consideration of larger business interest in China, in December 1993, the French Prime
Minister Edouard Balladur has bowed to Beijing's pressure agreeing to limit its
relationship with Taipei. See Lincoln Kaye, "Learning to bow", Far Eastern Economic
Review, (27 January, 1994), pp. 12-13.
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development plan" with total expenditure up to US$ 303 billion
since early 1991, many big international firms have taken
advantage of Taiwan's offers, and, in return, have been
lobbying their own governments to develop official links with
Taiwan. France, the most active and successful one, for
example, has upgraded its non-diplomatic relationship with
Taiwan by allowing a ministerial meeting in 1990 to advance
its interest in Taiwanese public construction projects. Within
two years, many European countries rushed ministerial visits
to Taipei in the footsteps of the French.13
China's open door policy to the world, accompanied by
Taiwan's change of policy to China, has made their economic
interactions far more profitable than ever before. However,
change of policy alone is not able to stimulate all kinds of
transaction flows, unless it is accompanied by some practical
incentives, such as economic advantages and a favourable
international system. In the last few decades the triangular
strategic relationships of the US, the Soviet Union and China,
have dominated international relations in the Pacific region.
For the strategic reason of confronting the Soviet Union, the
US allied with China and was very concerned with "China
factors" in its East Asian foreign policy, in particular the
policy to Taiwan stipulated in the 1981 Taiwan Relations Act
of the US Congress which is subject to the 1971 Sino-American
Shanghai Communique acknowledging that the PRC is the only
China. This new American policy inclining towards Beijing and
its "one China" emphasis has resulted in China's being able to
intervene in any third country's decision to develop official
links with Taiwan. That far-reaching American acknowledgement
of "one China" has even been exploited by Beijing to present
13
. See Julian Baum, "Ménage a trois", Far Eastern Economic Review, (27 January, 1994), p. 14.
328
its criticism of foreign countries' arms sales to Taiwan as
interference with China's domestic affairs. An example is the
transaction over the two submarines deal between Taiwan and
the Dutch government in 1982.
Ever since the Soviet Union disintegrated, "China could
no longer exploit the favourable strategic status between the
two superpowers". 14 Therefore, the "China factors" have been
less significant for American foreign policy than they used to
be. As a result, trade policy is becoming the most important
part of China-US relations. The US military presence in Asia
has been diminished, partly because of the Soviet Union's
disappearance and partly because Japan has been vigorous
enough to take a higher profile. More than this, the US is
increasingly concerned with its own home affairs, as the White
House has to face difficulties in convincing the American
public about maintaining its costly military presence in Asia,
as a former US consul general in Hong Kong said in a pane1. 15
•The post Cold War period has left Asia with some unsolved
"simmering disputes" - in the Korea Peninsula, Taiwan Straits,
Spratly and Paracel Islands, Kenkaku Islands, and China's
political succession, to name but a few. 16
 Many have agreed
that "security for Asia (in the post Cold War era) has to be
redefined largely in economic terms." 17
 Therefore, on the
n 	
14 . Quimao Chen, "New approaches in China's foreign policy", Asian Survey, 33: 3, (March
1993), p. 238.
15 In the Singapore panel scrutinising Asian security organised by Time international, Burton
Levin reminded Asian countries that they will have to get need to a prosperous Asia
without US military cover in the new era. See "Home alone: a new era - special report",
Time, (27 January, 1992), pp. 8-23.
16.For details of the traditional trouble spots of the region, see "Home alone: a new era -
special report", Time, (27 January, 1992), pp. 8-23. James Walsh, "A leaner, meaner
fighting machine", Time, (10 May, 1993), pp. 44-47.
17.Many participants shared the trend in the study panel by Time magazine in Singapore in
outlook on Asian security. See "Home alone: a new era - special report", Time, (27
January, 1992), p. 8.
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whole, "securing access to markets and technology" has become
Asia's most critical concern.18
This is not to suggest, however, that this optimistic
tone has ruled out any possible danger from political turmoil
and war in the region. In dealing more with economic recession
than with military confrontation, most Western countries,
since 1990, have sharply cut their defense budgets (with
France cutting 4.3 per cent, Britain 5.6 per cent, Germany 16
per cent, the US 16.6 per cent, and Spain 19.3 per cent)." The
US Clinton administration has even offered a five year plan
from 1994 to 1998 to slash a total US$124 billion from defense
spending. 2 ° On the other hand, as US troops pull out from the
Philippines they are leaving "a vacuum in the middle of Asia's
new political, military, and economic universe" .21 Fearing
political uncertainty, Asian countries, as they are able to
afford it, have begun to enter a new "arms race" by pouring
money into more up-to-date weaponry systems.22
In terms of the CEA, although there may be potential
political ambition for unification on the agenda cif both
Beijing and Taipei, the CEA development so far has not been
directly led by politics. However, the post Cold War scenario
has provided a political acquiesence between the "three
Chinas" to the CEA development, which could be regarded as a
necessary supplement to the thriving economic transactions. In
terms of economic integration, the consensus of the three has
focused more on integration of economic development and on
pursuing industrial competitive strategy globally. Through its
18. Ibid.
lg. Many in Europe confess that "a force-cutting campaign has gone too far". A reprisal has
been considered by the NATO alliances. See "Attacking the cut", Time, (12 April, 1993), p.
36, 38
20.See Bruce Van Voorst, "Man in a minefield", Time, (5 April, 1993), pp. 42-43.
21.
22.See Ibid., and "Asia unleashed", The Economist, (3 April, 1993), pp. 15-16.
"The new universe", Time, (17 May, 1993), p. 49.
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investment incentives to Taiwanese businessmen, Beijing is
certain to attract Taiwanese industries to the Mainland in
order to deepen the degree of Taiwan's dependence on the
Chinese economy. (Refer to Figure 7.1.) Beijing's political
intention could be infiltrated into Taipei via Mainland
Taiwanese business interest groups, e.g. in the case of
business groups lobbying the Taipei government for "direct
trade" with China. In consequence, the Taipei government could
lose its political initiative against China and find itself
increasingly at the mercy of Beijing.23
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Kong and China, since Hong Kong is toIn the case of gong
become China's responsibility after 1997, the increasing
commercial transactions between them offer the hope of
political harmonisation between different political and
23
. Taiwanese officals are deeply concerned about further direct links with China which could
result in the loss of economic superiority over China. This worry is expressed in the
governemnt's various documents and publications. see Koong-Lian Kao, Lian Ann Ging Mou
Shian Kuan Yu Chan Wang, (Current Economic and Trade Situation and Outlook Between Two
Sides of the Strait), Mainland Affairs Council, The Executive Yuan, R. 0. C., 1993.
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economic systems. For Beijing, politically, Hong Kong's return
is certain, but it is still doubtful whether Hong Kong will be
able to fit into its "one country, two systems" framework of
unification. As China is pledged to maintain Hong Kong's
current prosperity for 50 years in the 1984 Sino-British
Agreement, Beijing has, therefore, geared up its economic
activities to attract Hong Kong investors, and, most
importantly, to demonstrate its commitment. In addition, China
has not only poured a great deal of capital into Hong Kong,
but also won over the confidence of the local business
community and even the support of politicians, except for
those who are pro-democracy. Hong Kong's grass-root anti-
Patten Business and Professional Federation, led by Gordon Wu
and property tycoon Vincent Lo, has as an aim to keep a good
relationship with Beijing. 24 In contrast to the United
Democratic Party, the Liberal Party and the Democratic
Alliance for the Betterment of Hong Kong are both taking a
pro-Beijing line. Trying to defuse political mistrust,
politically, Beijing is moving quickly and loudly to express
its willingness to tie in with Hong Kong's capitalism. In
reality, Beijing shows no hesitation about taking over control
of Hong Kong's economic dynamics. In the light of the handover
in 1997, Hong Kong has little option but to integrate with
China economically. Soon after Hong Kong's future was decided
in the 1984 agreement, there appeared to be less confidence
about that future. This resulted in a large outflow of
business and emigration.
The change of Asia-Pacific trade structure with its
gradually increasing emphasis on intra-regional trade has, to
some extent, also promoted the competition between regional
24
. See for detail James Walsh, "The ties that bind", Time, (21 March, 1994), pp. 34-35.
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economies themselves, because of limited regional markets and
restrained world markets. In addition, China's commitment to
economic development in the context of the post-Cold War
environment has virtually recognised the importance of Hong
Kong remaining prosperous. Hong Kong businessmen have
gradually realised that it would be wise to concentrate on
making commercial links with a reforming China not only to
gain profits and strengthen competitiveness but also to assure
their long term security. In return, Hong Kong's pumping
capital into China will safeguard China's current reforms. As
Hong Kong has resumed its investment flows in China after the
Tiananmen incident, Hong Kong's big firms have launched, since
1992, a series of large scale infrastructure investment
projects in China, which has boosted a "second wave" of
investment. 25 The move towards longer term investment in
infrastructure, instead of quick profits, characterises the
change of investment flows and their endorsement of the Basic
Law. For example, Gordon Wu's Hopewell Holdings, a
construction conglomerate, has launched a US$ 1.2 billion six-
lane expressway between Hong Kong and Guangzhou. 25 In
reflecting the Chinese business community's view on the recent
row between Hong Kong governor, Chris Patten, and Beijing, Wu
comments that "Our biggest and only opportunity is to work
with them gently and concentrate on the economy". 27 Cheng Yu-
Tung's New World Development has become further involved in
Chinese real-estate business. 28 The New China Hong Kong Group
Ltd., set up in May 1993 with collaboration between Hong Kong
25
. Shin Pao (Hong Kong Economic Journal), (16 December, 1992.)
26. Fortune, (9 March, 1992), P
. 39.
27. Financial Times, (28 September, 1993), p. 19.
28.Henny Sender, "China Savvy", Far Eastern Economic Review, (22 April, 1993).
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and China, has devoted its business to Chinese infrastructure,
real estate, and telecommunications."
7.2. THE APPREHENSION OF NEIGHBOURING ECONOMIES ABOUT THE
CHINESE ECONOMIC AREA
The intention of the CEA, especially as perceived by its
neighbouring countries in Southeast Asia, is the resurrection
of Chinese nationalism. As the sense of an integrating Chinese
community in East Asia has grown following massive trade and
investment flows launched by overseas Chinese in the region,
other regional economic powers, notably Japan and ASEAN, have
been anxiously following developments. For Japan, the
establishment of the CEA may further disrupt the alternative
regional grouping proposed by the Japanese and others. More
worryingly, for ASEAN, given its economic domination already
by ethnic Chinese, economic integration based on the CEA
within a larger regional framework exclusively covering the
Chinese community could raise the suspicion that Chinese
economic power will dominate all the region. It could be for
this reason that so far the "three Chinas", China, Taiwan and
Hong Kong, have been reluctant to support the CEA openly.
In addition, many proposals for regional integration have
been based on individual interests and therefore there has
been less support from regional countries for any particular
plan. For example, the East Asia Economic Caucus (EAEC)
proposed by Malaysia, has not as yet been welcomed in the
region. Regional leaders even including those of ASEAN
countries themselves, President Suharto of Indonesia in
29 . Jonathan Karp, "The new insiders", Far Eastern Economic Review, (27 May, 1993).
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particular, have cast some doubts on its prospects. 3° As a
result, many economies, instead, have hustled to expand in
their own hinterlands through which their economic strength to
compete in the world market will be improved.
7.2.1. Incompatibility or Compatibility: Japanese Interest and
the Formation of the CEA
Since Japan has been involved in almost all the processes
forming sub-regional blocs directly or indirectly in East Asia
in terms of industrial development, any emerging regional bloc
that does not work in favour of Japanese interests will not be
feasible. As the dominant economic actor, Japan has been a
major determinant of the remarkable economic growth of the
Asia-Pacific region, especially in most of the East and
Southeast Asian economies. Notably, the fast growing economies
in East and Southeast Asia have been based upon the "flying
geese" pattern of economic development led by Japan. 31
 Indeed,
Japanese industrial experience and technological expertise
have spread to every part of the regional economic
development.
It can be argued that there appear to be five possible
scenarios for the Asia-Pacific region: the Yen bloc, the
Beijing bloc, the Western Pacific community, the pan-Pacific
community, and Cooperating Asia-Pacific subgroups. 32 Apart from
30. Since Malaysian Premier Mahathir's EAEC openly excludes the US, Canada, Australia, and New
Zealand, the cautious response of the US and most the APEC countries has halted the plan.
Fearing US opposition, Japan, a proposed leading member in the EAEC, has been reluctant to
support the idea.
31. Reinhard Drifte called the "flying geese" pattern a "three stage" economic hierarchy. See
his Japan's Foreign Policy, (London: RIIA, Routledge, 1990), p. 92.
32. Duk-Choong Kim, "Open regionalism in the Pacific: A world of trading blocs?", American
Economic Review, 82: 2, (May 1992). His other article sketches the future in more detail.
"Scenarios for an Asian Bloc?", The Korean Journal of International Studies, 24: 2,
(Summer 1993), pp. 190-195.
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the political considerations of other powers, notably the US,
and Russia, Japanese industrial strength has virtually tied
its neighbours' economic development in to its own networks of
foreign aid programmes, trade links, foreign investment, and
even more crucially technological transfers. The creation of
an industrial division of labour between China, Taiwan and
Hong Kong, and between China and South Korea, for instance,
has taken place against the context of Japanese industrial
domination, from the control of technology for upstream
products right through to the markets.
As the rising economic power capable of rivalling
American economic supremacy, Japan has its own plan to lead a
single regional economic unit. Perhaps because of previous
partly successful attempts with regard to proposed regional
blocs in the Pacific community (see Chapter Four in detail),
Japan's new strategy, called the New Asian Industrial
Development (New AID) Plan, was announced in January 1987 by
its Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI). The
plan was mainly based on practical industrial cooperation
which has already existed widespread across East Asian
economies throughout their catching-up process on the way to
economic development. Since the mid-1980s, Japan and the ANICs
have steadily expanded their foreign investments in the region
itself, not only because of dramatic appreciation of their
currencies but also because of the decade-long slowing down of
economic performances in most Western industrialised
countries, the momentum of Asia-Pacific economic cooperation,
and regional governments' policies. 33 As a result, a regional
33
. For details of reasons for the rapid growth in intraregional investment and individual
countries investments, (Japan, Hong Kong, China, Taiwan, and South Korea), see Edward K.
Y. Chen, "Forign direct investment in East Asia", Asian Development Review, 11: 1, (1993),
pp. 24-59. For Japan's expanding investment in the ANICs in the 1980s and its implication
of market effects see Drifte, Japan's Foreign Policy, pp. 94-95.
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division of labour led by Japan has raised the possibility of
forming "a de facto economic sphere". 34 Indeed, Japan's plan is
to coordinate its overseas development assistance, trade, and
foreign direct investment throughout Japan, the ANICs, ASEAN
countries and China, in order to enable Japan effectively to
manage regional industrial production. 35 A single economic unit
led by Japan, which is the centre of the plan, has exposed
Japan's attempt to integrate East Asian economies to rely more
on economic means than political ones.
The Japanese plan is, to a large extent, reliant on the
stable relationship between China and Japan. Described by the
former Japanese Prime Minister, Kiichi Miyazawa, Japanese-US
and Japanese-China relations are the two wheels of its foreign
policy. The former is running on a "world order track", while
the latter is running on an "Asian order track". 35 In East
Asia, Japan's role as a "regional stabiliser" projecting its
economic and, to a less extent, political strength to balance
confrontation in the region between powers, in particular the
USA, the Russian Republic, and China (in the case of the Korea
Peninsula), has been notable.37
In retrospect, Japan's relations with China in the pre-
normalization period were largely shadowed by the United
States' policy of containing communism. In the early 1970s,
the change of US policy to open relationships with China, to
force the revaluation of the Japanese Yen and to impose quotas
on Japanese textile exports to the United States, guided by
34
. Toru Nakakita, "The takeoff of the East Asian Economic Sphere", Japan Review of
International Affairs, (Spring/Summer 1991), pp. 70-73.
35.Joseph Romm, "Japan's flying geese", Forbes, 150: 12, (23 November, 1992).
36.Jihua Zhou, "Japan's Foreign policy choices for the twenty-first Century: A Chinese
perspective", in Tsuneo Akaha, and Frank Langdon, (eds.), Japan in the Posthegemonic
World, (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publisher, 1993), p. 196.
37.Muthiah Alagappa, Japan's Political and Security Role in the Asia-Pacific, (Malaysia:
Institute of Strategic and International Studies, 1988), p. 25.
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39.
40.
41.
42.
38
the "Nixon Doctrine" of 1969, shocked Japan. 38 This has partly
brought Japan onto the course initiated by the Americans to
confirm that the importance of China has to be taken into
account in pursuing regional peace and national security.
Since 1971, the year of Sino-Japanese normalisation, the
relationship between them has steadily developed with a common
security target of eliminating the Soviet threat. 38 By linking
China with Japanese security, Japan has shown its eagerness to
support China's economic development and most recently China's
reform and open door policy from the beginning by means of
increasing foreign development aid, investment, and trade."
The solid intention to link with China has lain in a belief
that a stable and prosperous China is vital to Asia's peace
and to Japan's interests. Whatever role Japan is to play in
the world and the region itself, acceptability to China is all
the more important, because "without a good political
relationship with China, Japan cannot hope to win widespread
acceptance as a leader elsewhere in Asia.
Japanese relations have been conditioned by complementary
concerns in economic matters and in Chinese political
prejudice against Japanese expansionism. 42
 These facts have
• For this change of US policy which caused shocks for the Japanese see the discussion in
Donald C. Hellmann, "Japanese Politics and Foreign Policy: Elitist Democracy Within an
American Greenhouse", in Takashi Inoguchi and Daniel I. Okimoto, (eds.), The Political
Economy of Japan, Volume 2. The Changing International Context, (Stanford, California:
Stanford University Press, 1988), p. 364.
Scholars have found recently that the regional dimension of Japan's security strategy has
still been dominated by the threat of the former Soviet Union. They have urged Japan to
adjust its security strategy to the changes in the Soviet Union. See Fred C. Ikle, and
Terumasa Nakanishi, "Japan's grand strategy", Foreign Affairs, (Spring 1991), pp. 82-84.
See Whiting, "China and Japan: Politics versus Economics", pp. 41-44; also Qingxin Ken
Wang, "Recent Japanese economic diplomacy in China: political alignment in a changing
world order", Asian Survey, 33: 6, (June 1993), pp. 625-641.
For a similar observation of the importance of China in Japanese foreign policy to the
region, note the statement of the former Japanese ambassador to China, Yosuke Nakae, that
"It is certain that without friendly and cooperative relations between Japan and China
there can be no support for peace, stability and prosperity in Asia." David Arase, " Japan
in East Asia", in Akaha, and Langdon, (eds.), Japan in the Posthegemonic World, p. 123.
Based on his previous contribution to Sino-Japan relations, China Eyes Japan, (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1989), Allen Whiting continues to emphasize the heritage
"41 For decades, Sino-
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contributed to their highly asymmetrical economic
interdependence." Under economic complementarity, China gets
access to Japanese machinery, chemical products, technology,
and steel and other metallic products on which China's
development relies, while Japan, in return, imports food
stuffs and raw materials, in particular coal and oil, and
makes use of the Chinese potential market.
Japanese industrial development within the CEA has
appeared to be a part of a Japanese global strategy. All
national economies of the CEA have been receiving Japanese
capital, amounting to a large proportion of Japan's private
overseas investment. This is partly because the Chinese
economic reform opening its market to the world has brought
enormous commercial potential, and partly because for Japanese
businessmen China could offer the best opportunity to gain
competitive advantage, not merely comparatively, over their
potential rivals. 44 In terms of the structural relationship
between Japan and the CEA's economies as a whole, industrial
cooperation, across the Taiwan Strait between three economies,
namely Taiwan, Hong Kong, and China, was largely based on
labour-intensive industries, which relied on Japanese passed-
on technologies and machineries, during the first wave of
overseas Chinese rushing into China seeking locations
substitutive for production. As the CEA has developed and
of Chinese enmity against Japanese aggression in observing their relations. See his "China
and Japan: Politics versus Economics", The Annals, AAPSS, 519, (January 1992), pp. 39-51.
43. Sino-Japanese trade is basically asymmetrical in both quantitative and qualitative terms.
While the China trade is about 4-5 per cent of total Japanese foreign trade, Japan's trade
links with China account for about one fifth of total China foreign trade. In addition,
Japanese aid and private investment in China have also contributed to this asymmetry. See
Whiting, "China and Japan: Politics versus Economics", pp. 41-42; Japan is quite confident
about maintaining this asymmetrical interdependence in favour of Japan for some time,
Arase, " Japan in East Asia", p. 123.
For labour intensive industries , comparative advantage is based on cutting production
costs, e.g. wage and rents. However, for those capital- and technological-intensive
industries, competitive advantage stems from market share rather than simply lower cost of
production factors.
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become more noticeable, the global strategy of Japanese
companies has been to gain access to the great market and
manufacturing sites in the CEA through the creation of an
industrial division of labour.
Nissan Motor Co., the number two automaker in Japan, for
example, has expanded its cooperation with Yueloong Motor Co.,
Nissan's Taiwanese partner, in order to engineer the larger
global framework which was documented in its recent Asian
strategy for the 21st century. The centre part of its plan is
focused on Japan itself, Taiwan, Thailand, and Mainland
China. 45 The first practical step has been to introduce a newly
designed small commercial vehicle in summer 1994, which is to
be built in Taiwan and Thailand." Earlier, a joint venture
between Nissan Motor and Taiwan-based Honda Sophisticated
Instrument Co. had been announced which would invest in China
through partnership with China Motor Trading Hua-Tong Co. for
a manufacturing factory with a production capacity of up to
400,000 cars per year. 47
 Nissan is not alone in taking the
Taiwanese short cut to the Chinese market. Toyota, the number
one Japanese automaker, intends to incorporate a Taiwanese
partner, Kuo-Ruei Motor Co., into its network of international
manufacturing ventures. It already possesses a new factory in
Taiwan, set up in May 1993, which Toyota has regarded as its
launching pad to China.48
In the Cold War era, Japan's economic relationship with
China had blended with political and security considerations
concerned with counterbalancing the Soviet Union. The purpose
45. Central Daily News, International Edition, (30 September, 1993).
46. "The great Asian auto race", Business Week, (25 January, 1993), p. 24.
47. Central Daily News, International Edition, (20 July, 1993).
48.In his visit to Taiwan, President Tatsuro Toyota stated that the "new big car factory",
located in Kuan-In Industrial Park, Toayuan, Taiwan, is planned, in five years, to have a
production capacity of 200,000 cars annually. Central Daily News, International Edition,
(8 May, 1993).
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of Japan's official development aid and foreign direct
investment was to further its strategic interest in helping
China to accelerate its modernisation, and so strength China's
geopolitical importance for Asian stability, to some extent,
even at the expense of short-term Japanese business
interests." In addition, continued economic modernisation in
China has demonstrated its potential market ability which the
Japanese business community could not afford to ignore. With
the onset of the post-Cold War era in the late 1980s, whilst
Japan emerged as an economic superpower and China's importance
in military and political terms became much clearer, its China
policy became an important part of Tokyo's "global
diplomacy"." Japan's adherence to this policy was plainly
expressed in the Houston G7 summit in the summer of 1990,
where Prime Minister Kaifu announced Japan's third package of
yen loan to China with severe criticism pouring from other
leaders, because of the Japanese pursuing their interests at
the expense of moral principles at the time of global
sanctions against China in the wake of the Tiananmen
incident. 51 It is very clear that China is more important for
Japan in economic terms in the short term than in political
terms. Therefore, the formation of the CEA as an enlarged
Chinese market has unquestionably tempted the Japanese
business community.
It was not surprising that the Japanese took the lead in
breaking the diplomatic silence surrounding China just a few
months after the June 1989 incident. Although many Japanese
49. Japan's Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) and Ministry of Foreign
Affairs (MFA) are two major players in shaping China policy. When Hua-Deng took over
Beijing by ousting the Gang of Four, the MFA believed that its loan should be used to
stabilise the new ruling regime at a time of fragility. Wang, "Recent Japanese economic
diplomacy in China: political alignment in a changing world order", pp. 633-634.
50• Ibid., p. 634.
51. Ibid., pp. 634-635.
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big firms remain very cautious about the potential political
instability of Beijing, and the likely political struggle that
will occur when Deng Xiao-Ping dies, a large number of small
and middle sized companies, like Hong Kong and Taiwanese
enterprises, have flocked into China to take advantage of low
cost production factors. In the late 1980s, Japanese direct
investment in and trade with the "three Chinas" was greater
than that with the ASEAN countries (See Table 7.1).
TABLE 7.1 JAPAN'S AID, TRADE, AND INVESTMENT IN EAST ASIA
AID(US$mil.) TRADE($bn.) 1NVESTMENT($bn.)
China	 2,177	 53.19	 2.00
Taiwan	 n	 78.51	 1.23
Hong Kong	 n	 46.22	 4.18
CEA Total	 2,177	 178.02	 7.41
Indonesia	 1,433	 48.26
	 1.72
Malaysia
	
777	 29.49
	 0.99
Philippines 1,364
	 13.30
	 0.33
Singapore	 n	 36.93
	 2.35
Thailand	 1,307	 26.50
	 1.81
ASEAN Total 4,881 154.48
	 7.20
Note: total trade (1986-89), total direct investment
(April 1986-September 1989).
Source: Based on MITI & Ministry of Finance, see Charles
Smith, and Louise do Rosario, "Empire of the
sun", Far Eastern Economic Review, (3 May, 1990),
p. 48.
As the "three Chinas" combination has become Japan's
leading trading partner in Asia, Japan's exports to the CEA
rose by 23 per cent in comparison with the 1992 figure to
US$56.1 billion, and its imports from the CEA grew by 9 per
cent to $28.8 billion. 52 Whilst the worldwide economic
52 •
 "Hong Kong, Taiwan, China lead Asian trade partners: 'three Chinas' voraciously gobbling
up Japanese goods",Japan Times Weekly International Edition, 33: 21, (24-30 May, 1993), p.
13.
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recession has slowed down the European and North American
economies dramatically, the increasing transactions inside the
CEA have brought about the fastest growing economic
performance in the world, from which Japan's troubled sectors,
the electronics and car industries, have benefited through
increased exports."
MITI's general trade policy guidelines for China,
announced in 1991, suggest three major policy objectives: to
intensify bilateral trade relations and cooperation, to ensure
that China remains an important source of Japan's energy
supplies and an important export market for Japan, and to
avoid isolating China and thereby preserve peace and stability
in East Asia." To promote its relationships with China is
clearly in Japan's interest. As the CEA develops, its market
potential is becoming widely known. In 1992, Toyota Motors,
accompanied by a group of Japanese trading houses and a
transportation company, Sankyu, established new businesses in
China. This surge of direct investment by big Japanese firms
has been most important. It has led to China becoming Japan's
second biggest trading partner. 55 Apart from reinforcing
economic ties with China, Japan's desire to take advantage of
the formation of the CEA has been apparent through its
encouragement of trade with and direct investment in Hong
Kong, 55
 and its setting up the regional operation centre for
firms in Taiwan in accordance with the government's
aspirations in the CEA.57
53
. Robert Thomson, "Beijing encourages Tokyo trade links", Financial Times, (23 September,
1992), p. 8.
54.Information was based on MITI, Trade and Industry, (March 1991), P. 24. Quoted from
Qingxin Ken Wang, "Recent Japanese economic diplomacy in China", p. 632.
55.Robert Thomson, "Beijing encourages Tokyo trade links".
56.For Japanese investment in Hong Kong for the period of 1985-90, see Carl Goldstein, and
Anthony Rowley, "Shogun wedding", Far Eastern Economic Review, (28 June, 1990), pp. 70-71.
57.In response to Taipei's program of becoming the regional operational centre, Japanese
transnational corporations seem to have lagged behind American and European TNCs' moves
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TABLE 7.2. TOP FOUR FOREIGN INVESTORS IN CHINA (US$ bn.)
H.	 K. USA TAIWAN JAPAN
1979-84 64.9 10.2 - 11.5
1985 41.3 11.5 - 4.7
1986 14.4 5.3 - 2.1
1987 19.5 3.4 1.0 3.0
1988 34.7 3.7 4.2 2.8
1989 31.6 6.4 5.2 4.4
1990 36.8 3.6 9.9 4.6
1991 68.3 5.5 14.0 8.1
1992* 80.0 30.0 34.9 25.0
Total:
1979-92 391.5 79.6 68.3 66.2
(1988-92) (251.4) (49.2) (67.3) (44.9)
Note: * 1992 was an estimation.
Source: Industry Bureau, Ministry of Economic Affairs,
Kling Yeh Glen Hsun, (Industry Brief Information),
23: 9, (September 1993), P. 34. Information based
on Chung Kuo Dui Wuai Gin Gih Mou Yi Alien Gien,
(China Yearbook for Foreign Trade, Beijin);
C. D. Yien, L. C. Lin, and C. Chung, "Tai Shun Da
Lu Tou Tze Gi Mou Yi Tze Yien Giou", (A research
for Taiwan's businessmen China investment and
trade), Chung Hua Institution for Economic
Research, (June 1992).
There may be various reasons for Japanese business being
drawn into China. Firms may go to China for "defensive"
reasons in order to preempt their competitors and preserve
their market share. 58 Being jealous of, perhaps even afraid of,
overseas Chinese businessmen benefiting too much from China's
recent reforms," Japanese firms have clearly showed their
concern by the increase in their recent Chinese investment,
albeit it is not yet clear how far Japanese investment has got
there. Sony, the best known Japanese electronics giant, has chosen Taiwan to be the base
of its regional operation centre for manufacturing. Refer to Chapter five for details.
58. Denis F. Simon, "China in the World economic system", Proceedings of the Academy of
Political Science, 38: 2, (1991), p. 24; Reinhard Drifte argues that Japan is being forced
into increasing investment in China for "competitive" reasons, as its neighbouring ANICs
have invested in China to take advantage of China's low production factors. See his
Japan's Foreign Policy, p. 99.
59. "Hua Ren Yu Hua Chiao Chi Yeh Shien Chi Da Lu Toa Tze Rer", (Chinese and overseas Chinese
enterprises launch China fever of investment), Central Daily News, International Edition,
(4 May, 1993).
344
something to do with these "defensive" reasons (compared with
other major investors in Table 7.2). However, it is not so
difficult to imagine that for larger sized firms, in
particular, expanding market share always implies victory over
competitors. While industries in Hong Kong, Taiwan, South
Korea, and ASEAN countries, as well as the United States and
Europe, have been setting up business in China regardless of
the risk, increasing competition and the need to cut costs
have pushed Japanese industries to follow suit to avoid being
left behind. Due to the persistent economic slowdown in the
European and American markets in the late 1980s and the early
1990s, and, by contrast, the strong economic growth
performance in the CEA, business attention has largely shifted
to East Asia. This directly resulted in mounting pressure on
the part of the Japanese for access to the CEA.
Although the Japanese have contributed to almost all
parts of East Asian economic development, in terms of
transferring industrial experience and technology the Japanese
have still kept out their partners from the most critical
advances and high technology industries, with which the
developing countries of the region have as yet to be
satisfied." In many cases, firms, which are linked with
Japanese companies by cooperation arrangements or any other
business protocols, have been complaining about their
parsimonious technology transfers for years. Even the
relatively advanced ANICs have made such complaints against
the Japanese, let alone the rest of less developed East Asian
countries. For example, the Samsung group, one of the largest
South Korean conglomerates, the most formidable non-Japanese
Asian company, is still highly dependent upon US and Japanese
60
. Edward J. Lincoln, "Japan's Role in Asia-Pacific Cooperation: Dimensions, Prospects, and
Problems", Journal of Northeast Asian Studies, (Winter 1989), P. 10.
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partners for vital equipment. The Japanese above all have
shied away from sharing industrial secrets. 61 The original
purpose behind the Japanese transferring their technology was
not to stimulate greater technological independence in their
local partners, but to promote Japanese trade and to framework
the vertical division of labour in favour of Japanese
companies. 62 Although it is not surprising that the Japanese
put their business interests first, nevertheless, it is
paradoxically, to a large extent, outstanding Japanese
investment flows which have accelerated regional development
and technological levels. As far as developing technology in
the CEA is concerned, Taiwan's excellence in the manufacture
of commercial appliances and China's strength in fundamental
research could augur well for future industrial cooperation.
It also implies that through an industrial division of labour
based on technological cooperation, the CEA as a whole,
instead of being dependent upon Japan or anywhere else, could
develop its own technology base to support its further
economic development.
For example, Inventa Electronics Co. Ltd., one of
Taiwan's leading electronics companies, has taken the lead in
taking advantage of China's well-trained R & D personnel as an
advocate for its business strategy. By the end of 1992, the
company had recruited 250 staff for its laboratory from
universities around its Shanghai subsidiary. Thereby, it has
spread its framework for its industrial division of labour
across East Asia: lower technology and larger quantity
production in Malaysia; R & D in China; and headquarters in
61.
"Samsung: Korea' hope for high tech", Business Week, (27 January, 1992).
62.Edwin A. Winckler, and Susan Greenhalgh, (eds.), Contending Approaches to the Political
Economy of Taiwan, (New York: M. E. Sharpe, Inc., 1988), pp. 213-215.
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Taiwan." Another example shows that Tsang Kuen Enterprise Co.,
a successful electrical company, has organised its division of
labour, according to industrial ability, through its
subsidiaries. In terms of production, China is to be the main
supplier of components, and Mexico and the Czech Republic are
to be the location of its assembly plants. In respect of R &
D, Taiwan is to be the location of applied research and China
the location of its fundamental research." In the short run,
these joint efforts of Chinese and Taiwanese business will not
easily rival the Japanese in terms of technology. In the
longer term, economic integration in the CEA will not only
strengthen industrial output, but also accelerate
technological development. In this respect, the CEA appears to
be gaining potential as a rival to Japan's economic domination
in the region. However, that will only be achieved after the
CEA is working fully and successfully.
7.2.2. Long Lasting Anxiety Comes True: A Chinese Economic
Threat To ASEAN
From the Southeast Asian countries' point of view,
Chinese economic integration combining the economies of China,
Taiwan and Hong Kong, is likely to reopen a historic ethnic
wound of anti-Chinese sentiment in the region, which was on
the way to being healed. It may also stir up new competition
in terms of economic development. In response to the trend of
worldwide regionalism, East Asian countries are forming their
own groups to promote their individual interests, whether
stimulated by governments or by business itself. In Asia-
63. Y. W. Ho, "Gin Gi Chung Kuo De Gien Bin - Tai Shan", (The pioneer of Economic China
Taiwanese businessmen), Global Views, (15 December, 1992), p. 44.
64. Ibid., p. 43.
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Pacific, the Japanese "flying geese" industrial development
pattern has brought about the world's fastest growing
economies amongst Asian NICs since the 1970s, and another tier
of ANICs (mainly Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, and
Philippines) since the mid-1980s, as well as China. In all
these fast growing economies, except for South Korea, regional
economic activity seems to be dominated by Chinese
businessmen. Due to overseas Chinese families' particular
business networks that extend into every major market in
Southeast Asia, Japanese linking up with Chinese-owned
companies in the region is considered to be one of the major
factors in Japanese success there."
In Southeast Asia as a whole, the combined wealth of the
40 million overseas Chinese in the region, sources suggest,
may reach US$200 billion." These tremendous business groups
have established a powerful regional network, over time,
through capital flows, joint ventures, marriages, political
expediency, and a common culture and business ethics.°
Moreover, overseas Chinese are essentially stateless. Their
businesses are founded on shared dialect, personal
relationships, kinship, and a common origin in a clan, a
village or a county. As one study states very
straightforwardly, "the remarkable economic performance of the
Overseas Chinese in the ASEAN countries is fact and cannot be
explained away by any statistical or structural hypothesis. H68
In Indonesia, in the mid-1980s about 70-75 per cent of
the country's assets belonged to the ethnic Chinese. The
Indonesian Chinese, about 4 per cent of the population,
65.Ford S. Worthy, "Keys to Japanese success in Asia", Fortune, 124: 8, (7 October, 1991).
66.Henny Sender, "Inside the Overseas Chinese networks", Institutional Investors, 25: 10,
(September 1991), p. 38.
67.Ibid., p. 41.
68.Victor Simpao Limlingan, The Overseas Chinese in ASEAN: Business Strategies and Management
Practices, (Manila: Vita Development Co, 1986), P
. 
158.
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controlled 17 of the 25 biggest business groups in the
country. The Thai Chinese, according to a survey in the mid-
1970s, 8-10 per cent of the population, owned 90 per cent of
the commercial and manufacturing assets, and half the capital
of the banks. Only about 1 per cent of the population of the
Philippines is Chinese, but their companies account for two-
thirds of the sales of the 67 biggest commercial companies.
Sales of the smaller companies are even more dominated by the
Chinese." The Chinese, the second biggest ethnic group,
account for a third of the population in Malaysia, but have a
much larger share of Malaysian economic power and virtually
dominate its business."
TABLE 7.3 THE ETHNIC CHINESE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA (in million)
population* Chinese** in %***
Indonesia 181.4 7.2 3.9
Thailand 57.5 5.8 10.0
Malaysia 18.3 5.2 28.4
Singapore 2.8 2.0 71.4
Burma 42.1 1.5 3.5
Vietnam 67.6 0.8 1.1
Philippines 62.3 0.8 1.2
Source: * Asia 1992 Yearbook, Far Eastern Economic
Review, (December 1991).
** The Economist Yearbook 1993 Edition, p. 153.
Information based on Overseas Chinese Economy
Yearbook, R. 0. C.
*** own calculation.
Although formal racial discrimination has disappeared in
much of Southeast Asia, except in Malaysia, the recent
development of "China fever" seems to have provoked anti-
Chinese sentiment. Singapore, for example, has responded to
"China fever" in a positive way by "making China its top
69. Information above quoted from The Economist Year Book 1993 Edition.
70. "That sucking sound is China slurping up money", Business Week, (30 August, 1993), P. 19.
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72.
73.
overseas investment priority". 71
 Furthermore, the Singapore
government has actively participated in the process of forming
the CEA, and, to a larger extent, to Chinese unification. In
terms of security and long term economic development, it is in
its vital interest that Singapore, a city-state, continuously
pursues its internationalisation. This includes taking
positive account of blood of relationships with China and
Taiwan in particular. Indeed, Singapore, always regarded by
the regional Chinese community as a "Chinese place", is in an
unquestioned position to be a middleman in whom both Taipei
and Beijing unsuspectingly trust. 72 During the first ever
direct talks between quasi-official representatives of Beijing
and Taipei, the Strait Exchange Foundation (SEF) and the
Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits (ARATS),
held in Singapore in April 1993, it was said that Singapore,
as "an objective third party" for both of the players, had
advocated the talks between China and Taiwan from the first
emergence of their possibility.73
As a result, as Singapore's policy steers its attention
away from already existing cooperation with Malaysia and
Indonesia in its "Growth Triangle" with China, its ASEAN
partners have already cast some doubt on the intention of
. Michael Selwyn, "SE Asian Chinese head for home", Asian Business, 29: 4, (April 1993), p.
25; In 1993 about half Singapore's overseas investment projects in China received help
from Singapore's Economic Development Board. See "Giant leaps", The Economist, (2 April,
1994), pp. 64-65.
K. S. Liao, "Singapore De Da Lu Tzen Tse Gih Ch'i Tsai Lian An Kwan Shi Be Thu Yun",
(Singapore's Mainland policy and its role playing on the relations between two sides of
the Strait), Central Daily News, International Edition, (23 April, 1993).
Singapore's role, played in the first quasi-official meeting of China and Taiwan, was
significant. According to information revealed, Singapore's former Prime Minister, Lee
Kuan Yew, played a key role in helping Taipei and Beijing to arrange the meeting in
Singapore. In February 1992, Lee visited his Taipei counterpart, the premier Rau Pei-
Tsung, forwarding a message from China's President Yang Sun-Kuen for a dialogue between
Beijing and Taipei. See Central Daily News, International Edition, (19 April, 1993); also
Cora L. S. Wang, With a Clear Conscience, (Taipei: Commonwealth Publishing Co., 1994), pp.
262-264.
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Chinese investment. 74 The leader of Malaysia's opposition party
"Semangat - 46", Tengku Razaleigh Hamzah, has bluntly
criticised Malay Chinese for investing too heavily in China.
He also contended that with the economic integration of China,
Taiwan and Hong Kong, the appearance of the CEA is threatening
the regional countries' security. 75 The anxiety inside these
governments over China's absorption of foreign investment has
increased, although there is little sign yet that there is
going to be a new wave of anti-Chinese sentiment.
Nevertheless, following some major deals in China involving
overseas Chinese from Southeast Asia in 1992 and 1993 (Table
7.4), signs of a backlash around the regional governments has
emerged. Indonesia's State Minister for Investment Promotion,
Sanyoto Sastrowardoyo, has accused ethnic Chinese businessmen
of investing too much in China. 78
 Some regional media sources
even warned that anti-Chinese sentiment would return, if
ethnic Chinese conglomerates do not reinvest in Malaysia and
Indonesia eventually, using their earnings from investment in
China. 77 In April 1994, a workers' demonstration over a wage
dispute ended up as an anti-Chinese outbreak in Medan in
Indonesia. It is said that the event can be partly attributed
to criticism about recent ethnic Chinese investment in China.78
Moreover, in terms of economic development, China and
most ASEAN countries, except for Singapore and Brunei, are
nearly at the same level of economic development. With regard
74. See C. H. Wu, "Singapore Da Lu Rur Yin Chia Ling Kuo Yie Lui", (Singapore's "China fever"
causes doubt from neighbouring countries), Central Daily News, International Edition, (24
May, 1993).
75. T. M. . Hsui, "Mien Duei Chu Kuo Ren Ging Gih Tong Her, Ker Kuo Ging Yu Giou Gia", (Facing
Chinese Economic Integration, Countries are astonished and worried about it), Central
Daily News, International Edition, (1 June, 1993).
76. "That sucking sound is China slurping up money", p. 19.
77. Based on Hong Kong Economic Journal's report on 17 August, 1993, see "That sucking sound
is China slurping up money", p. 19. Earlier in a special report on China, the same warning
had been expressed. See "The spark plug of Asia's future", Business Week, (17 May, 1993),
p. 30.
78. See Central Daily News, International Edition, (19 April, 1994).
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TABLE 7.4. RECENT INVESTMENT BY OVERSEAS CHINESE FROM
SOUTHEAST ASIA IN CHINA
country	 company(tycoon) 	 investment(US$ mil.)
Thailand	 Charoen Pokphan	 3,000
Bankok Land
	
1,400
Soon Hua Seng
	
1,000
Singapore	 Jia Tong Group
	 500
Vikay Group
(Owned by Indonesian
Herman Tanlhaha)
	 260
Hong LWY Holdings
(Peter Lim, Tony Wong,
Steven Lam, and Chris Yong)	 210
Indonesia
	
China Strategic Investment
(Oel Hong Leong)	 260
Lippo Ltd(Mochtar Riady) 	 130
Lippo Ltd	 40
Malaysia	 Kuok Group(Robert Kuok)	 300
Kuok Group	 130
Berjaya Corp(Vincent Tan)	 100
Total	 US$7,300
Source: "SE Asian Chinese head for home", Asian Business,
(April 1993), p. 26.
to their recent economic development, they have all taken
advantage of their lower costs in wages, land, and resources
to encourage the relocation of many labour-intensive
industries from Japan and the ANICs. In seeking to woo foreign
investors to further their economic development, Southeast
Asian countries have experienced strong competition from China
at the same end of the development spectrum. Since the mid-
1980s, the ANICs have joined forces with the Japanese
investing in Southeast Asia to gain access to lower cost
production factors which no longer exist in their home
countries. 79 While China's economic development has been
79
. Although there have been huge investments from Japan and the ANICs in North America for
access to these markets, more recent investment trends seem to target Southeast Asia for
their lower cost production. For investment flows see Rober L. George, "The surge in
Pacific capital flows", Asian Finance, (15 December, 1988). For the purposes Of the ANICs'
352
speeding up to fully comply with reformist policy, more and
more foreign investors have been pulling their businesses, in
labour-intensive industries in particular, out of Southeast
Asia because production factors there, over time, have no
longer been as competitive as they were when businesses were
set up a few years ago.
As one of Malaysia's single largest investors in
manufacturing sectors, Taiwanese investors, for example, have
complained that the Malaysian government is unlikely to widen
its industrial incentives, is unable to control fast
increasing labour costs, and is not reliable about the
difficulties of securing visas which are of particular
importance for Taiwanese enterprises and their expatriate
executives and imported technicians." In early 1993, the then
Vice-Economic Minister of Taiwan, P. K. Chiang, stated that
Malaysia's investment climate was getting worse due to rising
labour costs and social problems. Moreover, George C. H. Wang,
the director of Taipei's Economic and Cultural Centre in
Malaysia, a leading organ of Taiwanese business, pointed out
that changes in the economic situation, China's accelerating
economic reforms as well as those in many other countries,
such as Vietnam and Indonesia, have offered better investment
incentives and a declining interest in Malaysia. 81 Indeed, an
analysis by the Taiwanese Ministry of Economic Affairs
suggests that the recent decline of Taiwan's investment in
Southeast Asia has resulted mainly from the changed investment
investment in Southeast Asia see Kong Yam Tan, "Industrial restructuring in the East Asian
Newly Industrialising Economies and the implications for ASEAN and ASEAN-China Economic
Relations", in Siow-Yue Chia, and Bifan Cheng, (eds.) ASEAN-China Economic Relations: In
The Context of Pacific Economic Development and Co-operation, (Singapore: Institute of
World Economics and Politics, 1992).
80.Doug Tsuruoka, "No more Mr Nice Guy", Far Eastern Economic Review, (18 March, 1993), p.
46.
81. Ibid.
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situation there, caused by soaring labour costs, and the
cancellation of tax preferences.82
The same story has been repeated with Taiwanese
investment in Thailand. The Mint Shine Electrical Co., a
Christmas tree light maker, for example, came to Thailand for
its cheap labour to gain a competitive edge in 1988.
Complaining that the minimum wage has jumped nearly 50 percent
between 1989 and 1992, the company has decided to shift
production to China." Thai Sanho, a manufacturer of sports
shoes, had to close its factory in Thailand in January 1993,
because their competitive advantage from cheap production had
been lost to their competitors in China and Indonesia.
Moreover, Lynns Group, a maker of audio equipment, has
gradually drained off much of its operation in Thailand. The
group's factory in Shenzhen, China, is taking over more
production."
The immediate effect of the redirection of investment to
China is that foreign investment in Southeast Asian countries
has decreased sharply. The Japanese, the biggest foreign
investors in the region, have been lured by the Chinese
"ultimate market" with its 1.2 billion-strong consumer market,
the world's most attractive investment opportunity in the
early 1990s. 85 Since 1990, Japanese investment in China has
nearly tripled to a current annual rate of $882 million." The
trend in Japanese direct investment in Asia seems to be away
from Thailand and Indonesia, in favour of investment in China
82 •
 
Central Daily News, International Edition, (14 June, 1993).
83
. Gordan Fairclough, "Chopping the chopsticks: some labour-intensive firms flee Thailand",
Far Eastern Economic Review, (18 March, 1993), P. 48.
84.Although labour-intensive industries have escaped from Thailand, foreign investment has
increasingly tended towards higher-technology industries. See Fairclough, "Chopping the
chopsticks", p. 48.
85. Brian Caplen, "An opportunity too good to miss", Asian Business, 28: 10, (October 1992).
86.Yoko Shibata, "Japan's investment targets in Asia", Global Finance, 7: 2, (February 1993).
P. 64.
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and Vietnam. 87 It is yet to be proven to what extent these
industries' withdrawal of capital from Southeast Asia has been
encouraged from China. Nevertheless, clear evidence exists
that the Taiwanese, another of the region's biggest investors,
have also cut their investment in Malaysia, the Philippines
and Thailand sharply in the last two years, as their eagerness
to invest in China took of f. 88 (Refer to the series of Figure
in Appendix F-7.1 for details.) There is a tendency to blame
China when questions are asked about the causes of this shift.
Djisman Simandjuntak, executive director of Prasetiya Mulya, a
business school in Jakarta, says "China must be the main
factor (for its plunging foreign investment)."89
Apart from competing for foreign investment, these
countries have gradually been facing increasingly strong
competition from Chinese exports in labour-intensive
industries such as footwear, textiles, and electronics."
According to a shift-share analysis of competition amongst
ASEAN, China and the ANICs in the Japanese market, for
instance, the results suggest that ASEAN exports have suffered
the most from the recent entrance of China into the Japanese
market. 91
 In seven of the ten Standard
Classification (SITC) categories, China
advantage, compared to ASEAN, especially
and machinery plus transport equipment. It
competition has mainly stemmed from their
of economic development and their exports
industrial products.
International Trade
has a competitive
in crude materials
is notable that the
similarity in terms
of labour-intensive
87. Joy M. Tadaki, "China and Vietnam tempting for direct investment", Japan Times Weekly
International Edition, 33: 4, (25 January-31 January, 1993), p. 15.
88. Julian Baum, "Taipei's offshore empire", Far Eastern Economic Review, (18 March, 1993), p.
45
89. "That sucking sound is China slurping up money", p. 19.
90. The spark plug of Asia's future", p. 30.
91. Fred Herschede, "Competition among ASEAN, China and the East Asian NICs: A shift-share
analysis", ASEAN Economic Bulletin, 7: 3, (March 1993).
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Another two studies have also discovered that China and
ASEAN do compete directly for market shares in labour
intensive industries, such as clothing, textiles, footwear,
furniture, textile yarn, thread and toys, in the United
States, Japan, other Asia-Pacific countries and Europe. 92 The
two economies have tended to pursue economic development by
following the ANICs model of industrialisation through the
export of labour intensive products to developed countries.
Since the export markets for these products are restrained by
worldwide economic recession and protectionist pressures from
developed countries, it has been inevitable that tense
competition has arisen between the two and has cast a shadow
on their future relationship. 93 Although there is yet to emerge
an obvious regional integration framework in the Asia-Pacific
region, every subregional grouping has inevitably hinged on
each others' development, because their common characteristic
of outward-looking economic development, has, to some extent,
tied them to the larger framework of an international
industrial division of labour. Each developing grouping is
likely to be acknowledged by others because of their mutual
interests. The CEA has not been excluded from this linkage.
For the ASEAN countries, the possible economic impact of
the CEA, whether positive or negative, deserves to be analysed
further. As the CEA is a natural and "loose formation", 94 the
governments' unwillingness, as of yet, to become involved in
its formation implies that the current economic transactions,
either inter-regional or intra-regional, will not be changed.
92. R. Tyers, P. Philips, and C. Findlay, "ASEAN and China exports of labour-intensive
manufacturers: performance and prospects", ASEAN Economic Bulletin, 1: 3, (March 1987);
John Wong, "Integration of China into the Asia-Pacific region", The World Economy,
(September 1988).
93.Kong Yam Tan, "Industrial restructuring in the East Asian Newly Industrialising
Economies", pp. 190-191.
94.Charng Kao, "A 'great China Economic Sphere': reality and prospects", Issues and Studies,
28: 11, (November 1992), p. 63.
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So long as the CEA remains the concern of the private sectors,
the increasing intra-regional economic ties are likely to
accelerate Asia-Pacific regional economic cooperation to help
along regional economic development. In the long-term, a
strong Chinese economic group right next to the ASEAN would
probably outweigh any other regional grouping and become the
leader in the region. For now, the development of subregional
groupings is likely to boost the de facto "Japanese Yen Bloc"
in Asia-Pacific.
7.3. THE EMERGENCE OF REGIONALISM AND CHINESE ECONOMIC
INTEGRATION
7.3.1. The Impact of the Single European Market on the
Formation of the Chinese Economic Area
Owing to historic, geo-political linkage, and in
particular market dependence, the US' market's importance to
the CEA as well as to the other East Asian economies is
relatively more notable than the ECs'. However, since the mid-
1980s, owing to increasing protectionism in the US, a
strategic demand of the ANICs for trade diversification away
from the US markets has steadily increased their trade
relationship with the EC. 95 Above all, the "graduation" of the
ANICs from the US Generalized System of Preference (GSP) in
1989 has further reduced their dependence on the US. 96 While
95. For example, Taiwan's exports to the US market accounted for 48.8 per cent of its total
exports, its highest level, in 1984. Since then, as its efforts to diversify market
dependence, Taiwan has steadily reduced its exports to the US to 32.4 per cent in 1990,
and 28.9 per cent in 1992. On the other hand, Taiwan's trade with Europe has increased
from 10.4 per cent in 1984, the lowest point, to 17.9 per cent in 1990, and 17.2 per cent
in 1992. See Taiwan Statistical Data Book, 1993, Council for Economic Planning and
Development, R. 0. C.; Economic Progress & European Trade of the Republic of China, 1993,
Euro-Asia Trade Organisation.
96.C. H. Ewan, "The emerging pattern on trade and interdependence in the Pacific region",
Tokyo Club Papers, 4, part 2, (1991), p. 145.
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the ANICs export dependence upon the US accounted for 37.2 per
cent of total exports in 1986, and 30 per cent in 1989, their
export dependence upon the EC accounted for 10.6 per cent in
1985, and 13.9 per cent in 1989. 97 Taiwan's trade alone with
North America, including the US and Canada, accounted for 37.6
per cent of total trade in 1983, and 27.5 per cent in 1992. In
the same recorded period, Taiwan increased trade with the EC
from 11.1 percent to 17.2 per cent. 98 While Hong Kong's exports
to the EC, too, increased from 18.2 per cent of total exports
in 1985, to 22 per cent in 1987, the US share of its exports
declined from 44.4 per cent to 37.3 per cent.99
In terms of export goods, the ANICs major export items to
the EC are electronics, textiles, and shoes; more recently
joined by office machines, stereos, and electrical equipment,
whose prices the Europeans have found hard to compete with. 100
In addition, Taiwan, for example, has continuously enjoyed a
trade surplus in trade with the EC, from US$491 million in
1983 to $1.48 billion in 1992. 101 In the case of China-EC
trade, China's rapidly increasing trade surplus against the EC
was US$10 billion in 1991 and about $12.1 billion in 1993.102
Due to their continuous trade surplus against the EC and EC
industry's failing to compete, the ANICs and China have been
subjected to the EC protectionist backlash, anti-dumping
actions in particular. Altogether, anti-dumping investigations
initiated by the EC against Asian export economies comprised
97. The import figure has also suggested the same developing trend. Information based on IMF,
Direction of Trade Statistics and Taiwan's Monthly Statistics of Exports and Imports, see
Ibid., p. 140.
98. Figures for Taiwan refer to Euro-Asia Trade Organisation, Economic Progress and European
Trade of the Republic of China 1993, p. 27.
99
.Elaine Kurtenbach, "Dragons against the fortress", International Management, (October
1988), p. 62.
100
.Ibid.
101
.See Economic Progress and European Trade of the Republic of China 1993, Euro-Asia Trade
Organisation, p. 4.
102
.See the IMF figures Financial Times, (25 February, 1994), p. 8.
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half the 169 cases between 1987 and 1991. 103 In 1991, China was
hit with four such investigations and Taiwan with two, while
Hong Kong and South Korea were under another Brussels' anti-
dumping investigation in their export of floppy disks. 104 Not
satisfied with quota restrictions on Asian imports, recently,
European textile makers, one of most dynamic lobbying groups,
have tried to press the European Commission to step up anti-
dumping investigations. An expert said that anti-dumping
inquiries have always a "trade chilling effect", because even
though they do not end in a fine, European importers would
become reluctant to do business with firms subjected to the
Commission's investigation and probable fine.105
Although China's booming exports to the EC and the US may
have partly resulted from the development of the CEA, as
Taiwan and Hong Kong's producers have relocated in China,
there is not yet a clear empirical survey on how much its two
CEA partners have contributed to China's performance in
foreign trade. In economic terms, while the EC has moved
towards completing the single market and, at the same time,
stepped up its protectionist actions agianst East Asian
economies, the progress of Asia-Pacific regionalism in general
and of the CEA in particular has been accelerated, as a
result . 106 Of course, the development of the CEA has been
characterised by both its defensive (increasing collective
economic weight) and offensive (strengthening its
competitiveness) tendencies towards regionalism elsewhere. The
effects of the EC in 1992 on its trade partners in the
developing world have been shown in trade creation and
103
."If you can't beat 'em", Far Eastern Economic Review, (8 October, 1992), P. 71.
104
.1bid.
105
.Shada Islam, "Textile trouble", Far Eastern Economic Review, (3 February, 1994), p. 50.
106 This general trend has been notable in Asia-Pacific economic cooperation. See arguments in
Lawrence Krause, "Trade policy in the 1990s I: goodbye bipolarity, hello regions", The
World Today, 46: 5, (May 1990), pp. 83-84.
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diversion effects. As European countries with the Single
Market in place to strengthen competitiveness take on their
competitors, there is likely to be a further redirection of
trade away from European traditional suppliers and towards
intra-EC trade." 7 In fact, the trade diversion effect of the
EC's 1992 programme will be greatest for "low-value,
undifferentiated, highly price-elastic goods, such as
textiles, clothing, footwear, leather goods, electronic
components, metals, chemicals." Amongst all developing
countries' groups, Asian NICs and ASEAN countries including
China will be the worst losers facing the trade diversion
effect of the EC's 1992 programme.109
The general implication of the completion of the European
single market for the CEA has been the EC's protectionist
challenge and the challenge of competition. 110 The EC's
protectionism will be more discriminating in a new trade
structure in granting preferences to neighbouring economies,
such as the current members of the European Free Trade
Association (EFTA), the Mediterranean countries of Turkey,
Malta, and Cyprus, East European countries, and the
Commonwealth of Independent States in various manners. Against
this, there will be a most discriminated hierachy of
preferences against East Asian economies. As they compete with
these preferred EC economies in a wide range of products the
EC markets will turn bitter. Furthermore, the completion of
the single market will inevitably result in a more rational
competitive environment within the market itself. As a result,
less competitive European industry will generate demands for
107
.See Michael Davenport and Sheila Page, Europe: 1992 and the Developing World, (London:
Overseas Development Institute, 1991), p. 18.
108
.See Sheila Page, "Europe 1992: views of developing countries", The Economic Journal, 101,
(November 1991), p. 1559.
109 .Ibid., p. 1560.
110
.Soogil Young, "East Asia as a regional force for regionalism", P. 136.
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increasing trade barriers, such as in addition to anti-dumping
duties, local content, origin provisions, and financial
assistance to selected industries, in order to regain
competitive advantage against external competitors.
TABLE 7.5. ESTIMATIONS OF EC 1992 EFFECTS ON DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES (million ECUs)
group of countries	 trade diversion	 total effecta
ACP countries	 -477	 361
Maghreb countries	 -534	 80
South Asia and China	 -1125	 -119
Asian NICs	 -4077	 -1491
ASEAN countries 	 -464	 -18
Western Hemisphere	 -751	 246
OPEC	 -847	 1224
Asian NICs creation diversion total effect (US$ mil.)
Hong Kong 725 -735 193
Taiwan 1087 -1468 -262
South Korea 797 -1003 -75
Singapore 487 -759 -195
Note: a . The total effect is calculated together with regard to
trade creation and diversion effects.
Source: Information is based on Page, "Europe 1992: views of
developing countries", p. 1560; Michael Davenport,
"Primary benefits", Far Eastern Economic Review, (13
June, 1991), p. 69.
Apart from European industry's demand for protection from
outsiders' competition, the EC's willingness to encourage more
exports from East European economies under special
arrangements will do more harm to East Asian economies, ill
 In
addition, those export items of the ANICs that retain high
similarity to the European counterparts' are much more likely
to be subjected to protectionist practice. One economic
research on the impact of the EC 1992 on Taiwan's exports,
suggests that Taiwanese exports of textiles and clothing, for
example, have met competition from the EC countries with
regard to export similarity index: Italy with 73.96, Portugal
111 .Lawrence Krause and Soogil Young have expressed the same worry.
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65.13, France 63.80, Greece 58.23, and Spain 58.22. 112 In terms
of industrial sectors, the ANICs' and China's consumer
electronics have been subjected to the strongest protectionist
backlash in the EC (Table 7.5), not only because of strong
industrial lobbying for protection, but because of their
products' high similarity to those of the EC makers."3
In the face of this gloomy picture for Asian exporters
with regard to the European Single Market, many have suggested
the ANICs taking up some alternative policies: allying with
European firms, making approaches to EC's neighbouring
countries that have treaty gaining access to the EC,
diversifying trade to other areas, reinforcing competitiveness
by further restructuring, or expanding intra-Asia-Pacific
trade. 114 However, it seems that the likelihood of establishing
a regional economic cooperation grouping is the "ultimate
solution" for Asian economies. 115
 As far as the CEA is
concerned, it seems that Taiwan and Hong Kong's interest is
better served everywhere by integration into the CEA than
separate from it. Apart from other marketing strategies, which
Taiwan and Hong Kong's exporters may have sought for in order
to gain access to the European market, the fundamental
economic complementarity amongst the CEA economies provides
their industries with a better opportunity to compete, in
particular in labour-intensive industries. Persistent regional
112
.The ESI = 100 represents perfect similarity between analyzed economies' export structure,
which would evoke competition. See Chien-nan Wang, and Jui-ling Hsu, "The Impact of the
European Integration on Taiwan and Taiwan's Response", in 1992 Sino-European Conference on
Economic Development: Impact of the European Integration and Response of Non-EC Countries,
Chung-Hua Institute for Economic Research, Taipei, 6-7 May, 1992.
113 .See Davenport and Page, Europe: 1992 and the Developing World, p. 42.
114
.Peter J. Buckly, Hafiz Mirza, and Kate Prescott, "Europe 1992 and its impact on Pacific
futures", The Pacific Review, 4: 4, (1991), p. 373.
115
.Ibid; Soogil Young agrees with this suggestion. See his "East Asia as a regional force for
globalism"; also Kym Anderson suggests East Asia economies need to club together with
North American economies as a way of maintaining an open global trading system. See
"Europe 1992 and the Western Pacific Economies", The Economic Journal, 101, (November
1991), p. 1549.
362
industrial restructuring processes and integrating
complementary economies, therefore, will give economies in the
region a brighter prospect for international trade.
7.3.2. Cooperation or Competition: the Effect of the North
American Free Trade Area on the Chinese Economic Area
In terms of economic structure, European integration has
taken the form of "horizontal integration", which integrates
regional countries with nearly the same degree of economic
development. 116 NAFTA, by contrast, will progress on a
complementary basis through a general vertical division of
labour: on the one hand, the United States and Canada,
providing advanced technology, capital, markets; Mexico, on
the other hand, serving as a manufacturing base with low-cost
labour. It is clear that after NAFTA was legally launched in
January 1994, there is going to be a change of trade structure
in the three economies, with the US and Canadian industries
taking advantages of Mexico's cheaper labour rate, which would
help them build up competitive advantage over their
competitors elsewhere. Although the general American public,
in particular trade unions relating to jobs being relocated in
Mexico, retain doubts about the economic effect that NAFTA
will bring about, the fact that industrial division of labour
has taken place will benefit industries inside NAFTA. 117
 US
Trade Representative Carla Hills stressed that NAFTA would, on
116 .Tetsuo Naito, "North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and its influence on Asia", RIM
Pacific Business and Industries, 2, (1993), 8.
117 .The arguments around for and against the NAFTA became a public fuss in the US. All sides'
arguments have been discussed in Gary Hufbauer, and Jeffrey Schott, NAFTA: An Assessment,
(Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics, 1993). A clarified discussion
the NAFTA myth and misconception is provided by William A. Orme, Jr. "Myths versus Facts:
The whole truth about the half-truths", Foreign Affairs, 72: 5, (November/December, 1993),
pp. 2-12.
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the one hand, help the US companies compete with their
Japanese and European rivals more effectively by using
Mexico's cheaper labour through industrial collaboration, and
would, on the other hand, guard against East Asians
penetrating the US market through Mexic0.118
The main contents of the NAFTA agreement have two
noticeable features: tariffs to be abolished within 15 years
and rigid country-of-origin regulations to be introduced (see
Table 7.6). Before NAFTA comes into being, there are at
present about 70 per cent of Mexican products entering the US
market tax-free under the GSP, and the average tariff on the
US imports from Mexico is already low at 3.4 per cent, (Canada
2.4 per cent for the Mexican products). 119
 Therefore, while
tariffs will be abolished within NAFTA and be kept at the
current rates for outsiders, it will not pose an immediate
threat to East Asian exporters. However, NAFTA's regulations
of country-of-origin highlight the group's protectionist
propensity, which is likely to hit Mexico's East Asian
investors hardest, particularly in the sectors of textiles,
motor vehicles, and electronics and electric products. For
example, clothing made in Mexico would have to use yarn or
fibre made in North America rather than imported from East
Asia.
Similarly, a range of consumer and industrial-electronic
products ought to be equipped with printed circuit assemblies
made in NAFTA. 120 For most Asian firms, the tight regulations
of NAFTA will accelerate their efforts for internationalising
production and will increase their foreign investment in
118. "New kid on the bloc", Far Eastern Economic Review, (27 August, 1992), pp. 50-51.
119 .Fi gure was based on International Trade Commission, see Han Soo Kim, and Ann Weston, "A
North American Free Trade Agreement and East Asian developing Countries", ASEAN Economic
Bulletin, 9: 3, (March 1993), p. 289.
120 .Susumu Awanohara, "Not-so-fine print: NAFTA's details may exclude Asian traders", Far
Eastern Economic Review, (24 September, 1992), p. 106.
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TABLE 7.6. THE MAIN CONTENTS OF NAFTA AGREEMENT
Framework Tariffs to be abolished within 15 years.
Strict country-of-origin regulations to be
introduced
Tariff	 Every 5 years on item-by-item basis. In first
5 years, 90% of Mexico's exports to the US and
60% of US exports to Mexico to be covered.
Motor	 Tariffs on auto parts to be abolished in 5
Vehicles	 years. Local content ratio to be set at 50% in
first 4 years and at 62.5% beginning in the
9th year.
Electronic Use of certain parts produced in North America
& Its	 to be required for selected products such as
Products	 computers (mother boards) and TVs (picture
tubes).
Textiles	 Import duties to be abolished within 10 years.
Country-of-origin regulations to be tightened
(use of yarn made in North America to be
required).
Maquil-	 Tariff exemption system to be abolished by
adora	 2001.
Energy	 Mexico's oil industry to be partially opened
to foreign investment (oil field ownership
prohibited).
Finance	 Mexico's financial markets to be completely
liberalised beginning in 2000. Companies in
NAFTA area to be allowed to establish wholly
owned local subsidiaries within the area.
Others	 Agricultural produce, land transportation,
telecommunications, investment, regulations,
environmental protection, etc.
Source: Excerpted from Tetsuo Naito, "North Amrican Free
Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and its Influence on
Asia", p. 9.
Mexico in order to benefit from access to the integrated
market. Strict rules about country-of-origin will accelerate
further integration of related industries within NAFTA at the
expense of outsiders. A complementarity within the textile
industry, for instance, between the American upstream makers
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and the Mexican downstream makers will step up their
collaboration and strengthening competitiveness against East
Asian products. As a result, they will together discourage
imports from outsiders, which would bring about the trade
diversion effect for their trade partners. The American
Textile Manufacturers' Institute went even further, appealing
for 100 per cent North American content in imported
textiles, 121
The general picture of NAFTA drawn by the Agreement has
worried exporters from the ANICs and ASEAN countries, because
their similarity to Mexico in the stage of industrial
development would lead to fierce competition. 122 One study
concludes that East Asian countries, the ANICs in particular,
would be larger losers from the trade diversion effect than
Latin American countries both in absolute and relative term,
as a result of their export, high similarity to those of
Mexico.m Indeed, World Bank economist Alexander Yeats says
that Asian manufacturers of labour-intensive products such as
textiles, toys, and footwear will suffer a trade diversion of
up to US$400 million a year. 124 Direct foreign investment
heading towards a region aims partly to take advantage of
regional integration, namely free trade and market scale, and
partly to circumvent the possible trade barriers
discriminating against outsiders. Therefore, there are reasons
to believe that the formation of NAFTA will lure those inflows
of foreign investment to Mexico, in particular those East and
121. "America's back door", Far Eastern Economic Review, (11 July, 1991), p. 44.
122 .Rccording to OECD reports, Mexico, along with the Asian four NICs, Brazil, Greece,
Portugal, Spain, and Yugoslavia, was also classified as a NIC. See The Impact of the Newly
Industrialising Countries: on Production and Trade in Manufactures, Report by the
Secretary-General, (Paris: OECD, 1979); also The Newly Industrialising Countries:
Challenge and Opportunity for OECD Industries, (Paris: OECD, 1988).
l23 See Kim, and Weston, "A North American Free Trade Agreement and East Asian developing
Countries", p. 295.
124 . "New Kid on the bloc", p. 51.
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Southeast Asian export-oriented investments targeting the US
market, including those of companies originally US-investing
in regional operations.
As far as the CEA is concerned, Taiwan's export
dependence on the North American market has long been
substantial. In 1990, Taiwan exported US$25 billion to North
America, which accounted for 38.7 per cent of its total
exports. At the same time, while Hong Kong exported $21
billion to North America which accounted for 26.3 per cent of
its total, China's dependence on North America was the least
with $8 billion, about 11.6 per cent of its total exports.
It has become likely that Taiwanese and many foreign investors
in the CEA targeting the US export market would be distracted
in their industrial operation from the CEA by Mexico's
privileges in NAFTA. According to the China Export-import Bank
of the ROC, which offers loans and guarantees services for
exporters, compared with the previous year the volume of
Taiwanese enterprises' export insurance for investment in
ASEAN countries and Vietnam doubled in the first four months
of 1994. It increased six times for investment in Mexico in
the same period. 126 Consequently, the investors from the CEA
who would be forced to comply with NAFTA's strict local
content regulations will have to produce many more of their
components in North America. Whatever economic advantage or
disadvantage this development will generate to the CEA
economies eventually, the effect of NAFTA has stimulated
industrial adjustment to reinforce competitiveness within the
CEA, by bringing about increasing industrial integration.
Apart from the economic effect to be brought about by
NAFTA, the potential expansion of NAFTA has more striking
125 .Information based on IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics, 1991.
126 
.Central Daily News, International Edition, (31 May, 1994).
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effects on the emergence of economic groupings in the Asia-
Pacific region. "Enterprise Initiative for the Americas", a
notion originally proposed by the former US President Bush in
1990 has developed into the lively concept of the "Western
Hemispheric Free Trade Zone" which has won support from most
Latin American governments.'" The potentially protectionist
NAFTA expanding to a western hemisphere trading bloc linking
all parts of Latin America would pose even greater
psychological threat to the system of open regionalism and
free trade which the Asian-Pacific economies have long
asserted. Already Latin America has been evolving into a
cluster of free trade zones, customs unions, and various
bilateral and trilateral free trade arrangements, such as
Mexico-Chile-Venezuela Free Trade Agreement of April 1991,
Mexico and five Central American countries free trade
agreement of August 1992, the custom union of the Andes Common
Market signed in September 1992, the South American Common
Market signed in March 1991, and the Central American Economic
Union in 1993. 128 Applauding the US Congress for ratifying the
NAFTA agreement, Alejandro Foxly, the Chilean Finance
Minister, said that Chile would be the next on the US free
trade agenda. US officials also pointed out that Argentina and
Venezuela are most likely to follow suit.129
Accordingly, there appear to be two implications of the
NAFTA expansion for economic development and regional
127 .The new US trade policy towards its neighbours in Latin America has been regarded as less
confrontational. Stephen Fidler, "Where trade winds blow", Financial Times, (19 Novemebr,
1993), p. 25.
129 .For the development of American regionalism see Andrew Burrell, "Latin America in the New
World Order: a regional bloc of the Americas?", International Affairs, 68: 1, (January
1992), pp. 121-139. For all trade arrangements in Latin America see Susumu Awanohara,
"Liberal infection: Asia concerned by pacts in the Americas", Far Eastern Economic Review,
(10 September, 1992), pp. 73-74; Naito, "North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and
its influence on Asia", pp. 11-12; Financial Times, (19 Novemebr, 1993), p. 25; also more
recently Barbara Rudolph, "Free Trade fever", Times, (3 October, 1994), pp. 50-51.
129 .Stephen Fidler, "Where trade winds blow", p. 25.
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integration in the Asia-Pacific region. Firstly, in response,
the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) has stepped up
efforts to become the hub linking Asian economies and NAFTA.
The Asia-Pacific export-led economies are more eager than ever
before to seek for regional integration to assure their
interests in open regionalism. By means of APEC tying up with
NAFTA, the aspirations for pan-Pacific integration could serve
regional economies' persistent goals for economic growth by
securing free trade. Secondly, the emergence of subregional
groupings represents the other level of regional integration
by way of industrial restructuring. The increasing constraints
imposed by NAFTA on the export-led economies in Asia-Pacific
provide them with an impetus to carry out industrial
restructuring and to collaborate industrially both at national
and international levels, which would intensify prospects for
regional integration. The emergence of the CEA has rightly
reflected this development, as industrialists in the region
have been pursuing the strength of their competitive advantage
by international division of labour.
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CONCLUSION: REGIONAL ECONOMIC INTEGRATION IN
A WORLD OF INCREASING COMPETITION
Traditional theories of regional integration, derived
from academic efforts to understand the establishment of the
EC, do not cope well with actual developments, because of
their neglect of external factors. This has handicapped their
extension to practical application. While nowadays many of the
problems of the world remain concerned with national
development, social welfare and human well-being, individual
economies have shown their enormous weakness in tackling those
problems on their own. The emergence of a globally
interdependent economic system has changed international
regimes and has increasingly blurred national borders and the
boundary of market and state.' In particular, in terms of
economic and trade policy, national economies have become more
vulnerable than ever before to external challenges. They
therefore need wider frameworks other than national ones to
cooperate with each other so that their interests may be
assured and their problems may be solved collectively with
more strength. The need for cooperation has provided a
favourable impetus for the emergence of regional integration,
or of "new regionalism" in a world of increasing competition.2
Therefore, in the context of clustering regional groupings, we
are bound to consider not only the internal processes which
1
. Changes in international regimes is referred to in the discussion in Robert 0. Keohane and
Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence, 2nd edition, (Glenview, Illinois: Scott,
Foresman and Company, 1989): Charles W. Kegley, Jr. and Eugene R. Wittkopf, World
Politics: Trend and Transformation, 3rd edition, (London: Macmillan, 1989), p. 180.
2 •
 Norman Palmer argues that this emergence of regional blocs in an era of interdependence
marks a new regionalism different from the old regionalism that appeared in the 19508 in
Europe. See Palmer, The New Regionalism in Asia and the Pacific, (Lexington,
Massachusetts: D. H. Heath and Company, 1991).
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influence integrating economies but also the external effects
of economic interdependence, such as international competition
and trade disputes. These are what Keohane and Nye have argued
to be the focal point of interdependence. 3 Extending the notion
of interdependence from states to regions, they argue that
external factors should be taken into account in the process
of regional integration.
8.1. EXTERNAL INCENTIVES, INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT AND REGIONAL
ECONOMIC INTEGRATION
Throughout this thesis, the "external incentives-
industrial development" approach has stressed that regardless
of the political scenario, the pursuit of regional economic
integration will proceed as long as there is a strong demand
for industrial restructuring by a group of economies in a
region. In the 1970s, while the process of European
integration was grounded by a combination of global recession,
two oil crises, and an intergovernmentalist approach to
European cooperation, the EC's economy as a whole suffered
from poor economic performance and the disadvantages of an
"uncommon market". Increasing international competition in
productivity, development of technology, and market share,
further weakened individual European industries in both
European and world markets. Industrialists and politicians
came to realise that their future economic strength would be
at risk, unless they could pool their resources to complete
the Internal Market. As a result, exogenous industrial
restructuring	 regenerated	 the	 momentum	 for	 European
integration. One politician states:
3
. See Keohane and Nye, Power and Interdependence, pp. 6-11.
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"[B]y the 80s, under the stimulus of competition from
abroad, especially from Japan, and of the progressive
return of European Governments to the principles of free
markets, the process of integration shifted into high
gear. "4
When European industry sought competitive industrial
strength by way of an expansion of industrial collaboration
and proposed a single European market programme, its effect
was to transform the previously sluggish pace of integration.
Not only has European industry projected its European vision
over economic development and integration, but also foreign
investors, e.g. Japan, the USA and the ANICs, who have been
looking on Europe as a single market for a long time, have
assimilated a European business vision based on regional
identities. Furthermore, industrial collaboration in the EC
not only regenerated the momentum for European integration but
also inspired a new type of regionalizing industrial
competitiveness on which regional groupings elsewhere have
hinged. Parallel to industrial development, the resumption of
European political and economic integration has also provided
a new framework for the study of regional integration through
an analysis of industrial development in response to
competition from abroad. Although successful negotiations
between national governments contributed to legalising
initiatives for European integration, European industrial
demand for the completion of the Internal Market was more
important for bringing forward political consensus on the need
for further integration. Lord Young, the British former
4
. Brian Mulroney, Trade Outlook: Globalization or Regionalization, Singapore Lecture,
(Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1990), p. 7.
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Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, recalled in 1988
just that:
"[I]n the early 1980s no meeting of Heads of Government
was completed, it seemed, without a call to action. But
for a long time we did not get much beyond the rhetoric.
Lord Cockfield's White Paper, completing the Internal
Market, submitted to the Milan European Council in June
1985 was a major landmark, and the political impetus has
accelerated since then."5
Against this background of a lack of political impetus between
European governments for action, the Completion of the
Internal Market Programme generated incentives for further
economic and political integration. The relaunch of
integration was demanded rather more for strengthening
industrial development than for reforming the EC institutions.
This "external incentives-industrial development"
perspective of regional integration has provided, if not
invented, a more accurate tool for understanding the emergence
of subregional groupings in the Asia-Pacific region. The
development of regional groupings in Asia-Pacific has shown
that though different from European forms and definitions of
integration, especially without any existing supranational
political frameworks, the process of regional economic
cooperation is being facilitated by the demands for industrial
development and economic growth in the face of industrial
competition. It is far too early to establish a common
political framework to regulate cooperation because there is a
certain historical insufficiency of experience of cooperation
in the region, and a lack of both a common goal for economic
5
. Lord Young, "Creating a Single European Market I: a British view", The World Today, (March
1988), P. 38.
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interactions, and political commitment to regional integration
which as yet hardly exist amongst Asia-Pacific economies. It
seems to be more accurate at this stage to use the term
"economic cooperation" rather than "economic integration" in
the Asia-Pacific region, as many economic interactions in the
region are undertaken by means of cooperation at state-level
or industrial sector-level rather than by integration of
transnational institutions. Economic cooperation of
subregional groupings in the Asia-Pacific region characterised
by the private sectors' dynamics could, therefore, offer a new
pattern of regional integration.
Michael Haas in his definition of "the Asian way" has
pointed out that informal incrementalism stresses the "utility
of noninstitutional frameworks for discussion, while
operational activities are entrusted to organisations without
elaborate constitutional specifications." Furthermore,
stressing a principle of "primacy of economics over politics",
Haas suggests that "Asian countries have gradually come to the
realisation that they must work together economically on a
truly multilateral basis ... 11 and "[A]lthough economic
competition keeps prices of primary products down in the First
World, cooperation serves the best economic interests of the
developing countries of Asia." 7 Accordingly, there is not and
will not be, at least in the foreseeable future, extensive
regional integration in Asia-Pacific leading to political
integration. This proposition has hinged on the successful
renovation of the world trade regime, but, certain notions of
economic integration will prevail further as regional industry
undertakes further cooperation ventures.
6. Michael Haas, The Asian Way to Peace: A Story of Regional Cooperation, (New York: Praeger,
1989), p. 8.
7. Ibid., p. 19.
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The emergence of the Chinese Economic Area, in
particular, has been stimulated by intense global industrial
competition, dynamic industrial momentum and economic
complementarity, in spite of political difficulties. As far as
the process of economic integration is concerned, the private
sector, driving by the vision of establishing regional
business complexes able to compete in world markets, has
played the most important part in the formation of the CEA.
This perspective takes major account of industry's role in the
process of economic integration. In actual development, as
economic complementarity has brought about the opportunity for
industrial cooperation, industrialists in the CEA have been
pressing ahead the agenda for economic integration. By
contrast, traditional academic wisdom about regional
integration has found itself incapable of explaining why the
pace and momentum of integration are now motivated by external
factors, generated by industrial development and led by the
private sector.
In terms of industrial development and industrialists'
attitudes, European integration was relaunched by the efforts
of industrialists to campaign for the single market that would
strengthen their industrial competitiveness, create more jobs,
and develop high-technology. By contrast, while the decline of
the ANICs' industrial competitiveness, in labour-intensive
industries in particular, was largely due to the shortage of
labour and rapidly rising production costs, the momentum of
Asia-Pacific subregional groupings has been based on efforts
to strengthen their competitiveness and so to maintain their
economic growth. Moreover, in the CEA, the transnational
corporations projecting their regional marketing strategy into
the "greater China" area have produced a business vision of
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regional identities, which has encouraged more interactions
collaborating in technology development, management, personnel
training and production through the TNCs' regional frameworks.
As the TNCs have helped to organise the regional division of
labour, they have served as an external impetus to regional
integration.8
In terms of the issue of employment, while one of the
major effects of the Single European Market is assumed to be
the creation of more jobs, the CEA will allow Hong Kong's and
Taiwanese manufacturers to gain convenient access to China's
affluent labour markets. In the face of increasing competition
in world markets, individual economies in the EC and CEA have
become more willing to commit themselves to various programmes
for industrial cooperation and market integration.
8.2. THE ESSENCES AND INCENTIVES OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION AND
CHINESE ECONOMIC INTEGRATION
According to traditional theories of integration, unless
a certain degree of political cooperation, or a political
framework, exists between relevant countries, integration will
not be meaningful. Industrial development has contributed much
to the revitalising of European integration, in particular to
bringing forth national support for integration initiatives.
Although the Single Market has not yet brought about the full
benefits expected (in the single market's first year the EC's
GDP decreased by 0.3 per cent and its unemployment rose to
10.5 per cent of the workforce), 9 it is unlikely that European
"Lobby for free trade and removal of barriers to trade" is one of the positive
contributions that the TNCs have had. See an assessment by Kegley, Jr. and Wittkopf, World
Politics: Trend and Transformation, pp. 160-161.9. 
"Survey: the European Union", The Economist, (22 October, 1994), p. 11.
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economies would have performed better without the Single
Market. One commentator has suggested that the EC has built "a
Europe for business" by the commitment to the Single Market
and now politicians should create "a Europe for people" .lo
While in the last decade the EC's task was to strengthen its
competitiveness, on top of the effort for industrial strength
the EC must now focus on social issues like unemployment and
balancing regional development. Over all, industrial influence
remains at the forefront in pushing ahead economic integration
and social integration.
The assumption that industrial development and the
activities of the private sector have stimulated economic
integration has provided a new and systematic approach to
account for the emergence of Chinese economic integration. The
progress of the CEA has apparently and essentially been
stimulated by flourishing business flows and the need for
industrial development to face up to fierce industrial
competition. The CEA has so far been limited to purely
functional cooperation between China, Taiwan and Hong Kong in
the face of existing political and external constraints.
However, with regard to the progress of industrial
development, China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong have already
established de facto cooperation frameworks through business
links. This de facto economic integration has appeared to be
based on an industrial division of labour rather than
political motives. This fact demonstrates that the economic
cooperation of the CEA which has been taking place has not
been based on political incentives, but on business
incentives, i.e. comparative advantage and economic
complementarity .
10
. Jay Branegan, "Reinventing Europe", Time, (19 September, 1994), pp. 32-41.
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The formation of the CEA aims at stimulating economic
growth and the economic development of related economies.
Industrial strategies of both the private and public sectors
in the CEA for the 1990s and after are driving the CEA towards
a closely tied economic framework. Given the fact that the
private sector is leading the pace of economic integration,
the CEA has been a result of appealing for more comprehensive
cooperation in industrial development between Hong Kong,
Taiwan and China. This business-driven process of economic
integration in the CEA has come to challenge the traditional
understanding of regional integration in Western Europe,
according to which economic integration heads towards
political integration and the process of economic integration
is regulated and led by political actors.
This development of economic integration in the CEA is
contrary to, particularly, European integration that has been
based on a clear political agenda accompanied by economic
frameworks in which the relationship and obligations of the EC
and its member states are stipulated. The area of least
similarity in the process of regional integration of the two
regions has been the impetus of economic and industrial
development. Although cultural homogeneity and the emergence
of regional identity may have contributed to the essentials of
regional integration in both cases, it has been the momentum
of industrial development and industrialist intentions that
have given the EC and the fledgling CEA a start.
While industrial development has boosted the momentum of
European integration on the basis of a transnational political
framework, the emergence of the CEA is entirely based on
industrial development against the context of persisting
political antagonism. As industrial development has brought
378
about a regional business identity and the impetus for
economic integration, businessmen in China, Taiwan, and Hong
Kong now want a further inter-national or trans-national
business framework in order to expand their business ambitions
and to assure their long-term interests inside and outside the
CEA. A transnational economic complex other than national
unification is more likely as the foreseeable future for the
CEA.
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APPENDIX F-2.A. INDUSTRIAL COUNTRIES: REAL USER PRICES
OF ENERGY AND ENERGY PRODUCTS, 1955-81
(1972=100)
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APPENDIX F-2.5. RELATIVE UNIT EXPORT VALUES (1980=100)
Source:
8aseci
(Jantl On IMF, Internationa l Fianancia1 Statisitcs,
2 986	 1986), Economic Survey of Europe in 1985-, uN.
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APPENDIX F-3.1. A WORLD OF ROBOTS
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Source: The Economist, (24 March, 1984), p. 68, based on
Merrill Lynch, OECD.
APPENDIX F-3.2. PAYING FOR TOMORROW'S WORLD
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Source: The Economist, (24 March, 1984), p. 68, based on
Philips and Drew, OECD, US Dept of Commerce.
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APPENDIX F-5.1. EMPLOYMENT BY INDUSTRY
IN TAIWAN : MANUFACTURING AND SERVICES
employment in %
50
45
40
35
30
1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992
Services
Manufacturing
42
35
43.7
34.5
44.9
33.9
46.3
32
46.9
30.9
47.9
30.1
--Fr— Manufacturing	 -.—I— Services
Source: Directorate General Budget, Accounting and
Statistics, R. 0. C., 1993.
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APPENDIX F-5.2. DISADVANTAGEOUS FACTORS
OF INVESTING IN TAIWAN
Policy Uncertainty
Trade Union Movement
Operation Costs
Public Order
Govt. Efficience
0	 20	 40	 60	 80	 100
multiple choice in %
Note: A survey of questionnaire answerd by 1000
enterprises in Taiwan
Source: Commonwealth, (1 March, 1992).
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60 7.7
50
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70
44.8
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SE Asia Taiwan China
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APPENDIX F-5.3. IDEAL.
 LOCATIONS FOR
TAIWAN ENTERPRISES: INVESTMENT TRENDS
Note: Information basis as in F-5.2.
Source: Commonwealth, 1 March, 1992.
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APPENDIX F-5.4. THE MOST IMPORTANT
FACTORS OF TAIWANESE INVESTING IN
CHINA MARKET
Inexpensive Cost
Market Potential
Labour Force
Improve Competition
Preemptive Market
multiple choice in %
Note: Information basis as in F-5.2.
Source: Commonwealth, (1 March, 1992).
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APPENDIX T-2.1.	 CONSUMER PRICE INDEX NUMERS
JAPAN AND THE US	 (all items 1980=100)
IN THE EC,
country
\Year 1977 1978 1979 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986
86 90 94 108 117 126 134 141 142
DM 74 81 89 112 123 132 140 146 152
73 80 88 113 127 139 149 158 162
FRG 89 91 95 106 112 116 118 121 121
GR 60 67 80 125 151 181 214 256 315
IR 69 75 85 120 141 156 169 178 185
64 72 83 118 137 157 174 190 202
87 90 94 108 118 128 136 140 140
NL 71 73 77 87 92 95 98 100 100
57 69 86 120 147 184 238 284 317
SP 62 75 87 115 131 147 164 178 194
UK 69 75 85 112 121 127 133 142 146
EC9 76 81 88
EC10 111 124 136 147
EC12 170 181
US 74 79 88 110 117 121 126 131 133
JAP 86 90 93 105 108 110 112 115 115
Source: The United Nations, Statistical Yearbook 1985/86.
APPENDIX T-2.2. THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY: THE GROWTH RATES
OF OUTPUT, EMPLOYMENT AND INVESTMENT, 1950-70
output GDP employment	 investment
Belgium 3.5 0.4 22.4
Denmark 4.0 1.1 21.0
France 5.0 0.4 23.7
Germany 6.2 1.2 27.0
Greece 6.0 0.9 23.1
Ireland 2.5 -0.7 21.9
Italy 5.4 0.4 22.1
Netherlands 5.0 1.1 26.0
Portugal 5.1 0.2 18.8
Spain 6.1 0.8 22.6
UK 2.7 0.5 17.5
Source: Derek Aldcroft, The European Economy 1914-1990,
3rd edition, (London: Routledge, 1993), p. 140.
393
APPENDIX T-2.3. GROWTH RATES OF GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT
AND EMPLOYMENT 1950-1987
1950-1973	 1973-1987
GDP Employment GDP/EM 	 GDP Employment GDP/EM
EC12 4.7 0.6 4.1 1.9 0.1 1.8
USA 3.7 1.5 2.2 2.5 1.9 0.6
Japan 9.6 1.7 4.1 3.8 0.8 3.0
Source: As T-2.2.
APPENDIX T-2.4. THE EC12 ECONOMIC PERFORMANCES 1960-1990
1973/60 1980/73 1985/80 1990/85
Real GDP 4.8 2.2 1.5 3.1
Employment 0.3 0.1 -0.4 1.2
Investment 5.6 0.3 -0.6 5.7
prices 4.6 12.4 8.8 4.1
Source: Commission of the European Communities, European
Economy, 42, (1989), p. 111.
APPENDIX	 T-2.5.
COMMUNITY,
	 USA
labour force)
UNEMPLOYMENT	 RATE:	 THE	 EUROPEAN
AND	 JAPAN	 (percentage	 of	 civilian
EC12 USA JAPAN
1964 1.9 5.2 1.2
1966 2.0 3.8 1.3
1968 2.7 3.6 1.2
1970 2.4 4.9 1.2
1964-70 2.3 4.2 1.2
1972 2.8 5.6 1.4
1974 2.8 5.6 1.4
1976 4.7 7.7 2.0
1978 5.3 6.1 2.3
1980 6.0 7.1 2.0
1971-80 4.1 6.4 1.8
1982 9.0 9.7 2.4
1984 10.7 7.5 2.7
1986 10.7 7.0 2.8
1988 9.7 5.5 2.5
1990 8.5 5.4 2.2
1981-90 9.6 7.1 2.5
Source: Commission of European Communities, European
Economy, 46, (December 1990).
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APPENDIX T-3.1. MANUFACTURING OF MAJOR INDUSTRIAL
COUNTRIES
1975 1980 1983
USA value added/na	 (in million dollars) 389058 /c 442691 /c 458479 /c
value added	 (in million dollars) 440770 769900
_	
...
Industrial production index 100 124 123
gross output (in million dollars) 1038100 1857100 ...
employment (in thousands) 17108 19210 20385
UK	 value added/na	 (in million dollars) 68638 /c 53818 /c -	 50874 /c
value added (in million dollars) 82067 183791
-..
industrial production index 100 98 92
gross output
	 (in million dollars) 204578 420814 ...
employment (in thousands) 7394 6462 5303
J	 value added/na	 (in million dollars) 150316 /c 215061 /c 228356 /c
value added	 (in million dollars) 157028 340748 383496
industrial production index 100 135 140
gross output	 (in million dollars) 435780 974895 1002810
employment (in thousands) 10565 10253 10426;
1
I	 value added/na	 (in million dollars) 55667 /0 74879 /c 874637c
value added	 (in million dollars) 51010 97231
industrial production index 100 130 120
gross output	 (in millon dollars) 122836 251426 •••	 .
employment (in thousands) 3582 3333 3124.
FRG value added/na (in million dollars) 158655 /c 187568 /c 177119 /c
value added	 (in million dollars) 144279 268948 207599
industrial production index 100 121 116
gross output (in million dollars) 291402 633333 494518
employment (in thousands) 7284 7229 6578
F	 value addea/na	 (in million dollars) 102051 /0 114733 /c 111706 /c
value added (in million dollars) 92827 170308 130193
industrial production index .	 100 113 110
gross output	 (in million dollars) 223551 430142 317767
employment (in thousands) 5325 5058 4712
Source: Industry and Development Global Report 1991/ 92, UNIDO.
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APPENDIX T-3.2. PATENTS: APPLICATIONS, GRANTS, PATENTS IN
country
FORCE
application	 for	 patents grants	 of	 patents patents in force
1 area 1975 1982 1983 1984 1975 1982 1983 1984 1975 1982 1983 1984
a 13224 3858 3066 2835 13144 3826 3031 2764 125158 81304 72332 64499
OH 5959 5801 6087 6278 2423 1530 1155 1089 16944 10625
40437 22242 21176 20200 14320 23144 25043 23666 351912 285848 264556 353683
FRG 60095 47826 47103 45209 18290 16306 20913 21758 125863 136723 137220 131638
GR 2981 3260 3211 3490 1831 2236 2183 9153 10 2 222 0.2 POO
IR 2844 3110 3094 33/2 979 1083 1020 1152 5864 8065 7856 7791
I 12080 11519 1049 1900 002 202 1,02 020
2548 130
II 554 1885 574 554 15230 12392 16955
NL 15267 5085 4500 3979 3845 6653 8361 10257 22311 28043 32403 38236
POR 1461 1826 1851 1852 3035 1213 1200 637 200 1863 3036 3955
SP 10522 10201 9850 10700 9258 9710 8806 8213 54500
UK 53400 37093 34691 32828 40689 29590 28254 18867 249671 228067 229549 222558
JAP 159821 235324 252685 282314 46728 5060 54701 61800 ... 404293 419143 439489
US 101014 109625 103703 111284 71994 57889 56862 67201 1060230 1199526 1193527 1192322
BRA 8794 7678 7202 6719 911 10074 6061 4887 ..1
H K 629 711 892 830 605 558 740 1010 OPP •
SK 2914 5924 6394 8633 442 2607 2433 2365 SS. 8346 9960 11979
HEX 4806 4095 4003 001 2583 2247 1737 • 36659 38706 40331
SIN I.	 •	 • 648 857 931 519 391 8707 9098
Source: World Intellectual Property Organisation (Geneva).
Quote : Statistical Yearbook 1985/86, UN.
APPENDIX T-3.3. INDUSTRIAL DESIGN: APPLICATIONS,
REGISTRATIONS GRANTED, REGISTRATION IN FORCE
Applications	 for	 regist, Registrations granted Registrations in force
1915 1982 1983 1984 1975 1982 1983 1984 1975	 1982 1983 1984
ON	 1001 1234 1259 1189 876 1015 1043 1040 6715 7366 7338 7403
F	 4175 4660 5013 5971 12177 13089 13813 15937 140000 174000 182000 191000
FRG	 2979
ER	 230
4247
395
P.P
365 403
56840
210
65958
298
66118
372
67680
400
4389
1109
“O
1958
SOP
2073
42,
2254
I POO 9637 10300 19 316 /I
POR	 374 571 540 658 482 233 153 421 ... •	 • •	 •
SP	 3967 2632 2477 2641 3458 2070 3033 1896 17860 PIP POP .02.
UK	 4730 6233 6792 1237 3019 4450 6878 6697 34141 35640 38310 39827
JAP	 52250 59390 57618 54683 34829. 33499 32237 34191 118619 271401 276399 282593
US	 6269 8114 8082 8139 4282 4944 4564 4938 43258 52850 54306 56169
BRA	 .„ 994 1340 1323 ,„ 787 645
S K	 6707 11902 13947 15870 1589 4751 6367 7108 12253 18370 21647 23813
HEX	 ... 521 444 630 ... 327 320 254 ... 1835 1846 1544
Source: Statistical Yearbook 1985/86, UN.
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APPENDIX T-3.4. EXPORT MARKET SHARES OF SELECTED
COUNTRIES IN HI-TECH PRODUCTS (current ECU in %)
EUR 12	 USA	 JAPAN	 EFTA	 TOTAL
I. Aerospace
1978	 44.9
	
49.5
	
0.8	 • 4.8	 100
1980	 61.3
	 35.7	 0.6	 2.4	 100
1962
	 56.5	 39.5	 1.1	 2.8	 100
1984	 53.7	 42.5	 0.9
	
2.9
	
100
1986	 49.9	 45.2	 1.1	 3.8	 100
II. Automatic data-processing equipment & machines
1978	 30.8	 57.7	 9.9	 1.6	 100
1980	 30.7	 58.0
	 9.6	 1.7
	
100
1982	 25.7	 54.2	 18.7	 1.5	 100
1984	 20.3	 43.0	 35.5	 1.2	 100
1986	 26.7	 22.0	 49.2	 2.1	 100
III. Electronic equipment
1978
	
31.8
	
42.1
	
22.7
	
3.4
	
100
1980
	
26.5
	
44.8
	
25.4
	
3.3
	
100
1982
	
23.4
	
46.4
	
27.6
	
2.6
	
100
1984
	
19.8
	
40.3
	
37.9
	
2.0
	
100
1986
	
28.6
	
24.0
	
43.9
	
3.4
	
100
IV. Telecommunications equipment
1978
	
30.4
	
11.7
	
49.2
	
8.8
	
100
1980
	
28.0
	
11.5
	
52.1
	
8.3
	
100
1982
	
22.4
	
12.6
	
57.1
	
7.8
	
100
1984
	
17.2
	
9.8
	
66.7
	
• 6.3
	
100
1986
	
19.0
	
7.6
	
66.0
	
7.3
	
100
V. Scientific instruments
1978	 29.0	 22.6	 31.2	 17.1	 100
1980	 30.0	 26.4	 29.1	 14.5	 100
1982	 28.0	 30.1	 30.3	 11.5	 100
1984	 26.8	 32.3	 31.9	 9.0	 100
1986	 29.7	 26.6	 33.9	 9.8	 100
VI. Electrical machinery
1978
	
49.6
	
12.5
	
22.5
	
15.4
	
100
1980
	
48.8
	
13.8
	
22.4
	
15.0
	
100
1982
	
46.3
	
15.8
	
23.5
	
14.4
	
100
1984
	
38.7
	
17.2
	
30.9
	
13.2
	
100
1986
	
39.5
	
14.5
	
30.6
	
15.4
	
100
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VII. Non-electrical machinery
1978	 43.8	 29.0	 19.9	 7.3	 100
1980	 43.5	 31.6	 16.6	 8.3	 100
1982	 39.8	 32.0	 19.6	 8.6	 100
1984	 .35.2	 31.0	 24.6	 9.3	 100
1986	 32.1	 31.0	 25.3	 11.6	 100
VIII. Chemicals
1978
	
59.7
	
17.3
	
11.8
	
11.2
	
100
1980
	
61.8
	
16.3
	
11.2
	
10.7
	
100
1982
	
55.8
	
21.3
	
12.3
	
10.6
	
100
1984
	
54.0
	
22.5
	
13.2
	
10.3
	
100
1986
	
60.1
	
15.1
	
13.1
	
11.7
	
100
Source: Eurostat, Statistical Analysis of Extra-EUR 12
Trade in Hi-tech Products, 1989.
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APPENDIX T-3.5. EUR12 INDIVIDUAL HI-TECH PRODUCTS BY
INDUSTRY AND MAIN PARTNER: IMPORTS
PROCCT/PRODUIT
	
1978	 1982	 1924	 1925	 Ahnual Grmth (X)
1978-82 1982-86	 1978-85
M.ECU	 X	 M.ECU	 X	 II. ECU	 X.ECU	 X
'	 INDUSTRY: AEROSPACE/INDUSTRIE: AERIEN
AIRCRAFT PISTON ENGINES ( 71311 )	 MOT.EXPLOSIOR A PISTONIAVIONS
USA 13.3	 82.7 15.1 76.6 13.5 74.3 19.7 86.0
4.9 5.1 5.0
5WECEN / SUEDE 0.1	 0.4 0 0.1 0.2 1.1 1.0 4.5 -37.5 210.4 33.3
CANADA 0.2	 1.2 0.1 0.4 1.6 8.7 0.9 4.1 -19.2 84.7 22.2
AUSTRIA / AUTRICHE 0	 0.1 0.3 1.4 0.2 1.0 0.6 2.5 1C9.3 19.4 53.1
SIN:LAP:1SE / SINGAFOUR 0	 0 0 0.1 0 0 0.1 0.5 21.8 75.2 45.5
PARTS NES OF 7144.71481 ( 71491	 )	 PROP.A REACT.TUR80 PIEC.DETACH
USA 314.8	 87.7 1043.7 02.7 1210.8 79.7 1548.0 83.1 31.9 10.4 20.6
CANADA 9.2	 2.3 54.9 4.4 51.7 3.4 52.6 2.8 56.4 -1.1 24.4
JAPAN / JAPON 0.4	 0.1 24.5 1.9 10.1 0.7 44.8 2.4 181.4 16.3 80.9
SIN9APORE / SINGAPOUR 1.0	 0.3 1.8 0.1 22.5 1.5 26.1 1.4 15.2 94.6 49.7
PHILIPPINES 0.3	 0.1 0.2 0 8.5 0.6 23.0 1.2 -8.8 219.3 70.7
HELICOPTERS	 ( 79210 ) HELICOPTERES
USA 18.3	 75.4 51.3 28.4 12.4 2.3 21.8 5.5 29.3 -19.3 2.2	 .
CRAZIL / CRESIL 0	 0 0 0 0 0 6.2 1.6 0 0 0
FATZERLAND / SUISSE 1.8	 7.2 0.7 0.4 1.7 0.3 2.8 0.7 -21.3 42.5 5.9
IRAQ / IRAK 0	 0 0 0 2.5 0.5 1.4 0.4 0 0 0
CANADA 0	 0 0 0 0 0 0.1 0 a 0 0
AiRCUT HES 2000KG OR LS ( 79220 )	 AERODYN.A MOT.2000KG ET MOINS
USA 21.5	 97.7 24.9 52.6 20.6 55.8 57.7 56.0
3.8 23.3 13.i
MALL / BRESIL 0	 0 0.6 1.2 0.6 1.6 5.1 5.0 0
71.6 0
CHILE / CHILI 0	 0 0 0 0 0 1.7 1.7 0
0 0
CANADA 0	 0 0.1 0.2 0 0 1.1 1.0
0 77.3 0
AUSTRIA / AUTRICHE 0.1	 0.5 0.3 0.7 1.1 3.1 0.2 0.2
30.0 -12.8 6.5
AIRCRFT HES OVER 15GCOK6 ( 79210 )	 AERODYN.A FUT 15000KG ET PLUS
USA 590.9	 96.1 749.8 68.2 741.0 43.4 1576.6 77.0 6.1 20.4
13.1
SINGAPORE / SINGAPOUR 0	 0 0 0 0 0 40.7 2.0 0 0
0
ROMANIA / ROUMANIE 0	 o a o- o 0 15.5 0.8 0 0
0
KUWAIT / KOWAIT 0	 0 0.4 0 10.5 0.6 7.6 0.4 0 111.9
0
NIGER 0	 0 0 0 0 0 6.8 0.3 0 0
0
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ER12 : Indwidual Hi-tech Products by Industry and Main Partner : IWORTS
EU3I2 : Produits Hi-tech Individuols par Industrio at par Partenairo Important Prim:pus 	 PPORTATIONS.
PRODUCT/PRODUIT	 1978	 1982	 1984	 1935	 Annual Growth (1)
1978-82	 1982-53	 1978-25
M.ECU	 %	 II. ECU	 %	 M.ECU	 %	 M.ECU	 %
AIRCRAFT PARTS NES ( 79293 ) PIECE DETACH.M3 722
USA	 581.3	 83.1	 901.4	 35.5 1103.4	 37.9 1502.3	 72.9	 11.6	 13.8	 12.7
CANADA	 11.4	 1.6	 19.4	 0.8	 15.9	 0.5	 23.1	 2.1	 14.1	 19.2	 16.6
SAUDI ARABIA / ARABIE SAOU	 7.2	 1.0	 17.8	 0.7	 13.7	 0.5	 2 4 .5	 1.3	 25.3	 8.3	 16.5
SWEDEN / SUEDE	 4.2	 0.6	 10.0	 0.4 ' 12.7	 0.4	 23.1	 1.2	 24.2	 23.1	 23.6
	
2.9	 0.4	 5.8	 0.3	 9.4	 0.3	 22.1	 1.2	 23.6	 34.3	 28.8
INDUSTRY:AUTOMATIC DATA PROCESSING MACHINES/ INDUSTRIE: MACHINES AUTCMATIOUES A TRAITMENT DE DONNES
ELECTRIC TYPEUITERS ( 75111 ) MACHINES A ECRIRE ELECTRIOUES
JAPAN / JAM	 .	 10.7	 14.7	 68.8	 40.6	 161.8	 54.8	 65.1	 47.6	 59.1	 -1.4	 25.3
SWITZERLAND / SUISSE	 19.7	 27.0	 21.0	 12.4	 29.3	 9.9	 25.0	 18.3	 1.7	 4.4	 3.0
SINGAPORE / S1NGAPOUR
	
2.5	 3.4	 12.2	 7.2	 10.6	 3.6	 13.2	 9.6	 49.3	 2.0	 23.4
SWEDEN / SUEDE	 8.5	 11.6	 11.4	 6.7	 20.3	 6.9	 9.5	 6.9	 7.7	 -4.5	 1.4
BRAZIL / BRESIL
	
0	 0	 2.5	 1.5	 4.2	 1.4	 8.5	 6.3	 197.2	 36.3	 101.3
ANALOG,HYBRID COMPUTERS ( 75210 ) ORDINATEUR ANALOG.HYBRIDES
USA	 •2.6	 82.5	 91.0	 77.8	 55.3	 56.9	 40.5	 52.2	 20.9	 -18.3	 -.6
JAPAN / JAPON
	
3.8	 7.4	 1.5	 1.3	 7.4	 8.9	 6.2	 9.6	 -20.4	 42.1	 6.4
SlIITZERLAND / SUISSE	 0.6	 1.2	 0.8	 0.7	 2.2	 2.6	 2.3	 4.4	 6.6	 38.1	 21.3
SWEDEN / SUEDE	 2.1	 4.1	 1.9	 1.7	 2.3	 2.7	 2.4	 3.7	 -2.2	 5.4	 1.6
TAIWAN
	
0	 0	 0	 0	 0.2	 0.3	 2.3	 3.5	 0	 205.7	 0
DIGITAL COWUTERS ( 75220 ) ORDINATEUR DIGITAL
USA
JAPAN / JAPON
KOREA REP.
TAIWAN
HONG KONG
158.5	 92.6	 472.2	 89.0	 884.0	 79.6	 811.6
0.6	 0.3	 27.1	 5.1	 131.7	 11.9	 211.9
0	 0	 0	 0	 1.4	 0.1	 123.4
0	 0	 0.3	 0.1	 4.4	 0.4	 76.3
0	 0	 1.4	 0.3	 8.9	 0.8	 67.7
	
58.0	 31.4	 14.5	 22.7
	
15.1	 160.5	 67.1	 108.7
	
8.8	 111.5	 786.2	 332.9
	
5.5	 0	 311.6	 0
	
4.8	 0	 161.8	 0
DIGITL CENTRL PROCESSORS ( 75220 ) UNITE CENTR.TRAITEM.DIGITAL
USA	 215.5	 85.5	 566.5	 79.8 1185.3	 77.5 1184.6	 58.2
JAPAN / JAPON	 15.5	 6.1	 74.3	 10.5	 127.7	 8.3	 287.8	 14.1
KOREA REP.	 0	 0	 0.1	 0	 33.6	 2.2	 122.4	 6.0
HONG KONG	 0	 0	 2.7	 0.4	 51.6	 3.4	 117.9	 5.8
TAIWAN	 0	 0	 0.5	 0.1	 11.0	 0.7	 57.3	 2.8
27.3	 20.3	 23.7
48.0	 40.3	 44.1
0	 535.6	 0
211.5	 156.3	 182.6
0	 230.2	 0
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EUR12 : Induvidual Hi-tech Products by Industry and Main Partner : IMPORTS
EURI2 : Produits Hi-tech Individuals par Industrie et par Partenairo Important Princloaux :
r
PRCDUCT/PROGUIT 1978
	 1932	 1984 1986 Annual Oronth	 (%)
1978-82	 1932-85 123-55
M.ECU	 %	 M.E:U	 %	 M.ECU
OiGITL CENTRL STCR UNITS
	 ( 75240 )	 UNITE ME•OIRE CORA/1617AL
USA 24.3	 88.4	 57.3	 82.1	 96.2 85.7	 100.1 82.0 24.2 14.7 19.4
JAPAN / JAPER 1.2	 4.2	 5.5	 7.8	 7.1 6.4	 9.4 7.7 47,6 14.1 29.5
SINGUCRE / SINGAP:UR
	
.
0	 o	 0.1	 0.1	 0 0	 2.5 2.1 o 162.6 0
TAIW1 a	 o	 0	 o	 0.8 0.7	 2.2 1.8 -15.9 532.4 133.5
VEEN / SU,DE 0.9	 3.3	 0.8	 1.1	 1.3 1.2	 1.6 1.3 -3.6 20.1 7.3'
AC? PERIPHERAL UNITS
	 ( 75250 )
	 UNITE PERIPHERIZ1 ADAPTATICH
USA 812.2
	 79.6	 2145.5
	 75.3	 3CC5.0 60.2	 27C6.2 48.2 27.5 5.9 16.2
JAPAN / JAPON 29.5	 2.2	 255.2	 3.3	 954.8 ;3.1
	 1651.4 29.4 71.5 59.5 65.4
SWEDEN / SUEDE 107.2
	 10.5	 205.3
	 7.2	 227.9 6.5	 370.4 6.6 17.7 15.8 '16.3
TAIWAN 0	 0	 7.7	 0.3	 170.4 3.4
	 274.5 4.9 273.1 144.0 201.7
SINGAPORE / SINGAPaR 0.1
	 0	 2.3	 :).1	 112.7 2.2	 154.4 2.9 126.1 190.8 156.4
OFF-LINE DATA PROC EQUIP
	 ( 75230 )
	 MCH.AUXIL.TRAITEMEAT INFORMAT.
USA
JAPAN / JAPON
SINGAPORE / SINGAPOUR
SWEDEN / SUEDE
SWITZERLAND / SUISSE
202.4	 82.4	 222.7	 85.6	 233.0
14.7	 6.0	 13.5	 5.2	 42.5
0.2	 0.1	 0.1	 0	 2.5
11.8	 4.8	 3.8	 1.5	 4.1
4.9	 2.0	 6.7	 2.6	 9.7
73.1	 183.9
13.3	 86.8
0.8	 21.9
1.3	 17.5
3.0	 14.0
50.0
23.6
5.9
4.8
3.8
2.4
-1.9
-31.3
-24.4
8.1
-4.7
59.0
357.3
46.1
20.3
-1.2
24.9
77.2
5.1
14.0
INDUSTRY: ELECTRONIC EQUIPMENT/INDUSTRIE: EQUIPEMENT ELECTRONIQUE
ELECTRO-MEDICAL EQUIMIT 	 ( 77410 )	 APP.ELECTRICITE MEDICAL
USA 69.7	 62.5	 157.0	 64.8	 176.6 59,9	 172.1 47.0 22.5 2.3 12.0
JAPAN / jAPON 11.3	 10.1	 51.3	 21.2	 71.9 24.4	 134.0 36.6 46.0 27.1 36.2
SWEDEN / SUEDE 13.1	 11.7	 12.7	 5.2	 12.1 4.1	 13.5 3.7 -.a 1.7 0.4
SWITZERLAND / SUISSE 9.0	 8.1	 10.7	 4.4	 12.1 4.1	 12.5 3.4 4.4 3.8 4.1
AUSTRIA / AUTRICHE 2.6	 2.4	 3.7	 1.5
	 6.9 2.3	 11.6 3.2 8.6 33.5 20.4
X-RAY APPARATUS,ETC 	 ( 77420 )	 APP.RAYONS X
USA 55.5	 51.1	 111.4
	 62.5
	 118.7 51.5	 84.6 35.4 19.0 -6.6 5.4
JAPAN / JAPON
	 . 8.5	 7.8	 17.2	 9.7
	 26.7 11.6	 43.6 18.2 19.3 26.1 22.6
SWEDEN / SUEDE 9.4	 8.7	 10.3	 5.8
	 21.9 9.5	 40.0 16.7 2.1 40.5 19.8
SWITZERLAND / SUISSE 12.9
	 11.8	 16.9	 9.5
	 21.6 9.4	 25.0 10.4 7.1 10.2 8.7
AUSTRIA / AUTRICHE 4.2	 3.9	 5.4	 3.1
	 7.5 3.2	 11.5 4.8 6.8 20.5 13.4
TY PICTURE TUBES 	 ( 77610 ) TUBES CATHODIDUES POUR TY
JAPAN / JAPON 132.7	 42.3	 201.1
	 58.5	 166.8 40.3	 172.4 49.8 10.9 -3.0 3.3
AUSTRIA / AUTR1CNE 17.7	 5.6	 16.2
	 4.7	 69.9 20.2	 76.1 22.0 -2.2 47.3 20.0
KOREA REP. 1.6	 0.5	 1.4
	 0.4	 ' 4.4 1.3	 27.3 7.9 -3.6 109.5 42.1
TA1NAH 6.7	 2.1	 3.8	 1.1	 8.7 2.5	 5.6 1.6 -13.3 10.4 -2.1
SINGAPORE / S1NGAPOUR 0.1
	 0	 8.1	 2.4	 3.9 I.!	 2.9 0.8 179.4 -22.0 46.8
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'	
EUR12 : Prcduits Hi-tech Individuals par Industrio at par Partcnairo lrportant Principaux : IITORTATIONS
FRONCT/PRODUIT 1978 1982	 1984 1935
Annual Groyth
1978-82	 1982-56
(%)
1978-5Z
M.ECU %	 M.ECU	 %	 M.ECU X H.ECU %
OTH ELECTRONIC TUBES,ETC ( 77620 )	 AUT.LAWE TUBE VALVE ELECTRONO
'JAPAN / JAPON 11.0 10.3	 31.5	 18.2	 77.7 28.1 111.6 35.4 30.2 37.2 33.6
USA 44.5 41.6	 83.2	 48.2	 108.2 39.2 MO 27.9 16.9 1.4 8.9
KOREA REP. 0.4 0.4	 0	 0	 3.5 1.2 17.7 5.6 -49.8 420.8 61.7
TAIWAN 0.1 0.1	 0.4	 0.2	 5.9 2.1 13.1 4.2 34.2 146.1 81.8
SWITZERLAND / SUISSE 4.0 3.7	 5.2	 3.0	 6.1 2.2 7.7 2.4 6.8 10.2 8.5
0103ES,TRANSISTORS,ETC ( 77629 ) 0100ES TRANSISTORS ET SIMILA1R
USA 143.4 39.2	 215.8	 35.8	 306.6 30.4 271.7 25.3 10.8
5.9 8.3
JAPAN / JAPON 19.2 5.2	 56,6	 9.4	 170.0 16.9 229.1 21.5 31.1 42.0
36.4
MALAYSIA 27.1 7.4	 77.9	 12.9	 86.2 6.5 60.6 5.7 30.2
-6.0 10.6
HONG KONG 17.2 '	 4.7	 24.6	 4.1	 45.3 4.5 54.9 5.1 9.4
22.2 15.6
AUSTRIA / AUTRICHE 20.9 8.5	 27.1	 4.5	 37.9 3.8 54.1 5.0 -3.2 18.8
7.2
ELECTRONIC MICROCIRCUITS ( 77640 )	 MICROSTRUCTURES ELECTRONIOUES
USA 319.6 51.5	 655.4	 42.4	 1202.9 35.4 941.4 29.7 19.7 9.5
11.5
JAPAN / JAFON 18.8 3.0	 169.6	 11.0	 643.1 17,5 559.3 17.7 73.3 34.8 52.9
MALAYSIA 17.1 2.8	 78.5	 5.1	 208.4 7.8 293.8 9,3 46.3 39.1
42.5
SINGAPORE / SINGAPOUR 53.0 0.5	 162.4	 10.5	 237.0 6.4 195.5 6.2 32.3 4.9
17.5
TAIWAN 28.0 4.5	 77.7	 5.0	 175.5 4.8 185.9 5.9 29.0 24.4 26.7
PIEZO-ELC CRYSTALS,MgTO ( 77681 ) CRISTAUX PIEZO-ELECTRANTES
JAPAN / JAPON 9.4 42.7	 16.1	 38.0	 31.5 40.4 31.4 47.6 14.5 18.2
16.3
USA 6.7 30.4	 8.7	 20.4	 15.4 19.7 8.5 13.0
6.7 -.2 3.2
MALAYSIA 0.1 0.3	 4.7	 11.1	 9.7 12.4 6.2 9.4 189.2
7.3 76.2
KOREA REP. 1.4 6.5	 3.0	 7.0	 6.7 8.6 3.5 5.4 20.4
4.7 12.3
TAIWAN 0 0	 1.1	 2.5	 3.4 4.4 3.4 5.2 264.0
34.5 121.3
ELECTRNIC COMPON PTS NES ( 77689 )	 PIECE DETACHE NOA DE 776
JAPAN / jAPON 17.7 19.6	 34.4	 24.8	 74.6 36.5 85.5 41.2 18.1 25.6 21.8
USA 34.6, 38.3	 58.9	 42.6	 63.9 31.3 55.2 27.0 14.2 -1.2 6.2
SNITZERLANO / SUISSE 3.9 4.3	 5.9	 4.2	 9.4 4.6 9.6 4.6 10.9 13.0 12.0
AUSTRIA / AUTR1CHE 6.0 6.6	 6.3	 4.6	 7.2 3.5 3.8 1.8 1.3 -11.8 -5.5
BRAZIL / BRESIL 1.0 1.2	 0.1	 0	 0.2 0.1 3.1 1.5 -51.5 169.3 14.3
ELECTRO-MAGNETS,ETC	 ( 77881)	 AIMANT ELECTRO PERMANT ETC
•
	
JAPAN / JAPON 11.9 27.8	 26.6	 36.8	 40.7 34.4 55.9 42.4 22.3 20.4 21.3
USA 15.8 37.0	 23.8	 32.9	 44.3 37.5 29.7 22.6 10.7 5.7 8.2
SHITZERLANO / SUISSE 7.4 17.3	 10.6	 14.7	 14.2 12.0 24.0 18.2 9.5 22.6 15.9
AUSTRIA / AUTRICHE 2.2 5.1	 3.1
	 4.3	 4.5 3.8 4.0 3.1 9.4 6.7
8.0
BRAZIL / BRESIL 0.2 0.4	 0	 0	 2.2 1.9 2.3 1.7 -34.7 190.0 37.8
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PROD1JCT/PRODJIT 1978	 1582	 1584	 1925
EUR12 : induvidual Hi-tech Products by Industry and Main Partner : IMPORTS
EUR12	 Produits Hi-tech Individuals par Industrie et par Partenaire Important Principaux : IFPORTATIONS
Annual Growth (X)
1978-82 1982-86 1978-85
M.ECU	 %	 M.ECU
	
IA. ECU	 M.ECU
.	 INDUSTRY: TELECCMIICATIONS EQUIPMENT/ INDUSTRIE: EQUIPEMENT TELECCWUNICATIONS
COLC(JR TV RECEIVERS	 ( 75110 )	 RECEPT.TV COULEUR
JAPAH /	 APOI
AUSTRIA / AUTRICHE
FINLAND / FINLANDE
SINGAPORE / SINGAPCUR
SWEDEN / SUEDE
125.0	 37.6	 194.8
53.1	 27.8	 153.3
29.5	 9.1	 60.6
20.9	 6.0	 1C0.5
54.7	 16.3	 57.7
20.2
23.8
9.4
15.3
8.9
206.0
93.4
84.1
120.0
98.6
30.2
13.7
12.3
17.6
14.4
233.8
139.2
121.1
109.7
79.2
27.1
16.2
14.1
12.7
9.2
11.5
13.3
18.7
49.7
1.3
4.7
-2.4
18.9
2.2
8.2
8.0
5.1
18.8
23.7
4.7
MONOCHROME TV RECEIVERS ( 76120 )	 RECEPT.11/ IOIR ET BLAIC
KOREA REP. 13.3	 9.5	 14.8 13.8 14.9 15.7 15.5 19.8 2.7
1.2 2.0
ROMANIA / ROUMANIE 0.4	 0.3	 0.2 0.2 6.3 6.6 9.3 11.9 -11.4
149.9 48.8
JAPAN / JAPON 51.1	 26.5	 16.0 15.0 11.8 12.4 8.6 11.0 -25.2
-14.3 -19.9
TAIWAN 41.1	 29.3	 39.8 37.3 27,4 28.8 8,2 10.5 -.3
-32.6 -18.3
HONG KONG 0.6	 0.4
	 7.0 6.5 4.0 4.3 7,2 9.2 87.3
0.8 37.4
MTR VEMC RADIO RECEIVERS ( 76210 )	 RECEPT.RADIO POUR AUTCMOBIL
,
JAPAN / JAPOH 69.6	 61.7	 122.3 52.9 154.7 49.9 210.5 42.6 15.1
13.2 14.1
KOREA REP. 1.6	 1.5	 22.9 9.9 42.4 13.7 91.7 19.5
93.3 41.4 65.3
BRAZIL / BRESIL 4.6	 4.1	 3.0 1.3 28.4 9.2 67.6 14.4 -9.8
117.3 40.0
MALAYSIA 0.1	 0.1	 3.7 1.6 13.7 4.4 35.3 7.5 132.0
75.3 101.7
SINGAPORE / SINGAPOUR 1.3	 1.2	 23.1 10.0 33.9 10.9 28.4 6.0 104.7
5.4 46.3
PORTABLE RADIO RECEIVERS ( 76220 )	 RECEPT.RADID PORTATIFS
JAPAN / jAPON	 .
HONG KONG
SINGAPORE / SINGAPOUR
KOREA REP.
MALAYSIA
125.2	 39.7	 158.7
69.5	 22.0	 106.3
37.4	 11.9	 88.8
24.1	 7.6	 32.3
9.6	 3.1	 30.3
29.4
19.7
16.5
6.0
5.6
160.9
97.6
85.1
60.4
54.6
27.1
16.4
14.3
10.2
9.2
218.2
130.3
99.9
98.6
97.6
26.2
15.6
12.0
11.8
11.7
6.1
11.2
24.1
7.6
33.1
8.3
5.2
3.0
32.2
34.0
7.2
8.2
13.1'
19.3
33.6
OTHER RADIO RECEIVERS	 ( 762E0 )	 RECEPT.RADIO AUTRES
JAPAN / JAPOH 282.7	 64.2	 204.7 40.3 126,8 35.6 255.0 44.1 -7.8 5.6
-1.3
TAIWAN 19.5	 4.4	 70.1 13.8 113.7 20.6 98.0 16.9 37.7
8.7 22.3
HONG KONG 41.7	 9.5	 72.5 14.3 77.8 14.1 80.6 13.9 14.8
2.7 8.6
KOREA REP. 26.0	 5.9	 56.7 11.2 61.0 11.0 31.9 5.5 21.6
-13.4 2.6
SINGAPORE / SINGAPOUR	 . 26.3	 6.0	 54.8 10.8 39.8 7.2 28.2 4.9 20.1
-15.3 0.9
ELECTRIC GRAMOPHONES,ETC ( 7631 )	 ELECTROPHDHE ETC.
JAPAN / JAPON 111.7	 83.0	 143.3 91.8 1E6.3 90.2 263.7 91.2 6.4 26.2 15.9
TAIWAN 0.3	 0.2	 0.8 0.5 3.5 2.0 12.7 3.2 24.5 100.7 58.0
.	 KOREA REP. 0.2	 0.2	 1,3 0.8 2.7 1.5 8.3 2.1 54.2 59.0 56.6
USA 7.6	 5.7	 5.5 3.5 1.7 1.0 2.4 0.3 -7.8 -11.5 -9.7
GERM CM RP / REPUBLIQUE 0.8	 0.6	 1.7 1.1 1.8 1.0 2.2 3.5 20.4 8.5 14.3
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EU312 : ProdJits Ri-tech Individuals par Industrie at car Partenaire 1r7.portan:	 : :!?3UAT13NS
PRCOUCT/PROJIT 1978 1932 1;35 Annual Grcrdh_ (%)
1375-52 1382-85 197345
11.EU %	 M.Ea1	 %	 M.Eal %
1'1 IPAGE,S110 RECRCRS.ETC ( 75231 )	 APP.ENRE6ISTR.F1EPR0D.IMA6E.50
JAPAN / jAP0N 105.4 61.5	 1110.3	 49.4	 1623.1 90.7 1489.0 76.4 73.7 7.6 26.1
AUSTRIA / AUTRICi; :z -16.7 27.1	 75.5	 3.4	 63.1 3.8 118.2 6.2 12.7 11.9 12.3
KOREA REP. 0 0	 0	 0	 1.1 0.1 92.2 4.9 12.6 60.6.5 182.1
HONG KONG 0.1 0	 0.3	 0	 1.6 0.1 71.6 3.8 101.0 204.5 147.4
USA 16.3 9.4	 18.9	 0.8	 28.2 1.6 29.8 1.6 3.8 12.0 7.8
DICTATING MACH I NES.ETC	 ( 76238 ) MON.A OICTER ET AUTRES
JAPAN / jAPON 284.2 55.8	 337.5	 63.0	 601.1 74.0 498.5 70.2 3.1 6.5 7.3
AUSTRIA / AUTRICHE 59.5 13.8	 34.0	 6.0	 39.2 4.8 45.7 6.4 -13.1 7.7 -3.2
HONG KONG 10.3 2.4	 35.6	 6.3	 41.1 5.1 39.9 5.6 35.4 2.9 18.4
TAIWAN 13.2 3.1	 15.0	 2.6	 27.4 3.4 30.9 4.4 3.2 19.9 11.2
KCREA REP. 23.1 5.3	 36.5	 6.4	 36.1 4.4 28.5 4.0 12.2 -6.0 2.7
LINE TELEPHONE,ETC ECjIP ( 76410 )	 APP.ELC.TELEPH.ETC.PAR F1L
JAPAN / JAPOR 22.0 15.8	 52.8	 23.1
	 113.6 26.6 268.9 41.2 24.5 50.2 36.8
USA 34.1 24.6	 66.7	 29.2
	 119.9 28.1 137.8 21.1 18.2 19.9 19.1
SWEOEN / SUEDE 38.9 28.0	 24.6	 10.8
	 55.0 12.9 77.8 11.9 -10.9 33.4 9.1
TAIWAN 1.2 0.9	 5.8	 2.6	 11.4 2.7 43.6 6,7 49.1 65.2 57.0
HONG KONG 0.2 0.2	 9.2	 4.0	 34.6 8.1 36.1 5.5 157.8 40.6 90.4
11IC60P11,LOUDSPKR,k2LlF8 ( 76420 )	 MICROPH.HT-PARLEUR.AITLIFICAT
JAPAN / JAPON 215.4 64.0	 317.5	 60.6
	 295.3 57.7 322.1 59.1 10.2 0.4 5.2
TAM 9.7 2.9	 49.9	 9.5	 63.1 12.3 69.0 12.7 50.7 8.4 27.8
USA 67.0 19•9	 76.8	 14.6	 68.4 13.4 59.9 11.0 3.5 -6.0 -1.4
KOREA REP. 8.3 2.5	 22.8	 4.3
	 29.1 5.7 29.5 5.4 23.7 6.6 17.1
AUSTRIA / AUTRICHE 4.2 1.3	 9.4	 1.8	 13.4 2.6 13.0 2.4 22.1 8.4 15.0
TY,RADIO TRANSM1TTRS,ETC ( 76430 )	 APP.EMETTEUR RECEPT.RADIO TV
JAPAN'/ JAPON 54.2 39.1	 87.9	 31.4	 74.6 28.3 114.8 33.5 12.9 6.9 9.8
USA 47.3 34.1	 90.0	 32.1	 91.4 34.6 104.9 30.6 17.4 3.9 10.5
FINLAND / F1NLANDE 0.5 0.3	 2.2	 0.8	 7.0 2.7 20.8 6.1 47.9 75.3 61.0
SWEDEN / SUEDE 6.8 4.9	 9.6	 3.4	 11.1 4.2 16.7 4.9 9.2 14.8 12.0
TAIWAN 3.9 2.8	 13.0	 4.6	 12.5 4.8 15.8 4.6 35.2 5.1 19.2
RADIOTELEPHOHE,ETC RCYRS ( 76481 )	 RECEPT.RA010-TELE-PHON.-TELEGR
USA 8.3 40.3	 20.8	 44.9	 24.2 35.1 17.6 29.4 25.9 -4.1 9.9
JAPAN / JAPON 4.9 23.8	 10.2	 22.1	 11.9 17.3 16.9 28.2 20.3 13.3 16.8
SWITZERLAND / SUISSE 3.1 15.1	 3.4
	 7.3
	 6.9 10.0 11.2 18.7 2.2 34.8 17.4
SWEDEN / SUEOE 1.4 -	 6.6	 3.2	 6.9	 6.5 9.4 6.5 10.8 23.9 19.1 21.5
SOUTH AFRICAN CUSTOMS UNIO 0 0.1	 0	 0.1	 0.1 0.1 1.3 2.2 12.2 130.7 60.9
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EUR12 : Pr:duits Hi-tech Individuals par Industrio at par Partonairo 17artant Principaux : IWORTATIO1S
PRODUCT/PRO:2IT 1978	 1932	 1934 1926 Annual Orcrith	 (t
1978-82 1932-C6 13-E-55
M.ECU	 %	 M.ECU	 M.ECU % M.ECU
TELEVISION CAMERAS	 ( 76482 )	 APP.PRISE-YUE Ti'
jAPAR / JAF:1 11.5	 59.0	 153.5	 87.3	 164.5 87.0 233.4 93.6 90.7 25.7 52.3
USA 5.9	 30.0	 16.3	 9.3	 14.1 7.5 10.0 2.4 28.8 -11.5 3.7
TAIWAN 0	 0	 0.1	 0.1	 1.2 0.6 1.8 0.4 93.0 95.3
34.2
SINGAPORE / SINGAPOUR 0	 0.2	 0.1	 0	 0.2 0.1 1.5 0.4 5.8 123.4 53.8
NORWAY / 8CR7E3E 0.1	 0.5	 0.3	 0.2	 0.6 0.2 1.4 0.3 35.7 44.3 32.9
RADAR APPARATUS,ETC ( 76463 )	 APP.RADAR RADIO-DETECT.SONDAGE
USA
jAPA1 / JAPC1
ErlITZERLAND / SUISH
56.5	 44.9	 177.4	 71.7	 177.5
7.4	 5.8	 22.5	 9.1	 20.9
23.7	 18.9	 11.7	 4.7	 22.0
62.7
7.4
7.3
155.9
31.2
17.8
61.9
12.4
7.1
33.1
32.3
-16.1
-3.2
8.5
11.0
:3.5
:3.8
-3.5
SWEDEN / SUE:E 6.7	 5.3	 3.3	 1.3	 3.6 1.3
6.9 2.7 -16.2 at 3.3
CANADA 1.5	 1.3	 2.4	 1.9	 3.6 1.3
5.8 2.3 11.0 24.4 17.5
PTS NES OF APPAR OF 76410 ( 76491 )	 PIECE DETACH.POUR APP.DU 76410
SVEDEN / SUEDE 57.5 46.4	 94.0	 36.7	 125.6	 31.5 154.9 30.2 13.1 13.3 13.2
USA 17.9 14.4	 46.6	 18.2	 76.1	 19.1 151.6 29.5 27.0 34.3 30.6
CANADA 4.3 3.4	 39.4	 15.0	 75.8	 19.0 67.5 13.1 73.1 15.1 2:.2
JAPAN / JAPC1 1.9 1.6	 17.2	 6.7	 23.2	 5.8 33.7 6.6 72.4 18.3 22.3
SWITZERLAND / SUISSE 12.6 10.1	 12.2	 4.7	 13.4	 3.4 20.3 4.0
-.8 13.7 5.2
PTS NES OF EQUIP OF 76420 ( 76192 )	 PIECE DETACH.POUR APP.DU 76420
JAPAN / JAM 6.1 29.8	 11.7	 34.9	 13.4	 31.5 12.1 32.2 17.8 0.7 3.9
USA 8.5 41.8	 11.3	 33.5	 12.4	 28.9 8.9 23.8 7.3 -5.8 0.5
TAIWAN 0.5 2.2	 3.1	 9.1	 7.7	 17.9 7.5 20.2 61.6 25.2 22.2'
AUSTRIA / AUTRICHE 2.9 14.3	 5.1	 15.1	 5.8	 13.6 4.8 12.9 15.0 -1.3 3.5
SVITZERLAND / SUISSE 0.4 1.9	 0.3	 1.0	 0.6	 1.4 1.1 2.8 -3.4 32.3 :3.1
TELECOM EQUIPMT PIS HES ( 76493 ) PIECE DET.P 761,762,7643.7648
.USA 85.5 36.0	 229.6	 39.8	 267.4	 39.6 273.6 36.3 28.0 4.5 15.5
JAPAN / JAPON 44.6 19.2	 130.5	 22.6	 138.1	 20.5 190.8 25.3 30.8 10.0 :9.9
SWEDEN / SUEDE 12.0 5.2	 31.1	 5.4	 39.9	 5.9 56.2 7.5 26.8 16.0 :1.3
SWITZERLAND / SUISSE 17.2 7.4	 24.1	 4.2	 33.4	 5.0 42.5 5.6 8.8 15.2 11.9
AUSTRIA / AUTRICHE 18.7 8.0	 30.7	 5.3	 34.2	 5.1 36.0 4.8 13.3 4.0 3.5
PARTS ETC OF SOUNDS EQUIP ( 76499 ) PIECE DETACH.ACCESS.POUR 763
JAPAN / JAPON 32.3 29.0	 87.7	 38.4	 259.6	 68.1 597.8 75.3 28.4 61.0 44.0
AUSTRIA / AUTRICHE 10.5 9.4	 55.1	 24.1	 37.2	 9.8 87.9 11.1 51.5 12.4 315
USA 41.9 37.6	 37.7	 16.5	 31.6
	 8.3 23.7 3.0 -2.6
-ILO
-5.9
SWITZERLAND / SUISSE 18.4 16.5	 11.4
	 5.0	 13.2	 3.5 15.9 2.1
-11.3 10.3
-1.1
TAIWAN 0.2 0.1	 1.0	 0.4	 3.3	 0.9 11.5 1.5 57.5 85.9 71.1
Source: Eurostat, Statistical Analysis of Extra-EUR 12
Trade in Hi-tech Products, 1989.
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APPENDIX T-3.6. THE MEMBERS OF THE ROUNDTABLE OF EUROPEAN
INDUSTRIALISTS IN 1987
Torvild Aakvaag
General director
Norsk Hydro, Norway
Umberto Agnelli
Deputy chairman
Fiat, Italy
Carlo de Benedetti
Chairman and CEO
Olivetti, Italy
Jean-Louis Beffa
President directeur general (PDG)
Saint-Gobain, France
Werner Breitschwerdt
Chairman
Daimler-Benz, West Germany
Sir John Clark
Chairman and CEO
Plessey, UK
Viscount Etienne Davignon
Chairman
Sibeka, Belgium
Wisse Dekker
Chairman supervisory board
Philips, Netherlands
Raul Gardini
President
Ferruzzi, Italy
Alain Gomez
PDG
Thomson, France
Pehr Gyllenhammar
Chairman and CEO
Volvo, Sweden
Patrick Hayes
Chairman
Waterford Glass, Ireland
Kari Kairamo
Managing director
Nokia, Finland
Karlheinz Kaske
President and CEO
Siemens, West Germany
Olivier Lecerf
PDG
Lafarge Coppee, France
Luis Magana
President
Furnas Electricas de Cataluna, Spain
Helmut Maucher
Managing director
Nestle, Switzerland
Hans Merkle
Chairman supervisory council
Robert Bosch, West Germany
Jerome Monod
FOG
Lyonnaise des Eaux, France
Curt Nicolin
Chairman
ASEA, Sweden
Antony Pilkington
Chairman
Pilkington Bros, UK
Stephan Schmidheiny
Chairman
Anova, Switzerland
Patrick Sheehy
Chairman
BAT Industries, UK
Luis Solana
Presidente
Compania Telefonica Nacional de
Espana, Spain
Dieter Spethmann
Chairman management board
Thyssen, West Germany
Foul Svanholm
Director
De Forenede Bryggerier, Denmark
Josef Taus
Managing partner
Constantia Industrieverwaltung, Austria
Pierre de Tillesse
Managing director
Petrofina, Belgium
Jacopo Vittorelli
Managing director
Pirelli, Italy
Source: Roy Eales, " Europe's Business Knights Regroup",
Multinational Business, 3, (Autumn 1987).
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APPENDIX T-5.1. TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND TAIWAN'S
PROGRAMME FOR A REGIONAL OPERATION CENTRE (1992-1993)
1. Formal Confirmation
TNCs	 CONTENT STYLE PARTNER I MARKET
AT&T Hi-tech/
market
SA MOEA Asia-
Pacific
GE Finance
& Tech.
60% share
SA MOEA
HT Co.
Asia-
Pacific
Carpenter Tech. Co. Patents &
tech.
MOEA &
WLEWCC
.,
Asia
Pacific
Motorola SA PEWA CEA
GM OPEL Plan
parts
SA MOEA &
Kuochan M
Asia-
Pacific
IBM SA MOEA CEA
ABB Group SA MOEA
Siemens DRAM Sub Co. Asia-
Pacific
2. Intention and In Negotiation: Strategic Alliance,
Joint Ventures, Technology Cooperation, and Subsidiary
Investment
Nippon Elect. Co Satellite
network
JV Teco EMC Pan
Pacific
Whirlpool 40% share Invest Teco EMC AP
Westinghouse EC Defence
Tech.
SA Mitac CEA, AP
Bull Computer
Gemplus
IC cards
Manu./Lab
JV
JV
TSEC/Gemp
TSEC/Bull
Asia
Asia
Pratt & Whitney Engine
Repair
Tech.
Coop.
CAL AP, China
Daewoo Group Vehicles JV Tuntex G CEA, ASEAN
Microsoft Marketing CEA
BAe RJX
Airplane
JV TAC &
RR
AP
407
Rolls Royce Group
(RR)
New Jet
Engine
JV TAC & BMW
-
Asia
Hewlett Packard Hi-tech
Marketing
Sub Co &
Wang
CEA
Federal Express Transport CEA
Philips Semi-
conductor
Sub Co AP
Daimler-Benz Groups TAC CEA
Northern Telecom. Electr.	 &
Home Appl
JV CEA
Du Pont Tech
Exchange
ITRI CEA
3. Others In Consideration
Japan's Copyer
Rank Xerox
Procure
Procure
CEA
Rank Xerox Photocopy
Machines
Manuf. CEA
Fujitsu Procure Acer
Bayer
3M
Rohoman-Haas
Note: 1. SA (Strategic Alliance), JV (Joint Venture), MOEA
(Ministry of Economic Affairs), AP (Asia
Pacific), TAC (Taiwan Aerospaces Co.), ITRI
(Industrial Technology Research Institute), Sub
(Subsidiary), CAL (China Airlines), TSEC (Taiwan
Solomon Enterprise Co.), CMC (Chinese Motor Co.).
2. Information showed here does not include those
cases signed prior to the announcement of the
regional operating centre programme.
Source: 1. Taiwan Industrial Panorama, Industrial
Development & Investment Centre, Ministry of
Economic Affairs, ROC, V. 20-21, various
numbers, October 1992-September 1993; and
2. Central Daily News, International Edition,
various reports, (January-September 1993).
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